Translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn - The Critique of Pure Reason; Part 21 lyrics

III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes There are only two modes of causality cogitable--the causality of nature Or of freedom. The first is the conjunction of a particular state with Another preceding it in the world of sense, the former following the Latter by virtue of a law. Now, as the causality of phenomena is Subject to conditions of time, and the preceding state, if it had always Existed, could not have produced an effect which would make its first Appearance at a particular time, the causality of a cause must itself be An effect--must itself have begun to be, and therefore, according to the Principle of the understanding, itself requires a cause We must understand, on the contrary, by the term freedom, in the Cosmological sense, a faculty of the spontaneous origination of a state; The causality of which, therefore, is not subordinated to another cause Determining it in time. Freedom is in this sense a pure transcendental Idea, which, in the first place, contains no empirical element; the Object of which, in the second place, cannot be given or determined in Any experience, because it is a universal law of the very possibility Of experience, that everything which happens must have a cause, that Consequently the causality of a cause, being itself something that has Happened, must also have a cause. In this view of the case, the whole Field of experience, how far soever it may extend, contains nothing that Is not subject to the laws of nature. But, as we cannot by this means Attain to an absolute totality of conditions in reference to the series Of causes and effects, reason creates the idea of a spontaneity, which Can begin to act of itself, and without any external cause determining It to action, according to the natural law of causality It is especially remarkable that the practical conception of freedom Is based upon the transcendental idea, and that the question of The possibility of the former is difficult only as it involves the Consideration of the truth of the latter. Freedom, in the practical Sense, is the independence of the will of coercion by sensuous impulses A will is sensuous, in so far as it is pathologically affected (by Sensuous impulses); it is termed animal (arbitrium brutum), when it is Pathologically necessitated. The human will is certainly an arbitrium Sensitivum, not brutum, but liberum; because sensuousness does not Necessitate its action, a faculty existing in man of self-determination Independently of all sensuous coercion It is plain that, if all causality in the world of sense were Natural--and natural only--every event would be determined by another According to necessary laws, and that, consequently, phenomena, in So far as they determine the will, must necessitate every action as a Natural effect from themselves; and thus all practical freedom would Fall to the ground with the transcendental idea. For the latter Presupposes that although a certain thing has not happened, it ought to Have happened, and that, consequently, its phenomenal cause was not so Powerful and determinative as to exclude the causality of our will--a Causality capable of producing effects independently of and even in Opposition to the power of natural causes, and capable, consequently, of Spontaneously originating a series of events Here, too, we find it to be the case, as we generally found in the Self-contradictions and perplexities of a reason which strives to pa** The bounds of possible experience, that the problem is properly not Physiological, but transcendental. The question of the possibility Of freedom does indeed concern psychology; but, as it rests upon Dialectical arguments of pure reason, its solution must engage the Attention of transcendental philosophy. Before attempting this solution A task which transcendental philosophy cannot decline, it will Be advisable to make a remark with regard to its procedure in the Settlement of the question If phenomena were things in themselves, and time and space forms of the Existence of things, condition and conditioned would always be members Of the same series; and thus would arise in the present case the Antinomy common to all transcendental ideas--that their series is either Too great or too small for the understanding. The dynamical ideas, which We are about to discuss in this and the following section, possess the Peculiarity of relating to an object, not considered as a quantity, but As an existence; and thus, in the discussion of the present question We may make abstraction of the quantity of the series of conditions And consider merely the dynamical relation of the condition to the Conditioned. The question, then, suggests itself, whether freedom is Possible; and, if it is, whether it can consist with the universality Of the natural law of causality; and, consequently, whether we enounce a Proper disjunctive proposition when we say: "Every effect must have its Origin either in nature or in freedom," or whether both cannot exist Together in the same event in different relations. The principle of An unbroken connection between all events in the phenomenal world, in Accordance with the unchangeable laws of nature, is a well-established Principle of transcendental an*lytic which admits of no exception. The Question, therefore, is: "Whether an effect, determined according to The laws of nature, can at the same time be produced by a free agent, or Whether freedom and nature mutually exclude each other?" And here, the Common but fallacious hypothesis of the absolute reality of phenomena Manifests its injurious influence in embarra**ing the procedure Of reason. For if phenomena are things in themselves, freedom is Impossible. In this case, nature is the complete