Immanuel Kant - The Critique of Pure Reason; Part 28 lyrics

SECTION III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis This critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts to extend The bounds of knowledge, by means of pure speculation, are utterly Fruitless. So much the wider field, it may appear, lies open to Hypothesis; as, where we cannot know with certainty, we are at liberty To make guesses and to form suppositions Imagination may be allowed, under the strict surveillance of reason To invent suppositions; but, these must be based on something that is Perfectly certain--and that is the possibility of the object. If we Are well a**ured upon this point, it is allowable to have recourse to Supposition in regard to the reality of the object; but this supposition Must, unless it is utterly groundless, be connected, as its ground of Explanation, with that which is really given and absolutely certain Such a supposition is termed a hypothesis It is beyond our power to form the least conception a priori of the Possibility of dynamical connection in phenomena; and the category Of the pure understanding will not enable us to excogitate any such Connection, but merely helps us to understand it, when we meet with It in experience. For this reason we cannot, in accordance with the Categories, imagine or invent any object or any property of an object Not given, or that may not be given in experience, and employ it in a Hypothesis; otherwise, we should be basing our chain of reasoning upon Mere chimerical fancies, and not upon conceptions of things. Thus, we Have no right to a**ume the existence of new powers, not existing in Nature--for example, an understanding with a non-sensuous intuition A force of attraction without contact, or some new kind of substances Occupying space, and yet without the property of impenetrability--and Consequently, we cannot a**ume that there is any other kind of community Among substances than that observable in experience, any kind of Presence than that in space, or any kind of duration than that in time In one word, the conditions of possible experience are for reason the Only conditions of the possibility of things; reason cannot venture To form, independently of these conditions, any conceptions of things Because such conceptions, although not self-contradictory, are without Object and without application The conceptions of reason are, as we have already shown, mere ideas, and Do not relate to any object in any kind of experience. At the same time They do not indicate imaginary or possible objects. They are purely Problematical in their nature and, as aids to the heuristic exercise Of the faculties, form the basis of the regulative principles for the Systematic employment of the understanding in the field of experience If we leave this ground of experience, they become mere fictions of Thought, the possibility of which is quite indemonstrable; and they Cannot, consequently, be employed as hypotheses in the explanation of Real phenomena. It is quite admissible to cogitate the soul as simple For the purpose of enabling ourselves to employ the idea of a perfect And necessary unity of all the faculties of the mind as the principle Of all our inquiries into its internal phenomena, although we cannot Cognize this unity in concreto. But to a**ume that the soul is a simple Substance (a transcendental conception) would be enouncing a proposition Which is not only indemonstrable--as many physical hypotheses are--but A proposition which is purely arbitrary, and in the highest degree rash The simple is never presented in experience; and, if by substance is Here meant the permanent object of sensuous intuition, the possibility Of a simple phenomenon is perfectly inconceivable. Reason affords no Good grounds for admitting the existence of intelligible beings, or Of intelligible properties of sensuous things, although--as we have no Conception either of their possibility or of their impossibility--it Will always be out of our power to affirm dogmatically that they do not Exist. In the explanation of given phenomena, no other things and no Other grounds of explanation can be employed than those which stand In connection with the given phenomena according to the known laws of Experience. A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere idea of reason Is employed to explain the phenomena of nature, would not give us any Better insight into a phenomenon, as we should be trying to explain what We do not sufficiently understand from known empirical principles, by What we do not understand at all. The principles of such a hypothesis Might conduce to the satisfaction of reason, but it would not a**ist The understanding in its application to objects. Order and conformity to Aims in the sphere of nature must be themselves explained upon natural Grounds and according to natural laws; and the wildest hypotheses, if They are only physical, are here more admissible than a hyperphysical Hypothesis, such as that of a divine author. For such a hypothesis would Introduce the principle of ignava ratio, which requires us to give Up the search for causes that might be discovered in the course of Experience and to rest satisfied with a mere idea. As regards the Absolute totality of the grounds of explanation in the series of these Causes, this can be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of Phenomena; because, as they are to us nothing more than phenomena, we Have no right to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis of The series of their conditions Transcendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible; and we cannot Use the liberty of employing, in the absence of physical, hyperphysical Grounds of explanation. And this for two reasons; first, because such Hypothesis do not advance reason, but