Immanuel Kant - The Critique of Pure Reason; Part 26 lyrics

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD If we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative reason as an Edifice, the idea of which, at least, exists in the human mind, it may Be said that we have in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements examined The materials and determined to what edifice these belong, and what Its height and stability. We have found, indeed, that, although we had Purposed to build for ourselves a tower which should reach to Heaven The supply of materials sufficed merely for a habitation, which was Spacious enough for all terrestrial purposes, and high enough to Enable us to survey the level plain of experience, but that the bold Undertaking designed necessarily failed for want of materials--not to Mention the confusion of tongues, which gave rise to endless disputes Among the labourers on the plan of the edifice, and at last scattered Them over all the world, each to erect a separate building for himself According to his own plans and his own inclinations. Our present task Relates not to the materials, but to the plan of an edifice; and, as we Have had sufficient warning not to venture blindly upon a design which May be found to transcend our natural powers, while, at the same time We cannot give up the intention of erecting a secure abode for the mind We must proportion our design to the material which is presented to us And which is, at the same time, sufficient for all our wants I understand, then, by the transcendental doctrine of method, the Determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure Reason. We shall accordingly have to treat of the discipline, the canon The architectonic, and, finally, the history of pure reason. This part Of our Critique will accomplish, from the transcendental point of view What has been usually attempted, but miserably executed, under the name Of practical logic. It has been badly executed, I say, because general Logic, not being limited to any particular kind of cognition (not Even to the pure cognition of the understanding) nor to any particular Objects, it cannot, without borrowing from other sciences, do more than Present merely the titles or signs of possible methods and the technical Expressions, which are employed in the systematic parts of all sciences; And thus the pupil is made acquainted with names, the meaning and Application of which he is to learn only at some future time CHAPTER I. The Discipline of Pure Reason Negative judgements--those which are so not merely as regards their Logical form, but in respect of their content--are not commonly held in Especial respect. They are, on the contrary, regarded as jealous enemies Of our insatiable desire for knowledge; and it almost requires an Apology to induce us to tolerate, much less to prize and to respect Them All propositions, indeed, may be logically expressed in a negative form; But, in relation to the content of our cognition, the peculiar province Of negative judgements is solely to prevent error. For this reason, too Negative propositions, which are framed for the purpose of correcting False cognitions where error is absolutely impossible, are undoubtedly True, but inane and senseless; that is, they are in reality purposeless And, for this reason, often very ridiculous. Such is the proposition Of the schoolman that Alexander could not have subdued any countries Without an army But where the limits of our possible cognition are very much contracted The attraction to new fields of knowledge great, the illusions to Which the mind is subject of the most deceptive character, and the Evil consequences of error of no inconsiderable magnitude--the negative Element in knowledge, which is useful only to guard us against error Is of far more importance than much of that positive instruction which Makes additions to the sum of our knowledge. The restraint which is Employed to repress, and finally to extirpate the constant inclination To depart from certain rules, is termed discipline. It is distinguished From culture, which aims at the formation of a certain degree of sk** Without attempting to repress or to destroy any other mental power Already existing. In the cultivation of a talent, which has given Evidence of an impulse towards self-development, discipline takes a Negative, culture and doctrine a positive, part That natural dispositions and talents (such as imagination and wit) Which ask a free and unlimited development, require in many respects the Corrective influence of discipline, every one will readily grant. But It may well appear strange that reason, whose proper duty it is to Prescribe rules of discipline to all the other powers of the mind Should itself require this corrective. It has, in fact, hitherto Escaped this humiliation, only because, in presence of its magnificent Pretensions and high position, no one could readily suspect it to be Capable of substituting fancies for conceptions, and words for things Reason, when employed in the field of experience, does not stand in need Of criticism, because its principles are subjected to the continual test Of empirical observations. Nor is criticism requisite in the sphere of Mathematics, where the conceptions of reason must always be presented In