Joint Chiefs of Staff - Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (Draft) lyrics

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS) 1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: “Operation MONGOOSE”, dated 5 March 19962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention. 2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. IT is a**umed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. 3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical buildup of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere. 4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months. 5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be a**igned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.