and all-sufficient Cause of every event; and condition and conditioned, cause and effect Are contained in the same series, and necessitated by the same law. If On the contrary, phenomena are held to be, as they are in fact, nothing More than mere representations, connected with each other in accordance With empirical laws, they must have a ground which is not phenomenal But the causality of such an intelligible cause is not determined or Determinable by phenomena; although its effects, as phenomena, must be Determined by other phenomenal existences. This cause and its causality Exist therefore out of and apart from the series of phenomena; while Its effects do exist and are discoverable in the series of empirical Conditions. Such an effect may therefore be considered to be free in Relation to its intelligible cause, and necessary in relation to the Phenomena from which it is a necessary consequence--a distinction which Stated in this perfectly general and abstract manner, must appear in The highest degree subtle and obscure. The sequel will explain. It is Sufficient, at present, to remark that, as the complete and unbroken Connection of phenomena is an unalterable law of nature, freedom is Impossible--on the supposition that phenomena are absolutely real. Hence Those philosophers who adhere to the common opinion on this subject can Never succeed in reconciling the ideas of nature and freedom Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity That element in a sensuous object which is not itself sensuous, I may be Allowed to term intelligible. If, accordingly, an object which must be Regarded as a sensuous phenomenon possesses a faculty which is not an Object of sensuous intuition, but by means of which it is capable of Being the cause of phenomena, the causality of an object or existence of This kind may be regarded from two different points of view. It may be Considered to be intelligible, as regards its action--the action of A thing which is a thing in itself, and sensuous, as regards its Effects--the effects of a phenomenon belonging to the sensuous world. We Should accordingly, have to form both an empirical and an intellectual Conception of the causality of such a faculty or power--both, however Having reference to the same effect. This twofold manner of cogitating A power residing in a sensuous object does not run counter to any of The conceptions which we ought to form of the world of phenomena or of A possible experience. Phenomena--not being things in themselves--must Have a transcendental object as a foundation, which determines them as Mere representations; and there seems to be no reason why we should not Ascribe to this transcendental object, in addition to the property of Self-phenomenization, a causality whose effects are to be met with in The world of phenomena, although it is not itself a phenomenon. But Every effective cause must possess a character, that is to say, a law of Its causality, without which it would cease to be a cause. In the above Case, then, every sensuous object would possess an empirical character Which guaranteed that its actions, as phenomena, stand in complete and Harmonious connection, conformably to unvarying natural laws, with all Other phenomena, and can be deduced from these, as conditions, and that They do thus, in connection with these, constitute a series in the order Of nature. This sensuous object must, in the second place, possess an Intelligible character, which guarantees it to be the cause of those Actions, as phenomena, although it is not itself a phenomenon nor Subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense. The former may Be termed the character of the thing as a phenomenon, the latter the Character of the thing as a thing in itself Now this active subject would, in its character of intelligible subject Be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only a condition Of phenomena, and not of things in themselves. No action would begin or Cease to be in this subject; it would consequently be free from the law Of all determination of time--the law of change, namely, that everything Which happens must have a cause in the phenomena of a preceding State. In one word, the causality of the subject, in so far as it is Intelligible, would not form part of the series of empirical conditions Which determine and necessitate an event in the world of sense. Again This intelligible character of a thing cannot be immediately cognized Because we can perceive nothing but phenomena, but it must be capable of Being cogitated in harmony with the empirical character; for we always Find ourselves compelled to place, in thought, a transcendental object At the basis of phenomena although we can never know what this object is In itself In virtue of its empirical character, this subject would at the same Time be subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality, and, as a Phenomenon and member of the sensuous world, its effects would have To be accounted for by a reference to preceding phenomena. Eternal Phenomena must be capable of influencing it; and its actions, in Accordance with natural laws, must explain to us how its empirical Character, that is, the law of its causality, is to be cognized in and By means of experience. In a word, all requisites for a complete and Necessary determination of these actions must be presented to us by Experience In virtue of its intelligible character, on the other hand (although we Possess only a general conception of this character), the subject Must be regarded as free from all sensuous influences, and from All phenomenal determination. Moreover, as nothing happens in this Subject--for it is a noumenon, and there does not consequently exist in It any change, demanding the dynamical determination of time, and for The same reason no connection