concreto in pure intuition, and baseless or arbitrary a**ertions are Discovered without difficulty. But where reason is not held in a plain Track by the influence of empirical or of pure intuition, that is, when It is employed in the transcendental sphere of pure conceptions, it Stands in great need of discipline, to restrain its propensity to Overstep the limits of possible experience and to keep it from wandering Into error. In fact, the utility of the philosophy of pure reason is Entirely of this negative character. Particular errors may be corrected By particular animadversions, and the causes of these errors may be Eradicated by criticism. But where we find, as in the case of pure Reason, a complete system of illusions and fallacies, closely connected With each other and depending upon grand general principles, there Seems to be required a peculiar and negative code of mental legislation Which, under the denomination of a discipline, and founded upon the Nature of reason and the objects of its exercise, shall constitute a System of thorough examination and testing, which no fallacy will be Able to withstand or escape from, under whatever disguise or concealment It may lurk But the reader must remark that, in this the second division of our Transcendental Critique the discipline of pure reason is not directed To the content, but to the method of the cognition of pure reason. The Former task has been completed in the doctrine of elements. But there Is so much similarity in the mode of employing the faculty of reason Whatever be the object to which it is applied, while, at the same time Its employment in the transcendental sphere is so essentially different In kind from every other, that, without the warning negative influence Of a discipline specially directed to that end, the errors are Unavoidable which spring from the unsk**ful employment of the methods Which are originated by reason but which are out of place in this Sphere SECTION I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism The science of mathematics presents the most brilliant example of the Extension of the sphere of pure reason without the aid of experience Examples are always contagious; and they exert an especial influence on The same faculty, which naturally flatters itself that it will have The same good fortune in other case as fell to its lot in one fortunate Instance. Hence pure reason hopes to be able to extend its empire in the Transcendental sphere with equal success and security, especially When it applies the same method which was attended with such brilliant Results in the science of mathematics. It is, therefore, of the Highest importance for us to know whether the method of arriving at Demonstrative certainty, which is termed mathematical, be identical with That by which we endeavour to attain the same degree of certainty in Philosophy, and which is termed in that science dogmatical Philosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by means of Conceptions; mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the Construction of conceptions. The construction of a conception is The presentation a priori of the intuition which corresponds to the Conception. For this purpose a non-empirical intuition is requisite Which, as an intuition, is an individual object; while, as the Construction of a conception (a general representation), it must be seen To be universally valid for all the possible intuitions which rank under That conception. Thus I construct a triangle, by the presentation of the Object which corresponds to this conception, either by mere imagination In pure intuition, or upon paper, in empirical intuition, in both cases Completely a priori, without borrowing the type of that figure from any Experience. The individual figure drawn upon paper is empirical; but It serves, notwithstanding, to indicate the conception, even in its Universality, because in this empirical intuition we keep our eye merely On the act of the construction of the conception, and pay no attention To the various modes of determining it, for example, its size, the Length of its sides, the size of its angles, these not in the least Affecting the essential character of the conception Philosophical cognition, accordingly, regards the particular only in The general; mathematical the general in the particular, nay, in the Individual. This is done, however, entirely a priori and by means of Pure reason, so that, as this individual figure is determined under Certain universal conditions of construction, the object of the Conception, to which this individual figure corresponds as its schema Must be cogitated as universally determined The essential difference of these two modes of cognition consists Therefore, in this formal quality; it does not regard the difference of The matter or objects of both. Those thinkers who aim at distinguishing Philosophy from mathematics by a**erting that the former has to do with Quality merely, and the latter with quantity, have mistaken the effect For the cause. The reason why mathematical cognition can relate only to Quantity is to be found in its form alone. For it is the conception of Quantities only that is capable of being constructed, that is, presented A priori in intuition; while qualities cannot be given in any other than An