Immanuel Kant - The Critique of Pure Reason; Part 27 lyrics

SECTION II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics Reason must be subject, in all its operations, to criticism, which Must always be permitted to exercise its functions without restraint; Otherwise its interests are imperilled and its influence obnoxious to Suspicion. There is nothing, however useful, however sacred it may be That can claim exemption from the searching examination of this supreme Tribunal, which has no respect of persons. The very existence of reason Depends upon this freedom; for the voice of reason is not that of A dictatorial and despotic power, it is rather like the vote of the Citizens of a free state, every member of which must have the privilege Of giving free expression to his doubts, and possess even the right of Veto But while reason can never decline to submit itself to the tribunal of Criticism, it has not always cause to dread the judgement of this court Pure reason, however, when engaged in the sphere of dogmatism, is not so Thoroughly conscious of a strict observance of its highest laws, as to Appear before a higher judicial reason with perfect confidence. On the Contrary, it must renounce its magnificent dogmatical pretensions in Philosophy Very different is the case when it has to defend itself, not before a Judge, but against an equal. If dogmatical a**ertions are advanced on The negative side, in opposition to those made by reason on the positive Side, its justification kat authrhopon is complete, although the proof Of its propositions is kat aletheian unsatisfactory By the polemic of pure reason I mean the defence of its propositions Made by reason, in opposition to the dogmatical counter-propositions Advanced by other parties. The question here is not whether its own Statements may not also be false; it merely regards the fact that Reason proves that the opposite cannot be established with demonstrative Certainty, nor even a**erted with a higher degree of probability. Reason Does not hold her possessions upon sufferance; for, although she cannot Show a perfectly satisfactory title to them, no one can prove that she Is not the rightful possessor It is a melancholy reflection that reason, in its highest exercise Falls into an antithetic; and that the supreme tribunal for the Settlement of differences should not be at union with itself. It is true That we had to discuss the question of an apparent antithetic, but we Found that it was based upon a misconception. In conformity with the Common prejudice, phenomena were regarded as things in themselves, and Thus an absolute completeness in their synthesis was required in the one Mode or in the other (it was shown to be impossible in both); a demand Entirely out of place in regard to phenomena. There was, then, no Real self-contradiction of reason in the propositions: The series of Phenomena given in themselves has an absolutely first beginning; and: This series is absolutely and in itself without beginning. The two Propositions are perfectly consistent with each other, because phenomena As phenomena are in themselves nothing, and consequently the hypothesis That they are things in themselves must lead to self-contradictory Inferences But there are cases in which a similar misunderstanding cannot be Provided against, and the dispute must remain unsettled. Take, for Example, the theistic proposition: There is a Supreme Being; and on the Other hand, the atheistic counter-statement: There exists no Supreme Being; or, in psychology: Everything that thinks possesses the attribute Of absolute and permanent unity, which is utterly different from the Transitory unity of material phenomena; and the counter-proposition: The Soul is not an immaterial unity, and its nature is transitory, like that Of phenomena. The objects of these questions contain no heterogeneous or Contradictory elements, for they relate to things in themselves, and not To phenomena. There would arise, indeed, a real contradiction, if reason Came forward with a statement on the negative side of these questions Alone. As regards the criticism to which the grounds of proof on the Affirmative side must be subjected, it may be freely admitted, without Necessitating the surrender of the affirmative propositions, which have At least, the interest of reason in their favour--an advantage which the Opposite party cannot lay claim to I cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable thinkers--Sulzer Among the rest--that, in spite of the weakness of the arguments hitherto In use, we may hope, one day, to see sufficient demonstrations of the Two cardinal propositions of pure reason--the existence of a Supreme Being, and the immortality of the soul. I am certain, on the contrary That this will never be the case. For on what ground can reason base Such synthetical propositions, which do not relate to the objects Of experience and their internal possibility? But it is also Demonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to maintain the Contrary with the least show of probability. For, as he can attempt such A proof solely upon the basis of pure reason, he is bound to prove That a Supreme Being, and a thinking subject in the character of a pure Intelligence, are impossible. But where will he find the knowledge which Can enable him to enounce synthetical judgements in regard to