with phenomena as causes--this active Existence must in its actions be free from and independent of natural Necessity, for or necessity exists only in the world of phenomena. It Would be quite correct to say that it originates or begins its effects In the world of sense from itself, although the action productive of These effects does not begin in itself. We should not be in this case Affirming that these sensuous effects began to exist of themselves Because they are always determined by prior empirical conditions--by Virtue of the empirical character, which is the phenomenon of the Intelligible character--and are possible only as constituting a Continuation of the series of natural causes. And thus nature and Freedom, each in the complete and absolute signification of these terms Can exist, without contradiction or disagreement, in the same action Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity I have thought it advisable to lay before the reader at first merely A sketch of the solution of this transcendental problem, in order to Enable him to form with greater ease a clear conception of the course Which reason must adopt in the solution. I shall now proceed to exhibit The several momenta of this solution, and to consider them in their Order The natural law that everything which happens must have a cause, that The causality of this cause, that is, the action of the cause (which Cannot always have existed, but must be itself an event, for it precedes In time some effect which it has originated), must have itself a Phenomenal cause, by which it is determined and, and, consequently, all Events are empirically determined in an order of nature--this law, I Say, which lies at the foundation of the possibility of experience And of a connected system of phenomena or nature is a law of the Understanding, from which no departure, and to which no exception, can Be admitted. For to except even a single phenomenon from its operation Is to exclude it from the sphere of possible experience and thus to Admit it to be a mere fiction of thought or phantom of the brain Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes In which, however, absolute totality cannot be found. But we need Not detain ourselves with this question, for it has already been Sufficiently answered in our discussion of the antinomies into which Reason falls, when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in the series Of phenomena. If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the illusion of Transcendental idealism, we shall find that neither nature nor freedom Exists. Now the question is: "Whether, admitting the existence of Natural necessity in the world of phenomena, it is possible to consider An effect as at the same time an effect of nature and an effect of Freedom--or, whether these two modes of causality are contradictory and Incompatible?" No phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series. Every Action, in so far as it is productive of an event, is itself an event or Occurrence, and presupposes another preceding state, in which its cause Existed. Thus everything that happens is but a continuation of a series And an absolute beginning is impossible in the sensuous world. The Actions of natural causes are, accordingly, themselves effects, and Presuppose causes preceding them in time. A primal action which forms an Absolute beginning, is beyond the causal power of phenomena Now, is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects are Phenomena, the causality of the cause of these effects must also be a Phenomenon and belong to the empirical world? Is it not rather possible That, although every effect in the phenomenal world must be connected With an empirical cause, according to the universal law of nature, this Empirical causality may be itself the effect of a non-empirical and Intelligible causality--its connection with natural causes remaining Nevertheless intact? Such a causality would be considered, in reference To phenomena, as the primal action of a cause, which is in so far Therefore, not phenomenal, but, by reason of this faculty or power Intelligible; although it must, at the same time, as a link in the chain Of nature, be regarded as belonging to the sensuous world A belief in the reciprocal causality of phenomena is necessary, if We are required to look for and to present the natural conditions of Natural events, that is to say, their causes. This being admitted as Unexceptionably valid, the requirements of the understanding, which Recognizes nothing but nature in the region of phenomena, are satisfied And our physical explanations of physical phenomena may proceed in their Regular course, without hindrance and without opposition. But it is no Stumbling-block in the way, even a**uming the idea to be a pure fiction To admit that there are some natural causes in the possession of a Faculty which is not empirical, but intelligible, inasmuch as it is not Determined to action by empirical conditions, but purely and solely upon Grounds brought forward by the understanding--this action being still When the cause is phenomenized, in perfect accordance with the laws of Empirical causality. Thus the acting subject, as a causal phenomenon Would continue to preserve a complete connection with nature and Natural conditions; and the phenomenon only of the subject (with all Its phenomenal causality) would contain certain conditions, which, if we Ascend from the empirical to the transcendental object, must necessarily Be regarded as intelligible. For, if we attend, in our inquiries with Regard to causes in the world of phenomena, to the directions of nature Alone, we need not trouble ourselves about the relation in which the Transcendental subject, which is completely unknown to us, stands to These phenomena and their connection in nature. The