empirical intuition. Hence the cognition of qualities by reason is Possible only through conceptions. No one can find an intuition which Shall correspond to the conception of reality, except in experience; It cannot be presented to the mind a priori and antecedently to the Empirical consciousness of a reality. We can form an intuition, by means Of the mere conception of it, of a cone, without the aid of experience; But the colour of the cone we cannot know except from experience. I Cannot present an intuition of a cause, except in an example which Experience offers to me. Besides, philosophy, as well as mathematics Treats of quantities; as, for example, of totality, infinity, and so On. Mathematics, too, treats of the difference of lines and surfaces--as Spaces of different quality, of the continuity of extension--as a Quality thereof. But, although in such cases they have a common object The mode in which reason considers that object is very different in Philosophy from what it is in mathematics. The former confines itself To the general conceptions; the latter can do nothing with a mere Conception, it hastens to intuition. In this intuition it regards the Conception in concreto, not empirically, but in an a priori intuition Which it has constructed; and in which, all the results which follow From the general conditions of the construction of the conception are in All cases valid for the object of the constructed conception Suppose that the conception of a triangle is given to a philosopher And that he is required to discover, by the philosophical method, what Relation the sum of its angles bears to a right angle. He has nothing Before him but the conception of a figure enclosed within three right Lines, and, consequently, with the same number of angles. He may an*lyse The conception of a right line, of an angle, or of the number three As long as he pleases, but he will not discover any properties not Contained in these conceptions. But, if this question is proposed to A geometrician, he at once begins by constructing a triangle. He knows That two right angles are equal to the sum of all the contiguous angles Which proceed from one point in a straight line; and he goes on to Produce one side of his triangle, thus forming two adjacent angles which Are together equal to two right angles. He then divides the exterior of These angles, by drawing a line parallel with the opposite side of the Triangle, and immediately perceives that he has thus got an exterior Adjacent angle which is equal to the interior. Proceeding in this way Through a chain of inferences, and always on the ground of intuition, he Arrives at a clear and universally valid solution of the question But mathematics does not confine itself to the construction of Quantities (quanta), as in the case of geometry; it occupies itself With pure quantity also (quantitas), as in the case of algebra, where Complete abstraction is made of the properties of the object indicated By the conception of quantity. In algebra, a certain method of Notation by signs is adopted, and these indicate the different possible Constructions of quantities, the extraction of roots, and so on. After Having thus denoted the general conception of quantities, according to Their different relations, the different operations by which quantity Or number is increased or diminished are presented in intuition in Accordance with general rules. Thus, when one quantity is to be divided By another, the signs which denote both are placed in the form peculiar To the operation of division; and thus algebra, by means of a symbolical Construction of quantity, just as geometry, with its ostensive or Geometrical construction (a construction of the objects themselves) Arrives at results which discursive cognition cannot hope to reach by The aid of mere conceptions Now, what is the cause of this difference in the fortune of the Philosopher and the mathematician, the former of whom follows the path Of conceptions, while the latter pursues that of intuitions, which he Represents, a priori, in correspondence with his conceptions? The cause Is evident from what has been already demonstrated in the introduction To this Critique. We do not, in the present case, want to discover an*lytical propositions, which may be produced merely by an*lysing our Conceptions--for in this the philosopher would have the advantage over His rival; we aim at the discovery of synthetical propositions--such Synthetical propositions, moreover, as can be cognized a priori. I must Not confine myself to that which I actually cogitate in my conception Of a triangle, for this is nothing more than the mere definition; I Must try to go beyond that, and to arrive at properties which are not Contained in, although they belong to, the conception. Now, this is Impossible, unless I determine the object present to my mind according To the conditions, either of empirical, or of pure, intuition. In the Former case, I should have an empirical proposition (arrived at by Actual measurement of the angles of the triangle), which would possess Neither universality nor necessity; but that would be of no value. In The latter, I proceed by geometrical construction, by means of which I Collect, in a pure intuition, just as I would in an empirical intuition All the various properties