John Stuart Mill - The Criterion of a Good Form of Government(chap.2) lyrics

The Criterion of a Good Form of Government THE FORM of government for any given country being (within Certain definite conditions) amenable to choice, it is now to Be considered by what test the choice should be directed; what Are the distinctive characteristics of the form of government Best fitted to promote the interests of any given society Before entering into this inquiry, it may seem necessary to Decide what are the proper functions of government; for Government altogether being only a means, the eligibility of The means must depend on their adaptation to the end. But This mode of stating the problem gives less aid to its investigation than might be supposed, and does not even bring the Whole of the question into view. For, in the first place, the Proper functions of a government are not a fixed thing, but Different in different states of society; much more extensive In a backward than in an advanced state. And, secondly, the Character of a government or set of political institutions can not be sufficiently estimated while we confine our attention To the legitimate sphere of governmental functions; for Though the goodness of a government is necessarily circumscribed within that sphere, its badness unhappily is not.every kind and degree of evil of which mankind are susceptible May be inflicted on them by their government, and none of The good which social existence is capable of can be any further ther realized than as the constitution of the government is Compatible with, and allows scope for, its attainment. Not To speak of indirect effects, the direct meddling of the public Authorities has no necessary limits but those of human life And the influence of government on the well-being of society can be considered or estimated in reference to nothing Less than the whole of the interests of humanity Being thus obliged to place before ourselves, as the test of Good and bad government, so complex an object as the aggregate interests of society, we would willingly attempt some Kind of cla**ification of those interests, which, bringing them Before the mind in definite groups, might give indication of The qualities by which a form of government is fitted to promote those various interests respectively. It would be a great facility if we could say the good of society consists of such And such elements; one of these elements requires such conditions another such others; the government, then, which Unites in the greatest degree all these conditions, must be the Best. The theory of government would thus be built up from The separate theorems of the elements which compose a good State of society Unfortunately, to enumerate and cla**ify the constituents Of social well-being, so as to admit of the formation of such Theorems is no easy task. Most of those who, in the last or Present generation, have applied themselves to the philosophy of politics in any comprehensive spirit, have felt the Importance of such a cla**ification, but the attempts which Have been made toward it are as yet limited, so far as I am Aware, to a single step. The cla**ification begins and ends With a partition of the exigencies of society between the two Heads of Order and Progress (in the phraseology of French Thinkers); Permanence and Progression, in the words of Coleridge. This division is plausible and seductive, from the Apparently clean-cut opposition between its two members And the remarkable difference between the sentiments to which they appeal. But I apprehend that (however admissible for purposes of popular discourse) the distinction between n Order, or Permanence and Progress, employed to define the qualities necessary in a government, is unscientific And incorrect For, first, what are Order and Progress? Concerning Progress There is no difficulty, or none which is apparent at first sight When Progress is spoken of as one of the wants of human Society, it may be supposed to mean Improvement. That is a Tolerably distinct idea. But what is Order? Sometimes it means More, sometimes less, but hardly ever the whole of what Human society needs except improvement In its narrowest acceptation, Order means Obedience. A Government is said to preserve order if it succeeds in getting Itself obeyed. But there are different degrees of obedience And it is not every degree that is commendable. Only an Unmitigated despotism demands that the individual citizen Shall obey unconditionally every mandate of persons in authority.We must at least limit the definition to such mandates as are general, and issued in the deliberate form of laws Order, thus understood, expresses, doubtless, an indispensable attribute of government. Those who are unable to make Their ordinances obeyed, can not be said to govern. But Though a necessary condition, this is not the object of government.That it should make itself obeyed is requisite, in Order that it may accomplish some other purpose. We are Still to seek what is this other purpose, which government Ought to fulfill abstractedly from the idea of improvement And which has to be fulfilled in every society, whether stationary or progressive.In a sense somewhat more enlarged, Order means the preservation of peace by the cessation of private violence. Order Is said to exist where the people of the country have, as