Immanuel Kant - The Critique of Pure Reason; Part 22 lyrics

CHAPTER III. The Ideal of Pure Reason SECTION I. Of the Ideal in General We have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects to the mind Except under sensuous conditions; because the conditions of objective Reality do not exist in these conceptions, which contain, in fact Nothing but the mere form of thought. They may, however, when applied to Phenomena, be presented in concreto; for it is phenomena that present to Them the materials for the formation of empirical conceptions, which Are nothing more than concrete forms of the conceptions of the Understanding. But ideas are still further removed from objective Reality than categories; for no phenomenon can ever present them to the Human mind in concreto. They contain a certain perfection, attainable By no possible empirical cognition; and they give to reason a systematic Unity, to which the unity of experience attempts to approximate, but can Never completely attain But still further removed than the idea from objective reality is the Ideal, by which term I understand the idea, not in concreto, but in Individuo--as an individual thing, determinable or determined by the Idea alone. The idea of humanity in its complete perfection supposes not Only the advancement of all the powers and faculties, which constitute Our conception of human nature, to a complete attainment of their Final aims, but also everything which is requisite for the complete Determination of the idea; for of all contradictory predicates, only One can conform with the idea of the perfect man. What I have termed An ideal was in Plato's philosophy an idea of the divine mind--an Individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of Every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal Existences Without rising to these speculative heights, we are bound to confess That human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which possess Not, like those of Plato, creative, but certainly practical power--as Regulative principles, and form the basis of the perfectibility of Certain actions. Moral conceptions are not perfectly pure conceptions of Reason, because an empirical element--of pleasure or pain--lies at the Foundation of them. In relation, however, to the principle, whereby Reason sets bounds to a freedom which is in itself without law, and Consequently when we attend merely to their form, they may be considered As pure conceptions of reason. Virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity Are ideas. But the wise man of the Stoics is an ideal, that is to say, a Human being existing only in thought and in complete conformity with the Idea of wisdom. As the idea provides a rule, so the ideal serves as an Archetype for the perfect and complete determination of the copy. Thus The conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as a standard of Action, with which we may compare and judge ourselves, which may help Us to reform ourselves, although the perfection it demands can never be Attained by us. Although we cannot concede objective reality to these Ideals, they are not to be considered as chimeras; on the contrary They provide reason with a standard, which enables it to estimate, by Comparison, the degree of incompleteness in the objects presented to It. But to aim at realizing the ideal in an example in the world of Experience--to describe, for instance, the character of the perfectly Wise man in a romance--is impracticable. Nay more, there is something Absurd in the attempt; and the result must be little edifying, as The natural limitations, which are continually breaking in upon the Perfection and completeness of the idea, destroy the illusion in the Story and throw an air of suspicion even on what is good in the idea Which hence appears fictitious and unreal Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason, which is always based Upon determinate conceptions, and serves as a rule and a model for Limitation or of criticism. Very different is the nature of the ideals Of the imagination. Of these it is impossible to present an intelligible Conception; they are a kind of monogram, drawn according to no Determinate rule, and forming rather a vague picture--the production of Many diverse experiences--than a determinate image. Such are the ideals Which painters and physiognomists profess to have in their minds, and Which can serve neither as a model for production nor as a standard for Appreciation. They may be termed, though improperly, sensuous ideals, as They are declared to be models of certain possible empirical intuitions They cannot, however, furnish rules or standards for explanation or Examination In its ideals, reason aims at complete and perfect determination According to a priori rules; and hence it cogitates an object, which Must be completely determinable in conformity with principles, although All empirical conditions are absent, and the conception of the object is On this account transcendent SECTION II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale) Every conception is, in relation to that which is not contained in It, undetermined and subject to the principle of determinability. This Principle is that, of every two contradictorily opposed predicates, only One can belong to a conception. It is a purely logical principle, itself Based upon the principle of contradiction; inasmuch as it makes complete Abstraction of the content and attends merely to the logical form of the Cognition But again, everything, as regards its possibility, is also subject to The principle of complete determination, according to which one of all The possible contradictory predicates of things must belong to it This principle is not based merely upon that of contradiction; for In addition to the relation between two contradictory predicates It regards everything as standing in a relation to the sum of Possibilities, as the sum total of all predicates of things, and, while Presupposing this sum as an a priori condition, presents to the mind Everything as receiving the possibility of its individual existence from The relation it bears to, and the share it possesses in, the aforesaid Sum of possibilities.