which belong to the schema of a triangle In general, and consequently to its conception, and thus construct Synthetical propositions which possess the attribute of universality It would be vain to philosophize upon the triangle, that is, to reflect On it discursively; I should get no further than the definition with Which I had been obliged to set out. There are certainly transcendental Synthetical propositions which are framed by means of pure conceptions And which form the peculiar distinction of philosophy; but these do not Relate to any particular thing, but to a thing in general, and enounce The conditions under which the perception of it may become a part of Possible experience. But the science of mathematics has nothing to do With such questions, nor with the question of existence in any fashion; It is concerned merely with the properties of objects in themselves Only in so far as these are connected with the conception of the Objects In the above example, we merely attempted to show the great difference Which exists between the discursive employment of reason in the sphere Of conceptions, and its intuitive exercise by means of the construction Of conceptions. The question naturally arises: What is the cause which Necessitates this twofold exercise of reason, and how are we to discover Whether it is the philosophical or the mathematical method which reason Is pursuing in an argument? All our knowledge relates, finally, to possible intuitions, for it Is these alone that present objects to the mind. An a priori or Non-empirical conception contains either a pure intuition--and in this Case it can be constructed; or it contains nothing but the synthesis of Possible intuitions, which are not given a priori. In this latter case It may help us to form synthetical a priori judgements, but only in the Discursive method, by conceptions, not in the intuitive, by means of the Construction of conceptions The only a priori intuition is that of the pure form of phenomena--space And time. A conception of space and time as quanta may be presented A priori in intuition, that is, constructed, either alone with their Quality (figure), or as pure quantity (the mere synthesis of the h*mogeneous), by means of number. But the matter of phenomena, by which Things are given in space and time, can be presented only in perception A posteriori. The only conception which represents a priori this Empirical content of phenomena is the conception of a thing in general; And the a priori synthetical cognition of this conception can give Us nothing more than the rule for the synthesis of that which may be Contained in the corresponding a posteriori perception; it is utterly Inadequate to present an a priori intuition of the real object, which Must necessarily be empirical Synthetical propositions, which relate to things in general, an a priori Intuition of which is impossible, are transcendental. For this Reason transcendental propositions cannot be framed by means of the Construction of conceptions; they are a priori, and based entirely on Conceptions themselves. They contain merely the rule, by which we are to Seek in the world of perception or experience the synthetical unity Of that which cannot be intuited a priori. But they are incompetent To present any of the conceptions which appear in them in an a priori Intuition; these can be given only a posteriori, in experience, which However, is itself possible only through these synthetical principles If we are to form a synthetical judgement regarding a conception, we Must go beyond it, to the intuition in which it is given. If we keep To what is contained in the conception, the judgement is merely an*lytical--it is merely an explanation of what we have cogitated in the Conception. But I can pa** from the conception to the pure or empirical Intuition which corresponds to it. I can proceed to examine my Conception in concreto, and to cognize, either a priori or a posterio What I find in the object of the conception. The former--a priori Cognition--is rational-mathematical cognition by means of the Construction of the conception; the latter--a posteriori cognition--is Purely empirical cognition, which does not possess the attributes of Necessity and universality. Thus I may an*lyse the conception I have Of gold; but I gain no new information from this an*lysis, I merely Enumerate the different properties which I had connected with the notion Indicated by the word. My knowledge has gained in logical clearness And arrangement, but no addition has been made to it. But if I take the Matter which is indicated by this name, and submit it to the examination Of my senses, I am enabled to form several synthetical--although still Empirical--propositions. The mathematical conception of a triangle I Should construct, that is, present a priori in intuition, and in This way attain to rational-synthetical cognition. But when the Transcendental conception of reality, or substance, or power is Presented to my mind, I find that it does not relate to or indicate Either an empirical or pure intuition, but that it indicates merely the Synthesis of empirical intuitions, which cannot of course be given A priori. The synthesis in such a conception cannot proceed a Priori--without the aid of experience--to the intuition which Corresponds to