rather stop it in its progress; Secondly, because this licence would render fruitless all its exertions In its own proper sphere, which is that of experience. For, when the Explanation of natural phenomena happens to be difficult, we have Constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation, which lifts Us above the necessity of investigating nature; and our inquiries are Brought to a close, not because we have obtained all the Requisite knowledge, but because we abut upon a principle which is Incomprehensible and which, indeed, is so far back in the track of Thought as to contain the conception of the absolutely primal being The next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its Sufficiency. That is, it must determine a priori the consequences Which are given in experience and which are supposed to follow from the Hypothesis itself. If we require to employ auxiliary hypotheses, the Suspicion naturally arises that they are mere fictions; because the Necessity for each of them requires the same justification as in the Case of the original hypothesis, and thus their testimony is invalid If we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect cause, we possess Sufficient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to aims, the Order and the greatness which we observe in the universe; but we Find ourselves obliged, when we observe the evil in the world and the Exceptions to these laws, to employ new hypothesis in support of the Original one. We employ the idea of the simple nature of the human soul As the foundation of all the theories we may form of its phenomena; but When we meet with difficulties in our way, when we observe in the soul Phenomena similar to the changes which take place in matter, we require To call in new auxiliary hypotheses. These may, indeed, not be false But we do not know them to be true, because the only witness to their Certitude is the hypothesis which they themselves have been called in to Explain We are not discussing the above-mentioned a**ertions regarding the Immaterial unity of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being as Dogmata, which certain philosophers profess to demonstrate a priori, but Purely as hypotheses. In the former case, the dogmatist must take care That his arguments possess the apodeictic certainty of a demonstration For the a**ertion that the reality of such ideas is probable is as Absurd as a proof of the probability of a proposition in geometry. Pure Abstract reason, apart from all experience, can either cognize nothing At all; and hence the judgements it enounces are never mere opinions They are either apodeictic certainties, or declarations that nothing can Be known on the subject. Opinions and probable judgements on the nature Of things can only be employed to explain given phenomena, or they may Relate to the effect, in accordance with empirical laws, of an actually Existing cause. In other words, we must restrict the sphere of opinion To the world of experience and nature. Beyond this region opinion is Mere invention; unless we are groping about for the truth on a path not Yet fully known, and have some hopes of stumbling upon it by chance But, although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the questions Of pure speculative reason, they may be employed in the defence of these Answers. That is to say, hypotheses are admissible in polemic, but Not in the sphere of dogmatism. By the defence of statements of this Character, I do not mean an attempt at discovering new grounds for their Support, but merely the refutation of the arguments of opponents. All a Priori synthetical propositions possess the peculiarity that, although The philosopher who maintains the reality of the ideas contained in the Proposition is not in possession of sufficient knowledge to establish The certainty of his statements, his opponent is as little able to prove The truth of the opposite. This equality of fortune does not allow The one party to be superior to the other in the sphere of speculative Cognition; and it is this sphere, accordingly, that is the proper arena Of these endless speculative conflicts. But we shall afterwards show That, in relation to its practical exercise, Reason has the right of Admitting what, in the field of pure speculation, she would not be Justified in supposing, except upon perfectly sufficient grounds; Because all such suppositions destroy the necessary completeness of Speculation--a condition which the practical reason, however, does not Consider to be requisite. In this sphere, therefore, Reason is Mistress of a possession, her title to which she does not require to Prove--which, in fact, she could not do. The burden of proof accordingly Rests upon the opponent. But as he has just as little knowledge Regarding the subject discussed, and is as little able to prove the Non-existence of the object of an idea, as the philosopher on the other Side is to demonstrate its reality, it is evident that there is an Advantage on the side of the philosopher who maintains his proposition As a practically necessary supposition (melior est conditio Possidentis). For he is at liberty to employ, in self-defence, the same Weapons as his opponent makes use of in attacking him; that is, he has a Right to use hypotheses not for the purpose of supporting the arguments In favour of his own propositions, but to show that his opponent knows No more than himself regarding the subject under 'discussion and cannot Boast of any speculative advantage Hypotheses are, therefore, admissible in the sphere of pure reason Only as weapons for self-defence, and not as supports to dogmatical Assertions. But the opposing party we must always seek for in ourselves For speculative reason is, in the sphere of transcendentalism Dialectical in its own nature. The difficulties and