Laura Laskey - Conscious Veganism as Religion lyrics

Constitutional Protections for Practitioners of Veganism: An Examination of Conscious Vegans within the framework of Law and Religion I. Constitutional Protection of Religion The United States was founded on principles of religious liberty and these principles are promoted and protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to a**emble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” This short clause protects religious freedom in two ways which are referred to as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. First, the establishment clause prohibits Congress from pa**ing any laws respecting the establishment of religion. Most obviously, this prohibits the establishment of a state sponsored religion. Also prohibited is for a law to favor one religion over another. Finally, the government may not favor religion over non-religion or vice versa . Fundamental to the Establishment clause is that individuals cannot be coerced by state action into practicing a religion that does not comport with their beliefs . Under the Establishment Clause, it is appropriate to construe the term religion narrowly in order to promote the underlying constitutional motivations. Second, the “Free Exercise” clause prohibits laws that have the effect of inhibiting the practice of religion. For example a law prohibiting the religious sacrifice of animals which did not place any similar restrictions on animals being k**ed for other reasons was found to violate the free exercise clause . There are many competing interests involved under the Free Exercise clause but its fundamental purpose is to allow for every citizen to be able to practice their faith without government interference and, in some instances, government protection. The Constitution makes it is clear that religious practice and the protection thereof, are fundamental rights of U.S. citizens begging the question: what exactly is a religion? II. Defining Religion A. Dictionary Definition of Religion Supreme Court Justices will often turn to the dictionary or dictionaries to inform their interpretations of meaningful terms and therefore the varying dictionary definitions of religion are an appropriate starting off point for understanding the meaning of the term . Merriam-Webster defines religion as: 1. the belief in a god or in a group of gods 2. an organized system of beliefs, ceremonies, and rules used to worship a god or a group of gods 3. an interest, a belief, or an activity that is very important to a person or group This definition provides that personal beliefs are fundamental to religion. It is suggested that, for the most part, these beliefs will pertain to God or Gods, however other important beliefs may qualify as constituting a religion. It is also indicated that religion involves certain practices and rules, meaning that religion can be a shaping force in peoples' lifestyles. A complimentary definition of religion is provided by a popular online dictionary: 1. a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, and purpose of the universe, especially when considered as the creation of a superhuman agency or agencies, usually involving devotional and ritual observances, and often containing a moral code governing the conduct of human affairs. 2. a specific fundamental set of beliefs and practices generally agreed upon by a number of persons or sects. Notably different from the Merriam-Webster definition, the word “God” is not present in the Dictionary.com definition. There is, however, reference to a superhuman universe creator, a figure synonymous with many people's idea of God, indicating that both definitions are referring to belief in the same or similar entities. Elaborating on Merriam-Webster's reference to rules, Dictionary.com discusses effect on lifestyle by identifying religion as the source of a moral code to be followed. While providing different sounding definitions, Merriam-Webster and Dictionary.com do not contradict one another. Melding the definitions together allows for establishing two definite characterizations that describe the meaning of the term religion. First, religion is based in beliefs. These beliefs are generally celestial in nature but other important beliefs could qualify as religious beliefs. Secondly, religion affects the way that people lead their lives through establishing rules and proscribed practices as well as influencing values. Identifying religion as (1) beliefs and (2) lifestyle impact embodies most of the sub-definitions in the two dictionaries and, while different, the two sources of definitions comport with each other. However, there is important language in the sub-definitions within each dictionary that demonstrate the diverging points in people's understanding of religion. In Merriam-Webster the key term is “organized”. Sub-definition “2” describes religious beliefs as “an organized system of beliefs”, however the term “organized” is absent from the other sub-definitions. A similar disparity exists in the Dictionary.com definition: sub-definition “2” specifies that a number of persons share the same beliefs, likely indicating that these beliefs are organized, while sub-definition “1” is only concerned with the beliefs themselves, meaning that they could be held and practiced individually. There is no indication that “organized” means “institutional” within the definition of religion. Rather, it seems that beliefs could be organized in relation to one another or within a framework. Similarly, the idea that a number of