things Which transcend the region of experience? We may, therefore, rest Assured that the opposite never will be demonstrated. We need not, then Have recourse to scholastic arguments; we may always admit the truth of Those propositions which are consistent with the speculative interests Of reason in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover, the only Means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest. Our Opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic solely, we can Be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to disconcert him; While we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have on our Side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of reason And can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with calm Indifference From this point of view, there is properly no antithetic of pure reason For the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field of Pure theology and psychology; but on this ground there can appear no Combatant whom we need to fear. Ridicule and boasting can be his Only weapons; and these may be laughed at, as mere child's play This consideration restores to Reason her courage; for what source Of confidence could be found, if she, whose vocation it is to destroy Error, were at variance with herself and without any reasonable hope of Ever reaching a state of permanent repose? Everything in nature is good for some purpose. Even poisons are Serviceable; they destroy the evil effects of other poisons generated In our system, and must always find a place in every complete Pharmacopoeia. The objections raised against the fallacies and Sophistries of speculative reason, are objections given by the nature Of this reason itself, and must therefore have a destination and Purpose which can only be for the good of humanity. For what purpose has Providence raised many objects, in which we have the deepest interest So far above us, that we vainly try to cognize them with certainty, and Our powers of mental vision are rather excited than satisfied by the Glimpses we may chance to seize? It is very doubtful whether it is for Our benefit to advance bold affirmations regarding subjects involved In such obscurity; perhaps it would even be detrimental to our best Interests. But it is undoubtedly always beneficial to leave the Investigating, as well as the critical reason, in perfect freedom, and Permit it to take charge of its own interests, which are advanced as Much by its limitation, as by its extension of its views, and which Always suffer by the interference of foreign powers forcing it, against Its natural tendencies, to bend to certain preconceived designs Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, and combat him Only with the weapons of reason. Have no anxiety for the practical Interests of humanity--these are never imperilled in a purely Speculative dispute. Such a dispute serves merely to disclose the Antinomy of reason, which, as it has its source in the nature of Reason, ought to be thoroughly investigated. Reason is benefited by the Examination of a subject on both sides, and its judgements are corrected By being limited. It is not the matter that may give occasion to Dispute, but the manner. For it is perfectly permissible to employ In the presence of reason, the language of a firmly rooted faith, even After we have been obliged to renounce all pretensions to knowledge If we were to ask the dispa**ionate David Hume--a philosopher endowed In a degree that few are, with a well-balanced judgement: What motive Induced you to spend so much labour and thought in undermining the Consoling and beneficial persuasion that reason is capable of a**uring Us of the existence, and presenting us with a determinate conception Of a Supreme Being?--his answer would be: Nothing but the desire of Teaching reason to know its own powers better, and, at the same time, a Dislike of the procedure by which that faculty was compelled to support Foregone conclusions, and prevented from confessing the internal Weaknesses which it cannot but feel when it enters upon a rigid Self-examination. If, on the other hand, we were to ask Priestley--a Philosopher who had no taste for transcendental speculation, but was Entirely devoted to the principles of empiricism--what his motives were For overturning those two main pillars of religion--the doctrines of The freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul (in his view The hope of a future life is but the expectation of the miracle of Resurrection)--this philosopher, himself a zealous and pious teacher of Religion, could give no other answer than this: I acted in the interest Of reason, which always suffers, when certain objects are explained And judged by a reference to other supposed laws than those of material Nature--the only laws which we know in a determinate manner. It would be Unfair to decry the latter philosopher, who endeavoured to harmonize his Paradoxical opinions with the interests of religion, and to undervalue An honest and reflecting man, because he finds himself at a loss the Moment he has left the field of natural science. The same grace must be Accorded to Hume, a man not less well-disposed, and quite as blameless In his moral character, and who pushed his abstract speculations to an Extreme length, because, as he rightly believed, the object of them