intelligible ground Of phenomena in this subject does not concern empirical questions. It Has to do only with pure thought; and, although the effects of this Thought and action of the pure understanding are discoverable in Phenomena, these phenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and Complete explanation, upon purely physical grounds and in accordance With natural laws. And in this case we attend solely to their empirical And omit all consideration of their intelligible character (which is the Transcendental cause of the former) as completely unknown, except in so Far as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol. Now let us Apply this to experience. Man is a phenomenon of the sensuous world and At the same time, therefore, a natural cause, the causality of which Must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must possess an Empirical character, like all other natural phenomena. We remark this Empirical character in his actions, which reveal the presence of certain Powers and faculties. If we consider inanimate or merely animal nature We can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves any other than a Faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous manner. But man, to Whom nature reveals herself only through sense, cognizes himself not Only by his senses, but also through pure apperception; and this in Actions and internal determinations, which he cannot regard as sensuous Impressions. He is thus to himself, on the one hand, a phenomenon But on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties, a purely Intelligible object--intelligible, because its action cannot be ascribed To sensuous receptivity. These faculties are understanding and reason The latter, especially, is in a peculiar manner distinct from all Empirically-conditioned faculties, for it employs ideas alone in the Consideration of its objects, and by means of these determines the Understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its Own conceptions, which, like the ideas of reason, are pure and Non-empirical That reason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at least we are Compelled so to represent it, is evident from the imperatives, which in The sphere of the practical we impose on many of our executive powers The words I ought express a species of necessity, and imply a connection With grounds which nature does not and cannot present to the mind of Man. Understanding knows nothing in nature but that which is, or has Been, or will be. It would be absurd to say that anything in nature Ought to be other than it is in the relations of time in which it Stands; indeed, the ought, when we consider merely the course of nature Has neither application nor meaning. The question, "What ought to happen In the sphere of nature?" is just as absurd as the question, "What ought To be the properties of a circle?" All that we are entitled to ask is "What takes place in nature?" or, in the latter case, "What are the Properties of a circle?" But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action, the Ground of which is a pure conception; while the ground of a merely Natural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon. This action Must certainly be possible under physical conditions, if it is Prescribed by the moral imperative ought; but these physical or natural Conditions do not concern the determination of the will itself, they Relate to its effects alone, and the consequences of the effect in the World of phenomena. Whatever number of motives nature may present to My will, whatever sensuous impulses--the moral ought it is beyond their Power to produce. They may produce a volition, which, so far from Being necessary, is always conditioned--a volition to which the ought Enunciated by reason, sets an aim and a standard, gives permission or Prohibition. Be the object what it may, purely sensuous--as pleasure Or presented by pure reason--as good, reason will not yield to grounds Which have an empirical origin. Reason will not follow the order Of things presented by experience, but, with perfect spontaneity Rearranges them according to ideas, with which it compels empirical Conditions to agree. It declares, in the name of these ideas, certain Actions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place and Which perhaps never will take place; and yet presupposes that it Possesses the faculty of causality in relation to these actions. For In the absence of this supposition, it could not expect its ideas to Produce certain effects in the world of experience Now, let us stop here and admit it to be at least possible that reason Does stand in a really causal relation to phenomena. In this case it Must--pure reason as it is--exhibit an empirical character. For every Cause supposes a rule, according to which certain phenomena follow as Effects from the cause, and every rule requires uniformity in these Effects; and this is the proper ground of the conception of a cause--as A faculty or power. Now this conception (of a cause) may be termed the Empirical character of reason; and this character is a permanent one While the effects produced appear, in conformity with the various Conditions which accompany and partly limit them, in various forms Thus the volition of every man has an empirical character, which is Nothing more than the causality of his reason, in so far as its effects In the phenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule, according to Which we are enabled to examine, in their several kinds and degrees, the Actions of this causality and the rational grounds for these actions And in this way to decide upon the subjective principles of the Volition. Now we learn what this empirical character is only from Phenomenal effects, and from the rule of these which is presented by