people share beliefs does not connotate organized religion because many people share beliefs that are not born in institutional religion. While the dictionary is only a potential starting-off point for a legal inquiry, the variation within the definitions identify and illustrate that the term “Religion” is subject to multiple, and even potentially conflicting interpretations. Given this fact and the complicated nature of constitutional law, many legal definitions have been developed in various contexts. B. Legal Definition of Religion Creating an appropriate definition of religion for constitutional purposes is challenging and carries important implications. An overly broad definition is at risk for being too vague and encompa**ing that which is not religion. While it is important that the definition does not become over-broad, employing a too narrow definition of religion threatens to exclude non-traditional faiths and minority religions and if certain faiths are excluded from protection the Constitution really isn't doing its job. Additionally, exclusion of minority and non-traditional faiths creates stagnancy and has the effect of limiting future growth and development in religion, exactly a phenomenon the founding fathers sought to avoid by creating religious protections . The framers of the Constitution sought to protect people's right to practice their own religion. In fact, Constitutional freedom of religion was described by Thomas Jefferson as the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights . Support for the proposition that individual practices should be protected is supplied by Thomas Paine, who advocated for practices to be deemed religious without the need for an official organization, clergy, and congregation . Paine a**erted: "I do not believe in the creed professed by the Jewish Church, by the Roman Church, by the Greek Church, by the Turkish Church, by the Protestant Church, nor by any church that I know of. My own mind is my own church." While this idea of total religious liberty seems consistent with the American ideal of religious freedom, Paine's views were not popular at the time . Nevertheless, Paine's a**ertions demonstrate that to some, religion is an individual endeavor and that these beliefs have been present since the founding of the country. The Supreme Court has never articulated a precise definition of religion and the Court's interpretation of what qualifies as a religion deserving of legal protection has evolved and varied throughout our nation's history . At the time the Supreme Court started considering cases related to religious liberty, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Court's interpretation of religion was limited to the theistic beliefs widely recognized by mainstream America . The Court wrote in 1890, “The term ‘religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will.” This definition is decidedly theistic due to the central role of the “Creator”, a synonym for God. Once again however, even this early definition does not specify the requirement of an organization of many people to qualify as a religion. As America's religious diversity increased, the Supreme Court's definition of religion expanded. By 1944 the Court insisted that the First Amendment valued unorthodox faiths as well as conventional religion stating, “freedom of religious belief embraces the right to maintain theories of life and of d**h and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths.” In considering these religious beliefs the Court a**erted that no inquiries as to the truth or falsity of religious beliefs shall be made, rather the appropriate factual inquiry is to focus on the sincerity of a**erted beliefs .This definition again does not presuppose a requirement of membership to a larger religious organization. About twenty years later the Court expanded the definition of religion even further stating that religion encompa**es beliefs which are “sincere and meaningful” that the Court determines hold “a place in the life of [their] possessor[s] parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.” This definition was created through interpretation of the exemption from military services which allowed those whose were opposed to participation in war by reason of their “religious training and belief” to be exempted from the draft . Under the relevant statute, beliefs that were based on a “merely personal code” did not qualify as religious . Nevertheless, the Court ruled in favor of protecting “liberty of conscience” in holding that the primarily ethical and philosophical beliefs in question qualified as religious . Modernly, the legal definition of religion courts choose to apply varies based on the claims and laws at issue, however one set of criteria, which was promulgated by the Third circuit, has been adopted by the Third, Eigth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals . This definition consists of three prongs by which to judge a**ertions of religiosity. The prongs, and corresponding criticisms, are as follows: (1) The subject matter it comprehends must be consistent with the a**ertion that it is, or is not, a religion . This measure allows for wide judicial discretion in rejecting religiosity but does not provide any objective standard for which to measure claims. It provides no illumination on the topic at all and proscribes circular reasoning. (2) Ideas are of an ultimate nature meaning that religions should be comprehensive . No guidelines for comprehensiveness are provided which allows for judicial