a General rule, ceased to prosecute their quarrels by private force And acquired the habit of referring the decision of their disputes and the redress of their injuries to the public authorties. But in this larger use of the term, as well as in the former Narrow one, Order expresses rather one of the conditions of Government, than either its purpose or the criterion of its Excellence; for the habit may be well established of submitting to the government, and referring all disputed matters to Its authority, and yet the manner in which the government deals with those disputed matters, and with the other things About which it concerns itself, may differ by the whole interval which divides the best from the worst possible If we intend to comprise in the idea of Order all that society requires from its government which is not included in The idea of Progress, we must define Order as the preservation of all kinds and amounts of good which already exist And Progress as consisting in the increase of them. This distinction does comprehend in one or the other section every Thing which a government can be required to promote. But Thus understood, it affords no basis for a philosophy of government We can not say that, in constituting a polity, certain provisions ought to be made for Order and certain othes for Progress, since the conditions of Order, in the sense Now indicated, and those of Progress, are not opposite, but The same. The agencies which tend to preserve the social good Which already exists are the very same which promote the Increase of it, and vice versâ, the sole difference being, that a Greater degree of those agencies is required for the latter purpose than for the former What, for example, are the qualities in the citizens indvidually which conduce most to keep up the amount of good Conduct, of good management, of success and prosperity Which already exist in society? Every body will agree that Those qualities are industry, integrity, justice, and prudence But are not these, of all qualities, the most conducive to improvement? and is not any growth of these virtues in the Community in itself the greatest of improvements? If so Whatever qualities in the government are promotive of industry, integrity, justice, and prudence, conduce alike to permanence and to progression, only there is needed more of Those qualities to make the society decidedly progressive than Merely to keep it permanent What, again, are the particular attributes in human beings Which seem to have a more especial reference to Progress And do not so directly suggest the ideas of Order and Presevation? They are chiefly the qualities of mental activity, enterprise, and courage. But are not all these qualities fully as Much required for preserving the good we have as for adding To it? If there is any thing certain in human affairs, it is that Valuable acquisitions are only to be retained by the continuation of the same energies which gained them. Things left to take care of themselves inevitably decay. Those whom success cess induces to relax their habits of care and thoughtfulness And their willingness to encounter disagreeables, seldom long Retain their good fortune at its height. The mental attribute Which seems exclusively dedicated to Progress, and is the Culmination of the tendencies to it, is Originality, or Invention. Yet this is no less necessary for Permanence, since, in The inevitable changes of human affairs, new inconveniences And dangers continually grow up, which must be encountered by new resources and contrivances, in order to keep Things going on even only as well as they did before. What ever qualities, therefore, in a government, tend to encourage Activity, energy, courage, originality, are requisites of Permanence as well as of Progress, only a somewhat less degree of Them will, on the average, suffice for the former purpose Than for the latter To pa** now from the mental to the outward and objective Requisites of society: it is impossible to point out any contrivance in politics, or arrangement of social affairs, which Conduces to Order only, or to Progress only; whatever tends To either promotes both. Take, for instance, the common institution of a police. Order is the object which seems most Immediately interested in the efficiency of this part of the Social organization. Yet, if it is effectual to promote Order That is, if it represses crime, and enables every one to feel his Person and property secure, can any state of things be more Conducive to Progress? The greater security of property is One of the main conditions and causes of greater prodution, which is Progress in its most familiar and vulgarest aspect The better repression of crime represses the dispositions which tend to crime, and this is Progress in a some what higher sense. The release of the individual from the Cares and anxieties of a state of imperfect protection sets his Faculties free to be employed in any new effort for improving his own state and that of others, while the same cause, by Attaching him to social existence, and making him no longer See present or prospective enemies in his fellow creatures Fosters all those feelings of kindness and fellowship towards Others, and interest in the general well-being of the community, which are such important parts of social improvement Take, again, such a familiar