objections we have To fear lie in ourselves. They are like old but never superannuated Claims; and we must seek them out, and settle them once and for ever, if We are to expect a permanent peace. External tranquility is hollow and Unreal. The root of these contradictions, which lies in the nature of Human reason, must be destroyed; and this can only be done by giving it In the first instance, freedom to grow, nay, by nourishing it, that it May send out shoots, and thus betray its own existence. It is our duty Therefore, to try to discover new objections, to put weapons in the Bands of our opponent, and to grant him the most favourable position In the arena that he can wish. We have nothing to fear from these Concessions; on the contrary, we may rather hope that we shall thus Make ourselves master of a possession which no one will ever venture to Dispute The thinker requires, to be fully equipped, the hypotheses of pure Reason, which, although but leaden weapons (for they have not been Steeled in the armoury of experience), are as useful as any that can Be employed by his opponents. If, accordingly, we have a**umed, from a Non-speculative point of view, the immaterial nature of the soul, and Are met by the objection that experience seems to prove that the growth And decay of our mental faculties are mere modifications of the sensuous Organism--we can weaken the force of this objection by the a**umption That the body is nothing but the fundamental phenomenon, to which, as A necessary condition, all sensibility, and consequently all thought Relates in the present state of our existence; and that the separation Of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous exercise of our Power of cognition and the beginning of the intellectual. The body Would, in this view of the question, be regarded, not as the cause of Thought, but merely as its restrictive condition, as promotive of the Sensuous and animal, but as a hindrance to the pure and spiritual life; And the dependence of the animal life on the constitution of the body Would not prove that the whole life of man was also dependent on the State of the organism. We might go still farther, and discover new Objections, or carry out to their extreme consequences those which have Already been adduced Generation, in the human race as well as among the irrational animals Depends on so many accidents--of occasion, of proper sustenance, of the Laws enacted by the government of a country of vice even, that it is Difficult to believe in the eternal existence of a being whose life has Begun under circumstances so mean and trivial, and so entirely dependent Upon our own control. As regards the continuance of the existence of the Whole race, we need have no difficulties, for accident in single cases Is subject to general laws; but, in the case of each individual, it Would seem as if we could hardly expect so wonderful an effect from Causes so insignificant. But, in answer to these objections, we May adduce the transcendental hypothesis that all life is properly Intelligible, and not subject to changes of time, and that it neither Began in birth, nor will end in d**h. We may a**ume that this life is Nothing more than a sensuous representation of pure spiritual life; that The whole world of sense is but an image, hovering before the faculty of Cognition which we exercise in this sphere, and with no more objective Reality than a dream; and that if we could intuite ourselves and Other things as they really are, we should see ourselves in a world of Spiritual natures, our connection with which did not begin at our birth And will not cease with the destruction of the body. And so on We cannot be said to know what has been above a**erted, nor do we Seriously maintain the truth of these a**ertions; and the notions Therein indicated are not even ideas of reason, they are purely Fictitious conceptions. But this hypothetical procedure is in perfect Conformity with the laws of reason. Our opponent mistakes the absence Of empirical conditions for a proof of the complete impossibility of all That we have a**erted; and we have to show him that he has not exhausted The whole sphere of possibility and that he can as little compa** that Sphere by the laws of experience and nature, as we can lay a secure Foundation for the operations of reason beyond the region of experience Such hypothetical defences against the pretensions of an opponent must Not be regarded as declarations of opinion. The philosopher abandons Them, so soon as the opposite party renounces its dogmatical conceit To maintain a simply negative position in relation to propositions which Rest on an insecure foundation, well befits the moderation of a true Philosopher; but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as Proofs of the opposite statement is a proceeding just as unwarrantable And arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who Advances affirmative propositions regarding such a subject It is evident, therefore, that hypotheses, in the speculative sphere Are valid, not as independent propositions, but only relatively to Opposite transcendent a**umptions. For, to make the principles of Possible experience conditions of the possibility of things in general Is just as transcendent a procedure as to maintain the objective reality Of ideas which can be applied to no objects except such as lie without The limits of possible experience. The judgements enounced by pure Reason must be necessary, or they must not be enounced at all. Reason Cannot trouble herself with opinions. But the hypotheses we have been Discussing are merely problematical judgements, which can neither be Confuted nor proved; while, therefore, they are not personal opinions They are indispensable as answers to objections which are liable to Be raised. But we must take care to