Experience; and for this reason all the actions of man in the world Of phenomena are determined by his empirical character, and the Co-operative causes of nature. If, then, we could investigate all the Phenomena of human volition to their lowest foundation in the mind There would be no action which we could not anticipate with certainty And recognize to be absolutely necessary from its preceding conditions So far as relates to this empirical character, therefore, there can be No freedom; and it is only in the light of this character that we can Consider the human will, when we confine ourselves to simple observation And, as is the case in anthropology, institute a physiological Investigation of the motive causes of human actions But when we consider the same actions in relation to reason--not for the Purpose of explaining their origin, that is, in relation to speculative Reason, but to practical reason, as the producing cause of these Actions--we shall discover a rule and an order very different from those Of nature and experience. For the declaration of this mental faculty may Be that what has and could not but take place in the course of nature Ought not to have taken place. Sometimes, too, we discover, or believe That we discover, that the ideas of reason did actually stand in a Causal relation to certain actions of man; and that these actions have Taken place because they were determined, not by empirical causes, but By the act of the will upon grounds of reason Now, granting that reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena; can An action of reason be called free, when we know that, sensuously, in Its empirical character, it is completely determined and absolutely Necessary? But this empirical character is itself determined by the Intelligible character. The latter we cannot cognize; we can only Indicate it by means of phenomena, which enable us to have an immediate Cognition only of the empirical character.* An action, then, in so far As it is to be ascribed to an intelligible cause, does not result from It in accordance with empirical laws. That is to say, not the conditions Of pure reason, but only their effects in the internal sense, precede The act. Pure reason, as a purely intelligible faculty, is not subject To the conditions of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible Character does not begin to be; it does not make its appearance at a Certain time, for the purpose of producing an effect. If this were not The case, the causality of reason would be subservient to the natural Law of phenomena, which determines them according to time, and as a Series of causes and effects in time; it would consequently cease to Be freedom and become a part of nature. We are therefore justified in Saying: "If reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena, it is a Faculty which originates the sensuous condition of an empirical Series of effects." For the condition, which resides in the reason, is Non-sensuous, and therefore cannot be originated, or begin to be. And Thus we find--what we could not discover in any empirical series--a Condition of a successive series of events itself empirically Unconditioned. For, in the present case, the condition stands out of and Beyond the series of phenomena--it is intelligible, and it Consequently cannot be subjected to any sensuous condition, or to any Time-determination by a preceding cause But, in another respect, the same cause belongs also to the series Of phenomena. Man is himself a phenomenon. His will has an empirical Character, which is the empirical cause of all his actions. There is No condition--determining man and his volition in conformity with this Character--which does not itself form part of the series of effects In nature, and is subject to their law--the law according to which an Empirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist For this reason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous Origination, all actions being phenomena, and belonging to the world of Experience. But it cannot be said of reason, that the state in which it Determines the will is always preceded by some other state determining It. For reason is not a phenomenon, and therefore not subject to Sensuous conditions; and, consequently, even in relation to its Causality, the sequence or conditions of time do not influence reason Nor can the dynamical law of nature, which determines the sequence of Time according to certain rules, be applied to it Reason is consequently the permanent condition of all actions of the Human will. Each of these is determined in the empirical character of The man, even before it has taken place. The intelligible character, of Which the former is but the sensuous schema, knows no before or after; And every action, irrespective of the time-relation in which it stands With other phenomena, is the immediate effect of the intelligible Character of pure reason, which, consequently, enjoys freedom of Action, and is not dynamically determined either by internal or external Preceding conditions. This freedom must not be described, in a merely Negative manner, as independence of empirical conditions, for in this Case the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of phenomena; but It must be regarded, positively, as a faculty which can spontaneously Originate a series of events. At the same time, it must not be supposed That any beginning can take place in reason; on the contrary, reason As the unconditioned condition of all action of the will, admits of no Time-conditions, although its effect does really begin in a series of Phenomena--a beginning which is not, however, absolutely primal I shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an example From its employment in the world of experience; proved it cannot be by Any amount of experience, or