case as that of a good system of Taxation and finance. This would generally be cla**ed as belonging to the province of Order. Yet what can be more conducive to Progress? A financial system which promotes the One, conduces, by the very same excellences, to the other Economy, for example, equally preserves the existing stock Of national wealth, and favors the creation of more. A just Distribution of burdens, by holding up to every citizen an Example of morality and good conscience applied to diffcult adjustments, and an evidence of the value which the Highest authorities attach to them, tends in an eminent dgree to educate the moral sentiments of the community, both In respect of strength and of discrimination. Such a mode of Levying the taxes as does not impede the industry, or unnecessarily interfere with the liberty of the citizen, promotes Not the preservation only, but the increase of the national Wealth, and encourages a more active use of the individual Faculties. And vice versâ, all errors in finance and taxation Which obstruct the improvement of the people in wealth and Morals, tend also, if of sufficiently serious amount, positively To impoverish and demoralize them. It holds, in short, unversally, that when Order and Permanence are taken in their Widest sense for the stability of existing advantages, the requisites of Progress are but the requisites of Order in a greater Degree; those of Permanence merely those of Progress in a Somewhat smaller measure In support of the position that Order is intrinsically different from Progress, and that preservation of existing and aquisition of additional good are sufficiently distinct to aford the basis of a fundamental cla**ification, we shall perhaps be reminded that Progress may be at the expense of Order; that while we are acquiring, or striving to acquire Good of one kind, we may be losing ground in respect to Others; thus there may be progress in wealth, while there is Deterioration in virtue. Granting this, what it proves is, not That Progress is generically a different thing from Permanence But that wealth is a different thing from virtue. Progress is Permanence and something more; and it is no answer to this To say that Progress in one thing does not imply Permanence In every thing. No more does Progress in one thing imply Progress in every thing. Progress of any kind includes Permanence in that same kind: whenever Permanence is sacrificed to some particular kind of Progress, other Progress is Still more sacrificed to it; and if it be not worth the sacrifice,not the interest of Permanence alone has been disregarded But the general interest of Progress has been mistaken If these improperly contrasted ideas are to be used at all in The attempt to give a first commencement of scientific precision to the notion of good government, it would be more Philosophically correct to leave out of the definition the word Order, and to say that the best government is that which is Most conducive to Progress. For Progress includes Order But Order does not include Progress. Progress is a greater Degree of that of which Order is a less. Order, in any other Sense, stands only for a part of the prerequisites of good government, not for its idea and essence. Order would find a More suitable place among the conditions of Progress, since If we would increase our sum of good, nothing is more indispensable than to take due care of what we already have. If We are endeavouring after more riches, our very first rule Should be, not to squander uselessly our existing means Order, thus considered, is not an additional end to be reconciled with Progress, but a part and means of Progress itself. If A gain in one respect is purchased by a more than equivalent Loss in the same or in any other, there is not Progress. Conduciveness to Progress, thus understood, includes the whole Excellence of a government But, though metaphysically defensible, this definition of The criterion of good government is not appropriate, because Though it contains the whole of the truth, it recalls only a Part. What is suggested by the term Progress is the idea of Moving onward, whereas the meaning of it here is quite as Much the prevention of falling back. The very same social Causes—the same beliefs, feelings, institutions, and practices—are as much required to prevent society from retrograding as to produce a further advance. Were there no improvement to be hoped for, life would not be the less an Unceasing struggle against causes of deterioration, as it even Now is. Politics, as conceived by the ancients, consisted wholly In this. The natural tendency of men and their works was to Degenerate, which tendency, however, by good institutions Virtuously administered, it might be possible for an indefnite length of time to counteract. Though we no longer hold This opinion; though most men in the present age profess The contrary creed, believing that the tendency of things, on The whole, is toward improvement, we ought not to forgetthat there is an incessant and ever-flowing current of human Affairs toward the worse, consisting of all the follies, all the Vices, all the negligences, indolences, and supinenesses of Mankind, which is only controlled, and kept from sweeping All before it, by the exertions which some persons constantly And others by fits, put forth in the direction