confine them to this function And guard against any a**umption on their part of absolute validity, a Proceeding which would involve reason in inextricable difficulties and Contradictions SECTION IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs It is a peculiarity, which distinguishes the proofs of transcendental Synthetical propositions from those of all other a priori synthetical Cognitions, that reason, in the case of the former, does not apply its Conceptions directly to an object, but is first obliged to prove, a Priori, the objective validity of these conceptions and the possibility Of their syntheses. This is not merely a prudential rule, it is Essential to the very possibility of the proof of a transcendental Proposition. If I am required to pa**, a priori, beyond the conception Of an object, I find that it is utterly impossible without the guidance Of something which is not contained in the conception. In mathematics It is a priori intuition that guides my synthesis; and, in this case All our conclusions may be drawn immediately from pure intuition In transcendental cognition, so long as we are dealing only with Conceptions of the understanding, we are guided by possible experience That is to say, a proof in the sphere of transcendental cognition does Not show that the given conception (that of an event, for example) leads Directly to another conception (that of a cause)--for this would be a Saltus which nothing can justify; but it shows that experience itself And consequently the object of experience, is impossible without the Connection indicated by these conceptions. It follows that such a Proof must demonstrate the possibility of arriving, synthetically and a Priori, at a certain knowledge of things, which was not contained in our Conceptions of these things. Unless we pay particular attention to this Requirement, our proofs, instead of pursuing the straight path indicated By reason, follow the tortuous road of mere subjective a**ociation. The Illusory conviction, which rests upon subjective causes of a**ociation And which is considered as resulting from the perception of a real and Objective natural affinity, is always open to doubt and suspicion For this reason, all the attempts which have been made to prove the Principle of sufficient reason, have, according to the universal Admission of philosophers, been quite unsuccessful; and, before the Appearance of transcendental criticism, it was considered better, as This principle could not be abandoned, to appeal boldly to the common Sense of mankind (a proceeding which always proves that the problem Which reason ought to solve, is one in which philosophers find great Difficulties), rather than attempt to discover new dogmatical proofs But, if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure reason And if I aim at pa**ing beyond my empirical conceptions by the aid of Mere ideas, it is necessary that the proof should first show that such A step in synthesis is possible (which it is not), before it proceeds To prove the truth of the proposition itself. The so-called proof of The simple nature of the soul from the unity of apperception, is a very Plausible one. But it contains no answer to the objection, that, as The notion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which is directly Applicable to a perception, but is an idea which must be inferred--if At all--from observation, it is by no means evident how the mere fact of Consciousness, which is contained in all thought, although in so far a Simple representation, can conduct me to the consciousness and cognition Of a thing which is purely a thinking substance. When I represent to my Mind the power of my body as in motion, my body in this thought is so Far absolute unity, and my representation of it is a simple one; and Hence I can indicate this representation by the motion of a point Because I have made abstraction of the size or volume of the body. But I cannot hence infer that, given merely the moving power of a body The body may be cogitated as simple substance, merely because the Representation in my mind takes no account of its content in space, and Is consequently simple. The simple, in abstraction, is very different From the objectively simple; and hence the Ego, which is simple in the First sense, may, in the second sense, as indicating the soul itself Be a very complex conception, with a very various content. Thus it is Evident that in all such arguments there lurks a paralogism. We guess (for without some such surmise our suspicion would not be excited In reference to a proof of this character) at the presence of the Paralogism, by keeping ever before us a criterion of the possibility of Those synthetical propositions which aim at proving more than experience Can teach us. This criterion is obtained from the observation that such Proofs do not lead us directly from the subject of the proposition to Be proved to the required predicate, but find it necessary to presuppose The possibility of extending our cognition a priori by means of ideas We must, accordingly, always use the greatest caution; we require Before attempting any proof, to consider how it is possible to extend The sphere of cognition by the operations of pure reason, and from What source we are to derive knowledge, which is not obtained from The an*lysis of conceptions, nor relates, by anticipation, to possible Experience. We shall thus spare ourselves much severe and fruitless Labour, by not expecting from reason what is beyond its power, or rather By subjecting it to discipline, and teaching it to moderate its vehement Desires for the extension of the sphere of cognition The first rule for our guidance is, therefore, not to attempt a Transcendental proof, before we have considered from what source we are To derive the principles upon which the proof