lies Entirely beyond the bounds of natural science, and within the sphere of Pure ideas What is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in the Present case to menace the best interests of humanity? The course to be Pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain and natural One. Let each thinker pursue his own path; if he shows talent, if he Gives evidence of profound thought, in one word, if he shows that he Possesses the power of reasoning--reason is always the gainer. If you Have recourse to other means, if you attempt to coerce reason, if you Raise the cry of treason to humanity, if you excite the feelings of The crowd, which can neither understand nor sympathize with such subtle Speculations--you will only make yourselves ridiculous. For the question Does not concern the advantage or disadvantage which we are expected To reap from such inquiries; the question is merely how far reason can Advance in the field of speculation, apart from all kinds of interest And whether we may depend upon the exertions of speculative reason, or Must renounce all reliance on it. Instead of joining the combatants It is your part to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle--a laborious Struggle for the parties engaged, but attended, in its progress as Well as in its result, with the most advantageous consequences for The interests of thought and knowledge. It is absurd to expect to be Enlightened by Reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what Side of the question she must adopt. Moreover, reason is sufficiently Held in check by its own power, the limits imposed on it by its own Nature are sufficient; it is unnecessary for you to place over it Additional guards, as if its power were dangerous to the constitution of The intellectual state. In the dialectic of reason there is no victory Gained which need in the least disturb your tranquility The strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason, and we cannot but wish That it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect freedom which Ought to be its essential condition. In this case, we should have had at An earlier period a matured and profound criticism, which must have Put an end to all dialectical disputes, by exposing the illusions and Prejudices in which they originated There is in human nature an unworthy propensity--a propensity which Like everything that springs from nature, must in its final purpose be Conducive to the good of humanity--to conceal our real sentiments, and To give expression only to certain received opinions, which are regarded As at once safe and promotive of the common good. It is true, this Tendency, not only to conceal our real sentiments, but to profess those Which may gain us favour in the eyes of society, has not only civilized But, in a certain measure, moralized us; as no one can break through the Outward covering of respectability, honour, and morality, and thus The seemingly-good examples which we which we see around us form an Excellent school for moral improvement, so long as our belief in Their genuineness remains unshaken. But this disposition to represent Ourselves as better than we are, and to utter opinions which are not Our own, can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary arrangement Of nature to lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized state, and to Teach us how to a**ume at least the appearance and manner of the good we See. But when true principles have been developed, and have obtained a Sure foundation in our habit of thought, this conventionalism must Be attacked with earnest vigour, otherwise it corrupts the heart, and Checks the growth of good dispositions with the mischievous weed of air Appearances I am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresentation and Hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion, where there is less Temptation to restrain the free expression of thought. For what can be More prejudicial to the interests of intelligence than to falsify our Real sentiments, to conceal the doubts which we feel in regard to our Statements, or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof which we Well know to be insufficient? So long as mere personal vanity is the Source of these unworthy artifices--and this is generally the case In speculative discussions, which are mostly destitute of practical Interest, and are incapable of complete demonstration--the vanity of The opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side; and thus the Result is the same, although it is not brought about so soon as if the Dispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright spirit. But Where the ma** entertains the notion that the aim of certain subtle Speculators is nothing less than to shake the very foundations of public Welfare and morality--it seems not only prudent, but even praise worthy To maintain the good cause by illusory arguments, rather than to give to Our supposed opponents the advantage of lowering our declarations to the Moderate tone of a merely practical conviction, and of compelling us to Confess our inability to attain to apodeictic certainty in speculative Subjects. But we ought to reflect that there is nothing, in the World more fatal to the maintenance of a good cause than deceit Misrepresentation, and falsehood. That the strictest laws of honesty