of good and Worthy objects. It gives a very insufficient idea of the impotance of the strivings which take place to improve and eevate human nature and life to suppose that their chief value Consists in the amount of actual improvement realized by Their means, and that the consequence of their cessation Would merely be that we should remain as we are. A very Small diminution of those exertions would not only put a Stop to improvement, but would turn the general tendency Of things toward deterioration, which, once begun, would Proceed with increasingly rapidity, and become more and More difficult to check, until it reached a state often seen in History, and in which many large portions of mankind even Now grovel; when hardly any thing short of superhuman Power seems sufficient to turn the tide, and give a fresh commencement to the upward movement.These reasons make the word Progress as unapt as the terms Order and Permanence to become the basis for a cla**ification Of the requisites of a form of government. The fundamental Antithesis which these words express does not lie in the things Themselves, so much as in the types of human character which Answer to them. There are, we know, some minds in which Caution, and others in which boldness, predominates; in some The desire to avoid imperilling what is already possessed is a Stronger sentiment than that which prompts to improve the Old and acquire new advantages; while there are others who Lean the contrary way, and are more eager for future than careful of present good. The road to the ends of both is the same; But they are liable to wander from it in opposite directions This consideration is of importance in composing the personnel of any political body: persons of both types ought to be Included in it, that the tendencies of each may be tempered In so far as they are excessive, by a due proportion of the other There needs no express provision to insure this object, provided care is taken to admit nothing inconsistent with it. The Natural and spontaneous admixture of the old and the young Of those whose position and reputation are made and those who have them still to make, will in general sufficiently answer the purpose, if only this natural balance is not disturbed By artificial regulation Since the distinction most commonly adopted for the clasification of social exigencies does not possess the properties Needful for that use, we have to seek for some other leading Distinction better adapted to the purpose. Such a distinction Would seem to be indicated by the considerations to which I Now proceed If we ask ourselves on what causes and conditions good Government in all its senses, from the humblest to the most Exalted, depends, we find that the principal of them, the One which transcends all others, is the qualities of the human beings composing the society over which the government is exercised We may take, as a first instance, the administration of justice; with the more propriety, since there is no part of public Business in which the mere machinery, the rules and contrivances for conducting the details of the operation, are of Such vital consequence. Yet even these yield in importance To the qualities of the human agents employed. Of what eficacy are rules of procedure in securing the ends of justice if The moral condition of the people is such that the witnesses Generally lie, and the judges and their subordinates take bribes? Again, how can institutions provide a good municpal administration if there exists such indifference to the subject that those who would administer honestly and capably Can not be induced to serve, and the duties are left to those Who undertake them because they have some private interest to be promoted? Of what avail is the most broadly popular representative system if the electors do not care to choose The best member of Parliament, but choose him who will Spend most money to be elected? How can a representative Assembly work for good if its members can be bought, or if Their excitability of temperament, uncorrected by public discipline or private self-control, makes them incapable of calm Deliberation, and they resort to manual violence on the floor Of the House, or shoot at one another with rifles? How, again Can government, or any joint concern, be carried on in a Tolerable manner by people so envious that, if one among Them seems likely to succeed in any thing, those who ought To cooperate with him form a tacit combination to make Him fail? Whenever the general disposition of the people is Such that each individual regards those only of his interests Which are selfish, and does not dwell on, or concern himself For, his share of the general interest, in such a state of things Good government is impossible. The influence of defects of Intelligence in obstructing all the elements of good government requires no illustration. Government consists of acts Done by human beings; and if the agents, or those who choose The agents, or those to whom the agents are responsible, or The lookers-on whose opinion ought to influence and check All these, are mere ma**es of ignorance, stupidity, and baleful Prejudice, every operation of government will go wrong; While, in proportion as the men rise above this standard, so Will the government improve in quality up to the point of Excellence, attainable but