disregard of any faith that does not address every topic addressed by another faith. Comprehensiveness is a value judgment and thus an inappropriate measure due to the fact that religious beliefs vary in their concerns and priorities. (3) Formal, external, or surface signs exist . The an*lysis under this prong is again open to too wide of judicial interpretation. The signs acknowledged are institutionally propagated practices that are exclusive in nature like “formal services” and “existence of clergy” . The bias of this prong is demonstrated by the fact that it doesn't consider that certain faiths may purposely exclude such practices or reject the idea of a religious hierarchy. Furthermore, bias is illustrated by the the Malnak court's inclusion of “efforts at propagation” as an indica of religiousness . Propagation of faith is a squarely Christian value and an objectionable idea to those who prefer to peacefully practice without attempting to influence others to share their faith. The above described Malnak test is fundamentally flawed in that it does little more than a**ert a religion is like a religion if it is like a Judeo-Christian religion, or what is referred to by courts as “traditional religion” . Judicial application of a standard so dependent on Judeo-Christian ideology offends constitutional protections because it attributes the weight of law to the practices of a select few religions and thus judicially sanctions the righteousness of a select few religious beliefs and practices. C. My Proposed Definition of Religion It seems that many courts are adopting the Malnak test without considering its shortcomings or the implications of its use. Judicial opinions often a**ert the difficulty of establishing an objective test for religion and the potential dangers of allowing for too broad of a definition without acknowledging the corresponding danger of infringing on non-traditional religious practices. Additionally, the sweeping concern for a narrow definition basically disregards the Free Exercise clause in favor of not having to accommodate “non-traditional” practices. In response, I propose an objective test consisting of four elements which is more appropriate for determining religiosity of practices in modern day America. Under my view religion is described by a demonstrable commitment to: beliefs and practices that are motivated by a feeling of spiritual accountability, and characterized by an a**ertion of righteousness. This test can be applied to a wide range of faiths objectively. Those whose spiritual accountability is based in the teachings of an organized religion are not precluded from protection by this standard. It is appropriately inclusive because this measure additionally allows for protection of practices that are functionally equivalent to those based on an accountability to historical religious texts but are instead motivated by commitment to other sources that are believed to be righteous by the beholder. In practice, claims of religiosity based on an a**ertion of motivation from spiritual accountability should not be blindly sanctioned as religious. Instead, the basis for these beliefs must be articulable by the claimant within a comprehensible framework of his faith and evidenced by commitment to practices. Commitment to practices has not been identified as a marker of religiosity but I a**ert that it should be. An honestly secular an*lysis can only result in acknowledgment that a devoted practitioner who can objectively demonstrate his commitment to the beliefs he espouses is more entitled to protection of his practices than somebody who cannot demonstrate a commitment to his purported beliefs or resulting practices. This standard will not deny practitioners religious protection because their adherence to a traditional religion should be easily demonstrable. Lastly, a**ertion of righteousness is a fundamental component of religiosity and thus distinguishes merely moral and philosophical beliefs from religious beliefs. Righteousness is indicated by an a**ertion of truth that is maintained with conviction although not subject to conclusive proof. As such, righteous beliefs are those that are not based entirely in logic but rather are dependent on faith and beliefs. Evidence of the righteous nature of a belief may be provided by the existence of supporting or opposing a**ertions within traditional religions. This comparison to traditional faiths is allowable because dissimilarity to a traditional religion is not fatal to a claim of religiosity, as is unconstitutionally so under the Malnak test. The following discussion of Conscious Veganism explains why a vegan lifestyle fulfills the objective criteria for religious practice deserving of legal protection. This is so because it constitutes the exercise of a commitment to the righteousness of beliefs and practices that are motivated by a feeling of spiritual accountability. The two cases that have considered the claim, however, clearly indicate that a lack of a Judeo-Christian basis for vegan practice is likely to categorically disqualify the claim. III. VEGANISM A. The Beliefs, Practices, and Motivations of vegans. A vegan is somebody who refrains from consuming any and all animal products. This includes anything that is an animal or is derived from one . Vegans only eat plant based foods, unlike vegetarians who generally consume dairy, eggs, and sometimes fish . While diet is the prevailing identifying characteristic, vegans can be distinguished from individuals who simply eat an only plant-based diet because