is to be based, and what Right we have to expect that our conclusions from these principles will Be veracious. If they are principles of the understanding, it is vain to Expect that we should attain by their means to ideas of pure reason; For these principles are valid only in regard to objects of possible Experience. If they are principles of pure reason, our labour is alike In vain. For the principles of reason, if employed as objective, are Without exception dialectical and possess no validity or truth, except As regulative principles of the systematic employment of reason in Experience. But when such delusive proof are presented to us, it is Our duty to meet them with the non liquet of a matured judgement; and Although we are unable to expose the particular sophism upon which the Proof is based, we have a right to demand a deduction of the principles Employed in it; and, if these principles have their origin in pure Reason alone, such a deduction is absolutely impossible. And thus it Is unnecessary that we should trouble ourselves with the exposure and Confutation of every sophistical illusion; we may, at once, bring all Dialectic, which is inexhaustible in the production of fallacies, before The bar of critical reason, which tests the principles upon which all Dialectical procedure is based. The second peculiarity of transcendental Proof is that a transcendental proposition cannot rest upon more than A single proof. If I am drawing conclusions, not from conceptions, but From intuition corresponding to a conception, be it pure intuition, as In mathematics, or empirical, as in natural science, the intuition which Forms the basis of my inferences presents me with materials for many Synthetical propositions, which I can connect in various modes, while As it is allowable to proceed from different points in the intention, I Can arrive by different paths at the same proposition But every transcendental proposition sets out from a conception And posits the synthetical condition of the possibility of an object According to this conception. There must, therefore, be but one ground Of proof, because it is the conception alone which determines the Object; and thus the proof cannot contain anything more than the Determination of the object according to the conception. In our Transcendental an*lytic, for example, we inferred the principle: Every Event has a cause, from the only condition of the objective possibility Of our conception of an event. This is that an event cannot be Determined in time, and consequently cannot form a part of experience Unless it stands under this dynamical law. This is the only possible Ground of proof; for our conception of an event possesses objective Validity, that is, is a true conception, only because the law of Causality determines an object to which it can refer. Other arguments In support of this principle have been attempted--such as that from the Contingent nature of a phenomenon; but when this argument is considered We can discover no criterion of contingency, except the fact of an Event--of something happening, that is to say, the existence which is Preceded by the non-existence of an object, and thus we fall back on the Very thing to be proved. If the proposition: "Every thinking being is Simple," is to be proved, we keep to the conception of the ego, which Is simple, and to which all thought has a relation. The same is the Case with the transcendental proof of the existence of a Deity, which is Based solely upon the harmony and reciprocal fitness of the conceptions Of an ens realissimum and a necessary being, and cannot be attempted in Any other manner This caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all Propositions of reason. When reason employs conceptions alone, only one Proof of its thesis is possible, if any. When, therefore, the dogmatist Advances with ten arguments in favour of a proposition, we may be sure That not one of them is conclusive. For if he possessed one which proved The proposition he brings forward to demonstration--as must always be The case with the propositions of pure reason--what need is there for Any more? His intention can only be similar to that of the advocate who Had different arguments for different judges; this availing himself of The weakness of those who examine his arguments, who, without going into Any profound investigation, adopt the view of the case which seems most Probable at first sight and decide according to it The third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a proof Is that all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or indirect But always ostensive or direct. The direct or ostensive proof not only Establishes the truth of the proposition to be proved, but exposes the Grounds of its truth; the apagogic, on the other hand, may a**ure us of The truth of the proposition, but it cannot enable us to comprehend The grounds of its possibility. The latter is, accordingly, rather an Auxiliary to an argument, than a strictly philosophical and rational Mode of procedure. In one respect, however, they have an advantage over Direct proofs, from the fact that the mode of arguing by contradiction Which they employ, renders our understanding of the question more Clear, and approximates the proof to the certainty of an intuitional Demonstration The true reason why indirect proofs are employed in different sciences Is this. When the grounds upon which we seek to base a cognition are too Various or too profound, we try whether or not we may not discover The truth of our cognition from its consequences. The modus ponens of Reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the truth of a proposition Would be admissible if all the inferences that can be drawn from it are Known to be true; for in this case there can be only one possible ground For these