Should be observed in the discussion of a purely speculative subject is The least requirement that can be made. If we could reckon with security Even upon so little, the conflict of speculative reason regarding the Important questions of God, immortality, and freedom, would have been Either decided long ago, or would very soon be brought to a conclusion But, in general, the uprightness of the defence stands in an inverse Ratio to the goodness of the cause; and perhaps more honesty and Fairness are shown by those who deny than by those who uphold these Doctrines I shall persuade myself, then, that I have readers who do not wish To see a righteous cause defended by unfair arguments. Such will now Recognize the fact that, according to the principles of this Critique If we consider not what is, but what ought to be the case, there can be Really no polemic of pure reason. For how can two persons dispute about A thing, the reality of which neither can present in actual or even in Possible experience? Each adopts the plan of meditating on his idea for The purpose of drawing from the idea, if he can, what is more than the Idea, that is, the reality of the object which it indicates. How shall They settle the dispute, since neither is able to make his a**ertions Directly comprehensible and certain, but must restrict himself to Attacking and confuting those of his opponent? All statements enounced By pure reason transcend the conditions of possible experience, beyond The sphere of which we can discover no criterion of truth, while They are at the same time framed in accordance with the laws of the Understanding, which are applicable only to experience; and thus it is The fate of all such speculative discussions that while the one party Attacks the weaker side of his opponent, he infallibly lays open his own Weaknesses The critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest tribunal For all speculative disputes; for it is not involved in these disputes Which have an immediate relation to certain objects and not to the laws Of the mind, but is instituted for the purpose of determining the rights And limits of reason Without the control of criticism, reason is, as it were, in a state Of nature, and can only establish its claims and a**ertions by war Criticism, on the contrary, deciding all questions according to the Fundamental laws of its own institution, secures to us the peace of Law and order, and enables us to discuss all differences in the more Tranquil manner of a legal process. In the former case, disputes are Ended by victory, which both sides may claim and which is followed by a Hollow armistice; in the latter, by a sentence, which, as it strikes At the root of all speculative differences, ensures to all concerned a Lasting peace. The endless disputes of a dogmatizing reason compel us To look for some mode of arriving at a settled decision by a critical Investigation of reason itself; just as Hobbes maintains that the state Of nature is a state of injustice and violence, and that we must leave It and submit ourselves to the constraint of law, which indeed limits Individual freedom, but only that it may consist with the freedom of Others and with the common good of all This freedom will, among other things, permit of our openly stating the Difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves unable to solve, without Being decried on that account as turbulent and dangerous citizens This privilege forms part of the native rights of human reason, which Recognizes no other judge than the universal reason of humanity; and As this reason is the source of all progress and improvement, such a Privilege is to be held sacred and inviolable. It is unwise, moreover To denounce as dangerous any bold a**ertions against, or rash attacks Upon, an opinion which is held by the largest and most moral cla** of The community; for that would be giving them an importance which they Do not deserve. When I hear that the freedom of the will, the hope of A future life, and the existence of God have been overthrown by the Arguments of some able writer, I feel a strong desire to read his Book; for I expect that he will add to my knowledge and impart greater Clearness and distinctness to my views by the argumentative power shown In his writings. But I am perfectly certain, even before I have opened The book, that he has not succeeded in a single point, not because I believe I am in possession of irrefutable demonstrations of these Important propositions, but because this transcendental critique, which Has disclosed to me the power and the limits of pure reason, has fully Convinced me that, as it is insufficient to establish the affirmative It is as powerless, and even more so, to a**ure us of the truth of The negative answer to these questions. From what source does this Free-thinker derive his knowledge that there is, for example, no Supreme Being? This proposition lies out of the field of possible experience And, therefore, beyond the limits of human cognition. But I would not Read at, all the answer which the dogmatical maintainer of the good Cause makes to his opponent, because I know well beforehand, that he Will merely attack the fallacious grounds of his adversary, without Being able to establish his own a**ertions. Besides, a new illusory Argument, in the construction of which talent and acuteness are shown