veganism proscribes more than just eating habits . Fully adherent vegans will not wear or purchase dead-animal products like leather or fur . Additionally, a strict vegan will abstain from purchasing or consuming items that are tested on animals or otherwise support animal cruelty . Vegan practitioners may choose to forgo certain medical treatments when the ingredients or development process includes animal testing or animal ingredients. A common example is that certain vaccinations contain egg products and others cow's blood . While abstaining from accepted medical practices may sound extreme, within the vegan framework the decision to avoid such treatments can easily be considered the only reasonable choice consistent with a commitment to abstaining from purchasing or ingesting animal products. There are many factors for why people choose to lead a vegan lifestyle including: (1) rejection of animal cruelty and exploitation, (2) concern for the health of the planet, (3) personal health, and (4) a desire for peaceful consciousness and spiritual evolution. While it is possible for a vegan to be motivated by a single concern, many motivations usually factor together within the psyche to form a personal value system that gives rise to fundamental commitment and complete dedication to the practice of veganism. Because this type of personal value system is necessarily a product of deep introspection and conscious personal choice, I will refer to such practitioners as “Conscious Vegans”. Following is a discussion of each of the motivations and their relationship to Conscious Veganism's religious commitment to beliefs and practices that are motivated by a feeling of spiritual accountability and characterized by an a**ertion of righteousness, thus qualifying as religious. Vegan practices contribute to the health of the environment all over earth. For example, going vegan reduces carbon dioxide emissions more than would exchanging a regular car for a hybrid car . Another gas that contributes to global warming is methane of which chickens, turkeys, pigs, and cows are collectively the greatest producers in the U.S. . The ma**ive numbers of animals farmed also s**s another precious resource: water. Nearly half of all water used in the U.S. goes to raising animals for food . In fact, a person could save more water by refraining from consuming one pound of meat than if they were to not shower for six months . Finally, one calorie from animal protein requires eleven times as much fossil fuel to produce than a calorie of plant protein . Similar to yogis, conscious vegans believe in taking accountability for their health. There are a multitude of personal health benefits one gains when eating a vegan diet. For example veganism reduces the risk for cardio vascular diseases like heart disease, type II diabetes, heart attack, and stroke . It has also been proven that veganism is very helpful in avoiding all sorts of cancers . Dr. T. Colin Campbell, arguably the foremost epidemiological researcher alive today, a**erts that no chemical carcinogen is nearly so important in causing human cancer as animal protein . Conscious Vegans' spiritual beliefs include the idea of a continuing spiritual evolution of the human species. For this reason Conscious Vegans reject practices rooted only in tradition. Due to the belief in spiritual evolution, Conscious vegans believe that although eating meat may have been necessary for human survival in the past, this is no longer the case and therefore not supportable given the present environmental conditions on Earth. Conscious vegans a**ert the righteousness of the contention that human practices should be adjusted based on information and believe in spiritual rewards for living in harmony with the principle of a God-given duty to evolve. The personal choices of Conscious Vegans are fundamentally informed by their genuine belief that non-human animal life is valuable. Conscious Vegans righteously reject the notion espoused by other religions that animals do not have souls. In fact, Conscious vegans believe animals are spiritually equal or even superior to humans. As such, animals serve as spiritual teachers and congregational brethren to Conscious Vegans. This spiritual relationship expressly prohibits the participation in the torture or exploitation of any animals and amounts to a religious commandment proscribing a non-optional lifestyle requirements. Additionally, Conscious Vegans believe that non-human animals have consciousness and thus cannot ignore the reality of animal suffering. Conscious Vegans are continuously aware of the sad reality that billions of animals have been, and continue to be, bred by humans to lead an existence in which they experience nothing but continuous torture, terror, and suffering until the time that they are gruesomely slaughtered. Within the vegan framework seemingly benign mentions of such “food” items like beef, chicken, milk, or bacon amount to flippant references to formerly living beings, at best. More likely such mentions will remind a Conscious Vegan of the barbaric practices of factory farmers and the resulting unimaginable agony faced by farmed animals. For example, a commercial for bacon will force recall of the surgical procedures performed on piglets with no anesthesia that often result in infection and d**h . A Conscious Vegan does not forget about the fact that male chicks of the egg laying variety are tossed in dumpsters to wait to die or that the beaks of chickens are literally cut off to prevent the birds from pecking each