* The principle of complete determination relates The content and not to the logical form. It is the principle of the Synthesis of all the predicates which are required to constitute the Complete conception of a thing, and not a mere principle an*lytical Representation, which enounces that one of two contradictory predicates Must belong to a conception. It contains, moreover, a transcendental Presupposition--that, namely, of the material for all possibility, which Must contain a priori the data for this or that particular possibility The proposition, everything which exists is completely determined, means Not only that one of every pair of given contradictory attributes, but That one of all possible attributes, is always predicable of the thing; In it the predicates are not merely compared logically with each other But the thing itself is transcendentally compared with the sum-total of All possible predicates. The proposition is equivalent to saying: "To Attain to a complete knowledge of a thing, it is necessary to possess a Knowledge of everything that is possible, and to determine it thereby in A positive or negative manner." The conception of complete determination Is consequently a conception which cannot be presented in its totality In concreto, and is therefore based upon an idea, which has its seat in The reason--the faculty which prescribes to the understanding the laws Of its harmonious and perfect exercise Now, although this idea of the sum-total of all possibility, in so far As it forms the condition of the complete determination of everything Is itself undetermined in relation to the predicates which may Constitute this sum-total, and we cogitate in it merely the sum-total of All possible predicates--we nevertheless find, upon closer examination That this idea, as a primitive conception of the mind, excludes a Large number of predicates--those deduced and those irreconcilable with Others, and that it is evolved as a conception completely determined a Priori. Thus it becomes the conception of an individual object, which Is completely determined by and through the mere idea, and must Consequently be termed an ideal of pure reason When we consider all possible predicates, not merely logically, but Transcendentally, that is to say, with reference to the content which May be cogitated as existing in them a priori, we shall find that Some indicate a being, others merely a non-being. The logical negation Expressed in the word not does not properly belong to a conception, but Only to the relation of one conception to another in a judgement, and is Consequently quite insufficient to present to the mind the content of a Conception. The expression not mortal does not indicate that a non-being Is cogitated in the object; it does not concern the content at all. A Transcendental negation, on the contrary, indicates non-being in itself And is opposed to transcendental affirmation, the conception of which Of itself expresses a being. Hence this affirmation indicates a reality Because in and through it objects are considered to be something--to be Things; while the opposite negation, on the other band, indicates a Mere want, or privation, or absence, and, where such negations alone Are attached to a representation, the non-existence of anything Corresponding to the representation Now a negation cannot be cogitated as determined, without cogitating at The same time the opposite affirmation. The man born blind has not the Least notion of darkness, because he has none of light; the vagabond Knows nothing of poverty, because he has never known what it is to be in Comfort;* the ignorant man has no conception of his ignorance, because He has no conception of knowledge. All conceptions of negatives are Accordingly derived or deduced conceptions; and realities contain the Data, and, so to speak, the material or transcendental content of the Possibility and complete determination of all things If, therefore, a transcendental substratum lies at the foundation of the Complete determination of things--a substratum which is to form the fund From which all possible predicates of things are to be supplied, this Substratum cannot be anything else than the idea of a sum-total of Reality (omnitudo realitatis). In this view, negations are nothing but Limitations--a term which could not, with propriety, be applied to Them, if the unlimited (the all) did not form the true basis of our Conception This conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a thing In itself, regarded as completely determined; and the conception of an Ens realissimum is the conception of an individual being, inasmuch as It is determined by that predicate of all possible contradictory Predicates, which indicates and belongs to being. It is, therefore, a Transcendental ideal which forms the basis of the complete determination Of everything that exists, and is the highest material condition of Its possibility--a condition on which must rest the cogitation of all Objects with respect to their content. Nay, more, this ideal is the only Proper ideal of which the human mind is capable; because in this case Alone a general conception of a thing is completely determined by and Through itself, and cognized as the representation of an individuum The logical determination of a conception is