Is suggestive of new ideas and new trains of reasoning, and in this Respect the old and everyday sophistries are quite useless. Again The dogmatical opponent of religion gives employment to criticism And enables us to test and correct its principles, while there is no Occasion for anxiety in regard to the influence and results of his Reasoning But, it will be said, must we not warn the youth entrusted to academical Care against such writings, must we not preserve them from the knowledge Of these dangerous a**ertions, until their judgement is ripened, or Rather until the doctrines which we wish to inculcate are so firmly Rooted in their minds as to withstand all attempts at instilling the Contrary dogmas, from whatever quarter they may come? If we are to confine ourselves to the dogmatical procedure in the Sphere of pure reason, and find ourselves unable to settle such Disputes otherwise than by becoming a party in them, and setting Counter-a**ertions against the statements advanced by our opponents There is certainly no plan more advisable for the moment, but, at the Same time, none more absurd and inefficient for the future, than this Retaining of the youthful mind under guardianship for a time, and thus Preserving it--for so long at least--from seduction into error. But When, at a later period, either curiosity, or the prevalent fashion Of thought places such writings in their hands, will the so-called Convictions of their youth stand firm? The young thinker, who has in his Armoury none but dogmatical weapons with which to resist the attacks of His opponent, and who cannot detect the latent dialectic which lies in His own opinions as well as in those of the opposite party, sees the Advance of illusory arguments and grounds of proof which have the Advantage of novelty, against as illusory grounds of proof destitute Of this advantage, and which, perhaps, excite the suspicion that the Natural credulity of his youth has been abused by his instructors. He Thinks he can find no better means of showing that he has out grown the Discipline of his minority than by despising those well-meant warnings And, knowing no system of thought but that of dogmatism, he drinks deep Draughts of the poison that is to sap the principles in which his early Years were trained Exactly the opposite of the system here recommended ought to be pursued In academical instruction. This can only be effected, however, by a Thorough training in the critical investigation of pure reason. For, in Order to bring the principles of this critique into exercise as soon as Possible, and to demonstrate their perfect even in the presence of the Highest degree of dialectical illusion, the student ought to examine the Assertions made on both sides of speculative questions step by step, and To test them by these principles. It cannot be a difficult task for him To show the fallacies inherent in these propositions, and thus he begins Early to feel his own power of securing himself against the influence of Such sophistical arguments, which must finally lose, for him, all their Illusory power. And, although the same blows which overturn the edifice Of his opponent are as fatal to his own speculative structures, if such He has wished to rear; he need not feel any sorrow in regard to this Seeming misfortune, as he has now before him a fair prospect into the Practical region in which he may reasonably hope to find a more secure Foundation for a rational system There is, accordingly, no proper polemic in the sphere of pure reason Both parties beat the air and fight with their own shadows, as they Pa** beyond the limits of nature, and can find no tangible point Of attack--no firm footing for their dogmatical conflict. Fight as Vigorously as they may, the shadows which they hew down, immediately Start up again, like the heroes in Walhalla, and renew the bloodless and Unceasing contest But neither can we admit that there is any proper sceptical employment Of pure reason, such as might be based upon the principle of neutrality In all speculative disputes. To excite reason against itself, to place Weapons in the hands of the party on the one side as well as in those of The other, and to remain an undisturbed and sarcastic spectator of the Fierce struggle that ensues, seems, from the dogmatical point of view To be a part fitting only a malevolent disposition. But, when the Sophist evidences an invincible obstinacy and blindness, and a pride Which no criticism can moderate, there is no other practicable course Than to oppose to this pride and obstinacy similar feelings and Pretensions on the other side, equally well or ill founded, so that Reason, staggered by the reflections thus forced upon it, finds it Necessary to moderate its confidence in such pretensions and to listen To the advice of criticism. But we cannot stop at these doubts, much Less regard the conviction of our ignorance, not only as a cure for the Conceit natural to dogmatism, but as the settlement of the disputes in Which reason is involved with itself. On the contrary, scepticism is Merely a means of awakening reason from its dogmatic dreams and exciting It to a more careful investigation into its own powers and pretensions But, as scepticism appears to be the shortest road to a permanent peace In the domain of philosophy, and as it is the track pursued by the Many who aim at giving a