other to d**h in the tiny cages in which they are stuffed . Especially women can imagine the sheer anguish faced by dairy cows who are continuously artificially impregnated in order to force production of milk. The calves resulting from these pregnancies are taken away from the mother only a day or two after birth at which point the cow is immediately inseminated again and forced to continue her existence as a milk production factory . In the face of these types of practices, belief in the value of non-human animal life and an empathetic understanding of animals as conscious beings gives rise to a vegan lifestyle. The beliefs in opposition to cruel and exploitive practices are held so strongly that Conscious Vegans are willing to forego deeply ingrained cultural practices multiple times per day on a daily basis. This conformity of daily behavior to deeply held values, rather than subscribing to values that comport with desired behavior, supports the religiousness of vegan convictions. B. Religious Functions Conscious Vegans do not waiver in their convictions or their daily practice even though they are commonly ostracized, their practices rarely accommodated, and their beliefs continuously belittled. The commitment and dedication of Conscious Vegans to their practices can be compared to traditionally religious practitioners. Like traditional religion, Conscious Veganism proscribes rules for daily behavior and is motivated by personal beliefs. This reality gives rise to a level of religiosity of practice that should be afforded legal protection. A commitment to veganism is an identifying and unifying characteristic for people who may otherwise seem to have nothing in common. This categorizing of vegans equates with religious categorization because members are identified by their practices, values, and beliefs. Further comparison can be made of the fact that, like devoutly religious individuals, Conscious Vegans are committed to their convictions. The strength of these convictions is demonstrated by the fact that vegan morals are not popular and are generally dismissed without consideration. Still, Vegans are committed to their beliefs even though they are not commonly shared by non-adherents and are even widely criticized and publicly disparaged. For whatever reason, proud anti-vegans are often compelled to publicize their rejection of the seemingly innocent individual practice. It is sadly ironic for a Conscious Vegan to realize that their fundamental commitment to the belief that it is wrong to hoard, gruesomely torture, and inhumanely slaughter any of God's creatures faces such loud public disapproval. Anti-vegans aggressively display their views on bumper stickers that say things like, “Save a cow, eat a vegan” or “I love animals, they are delicious” . It is clear that these stickers are hostile towards vegans as demonstrated by the fact that they are not self-expressive statements like, “I love eating meat” or even “I disagree with the practice of veganism”. Even more repugnant to a Conscious Vegan's faith are the bumper stickers that a**ert that God himself is opposed to their choices. For example, “If God didn't want us to eat animals he wouldn't have made them out of meat” or “There's a place for all God's creatures, right next to the potatoes”. These emotionally-charged references to the idea that God has an opinion on veganism indicate that a vegan lifestyle is more than a dietary and lifestyle practice and comports with the idea of veganism as its own religion deserving of legal protection. It additionally demonstrates the factor of righteousness existing both opposing and supporting vegan practices. The hostility faced by vegans, and the emotionally-compelled rejection of their beliefs, is also exemplified by a poignant and well-timed experience of the author of this paper: While waiting for cla** to begin at Pepperdine Law School, a student loudly a**erted that, “all vegans should be extinct”, clearly delighted by his not-so-witty remark . To add insult to injury no apology was made when offense was expressed. Certainly shouting that any other category of individual, who may very well be present in the room, should be dead because of their values, beliefs or food choices would not be accepted in a law school cla**room. The attacks to which vegans are subject while minding their own business in food-free environments provides further indication that they are deserving of legal protection. While the onslaught of impolite comments on personal eating habits and choices is bizarre and annoying, Conscious Vegans are more concerned by the reality that their way of life could be obstructed and prohibited, even by government actors, since it has not been established as qualifying for legal protection. Only two a**ertions of veganism itself as a religion have been heard by the courts. In Chenzira v. Cincinnati Children's Hospital a U.S. district court for the Southern District of Ohio denied a motion for summary judgment based on its determination that it is plausible that veganism is a religion. The issue was not further adjudicated because the parties settled out of court. In another instance, veganism as religion was expressly rejected by California Court of Appeal in Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group . C. Decisions of the Courts Regarding Veganism as a religion 1. Possibility of Religious Protection: Chenzira v. Cincinnati Children's Hospital The plausibility of veganism qualifying as a religion deserving of Constitutional protection was recognized by a Sixth