the conception; and, for this reason, none of these Conceptions can produce a determinative synthetical proposition, they Can never present more than a principle of the synthesis* of possible Empirical intuitions. A transcendental proposition is, therefore, a Synthetical cognition of reason by means of pure conceptions and the Discursive method, and it renders possible all synthetical unity in Empirical cognition, though it cannot present us with any intuition a Priori There is thus a twofold exercise of reason. Both modes have the Properties of universality and an a priori origin in common, but are In their procedure, of widely different character. The reason of this is That in the world of phenomena, in which alone objects are presented to Our minds, there are two main elements--the form of intuition (space and Time), which can be cognized and determined completely a priori, and the Matter or content--that which is presented in space and time, and which Consequently, contains a something--an existence corresponding to our Powers of sensation. As regards the latter, which can never be given in A determinate mode except by experience, there are no a priori notions Which relate to it, except the undetermined conceptions of the synthesis Of possible sensations, in so far as these belong (in a possible Experience) to the unity of consciousness. As regards the former, we Can determine our conceptions a priori in intuition, inasmuch as we are Ourselves the creators of the objects of the conceptions in space and Time--these objects being regarded simply as quanta. In the one case Reason proceeds according to conceptions and can do nothing more than Subject phenomena to these--which can only be determined empirically That is, a posteriori--in conformity, however, with those conceptions as The rules of all empirical synthesis. In the other case, reason proceeds By the construction of conceptions; and, as these conceptions relate To an a priori intuition, they may be given and determined in pure Intuition a priori, and without the aid of empirical data. The Examination and consideration of everything that exists in space Or time--whether it is a quantum or not, in how far the particular Something (which fills space or time) is a primary substratum, or a mere Determination of some other existence, whether it relates to anything Else--either as cause or effect, whether its existence is isolated or in Reciprocal connection with and dependence upon others, the possibility Of this existence, its reality and necessity or opposites--all these Form part of the cognition of reason on the ground of conceptions, and This cognition is termed philosophical. But to determine a priori an Intuition in space (its figure), to divide time into periods, or merely To cognize the quantity of an intuition in space and time, and to Determine it by number--all this is an operation of reason by means of The construction of conceptions, and is called mathematical The success which attends the efforts of reason in the sphere of Mathematics naturally fosters the expectation that the same good fortune Will be its lot, if it applies the mathematical method in other regions Of mental endeavour besides that of quantities. Its success is thus Great, because it can support all its conceptions by a priori intuitions And, in this way, make itself a master, as it were, over nature; while Pure philosophy, with its a priori discursive conceptions, bungles About in the world of nature, and cannot accredit or show any a priori Evidence of the reality of these conceptions. Masters in the science of Mathematics are confident of the success of this method; indeed, it is a Common persuasion that it is capable of being applied to any subject of Human thought. They have hardly ever reflected or philosophized on Their favourite science--a task of great difficulty; and the specific Difference between the two modes of employing the faculty of reason Has never entered their thoughts. Rules current in the field of common Experience, and which common sense stamps everywhere with its approval Are regarded by them as axiomatic. From what source the conceptions of Space and time, with which (as the only primitive quanta) they have To deal, enter their minds, is a question which they do not trouble Themselves to answer; and they think it just as unnecessary to examine Into the origin of the pure conceptions of the understanding and the Extent of their validity. All they have to do with them is to employ Them. In all this they are perfectly right, if they do not overstep the Limits of the sphere of nature. But they pa**, unconsciously, from the World of sense to the insecure ground of pure transcendental conceptions (instabilis tellus, innabilis unda), where they can neither stand nor Swim, and where the tracks of their footsteps are obliterated by time; While the march of mathematics is pursued on a broad and magnificent Highway, which the latest posterity shall frequent without fear of Danger or impediment As we have taken upon us the task of determining, clearly and certainly The limits of pure reason in the sphere of transcendentalism, and as The efforts of reason in this direction are persisted in, even after the Plainest and most expressive warnings, hope still beckoning us past the Limits of