inferences, and that is the true one. But this is a quite Impracticable procedure, as it surpa**es all our powers to discover all The possible inferences that can be drawn from a proposition. But this Mode of reasoning is employed, under favour, when we wish to prove The truth of an hypothesis; in which case we admit the truth of the Conclusion--which is supported by an*logy--that, if all the inferences We have drawn and examined agree with the proposition a**umed, all Other possible inferences will also agree with it. But, in this way, an Hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth. The modus Tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition Is not only a rigorous, but a very easy mode of proof. For, if it can Be shown that but one inference from a proposition is false, then the Proposition must itself be false. Instead, then, of examining, in an Ostensive argument, the whole series of the grounds on which the Truth of a proposition rests, we need only take the opposite of this Proposition, and if one inference from it be false, then must the Opposite be itself false; and, consequently, the proposition which we Wished to prove must be true The apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where It is impossible to mistake a subjective representation for an objective Cognition. Where this is possible, it is plain that the opposite of a Given proposition may contradict merely the subjective conditions of Thought, and not the objective cognition; or it may happen that both Propositions contradict each other only under a subjective condition Which is incorrectly considered to be objective, and, as the condition Is itself false, both propositions may be false, and it will Consequently, be impossible to conclude the truth of the one from the Falseness of the other In mathematics such subreptions are impossible; and it is in this Science, accordingly, that the indirect mode of proof has its true Place. In the science of nature, where all a**ertion is based upon Empirical intuition, such subreptions may be guarded against by the Repeated comparison of observations; but this mode of proof is of little Value in this sphere of knowledge. But the transcendental efforts of Pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective, which is the Real medium of all dialectical illusion; and thus reason endeavours In its premisses, to impose upon us subjective representations for Objective cognitions. In the transcendental sphere of pure reason Then, and in the case of synthetical propositions, it is inadmissible To support a statement by disproving the counter-statement. For only Two cases are possible; either, the counter-statement is nothing but The enouncement of the inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the Subjective conditions of reason, which does not affect the real case (for example, we cannot comprehend the unconditioned necessity of the Existence of a being, and hence every speculative proof of the existence Of such a being must be opposed on subjective grounds, while the Possibility of this being in itself cannot with justice be denied); or Both propositions, being dialectical in their nature, are based upon an Impossible conception. In this latter case the rule applies: non entis Nulla sunt predicata; that is to say, what we affirm and what we deny Respecting such an object, are equally untrue, and the apagogic mode of Arriving at the truth is in this case impossible. If, for example, we Presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its totality It is false, either that it is infinite, or that it is finite and Limited in space. Both are false, because the hypothesis is false. For The notion of phenomena (as mere representations) which are given in Themselves (as objects) is self-contradictory; and the infinitude of This imaginary whole would, indeed, be unconditioned, but would be Inconsistent (as everything in the phenomenal world is conditioned) With the unconditioned determination and finitude of quantities which is Presupposed in our conception The apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illusions which Have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical Philosophy. It may be compared to a champion who maintains the honour And claims of the party he has adopted by offering battle to all who Doubt the validity of these claims and the purity of that honour; while Nothing can be proved in this way, except the respective strength of the Combatants, and the advantage, in this respect, is always on the side Of the attacking party. Spectators, observing that each party is Alternately conqueror and conquered, are led to regard the subject of Dispute as beyond the power of man to decide upon. But such an opinion Cannot be justified; and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners The remark: Non defensoribus istis Tempus eget Each must try to establish his a**ertions by a transcendental deduction Of the grounds of proof employed in his argument, and thus enable us to See in what way the claims of reason may be supported. If an opponent Bases his a**ertions upon subjective grounds, he may be refuted with Ease; not, however to the advantage of the dogmatist, who likewise Depends upon subjective sources of cognition and is in like manner Driven into a corner by his opponent. But, if parties employ the direct Method of procedure, they will soon discover the difficulty, nay, the Impossibility of proving their a**ertions, and will be forced to appeal To prescription and precedence; or they will, by the help of criticism Discover with ease the dogmatical illusions by which they had been Mocked, and compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to Speculative insight and to confine itself within the limits of its Proper sphere--that of practical principles