by any number of facts, for such arguments Cannot establish the truth of transcendental propositions. Let us take a Voluntary action--for example, a falsehood--by means of which a man Has introduced a certain degree of confusion into the social life Of humanity, which is judged according to the motives from which it Originated, and the blame of which and of the evil consequences arising From it, is imputed to the offender. We at first proceed to examine the Empirical character of the offence, and for this purpose we endeavour To penetrate to the sources of that character, such as a defective Education, bad company, a shameless and wicked disposition, frivolity And want of reflection--not forgetting also the occasioning causes which Prevailed at the moment of the transgression. In this the procedure is Exactly the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of Causes which determine a given physical effect. Now, although we believe The action to have been determined by all these circumstances, we do Not the less blame the offender. We do not blame him for his unhappy Disposition, nor for the circumstances which influenced him, nay, not Even for his former course of life; for we presuppose that all these Considerations may be set aside, that the series of preceding conditions May be regarded as having never existed, and that the action may Be considered as completely unconditioned in relation to any state Preceding, just as if the agent commenced with it an entirely new series Of effects. Our blame of the offender is grounded upon a law of reason Which requires us to regard this faculty as a cause, which could have And ought to have otherwise determined the behaviour of the culprit Independently of all empirical conditions. This causality of reason we Do not regard as a co-operating agency, but as complete in itself. It Matters not whether the sensuous impulses favoured or opposed the Action of this causality, the offence is estimated according to its Intelligible character--the offender is decidedly worthy of blame, the Moment he utters a falsehood. It follows that we regard reason, in Spite of the empirical conditions of the act, as completely free, and Therefore, therefore, as in the present case, culpable The above judgement is complete evidence that we are accustomed to think That reason is not affected by sensuous conditions, that in it no change Takes place--although its phenomena, in other words, the mode in Which it appears in its effects, are subject to change--that in it no Preceding state determines the following, and, consequently, that It does not form a member of the series of sensuous conditions which Necessitate phenomena according to natural laws. Reason is present and The same in all human actions and at all times; but it does not itself Exist in time, and therefore does not enter upon any state in which it Did not formerly exist. It is, relatively to new states or conditions Determining, but not determinable. Hence we cannot ask: "Why did not Reason determine itself in a different manner?" The question ought to Be thus stated: "Why did not reason employ its power of causality To determine certain phenomena in a different manner?" But this is A question which admits of no answer. For a different intelligible Character would have exhibited a different empirical character; and When we say that, in spite of the course which his whole former life has Taken, the offender could have refrained from uttering the falsehood This means merely that the act was subject to the power and Authority--permissive or prohibitive--of reason. Now, reason is not Subject in its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time; and A difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of Phenomena to each other--for these are not things and therefore not Causes in themselves--but it cannot produce any difference in the Relation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason Thus, then, in our investigation into free actions and the causal power Which produced them, we arrive at an intelligible cause, beyond which However, we cannot go; although we can recognize that it is free, that Is, independent of all sensuous conditions, and that, in this way, it May be the sensuously unconditioned condition of phenomena. But for what Reason the intelligible character generates such and such phenomena And exhibits such and such an empirical character under certain Circumstances, it is beyond the power of our reason to decide. The Question is as much above the power and the sphere of reason as the Following would be: "Why does the transcendental object of our external Sensuous intuition allow of no other form than that of intuition in Space?" But the problem, which we were called upon to solve, does not Require us to entertain any such questions. The problem was merely This--whether freedom and natural necessity can exist without opposition In the same action. To this question we have given a sufficient Answer; for we have shown that, as the former stands in a relation to a Different kind of condition from those of the latter, the law of the one Does not affect the law of the other and that, consequently, both can Exist together in independence of and without interference with each Other The reader must be careful to remark that my intention in the above Remarks has not been to prove the actual existence of freedom, as a Faculty in which resides the cause of certain sensuous phenomena. For Not to mention that such an argument would not have a transcendental Character, nor have been limited to the discussion of pure Conceptions--all attempts at inferring from experience what cannot be Cogitated in accordance with its laws, must ever be unsuccessful. Nay More, I have not even aimed at demonstrating the possibility of freedom; For this