experience into the splendours of the intellectual world--it Becomes necessary to cut away the last anchor of this fallacious and Fantastic hope. We shall, accordingly, show that the mathematical Method is unattended in the sphere of philosophy by the least Advantage--except, perhaps, that it more plainly exhibits its own Inadequacy--that geometry and philosophy are two quite different things Although they go band in hand in hand in the field of natural science And, consequently, that the procedure of the one can never be imitated By the other The evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms, and Demonstrations. I shall be satisfied with showing that none of these Forms can be employed or imitated in philosophy in the sense in which They are understood by mathematicians; and that the geometrician, if He employs his method in philosophy, will succeed only in building Card-castles, while the employment of the philosophical method in Mathematics can result in nothing but mere verbiage. The essential Business of philosophy, indeed, is to mark out the limits of the Science; and even the mathematician, unless his talent is naturally Circumscribed and limited to this particular department of knowledge Cannot turn a deaf ear to the warnings of philosophy, or set himself Above its direction I. Of Definitions. A definition is, as the term itself indicates, the Representation, upon primary grounds, of the complete conception of A thing within its own limits.* Accordingly, an empirical conception Cannot be defined, it can only be explained. For, as there are in such A conception only a certain number of marks or signs, which denote a Certain cla** of sensuous objects, we can never be sure that we do not Cogitate under the word which indicates the same object, at one time A greater, at another a smaller number of signs. Thus, one person may Cogitate in his conception of gold, in addition to its properties of Weight, colour, malleability, that of resisting rust, while another Person may be ignorant of this quality. We employ certain signs only so Long as we require them for the sake of distinction; new observations Abstract some and add new ones, so that an empirical conception never Remains within permanent limits. It is, in fact, useless to define a Conception of this kind. If, for example, we are speaking of water and Its properties, we do not stop at what we actually think by the word Water, but proceed to observation and experiment; and the word, with The few signs attached to it, is more properly a designation than a Conception of the thing. A definition in this case would evidently be Nothing more than a determination of the word. In the second place, no A priori conception, such as those of substance, cause, right, fitness And so on, can be defined. For I can never be sure, that the clear Representation of a given conception (which is given in a confused State) has been fully developed, until I know that the representation Is adequate with its object. But, inasmuch as the conception, as it is Presented to the mind, may contain a number of obscure representations Which we do not observe in our an*lysis, although we employ them in our Application of the conception, I can never be sure that my an*lysis is Complete, while examples may make this probable, although they can never Demonstrate the fact. Instead of the word definition, I should rather Employ the term exposition--a more modest expression, which the critic May accept without surrendering his doubts as to the completeness of the an*lysis of any such conception. As, therefore, neither empirical nor a Priori conceptions are capable of definition, we have to see whether the Only other kind of conceptions--arbitrary conceptions--can be subjected To this mental operation. Such a conception can always be defined; for I must know thoroughly what I wished to cogitate in it, as it was I who Created it, and it was not given to my mind either by the nature of my Understanding or by experience. At the same time, I cannot say that, by Such a definition, I have defined a real object. If the conception is Based upon empirical conditions, if, for example, I have a conception of A clock for a ship, this arbitrary conception does not a**ure me of the Existence or even of the possibility of the object. My definition of Such a conception would with more propriety be termed a declaration of A project than a definition of an object. There are no other conceptions Which can bear definition, except those which contain an arbitrary Synthesis, which can be constructed a priori. Consequently, the science Of mathematics alone possesses definitions. For the object here thought Is presented a priori in intuition; and thus it can never contain more Or less than the conception, because the conception of the object has Been given by the definition--and primarily, that is, without deriving The definition from any other source. Philosophical definitions are Therefore, merely expositions of given conceptions, while mathematical Definitions are constructions of conceptions originally formed by the Mind itself; the former are produced by an*lysis, the completeness of Which is never demonstratively certain, the latter by a synthesis. In A mathematical definition the conception is formed, in a philosophical Definition it is only explained. From this it follows: (a) That we must not imitate, in philosophy, the mathematical usage of Commencing with definitions--except by way of hypothesis or experiment For, as all so-called philosophical definitions are merely an*lyses of Given conceptions, these conceptions, although only in a confused form Must precede the an*lysis; and the incomplete exposition must precede The complete, so that we may be able to draw certain inferences from the Characteristics which an incomplete an*lysis has enabled us to discover Before we attain to the complete exposition or definition of the Conception. In one word, a full and clear definition ought, in Philosophy, rather to form the conclusion than the commencement of our Labours.