based upon a disjunctive Syllogism, the major of which contains the logical division of the Extent of a general conception, the minor limits this extent to a Certain part, while the conclusion determines the conception by this Part. The general conception of a reality cannot be divided a priori Because, without the aid of experience, we cannot know any determinate Kinds of reality, standing under the former as the genus. The Transcendental principle of the complete determination of all things is Therefore merely the representation of the sum-total of all reality; it Is not a conception which is the genus of all predicates under Itself, but one which comprehends them all within itself. The complete Determination of a thing is consequently based upon the limitation of This total of reality, so much being predicated of the thing, while all That remains over is excluded--a procedure which is in exact agreement With that of the disjunctive syllogism and the determination of the Objects in the conclusion by one of the members of the division It follows that reason, in laying the transcendental ideal at the Foundation of its determination of all possible things, takes a course In exact an*logy with that which it pursues in disjunctive syllogisms--a Proposition which formed the basis of the systematic division of all Transcendental ideas, according to which they are produced in complete Parallelism with the three modes of syllogistic reasoning employed by The human mind It is self-evident that reason, in cogitating the necessary complete Determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being Corresponding to its ideal, but merely the idea of the ideal--for The purpose of deducing from the unconditional totality of complete Determination, The ideal is therefore the prototype of all things Which, as defective copies (ectypa), receive from it the material of Their possibility, and approximate to it more or less, though it is Impossible that they can ever attain to its perfection The possibility of things must therefore be regarded as derived--except That of the thing which contains in itself all reality, which must be Considered to be primitive and original. For all negations--and they Are the only predicates by means of which all other things can be Distinguished from the ens realissimum--are mere limitations of a Greater and a higher--nay, the highest reality; and they consequently Presuppose this reality, and are, as regards their content, derived from It. The manifold nature of things is only an infinitely various mode of Limiting the conception of the highest reality, which is their common Substratum; just as all figures are possible only as different modes of Limiting infinite space. The object of the ideal of reason--an object Existing only in reason itself--is also termed the primal being (ens Originarium); as having no existence superior to him, the supreme being (ens summum); and as being the condition of all other beings, which rank Under it, the being of all beings (ens entium). But none of these terms Indicate the objective relation of an actually existing object to Other things, but merely that of an idea to conceptions; and all our Investigations into this subject still leave us in perfect uncertainty With regard to the existence of this being A primal being cannot be said to consist of many other beings with an Existence which is derivative, for the latter presuppose the former, and Therefore cannot be constitutive parts of it. It follows that the ideal Of the primal being must be cogitated as simple The deduction of the possibility of all other things from this primal Being cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as a limitation, or as a Kind of division of its reality; for this would be regarding the primal Being as a mere aggregate--which has been shown to be impossible Although it was so represented in our first rough sketch. The highest Reality must be regarded rather as the ground than as the sum-total Of the possibility of all things, and the manifold nature of things be Based, not upon the limitation of the primal being itself, but upon the Complete series of effects which flow from it. And thus all our powers Of sense, as well as all phenomenal reality, phenomenal reality, may be With propriety regarded as belonging to this series of effects While they could not have formed parts of the idea, considered as an Aggregate. Pursuing this track, and hypostatizing this idea, we shall Find ourselves authorized to determine our notion of the Supreme Being By means of the mere conception of a highest reality, as one, simple All-sufficient, eternal, and so on--in one word, to determine it in its Unconditioned completeness by the aid of every possible predicate The conception of such a being is the conception of God in its Transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the Object-matter of a transcendental theology But, by such an employment of the transcendental idea, we should be over Stepping the limits of its validity and purpose. For reason placed It, as the conception of all reality, at the basis of the complete Determination of things, without requiring that this conception be Regarded as the conception of an objective existence. Such an existence Would be purely fictitious, and the hypostatizing of the content of The idea into an ideal, as an individual being, is a step perfectly Unauthorized. Nay, more, we are not even called upon to a**ume the Possibility of such an hypothesis, as none of the deductions drawn From such an ideal would affect the complete determination of things in General--for the sake of which alone is the idea necessary It is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic Of