too would have been a vain endeavour, inasmuch as it is beyond The power of the mind to cognize the possibility of a reality or of a Causal power by the aid of mere a priori conceptions. Freedom has been Considered in the foregoing remarks only as a transcendental idea, by Means of which reason aims at originating a series of conditions in The world of phenomena with the help of that which is sensuously Unconditioned, involving itself, however, in an antinomy with the laws Which itself prescribes for the conduct of the understanding. That this Antinomy is based upon a mere illusion, and that nature and freedom are At least not opposed--this was the only thing in our power to prove, and The question which it was our task to solve IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences In the preceding remarks, we considered the changes in the world of Sense as constituting a dynamical series, in which each member is Subordinated to another--as its cause. Our present purpose is to avail Ourselves of this series of states or conditions as a guide to An existence which may be the highest condition of all changeable Phenomena, that is, to a necessary being. Our endeavour to reach Not the unconditioned causality, but the unconditioned existence, of Substance. The series before us is therefore a series of conceptions And not of intuitions (in which the one intuition is the condition of The other) But it is evident that, as all phenomena are subject to change and Conditioned in their existence, the series of dependent existences Cannot embrace an unconditioned member, the existence of which would Be absolutely necessary. It follows that, if phenomena were things In themselves, and--as an immediate consequence from this Supposition--condition and conditioned belonged to the same series of Phenomena, the existence of a necessary being, as the condition of the Existence of sensuous phenomena, would be perfectly impossible An important distinction, however, exists between the dynamical and the Mathematical regress. The latter is engaged solely with the combination Of parts into a whole, or with the division of a whole into its parts; And therefore are the conditions of its series parts of the series And to be consequently regarded as h*mogeneous, and for this reason, as Consisting, without exception, of phenomena. If the former regress, on The contrary, the aim of which is not to establish the possibility of An unconditioned whole consisting of given parts, or of an unconditioned Part of a given whole, but to demonstrate the possibility of the Deduction of a certain state from its cause, or of the contingent Existence of substance from that which exists necessarily, it is not Requisite that the condition should form part of an empirical series Along with the conditioned In the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present Dealing, there exists a way of escape from the difficulty; for it is Not impossible that both of the contradictory statements may be true In different relations. All sensuous phenomena may be contingent, and Consequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence, and yet There may also exist a non-empirical condition of the whole series Or, in other words, a necessary being. For this necessary being, as an Intelligible condition, would not form a member--not even the highest Member--of the series; the whole world of sense would be left in its Empirically determined existence uninterfered with and uninfluenced This would also form a ground of distinction between the modes of Solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies. For, while in the Consideration of freedom in the former antinomy, the thing itself--the Cause (substantia phaenomenon)--was regarded as belonging to the series Of conditions, and only its causality to the intelligible world--we are Obliged in the present case to cogitate this necessary being as purely Intelligible and as existing entirely apart from the world of sense (as an ens extramundanum); for otherwise it would be subject to the Phenomenal law of contingency and dependence In relation to the present problem, therefore, the regulative principle Of reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses an Empirically conditioned existence--that no property of the sensuous World possesses unconditioned necessity--that we are bound to expect And, so far as is possible, to seek for the empirical condition of every Member in the series of conditions--and that there is no sufficient Reason to justify us in deducing any existence from a condition which Lies out of and beyond the empirical series, or in regarding any Existence as independent and self-subsistent; although this should not Prevent us from recognizing the possibility of the whole series being Based upon a being which is intelligible, and for this reason free from All empirical conditions But it has been far from my intention, in these remarks, to prove the Existence of this unconditioned and necessary being, or even to evidence The possibility of a purely intelligible condition of the existence or All sensuous phenomena. As bounds were set to reason, to prevent it from Leaving the guiding thread of empirical conditions and losing itself in Transcendent theories which are incapable of concrete presentation; so It was my purpose, on the other band, to set bounds to the law of the Purely empirical understanding, and to protest against any attempts On its part at deciding on the possibility of things, or declaring the Existence of the intelligible to be impossible, merely on the ground That it is not available for the explanation and exposition of Phenomena. It has been shown, at the same time, that the contingency Of all the phenomena of nature and their empirical conditions is quite Consistent with the arbitrary hypothesis