Circuit District Court in Chenzira v. Cincinnati Children's Hospital . The plaintiff, Sakile Chenzira, is a practicing vegan whose beliefs prohibit the ingestion or consumption of products derived from animals . Chenzira's vegan belief system prevents her from being willing to receiving a flu vaccine because the vaccine contains egg products. As a result of her convictions, Chenzira refrained from vaccination notwithstanding the fact that her employer, Cincinnati Children's Hospital, required that all employees receive flu vaccinations . The hospital had accommodated Chenzira's practice of abstaining from such vaccination in the past, however in 2010 the hospital terminated her employment as a result of her failure to comply with the vaccination requirement . Chenzira brought suit against the hospital alleging, in relevant part, religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) . In response the hospital filed a motion to dismiss a**erting that Chenzira failed to sufficiently plead a religion protected by religious discrimination laws. In the motion, the hospital alleges that she pled no more than a dietary preference or social philosophy for what she consumes because her claim of holding a bona-fide religious belief lacks an evidentiary basis . As noted and applied by the Chenzira Court, when there is a question as to whether a practice or belief qualifies as religious under Title VII, the appropriate inquiry is whether the moral or ethical beliefs are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views, as enunciated in Seeger and Welsh . In her memo contra to the hospital's motion to dismiss Chenzira a**erts that her practice of veganism qualifies as religious under this standard. In doing so she points out that neither Seeger nor Welsh subscribed to any traditional religious belief system or practice and thus their conscientious objection to war is comparable to her beliefs . Chenzira additionally sought to establish a biblical foundation for her beliefs and practices. She references Deuteronomy, Chapters 14 and 15; Leviticus, Chapters 17 and 18; and Exodus, Chapter 20, along with an essay entitled “The Biblical Basis of Veganism” (Essay) in support of her claim of religiosity. In doing so she attempts to highlight that there is a foundation for vegan practices found in The Old Testament, a traditionally religious Judeo-Christian source . The Court considered Chenzira's claims in light of the well established guidelines for deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, namely that (1) all well-pleaded facts must be construed liberally in favor of the party opposing the motion, and (2) a complaint survives a motion to dismiss when the factual matter, accepted as true, is sufficient to state a plausible claim to relief . Within this framework the Court applied the Seeger/Welsh standard and determined that it is “plausible that [Chazira] could subscribe to veganism with a sincerity equating that of traditional religious views” and thus denied the motion to dismiss . In its decision, the Court distinguishes a sixth circuit ruling, Spies v. Voinovich, in which denial of a Buddhist prisoner's request for a vegan diet was upheld. In Spies, the prisoner himself concedes that a vegan diet is not a requirement of his faith and therefore the vegetarian diet he was provided was deemed adequate. The facts clearly distinguish the prisoner's dietary request from Chazira's a**ertion of veganism as a foundational religious belief . Chazira's claim for religious protection for her vegan beliefs and practices was not further adjudicated because the parties settled out of court for an undisclosed amount . A similar factual scenario, however, was presented to a California Court of Appeal in Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Group, a case in which the claim for veganism as religion was barely considered but expressly rejected . 2. Rejection of Veganism as Religion: Friedman v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group Jerry Friedman is a strict vegan who labels what he considers to be his religion “Ethical Veganism”. As an ethical vegan, Friedman believes “all living beings must be valued equally” . These beliefs include that “it is immoral and unethical for humans to k** or exploit animals, even for food, clothing and the testing of product safety for humans.” According to the values he espouses and the resulting intensive lifestyle requirements Friedman would likely identify as a Conscious Vegan. Like Chazira, who was willing to forfeit her employment in order to prevent having animal products injected into her blood stream, Friedman lost an offer for employment because of his sincere and deeply held beliefs . Friedman was hired as a computer contractor by Kaiser Permanente Medical Group (Kaiser) in a capacity that would never place him in contact with patients. His employment offer was withdrawn, however, when he refused to receive a mumps vaccine because it is grown in chicken embryos and thus offends his religious convictions. Given that the recession of the offer resulted from a commitment to the body of beliefs that served as religion in his life, Friedman brought suit under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) . Friedman's genuine a**ertion of religious practice was not even contemplated by a trial court because Kaiser's general demurrrer was sustained without leave to amend and the The California Court of Appeal, for the Second District, Division 5 (“Court”) affirmed after hardly considering the claim. Friedman brought