reason; we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this Dialectic, that we may have it in our power to give a rational Explanation of this illusion, as a phenomenon of the human mind. For The ideal, of which we are at present speaking, is based, not upon an Arbitrary, but upon a natural, idea. The question hence arises: How Happens it that reason regards the possibility of all things as deduced From a single possibility, that, to wit, of the highest reality, and Presupposes this as existing in an individual and primal being? The answer is ready; it is at once presented by the procedure of Transcendental an*lytic. The possibility of sensuous objects is a Relation of these objects to thought, in which something (the empirical Form) may be cogitated a priori; while that which constitutes the Matter--the reality of the phenomenon (that element which corresponds to Sensation)--must be given from without, as otherwise it could not even Be cogitated by, nor could its possibility be presentable to the mind Now, a sensuous object is completely determined, when it has been Compared with all phenomenal predicates, and represented by means of These either positively or negatively. But, as that which constitutes The thing itself--the real in a phenomenon, must be given, and that, in Which the real of all phenomena is given, is experience, one, sole, and All-embracing--the material of the possibility of all sensuous objects Must be presupposed as given in a whole, and it is upon the limitation Of this whole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their Distinction from each other and their complete determination, are based Now, no other objects are presented to us besides sensuous objects, and These can be given only in connection with a possible experience; it Follows that a thing is not an object to us, unless it presupposes The whole or sum-total of empirical reality as the condition of Its possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads us to consider this Principle, which is valid only of sensuous objects, as valid with regard To things in general. And thus we are induced to hold the empirical Principle of our conceptions of the possibility of things, as phenomena By leaving out this limitative condition, to be a transcendental Principle of the possibility of things in general We proceed afterwards to hypostatize this idea of the sum-total of all Reality, by changing the distributive unity of the empirical exercise Of the understanding into the collective unity of an empirical whole--a Dialectical illusion, and by cogitating this whole or sum of experience As an individual thing, containing in itself all empirical reality This individual thing or being is then, by means of the above-mentioned Transcendental subreption, substituted for our notion of a thing which Stands at the head of the possibility of all things, the real conditions Of whose complete determination it presents SECTION III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being Notwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels, to form some Presupposition that shall serve the understanding as a proper basis For the complete determination of its conceptions, the idealistic and Factitious nature of such a presupposition is too evident to allow Reason for a moment to persuade itself into a belief of the objective Existence of a mere creation of its own thought. But there are other Considerations which compel reason to seek out some resting place in the Regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned, which is not given As an actual existence from the mere conception of it, although it Alone can give completeness to the series of conditions. And this is The natural course of every human reason, even of the most uneducated Although the path at first entered it does not always continue to Follow. It does not begin from conceptions, but from common experience And requires a basis in actual existence. But this basis is insecure Unless it rests upon the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary. And This foundation is itself unworthy of trust, if it leave under and above It empty space, if it do not fill all, and leave no room for a why or a Wherefore, if it be not, in one word, infinite in its reality If we admit the existence of some one thing, whatever it may be, we must Also admit that there is something which exists necessarily. For what is Contingent exists only under the condition of some other thing, which Is its cause; and from this we must go on to conclude the existence of a Cause which is not contingent, and which consequently exists necessarily And unconditionally. Such is the argument by which reason justifies its Advances towards a primal being Now reason looks round for the conception of a being that may be Admitted, without inconsistency, to be worthy of the attribute of Absolute necessity, not for the purpose of inferring a priori, from The conception of such a being, its objective existence (for if reason Allowed itself to take this course, it would not require a basis in Given and actual existence, but merely the support of pure conceptions) But for the purpose of discovering, among all our conceptions of Possible things, that conception which possesses no element inconsistent With the idea of absolute necessity. For that there must be some Absolutely necessary existence, it regards as a truth already Established. Now, if it can remove every existence incapable of Supporting the attribute of absolute necessity, excepting one--this Must be the absolutely necessary being, whether its necessity is Comprehensible by us, that is, deducible from the conception of it Alone, or not Now that, the conception of which contains a therefore to every Wherefore, which is not defective in