of a necessary, although purely Intelligible condition, that no real contradiction exists between them And that, consequently, both may be true. The existence of such an Absolutely necessary being may be impossible; but this can never be Demonstrated from the universal contingency and dependence of sensuous Phenomena, nor from the principle which forbids us to discontinue the Series at some member of it, or to seek for its cause in some sphere Of existence beyond the world of nature. Reason goes its way in the Empirical world, and follows, too, its peculiar path in the sphere of The transcendental The sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena, which are mere Representations, and always sensuously conditioned; things in themselves Are not, and cannot be, objects to us. It is not to be wondered at Therefore, that we are not justified in leaping from some member of An empirical series beyond the world of sense, as if empirical Representations were things in themselves, existing apart from their Transcendental ground in the human mind, and the cause of whose Existence may be sought out of the empirical series. This would Certainly be the case with contingent things; but it cannot be with mere Representations of things, the contingency of which is itself merely a Phenomenon and can relate to no other regress than that which determines Phenomena, that is, the empirical. But to cogitate an intelligible Ground of phenomena, as free, moreover, from the contingency of the Latter, conflicts neither with the unlimited nature of the empirical Regress, nor with the complete contingency of phenomena. And the Demonstration of this was the only thing necessary for the solution of This apparent antinomy. For if the condition of every conditioned--as Regards its existence--is sensuous, and for this reason a part of The same series, it must be itself conditioned, as was shown in the Antithesis of the fourth antinomy. The embarra**ments into which a Reason, which postulates the unconditioned, necessarily falls, must Therefore, continue to exist; or the unconditioned must be placed in the Sphere of the intelligible. In this way, its necessity does not require Nor does it even permit, the presence of an empirical condition: and it Is, consequently, unconditionally necessary The empirical employment of reason is not affected by the a**umption Of a purely intelligible being; it continues its operations on the Principle of the contingency of all phenomena, proceeding from empirical Conditions to still higher and higher conditions, themselves empirical Just as little does this regulative principle exclude the a**umption Of an intelligible cause, when the question regards merely the pure Employment of reason--in relation to ends or aims. For, in this case, an Intelligible cause signifies merely the transcendental and to us unknown Ground of the possibility of sensuous phenomena, and its existence Necessary and independent of all sensuous conditions, is not Inconsistent with the contingency of phenomena, or with the unlimited Possibility of regress which exists in the series of empirical Conditions Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure Reason So long as the object of our rational conceptions is the Totality of conditions in the world of phenomena, and the Satisfaction, from this source, of the requirements of reason So long are our ideas transcendental and cosmological But when we set the unconditioned--which is the aim of All our inquiries--in a sphere which lies out of the World of sense and possible experience, our ideas become transcendent They are then not merely serviceable towards the completion of the Exercise of reason (which remains an idea, never executed, but always To be pursued); they detach themselves completely from experience and Construct for themselves objects, the material of which has not been Presented by experience, and the objective reality of which is not based Upon the completion of the empirical series, but upon pure a priori Conceptions. The intelligible object of these transcendent ideas may Be conceded, as a transcendental object. But we cannot cogitate it as A thing determinable by certain distinct predicates relating to its Internal nature, for it has no connection with empirical conceptions; Nor are we justified in affirming the existence of any such object It is, consequently, a mere product of the mind alone. Of all the Cosmological ideas, however, it is that occasioning the fourth antinomy Which compels us to venture upon this step. For the existence of Phenomena, always conditioned and never self-subsistent, requires us To look for an object different from phenomena--an intelligible object With which all contingency must cease. But, as we have allowed ourselves To a**ume the existence of a self-subsistent reality out of the field Of experience, and are therefore obliged to regard phenomena as merely a Contingent mode of representing intelligible objects employed by beings Which are themselves intelligences--no other course remains for us than To follow an*logy and employ the same mode in forming some conception Of intelligible things, of which we have not the least knowledge, which Nature taught us to use in the formation of empirical conceptions Experience made us acquainted with the contingent. But we are at present Engaged in the discussion of things which are not objects of experience; And must, therefore, deduce our knowledge of them from that which is Necessary absolutely and in itself, that is, from pure conceptions Hence the first step which we take out of the world of sense obliges Us to begin our system of new cognition with the investigation of A necessary being, and to deduce from our conceptions of it all our Conceptions of intelligible things. This we propose to attempt in the Following chapter