suit under the FEHA for religious creed discrimination. The FEHA and corresponding regulation, reported in California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 7293.1 (“7293.1”), clearly provide a definition of “religious creed” under FEHA's prohibition on discrimination based on a religious creed. This definition closely echoes the long established rule enunciated in SEEGER/WELSH in its a**ertion that: “‘Religious creed' includes any traditionally recognized religion as well as beliefs, observances, or practices which an individual sincerely holds and which occupy in his or her life a place of importance parallel to that of traditionally recognized religions.” After the Court describes this regulation, and references its basis in the Seeger and Welsh opinions, it reports that Friedman's claim for religious protection comports with Regulation 7293.1. It then enunciates the settled principle that “the interpretation of a statute by an agency charged with its administration is entitled to great weight”. The Court then qualifies the precedential effect of such interpretations with a brief acknowledgment that “final responsibility for interpretation of the statute rests with the courts”, a grant of power the Friedman Court takes full advantage over . Instead of focusing its inquiry to the meaning of the statute and/or regulation referenced above, the opinion launches into a meandering report of all sorts of many legal precedents relating to the definition of religion in contexts other than employment. It begins with California authority: “These California decisions point away from a strictly theistic definition of religion” . It then acknowledges that California courts have consistently looked to federal authority and begins another winding summary of precedent. The courts thorough report of precedent does not include any reference to how the court intends to apply what it describes or its relation to the claim or facts of the case. The opinion does nothing more than quote precedent for fifteen pages until it arrives at the question of what the meaning of religion is under the FEHA. In answering this question, the court simply states that it will apply the test from the concurring opinion in Malnak because a “test by an*logy to mainstream religions” it is the “best objective method” . The idea that comparison to other religions is objective rather than subjective is a**erted but not defended by the Court. The Malnak test is not used directly to determine religiosity under the FEHA but rather a**erts that the best way to determine “whether an FEHA claimant's ‘beliefs, observances, or practices' have ‘a place of importance parallel to that of traditionally recognized religions,' as required by regulation 7293.1, is to utilize the objective an*lysis in Africa, Wiggins, Alvarado, and Meyers”. Namely: “First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a religion is comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-system as opposed to an isolated teaching. Third, a religion often can be recognized by the presence of certain formal and external signs.” It enunciates this test on the last page of the opinion. Prior to identifying this test the court a**erts that an an*lysis to determine “parallel” beliefs should center around an inquiry of “what belief systems typify traditionally recognized religions.” The Court provides no reasoning for its conclusion that a parallel belief is a belief of the same “type” or its flagrant disregard of Supreme Court precedent that parallel beliefs are those “held with the strength of traditional religious convictions” as the Friedman court itself quoted earlier in its opinion. And even Malnak itself: Presumably beliefs holding the same important position for members of one of the new religions as the traditional faith holds for more orthodox believers are entitled to the same treatment as the traditional beliefs. T In focusing on types of beliefs, the Court fails to recognize that Constitutional Protection of Religion is meant to protect sincere beliefs and the practices resulting from them. Use of the third prong of Malnak to disqualify non-traditional types of beliefs easily amounts to a judicially sanctioned violations because religious beliefs of other faiths are used as legal measures. For example the courts consideration of Friedman's lack of a “functional equivalent” of the Ten Commandments or an historically religious text amounts to a government endorsement of the righteousness of those items to the exclusion of any faith relying on the longer established methods of oral tradition or spiritual intuition. The reliance on markers of traditional faiths proscribed enables courts to discredit nontraditional beliefs with conclusory statements and precludes a fair legal an*lysis. This is exemplified by the fact that the Court dismisses Friedman's claim in less than one page of its lengthy opinion with conclusory statements that 1) the beliefs system does not consider ultimate questions, 2) it reflects a moral and secular philosophy rather than religious and 3) no formal or external signs are present. D. Conclusion As this paper discusses at length, veganism can and does function as a religion in the lives of many. Vegan practices benefit everyone through fewer emissions, less water used, and less strain on the medical system. There is no objective reason to deny the religious claim of veganism and therefore it is frightening how quickly a genuine a**ertion of religiosity can be casually dismissed by a U.S. Court, as it was in Friedman. As veganism is becoming a growing trend with more and more people making the life-altering switch it is hoped that the courts will revisit the claim of veganism as a religion and grant it the Constitutional protections it deserves. REFERENCES: U.S. Const. amend. I. Legal Information Institute, Establishment Clause, Cornell University Law School, 3/13/14. . Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 578, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2651, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992). Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993) Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More Frequently to Dictionary, and Not Just for Big Words, The New York Times – U.S., 3/18/14 < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/us/14bar.html?_r=0> Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More Frequently to Dictionary, and Not Just for Big Words, Religion, Merriam-Webster Online, 3/18/14 < http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/religion>. Religion, Dictionary.com, 3/11/14 . Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. Rev. 123, 149 & 166. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, 153 (1991) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Freedom of Religion at the University of Virginia, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 957, 958 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1969)) Id. Id. (quoting Richard Emery Roberts, Excerpts from The Age of Reason, in Selected Writings of Thomas Paine 362 (1945)). “Thomas Paine” Donna D. Page, Veganism and Sincerely Held "Religious" Beliefs in the Workplace: No Protection Without Definition, 7 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 363, 364 (2005). David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 791, 811 (2002). Id. at 812. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). Id. at 88. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965). Id. at 164-165. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (2000). 380 U.S. 163, 170. Friedman v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, 102 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2002). Id. at 69. Id. Id. Id. at 60. Id. Global Evangelical Church, Core Christian Values of the Global Evangelical church . Friedman, 102 Cal. App. 4th at 60. Sandy Pukel, Vegans vs Vegetarian – Comparing these Healthy Diets, online Id. Id. Id. Id. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Vaccines, Blood & Biologics, Culinary Schools, Veganism & The Environment by the Numbers, Id. Id. Id. Id. NursingDegree.net, 57 Health Benefits of Going Vegan . Kathy, Freston, A Vegan Diet (Hugely) Helpful Against Cancer, 12/09/12 This a**ertion based on the extremely comprehensive China Study. Documentary Film: Vegucated, 2010, available on Netflix. Id. Id. Zazzle.com, Anti-Vegetarian Bumper Stickers, Personal Experience of Laura Laskey at Pepperdine Law School, 6:15 pm, 4/14/2014 Chenzira v. Cincinnati Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 1:11-CV-00917, 2012 WL 6721098 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2012) Friedman, 102 Cal. App. 4th. Chenzira v. Cincinnati Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 1:11-CV-00917, 2012 WL 6721098 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2012) Id. Id.; Janice Lloyd, Some health care workers don't want to get the flu vaccine for medical or religious reasons, USA Today, Online < http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/16/mandatory-flu-shot-nurses/1832813/> Chenzira, 1:11-CV-00917, 2012 WL 6721098 Id. Sakile S. CHENZIRA, Plaintiff, v. CINCINNATI CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant., 2012 WL 6858145 (S.D.Ohio) Code of Federal Regulations, § 1605.1 “Religious” nature of a practice or belief, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1; American Law Reports, Validity, construction, and application of provisions of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) and implementing regulations, making religious discrimination in employment unlawful, 22 A.L.R. Fed. 580 (Originally published in 1975). Chenzira v. Cincinnati Children's Hospital, 2012 WL 6858146 (S.D.Ohio). Id. Chenzira, 1:11-CV-00917, 2012 WL 6721098 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)), Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Products, 577 F.3d 625, 629–30 (6th Cir.2009), quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, (2007)) Id. Chenzira, 1:11-CV-00917, 2012 WL 6721098 (citing Spies, 173 F.3d at 407) Ben James, Hospital Settles Religious Bias Suit Over Veganism, Law360 . Friedman v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, 102 Cal. App. 4th 39 (2002). Friedman at 102 Cal. App. 4th at 44, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665 (quoting from plaintiff's original complaint). Id. Friedman, 102 Cal. App. 4th at 44, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 666. Id. This view is echoed in < > who states “the Friedman court dismissed the plaintiff's claim almost casually” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 7293.1 (2002). Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 102 Cal. App. 4th 39, 46, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 667 (2002) (Woods v. Superior Court (1981) 28 Cal.3d 668, 679, 170 Cal.Rptr. 484, 620 P.2d 1032; Morris v. Williams (1967) 67 Cal.2d 733, 748, 63 Cal.Rptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697.) Id. at 669. Id. at 66. Africa v. Com. of Pa., supra, 662 F.2d at p. 1032. Welsh @ 337/850