philosophical colouring to their contemptuous Dislike of all inquiries of this kind, I think it necessary to present To my readers this mode of thought in its true light Scepticism not a Permanent State for Human Reason The consciousness of ignorance--unless this ignorance is recognized to Be absolutely necessary ought, instead of forming the conclusion of My inquiries, to be the strongest motive to the pursuit of them. All Ignorance is either ignorance of things or of the limits of knowledge If my ignorance is accidental and not necessary, it must incite me, in The first case, to a dogmatical inquiry regarding the objects of which I Am ignorant; in the second, to a critical investigation into the bounds Of all possible knowledge. But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary And unavoidable, and that it consequently absolves from the duty of all Further investigation, is a fact which cannot be made out upon empirical Grounds--from observation--but upon critical grounds alone, that is, by A thoroughgoing investigation into the primary sources of cognition. It Follows that the determination of the bounds of reason can be made only On a priori grounds; while the empirical limitation of reason, which Is merely an indeterminate cognition of an ignorance that can never be Completely removed, can take place only a posteriori. In other words Our empirical knowledge is limited by that which yet remains for us to Know. The former cognition of our ignorance, which is possible only on a Rational basis, is a science; the latter is merely a perception, and we Cannot say how far the inferences drawn from it may extend. If I regard The earth, as it really appears to my senses, as a flat surface, I am Ignorant how far this surface extends. But experience teaches me that How far soever I go, I always see before me a space in which I can Proceed farther; and thus I know the limits--merely visual--of my actual Knowledge of the earth, although I am ignorant of the limits of the Earth itself. But if I have got so far as to know that the earth is a Sphere, and that its surface is spherical, I can cognize a priori and Determine upon principles, from my knowledge of a small part of this Surface--say to the extent of a degree--the diameter and circumference Of the earth; and although I am ignorant of the objects which this Surface contains, I have a perfect knowledge of its limits and extent The sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us to be A level surface, with an apparent horizon--that which forms the limit Of its extent, and which has been termed by us the idea of unconditioned Totality. To reach this limit by empirical means is impossible, and all Attempts to determine it a priori according to a principle, are alike in Vain. But all the questions raised by pure reason relate to that which Lies beyond this horizon, or, at least, in its boundary line The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers of human reason Who believe that they have given a sufficient answer to all such Questions by declaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our Knowledge--a horizon which, however, Hume was unable to determine. His Attention especially was directed to the principle of causality; and he Remarked with perfect justice that the truth of this principle, and even The objective validity of the conception of a cause, was not commonly Based upon clear insight, that is, upon a priori cognition. Hence He concluded that this law does not derive its authority from its Universality and necessity, but merely from its general applicability In the course of experience, and a kind of subjective necessity Thence arising, which he termed habit. From the inability of reason to Establish this principle as a necessary law for the acquisition of all Experience, he inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason to Pa** the region of the empirical This procedure of subjecting the facta of reason to examination, and If necessary, to disapproval, may be termed the censura of reason. This Censura must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all transcendent Employment of principles. But this is only the second step in our Inquiry. The first step in regard to the subjects of pure reason, and Which marks the infancy of that faculty, is that of dogmatism. The Second, which we have just mentioned, is that of scepticism, and it Gives evidence that our judgement has been improved by experience. But A third step is necessary--indicative of the maturity and manhood of the Judgement, which now lays a firm foundation upon universal and necessary Principles. This is the period of criticism, in which we do not examine The facta of reason, but reason itself, in the whole extent of its Powers, and in regard to its capability of a priori cognition; and thus We determine not merely the empirical and ever-shifting bounds of our Knowledge, but its necessary and eternal limits. We demonstrate from Indubitable principles, not merely our ignorance in respect to this Or that subject, but in regard to all possible questions of a certain Cla**. Thus scepticism is a resting place for reason, in which it may Reflect on its dogmatical wanderings and gain some knowledge of the Region in which it happens to be, that it may pursue its way with Greater certainty; but it cannot be its permanent dwelling-place. It