any respect whatever, which is All-sufficient as a condition, seems to be the being of which we can Justly predicate absolute necessity--for this reason, that, possessing The conditions of all that is possible, it does not and cannot itself Require any condition. And thus it satisfies, in one respect at least The requirements of the conception of absolute necessity. In this View, it is superior to all other conceptions, which, as deficient and Incomplete, do not possess the characteristic of independence of all Higher conditions. It is true that we cannot infer from this that what Does not contain in itself the supreme and complete condition--the Condition of all other things--must possess only a conditioned Existence; but as little can we a**ert the contrary, for this supposed Being does not possess the only characteristic which can enable reason To cognize by means of an a priori conception the unconditioned and Necessary nature of its existence The conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees with The conception of an unconditioned and necessary being. The former Conception does not satisfy all the requirements of the latter; but We have no choice, we are obliged to adhere to it, for we find that we Cannot do without the existence of a necessary being; and even although We admit it, we find it out of our power to discover in the whole sphere Of possibility any being that can advance well-grounded claims to such a Distinction The following is, therefore, the natural course of human reason. It Begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being. In This being it recognizes the characteristics of unconditioned existence It then seeks the conception of that which is independent of all Conditions, and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient Condition of all other things--in other words, in that which contains All reality. But the unlimited all is an absolute unity, and is Conceived by the mind as a being one and supreme; and thus reason Concludes that the Supreme Being, as the primal basis of all things Possesses an existence which is absolutely necessary This conception must be regarded as in some degree satisfactory, if we Admit the existence of a necessary being, and consider that there exists A necessity for a definite and final answer to these questions. In such A case, we cannot make a better choice, or rather we have no choice at All, but feel ourselves obliged to declare in favour of the absolute Unity of complete reality, as the highest source of the possibility Of things. But if there exists no motive for coming to a definite Conclusion, and we may leave the question unanswered till we have fully Weighed both sides--in other words, when we are merely called upon to Decide how much we happen to know about the question, and how much we Merely flatter ourselves that we know--the above conclusion does not Appear to be so great advantage, but, on the contrary, seems defective In the grounds upon which it is supported For, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that, namely, the Inference from a given existence (my own, for example) to the existence Of an unconditioned and necessary being is valid and una**ailable; That, in the second place, we must consider a being which contains all Reality, and consequently all the conditions of other things, to Be absolutely unconditioned; and admitting too, that we have thus Discovered the conception of a thing to which may be attributed, without Inconsistency, absolute necessity--it does not follow from all this that The conception of a limited being, in which the supreme reality does not Reside, is therefore incompatible with the idea of absolute necessity For, although I do not discover the element of the unconditioned in the Conception of such a being--an element which is manifestly existent in The sum-total of all conditions--I am not entitled to conclude that its Existence is therefore conditioned; just as I am not entitled to affirm In a hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain condition does not Exist (in the present, completeness, as far as pure conceptions are Concerned), the conditioned does not exist either. On the contrary We are free to consider all limited beings as likewise unconditionally Necessary, although we are unable to infer this from the general Conception which we have of them. Thus conducted, this argument is Incapable of giving us the least notion of the properties of a necessary Being, and must be in every respect without result This argument continues, however, to possess a weight and an authority Which, in spite of its objective insufficiency, it has never been Divested of. For, granting that certain responsibilities lie upon us Which, as based on the ideas of reason, deserve to be respected and Submitted to, although they are incapable of a real or practical Application to our nature, or, in other words, would be responsibilities Without motives, except upon the supposition of a Supreme Being to give Effect and influence to the practical laws: in such a case we should be Bound to obey our conceptions, which, although objectively insufficient Do, according to the standard of reason, preponderate over and are Superior to any claims that may be advanced from any other quarter The equilibrium of doubt would in this case be destroyed by a practical Addition; indeed, Reason would be compelled to condemn herself, if she Refused to comply with the demands of the judgement, no superior to Which we know--however defective her understanding of the grounds of These demands might be This argument, although in fact transcendental, inasmuch as it rests Upon the intrinsic insufficiency of the contingent, is so simple and Natural, that the commonest