* In mathematics, on the contrary, we cannot have a conception Prior to the definition; it is the definition which gives us the Conception, and it must for this reason form the commencement of every Chain of mathematical reasoning (b) Mathematical definitions cannot be erroneous. For the conception is Given only in and through the definition, and thus it contains only what Has been cogitated in the definition. But although a definition cannot Be incorrect, as regards its content, an error may sometimes, although Seldom, creep into the form. This error consists in a want of precision Thus the common definition of a circle--that it is a curved line Every point in which is equally distant from another point called the Centre--is faulty, from the fact that the determination indicated by the Word curved is superfluous. For there ought to be a particular theorem Which may be easily proved from the definition, to the effect that every Line, which has all its points at equal distances from another point Must be a curved line--that is, that not even the smallest part of It can be straight. an*lytical definitions, on the other hand, may be Erroneous in many respects, either by the introduction of signs which do Not actually exist in the conception, or by wanting in that completeness Which forms the essential of a definition. In the latter case, the Definition is necessarily defective, because we can never be fully Certain of the completeness of our an*lysis. For these reasons, the Method of definition employed in mathematics cannot be imitated in Philosophy 2. Of Axioms. These, in so far as they are immediately certain, are a Priori synthetical principles. Now, one conception cannot be connected Synthetically and yet immediately with another; because, if we wish to Proceed out of and beyond a conception, a third mediating cognition is Necessary. And, as philosophy is a cognition of reason by the aid Of conceptions alone, there is to be found in it no principle which Deserves to be called an axiom. Mathematics, on the other hand, may Possess axioms, because it can always connect the predicates of an Object a priori, and without any mediating term, by means of the Construction of conceptions in intuition. Such is the case with the Proposition: Three points can always lie in a plane. On the other hand No synthetical principle which is based upon conceptions, can ever Be immediately certain (for example, the proposition: Everything that Happens has a cause), because I require a mediating term to connect The two conceptions of event and cause--namely, the condition of Time-determination in an experience, and I cannot cognize any such Principle immediately and from conceptions alone. Discursive principles Are, accordingly, very different from intuitive principles or axioms The former always require deduction, which in the case of the latter May be altogether dispensed with. Axioms are, for this reason, always Self-evident, while philosophical principles, whatever may be the degree Of certainty they possess, cannot lay any claim to such a distinction No synthetical proposition of pure transcendental reason can be so Evident, as is often rashly enough declared, as the statement, twice two Are four. It is true that in the an*lytic I introduced into the list of Principles of the pure understanding, certain axioms of intuition; but The principle there discussed was not itself an axiom, but served merely To present the principle of the possibility of axioms in general, while It was really nothing more than a principle based upon conceptions. For It is one part of the duty of transcendental philosophy to establish The possibility of mathematics itself. Philosophy possesses, then, no Axioms, and has no right to impose its a priori principles upon thought Until it has established their authority and validity by a thoroughgoing Deduction 3. Of Demonstrations. Only an apodeictic proof, based upon intuition Can be termed a demonstration. Experience teaches us what is, but it Cannot convince us that it might not have been otherwise. Hence a proof Upon empirical grounds cannot be apodeictic. A priori conceptions, in Discursive cognition, can never produce intuitive certainty or evidence However certain the judgement they present may be. Mathematics alone Therefore, contains demonstrations, because it does not deduce its Cognition from conceptions, but from the construction of conceptions That is, from intuition, which can be given a priori in accordance with Conceptions. The method of algebra, in equations, from which the