Must take up its abode only in the region of complete certitude, whether This relates to the cognition of objects themselves, or to the limits Which bound all our cognition Reason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane, of the Bounds of which we have only a general knowledge; it ought rather to Be compared to a sphere, the radius of which may be found from the Curvature of its surface--that is, the nature of a priori synthetical Propositions--and, consequently, its circumference and extent. Beyond The sphere of experience there are no objects which it can cognize; nay Even questions regarding such supposititious objects relate only to the Subjective principles of a complete determination of the relations Which exist between the understanding-conceptions which lie within this Sphere We are actually in possession of a priori synthetical cognitions, as is Proved by the existence of the principles of the understanding, which Anticipate experience. If any one cannot comprehend the possibility Of these principles, he may have some reason to doubt whether they Are really a priori; but he cannot on this account declare them to be Impossible, and affirm the nullity of the steps which reason may have Taken under their guidance. He can only say: If we perceived their Origin and their authenticity, we should be able to determine the Extent and limits of reason; but, till we can do this, all propositions Regarding the latter are mere random a**ertions. In this view, the Doubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy, which proceeds without the Guidance of criticism, is well grounded; but we cannot therefore deny To reason the ability to construct a sound philosophy, when the way has Been prepared by a thorough critical investigation. All the conceptions Produced, and all the questions raised, by pure reason, do not lie in The sphere of experience, but in that of reason itself, and hence they Must be solved, and shown to be either valid or inadmissible, by that Faculty. We have no right to decline the solution of such problems, on The ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of Things, and under pretence of the limitation of human faculties, for Reason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is therefore bound Either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature The polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist Who erects a system of philosophy without having examined the Fundamental objective principles on which it is based, for the purpose Of evidencing the futility of his designs, and thus bringing him to a Knowledge of his own powers. But, in itself, scepticism does not give Us any certain information in regard to the bounds of our knowledge. All Unsuccessful dogmatical attempts of reason are facia, which it is always Useful to submit to the censure of the sceptic. But this cannot help Us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason cherishes of Better success in future endeavours; the investigations of scepticism Cannot, therefore, settle the dispute regarding the rights and powers of Human reason Hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all sceptical Philosophers, and his writings have, undoubtedly, exerted the most Powerful influence in awakening reason to a thorough investigation into Its own powers. It will, therefore, well repay our labours to consider For a little the course of reasoning which he followed and the errors Into which he strayed, although setting out on the path of truth and Certitude Hume was probably aware, although he never clearly developed the notion That we proceed in judgements of a certain cla** beyond our conception If the object. I have termed this kind of judgement synthetical. As Regard the manner in which I pa** beyond my conception by the aid Of experience, no doubts can be entertained. Experience is itself a Synthesis of perceptions; and it employs perceptions to increment the Conception, which I obtain by means of another perception. But we feel Persuaded that we are able to proceed beyond a conception, and to extend Our cognition a priori. We attempt this in two ways--either, through the Pure understanding, in relation to that which may become an object of Experience, or, through pure reason, in relation to such properties of Things, or of the existence of things, as can never be presented in any Experience. This sceptical philosopher did not distinguish these Two kinds of judgements, as he ought to have done, but regarded this Augmentation of conceptions, and, if we may so express ourselves, the Spontaneous generation of understanding and reason, independently of the Impregnation of experience, as altogether impossible. The so-called a Priori principles of these faculties he consequently held to be invalid And imaginary, and regarded them as nothing but subjective habits of Thought originating in experience, and therefore purely empirical And contingent rules, to which we attribute a spurious necessity and Universality. In support of this strange a**ertion, he referred us to The generally acknowledged principle of the relation between cause and Effect. No faculty of the mind can conduct us from the conception of a Thing to the existence of something else; and hence he believed he could Infer that, without experience, we possess no source from which we can Augment