understanding can appreciate its value We see things around us change, arise, and pa** away; they, or their Condition, must therefore have a cause. The same demand must again be Made of the cause itself--as a datum of experience. Now it is natural That we should place the highest causality just where we place supreme Causality, in that being, which contains the conditions of all possible Effects, and the conception of which is so simple as that of an All-embracing reality. This highest cause, then, we regard as absolutely Necessary, because we find it absolutely necessary to rise to it, and Do not discover any reason for proceeding beyond it. Thus, among all Nations, through the darkest polytheism glimmer some faint sparks of Monotheism, to which these idolaters have been led, not from reflection And profound thought, but by the study and natural progress of the Common understanding There are only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity, on the Grounds of speculative reason All the paths conducting to this end begin either from determinate Experience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense, and Rise, according to the laws of causality, from it to the highest Cause existing apart from the world--or from a purely indeterminate Experience, that is, some empirical existence--or abstraction is made of All experience, and the existence of a supreme cause is concluded from a Priori conceptions alone. The first is the physico-theological argument The second the cosmological, the third the ontological. More there are Not, and more there cannot be I shall show it is as unsuccessful on the one path--the empirical--as on The other--the transcendental, and that it stretches its wings in vain To soar beyond the world of sense by the mere might of speculative Thought. As regards the order in which we must discuss those arguments It will be exactly the reverse of that in which reason, in the progress Of its development, attains to them--the order in which they are Placed above. For it will be made manifest to the reader that, although Experience presents the occasion and the starting-point, it is the Transcendental idea of reason which guides it in its pilgrimage and Is the goal of all its struggles. I shall therefore begin with an Examination of the transcendental argument, and afterwards inquire what Additional strength has accrued to this mode of proof from the addition Of the empirical element SECTION IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God It is evident from what has been said that the conception of an Absolutely necessary being is a mere idea, the objective reality of Which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a Need of reason. On the contrary, this idea serves merely to indicate a Certain unattainable perfection, and rather limits the operations Than, by the presentation of new objects, extends the sphere of the Understanding. But a strange anomaly meets us at the very threshold; For the inference from a given existence in general to an absolutely Necessary existence seems to be correct and unavoidable, while the Conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any Conception of such a being Philosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary being And have nevertheless declined to take the trouble of conceiving Whether--and how--a being of this nature is even cogitable, not to Mention that its existence is actually demonstrable. A verbal definition Of the conception is certainly easy enough: it is something the Non-existence of which is impossible. But does this definition throw Any light upon the conditions which render it impossible to cogitate the Non-existence of a thing--conditions which we wish to ascertain, that we May discover whether we think anything in the conception of such a Being or not? For the mere fact that I throw away, by means of the word Unconditioned, all the conditions which the understanding habitually Requires in order to regard anything as necessary, is very far from Making clear whether by means of the conception of the unconditionally Necessary I think of something, or really of nothing at all Nay, more, this chance-conception, now become so current, many have Endeavoured to explain by examples which seemed to render any inquiries Regarding its intelligibility quite needless. Every geometrical Proposition--a triangle has three angles--it was said, is absolutely Necessary; and thus people talked of an object which lay out of the Sphere of our understanding as if it were perfectly plain what the Conception of such a being meant All the examples adduced have been drawn, without exception, from Judgements, and not from things. But the unconditioned necessity of A judgement does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. On the Contrary, the absolute necessity of a judgement is only a conditioned Necessity of a thing, or of the predicate in a judgement. The Proposition above-mentioned does not enounce that three angles Necessarily exist, but, upon condition that a triangle exists, three Angles must necessarily exist--in it. And thus this logical necessity Has been the source of the greatest delusions. Having formed an a Priori conception of a thing, the content of which was made to embrace Existence, we believed ourselves safe in concluding that, because Existence belongs necessarily to the object of the conception (that is Under the condition of my positing this thing as given), the existence Of the thing is also posited necessarily, and that it is therefore Absolutely necessary--merely because its existence has been cogitated in The conception If, in an identical judgement, I annihilate the predicate in thought And retain the subject, a contradiction is the result; and hence I