Correct answer is deduced by reduction, is a kind of construction--not Geometrical, but by symbols--in which all conceptions, especially those Of the relations of quantities, are represented in intuition by signs; And thus the conclusions in that science are secured from errors by the Fact that every proof is submitted to ocular evidence. Philosophical Cognition does not possess this advantage, it being required to consider The general always in abstracto (by means of conceptions), while Mathematics can always consider it in concreto (in an individual Intuition), and at the same time by means of a priori representation Whereby all errors are rendered manifest to the senses. The Former--discursive proofs--ought to be termed acroamatic proofs Rather than demonstrations, as only words are employed in them, while Demonstrations proper, as the term itself indicates, always require a Reference to the intuition of the object It follows from all these considerations that it is not consonant with The nature of philosophy, especially in the sphere of pure reason, to Employ the dogmatical method, and to adorn itself with the titles and Insignia of mathematical science. It does not belong to that order, and Can only hope for a fraternal union with that science. Its attempts at Mathematical evidence are vain pretensions, which can only keep it back From its true aim, which is to detect the illusory procedure of reason When transgressing its proper limits, and by fully explaining and an*lysing our conceptions, to conduct us from the dim regions of Speculation to the clear region of modest self-knowledge. Reason must Not, therefore, in its transcendental endeavours, look forward with such Confidence, as if the path it is pursuing led straight to its aim Nor reckon with such security upon its premisses, as to consider it Unnecessary to take a step back, or to keep a strict watch for errors Which, overlooked in the principles, may be detected in the arguments Themselves--in which case it may be requisite either to determine these Principles with greater strictness, or to change them entirely I divide all apodeictic propositions, whether demonstrable or Immediately certain, into dogmata and mathemata. A direct synthetical Proposition, based on conceptions, is a dogma; a proposition of the same Kind, based on the construction of conceptions, is a mathema. an*lytical Judgements do not teach us any more about an object than what was Contained in the conception we had of it; because they do not extend our Cognition beyond our conception of an object, they merely elucidate the Conception. They cannot therefore be with propriety termed dogmas. Of The two kinds of a priori synthetical propositions above mentioned, only Those which are employed in philosophy can, according to the general Mode of speech, bear this name; those of arithmetic or geometry would Not be rightly so denominated. Thus the customary mode of speaking Confirms the explanation given above, and the conclusion arrived at That only those judgements which are based upon conceptions, not on the Construction of conceptions, can be termed dogmatical Thus, pure reason, in the sphere of speculation, does not contain a Single direct synthetical judgement based upon conceptions. By means Of ideas, it is, as we have shown, incapable of producing synthetical Judgements, which are objectively valid; by means of the conceptions of The understanding, it establishes certain indubitable principles, not However, directly on the basis of conceptions, but only indirectly by Means of the relation of these conceptions to something of a purely Contingent nature, namely, possible experience. When experience is Presupposed, these principles are apodeictically certain, but in Themselves, and directly, they cannot even be cognized a priori. Thus The given conceptions of cause and event will not be sufficient for The demonstration of the proposition: Every event has a cause. For this Reason, it is not a dogma; although from another point of view, that of Experience, it is capable of being proved to demonstration. The proper Term for such a proposition is principle, and not theorem (although It does require to be proved), because it possesses the remarkable Peculiarity of being the condition of the possibility of its own ground Of proof, that is, experience, and of forming a necessary presupposition In all empirical observation If then, in the speculative sphere of pure reason, no dogmata are to Be found; all dogmatical methods, whether borrowed from mathematics Or invented by philosophical thinkers, are alike inappropriate and Inefficient. They only serve to conceal errors and fallacies, and to Deceive philosophy, whose duty it is to see that reason pursues a safe And straight path. A philosophical method may, however, be systematical For our reason is, subjectively considered, itself a system, and, in The sphere of mere conceptions, a system of investigation according to Principles of unity, the material being supplied by experience alone But this is not the proper place for discussing the peculiar method Of transcendental philosophy, as our present task is simply to examine Whether our faculties are capable of erecting an edifice on the basis Of pure reason, and how far they may proceed with the materials at their Command