a conception, and no ground sufficient to justify us in framing A judgement that is to extend our cognition a priori. That the light of The sun, which shines upon a piece of wax, at the same time melts it While it hardens clay, no power of the understanding could infer from The conceptions which we previously possessed of these substances; Much less is there any a priori law that could conduct us to such a Conclusion, which experience alone can certify. On the other hand, we Have seen in our discussion of transcendental logic, that, although we Can never proceed immediately beyond the content of the conception which Is given us, we can always cognize completely a priori--in relation However, to a third term, namely, possible experience--the law of its Connection with other things. For example, if I observe that a piece of Wax melts, I can cognize a priori that there must have been something (the sun's heat) preceding, which this law; although, without the aid Of experience, I could not cognize a priori and in a determinate manner Either the cause from the effect, or the effect from the cause Hume was, therefore, wrong in inferring, from the contingency of the Determination according to law, the contingency of the law itself; and The pa**ing beyond the conception of a thing to possible experience (which is an a priori proceeding, constituting the objective reality of The conception), he confounded with our synthesis of objects in actual Experience, which is always, of course, empirical. Thus, too He regarded the principle of affinity, which has its seat in the Understanding and indicates a necessary connection, as a mere rule of Association, lying in the imitative faculty of imagination, which can Present only contingent, and not objective connections The sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose principally From a defect, which was common to him with the dogmatists, namely, that He had never made a systematic review of all the different kinds of A priori synthesis performed by the understanding. Had he done so, he Would have found, to take one example among many, that the principle of Permanence was of this character, and that it, as well as the principle Of causality, anticipates experience. In this way he might have been Able to describe the determinate limits of the a priori operations of Understanding and reason. But he merely declared the understanding to be Limited, instead of showing what its limits were; he created a General mistrust in the power of our faculties, without giving us any Determinate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and unavoidable Ignorance; he examined and condemned some of the principles of The understanding, without investigating all its powers with the Completeness necessary to criticism. He denies, with truth, certain Powers to the understanding, but he goes further, and declares it to be Utterly inadequate to the a priori extension of knowledge, although he Has not fully examined all the powers which reside in the faculty; and Thus the fate which always overtakes scepticism meets him too. That is To say, his own declarations are doubted, for his objections were based Upon facta, which are contingent, and not upon principles, which can Alone demonstrate the necessary invalidity of all dogmatical a**ertions As Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the Understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason, against which However, his attacks are mainly directed, reason does not feel itself Shut out from all attempts at the extension of a priori cognition, and Hence it refuses, in spite of a few checks in this or that quarter, to Relinquish such efforts. For one naturally arms oneself to resist an Attack, and becomes more obstinate in the resolve to establish the Claims he has advanced. But a complete review of the powers of reason And the conviction thence arising that we are in possession of a limited Field of action, while we must admit the vanity of higher claims, puts An end to all doubt and dispute, and induces reason to rest satisfied With the undisturbed possession of its limited domain To the uncritical dogmatist, who has not surveyed the sphere of his Understanding, nor determined, in accordance with principles, the limits Of possible cognition, who, consequently, is ignorant of his own powers And believes he will discover them by the attempts he makes in the field Of cognition, these attacks of scepticism are not only dangerous, but Destructive. For if there is one proposition in his chain of reasoning Which be he cannot prove, or the fallacy in which he cannot evolve in Accordance with a principle, suspicion falls on all his statements However plausible they may appear And thus scepticism, the bane of dogmatical philosophy, conducts us to A sound investigation into the understanding and the reason. When we are Thus far advanced, we need fear no further attacks; for the limits of Our domain are clearly marked out, and we can make no claims nor become Involved in any disputes regarding the region that lies beyond these Limits. Thus the sceptical procedure in philosophy does not present any Solution of the problems of reason, but it forms an excellent exercise For its powers, awakening its circumspection, and indicating the Means whereby it may most fully establish its claims to its legitimate Possessions