nowhere attained, where the officers of government, themselves persons of superior virtue and Intellect, are surrounded by the atmosphere of a virtuous And enlightened public opinion The first element of good government, therefore, being The virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing The community, the most important point of excellence whichany form of government can possess is to promote the virtue And intelligence of the people themselves. The first question In respect to any political institutions is how far they tend to Foster in the members of the community the various desirable qualities, moral and intellectual, or rather (following Bentham's more complete cla**ification) moral, intellectual And active. The government which does this the best has Every likelihood of being the best in all other respects, since It is on these qualities, so far as they exist in the people, that All possibility of goodness in the practical operations of the Government depends We may consider, then, as one criterion of the goodness of A government, the degree in which it tends to increase the Sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and indvidually, since, besides that their well-being is the sole object Of government, their good qualities supply the moving force Which works the machinery. This leaves, as the other constituent element of the merit of a government, the quality of The machinery itself; that is, the degree in which it is adapted To take advantage of the amount of good qualities which May at any time exist, and make them instrumental to the right purposes. Let us again take the subject of judicature as An example and illustration. The judicial system being given The goodness of the administration of justice is in the compound ratio of the worth of the men composing the tribunals, and the worth of the public opinion which influences Or controls them. But all the difference between a good and A bad system of judicature lies in the contrivances adopted For bringing whatever moral and intellectual worth exists in The community to bear upon the administration of justice And making it duly operative on the result. The arrangements For rendering the choice of the judges such as to obtain the Highest average of virtue and intelligence; the salutary forms Of procedure; the publicity which allows observation and Criticism of whatever is amiss; the liberty of discussion and Cinsure through the press; the mode of taking evidence, acording as it is well or ill adapted to elicit truth; the facilities Whatever be their amount, for obtaining access to the tribunals; the arrangements for detecting crimes and apprehending offenders-all these things are not the power, but the machinery for bringing the power into contact with the obstacle; and the machinery has no action of itself, but withoutit the power, let it be ever so ample, would be wasted and of No effect. A similar distinction exists in regard to the consttution of the executive departments of administration. Their Machinery is good, when the proper tests are prescribed for The qualifications of officers, the proper rules for their promotion; when the business is conveniently distributed among Those who are to transact it, a convenient and methodical Order established for its transaction, a correct and intelligible Record kept of it after being transacted; when each individual Knows for what he is responsible, and is known to others as Responsible for it; when the best-contrived checks are provided against negligence, favoritism, or jobbery in any of the Acts of the department. But political checks will no more act Of themselves than a bridle will direct a horse without a rider If the checking functionaries are as corrupt or as negligent as Those whom they ought to check, and if the public, the mainspring of the whole checking machinery, are too ignorant Too pa**ive, or too careless and inattentive to do their part Little benefit will be derived from the best administrative Apparatus. Yet a good apparatus is always preferable to a bad It enables such insufficient moving or checking power as existsto act at the greatest advantage; and without it, no amount Of moving or checking power would be sufficient. Publicity For instance, is no impediment to evil, nor stimulus to good If the public will not look at what is done; but without publicity, how could they either check or encourage what they Were not permitted to see? The ideally perfect constitution Of a public office is that in which the interest of the funcary is entirely coincident with his duty. No mere system Will make it so, but still less can it be made so without a System, aptly devised for the purpose What we have said of the arrangements for the detailed administration of the government is still more evidently true of Its general constitution. All government which aims at being Good is an organization of some part of the good qualities Existing in the individual members of the community for the Conduct of its collective affairs. A representative constitution Is a means of bringing the general standard of intelligence and Honesty existing in the community, and the individual intellect and virtue of its wisest members, more directly to bear Upon the government, and investing them with greater influence in it than they would have under any other mode of