say The former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if I suppress both Subject and predicate in thought, no contradiction arises; for there is Nothing at all, and therefore no means of forming a contradiction. To Suppose the existence of a triangle and not that of its three angles Is self-contradictory; but to suppose the non-existence of both triangle And angles is perfectly admissible. And so is it with the conception of An absolutely necessary being. Annihilate its existence in thought, and You annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates; how then can There be any room for contradiction? Externally, there is nothing To give rise to a contradiction, for a thing cannot be necessary Externally; nor internally, for, by the annihilation or suppression of The thing itself, its internal properties are also annihilated. God is Omnipotent--that is a necessary judgement. His omnipotence cannot be Denied, if the existence of a Deity is posited--the existence, that is Of an infinite being, the two conceptions being identical. But when you Say, God does not exist, neither omnipotence nor any other predicate Is affirmed; they must all disappear with the subject, and in this Judgement there cannot exist the least self-contradiction You have thus seen that when the predicate of a judgement is annihilated In thought along with the subject, no internal contradiction can arise Be the predicate what it may. There is no possibility of evading the Conclusion--you find yourselves compelled to declare: There are certain Subjects which cannot be annihilated in thought. But this is Nothing more than saying: There exist subjects which are absolutely Necessary--the very hypothesis which you are called upon to establish For I find myself unable to form the slightest conception of a thing Which when annihilated in thought with all its predicates, leaves Behind a contradiction; and contradiction is the only criterion of Impossibility in the sphere of pure a priori conceptions Against these general considerations, the justice of which no one can Dispute, one argument is adduced, which is regarded as furnishing a Satisfactory demonstration from the fact. It is affirmed that there is One and only one conception, in which the non-being or annihilation of The object is self-contradictory, and this is the conception of an ens Realissimum. It possesses, you say, all reality, and you feel yourselves Justified in admitting the possibility of such a being. (This I am Willing to grant for the present, although the existence of a conception Which is not self-contradictory is far from being sufficient to prove The possibility of an object.) Now the notion of all reality embraces In it that of existence; the notion of existence lies, therefore, in The conception of this possible thing. If this thing is annihilated In thought, the internal possibility of the thing is also annihilated Which is self-contradictory I answer: It is absurd to introduce--under whatever term disguised--into The conception of a thing, which is to be cogitated solely in reference To its possibility, the conception of its existence. If this is Admitted, you will have apparently gained the day, but in reality have Enounced nothing but a mere tautology. I ask, is the proposition This or that thing (which I am admitting to be possible) exists, an an*lytical or a synthetical proposition? If the former, there is no Addition made to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its Existence; but then the conception in your minds is identical with The thing itself, or you have supposed the existence of a thing to Be possible, and then inferred its existence from its internal Possibility--which is but a miserable tautology. The word reality in the Conception of the thing, and the word existence in the conception of the Predicate, will not help you out of the difficulty. For, supposing you Were to term all positing of a thing reality, you have thereby posited The thing with all its predicates in the conception of the subject And a**umed its actual existence, and this you merely repeat in the Predicate. But if you confess, as every reasonable person must, that Every existential proposition is synthetical, how can it be Maintained that the predicate of existence cannot be denied without Contradiction?--a property which is the characteristic of an*lytical Propositions, alone I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this Sophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the Conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the Illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate (a Predicate which aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost all The endeavours of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate may Be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself; For logic pays no regard to the content of a judgement. But the Determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and enlarges The conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the conception Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of Something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is Merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition, God Is omnipotent, contains two conceptions, which have a certain object or Content; the word is, is no additional predicate--it merely indicates The relation of the predicate to the subject. Now, if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say: God is Or, There is a God, I add no new predicate to the conception of God I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its Predicates--I posit the object in relation to my conception. The content Of both is the same; and there is no addition made to the conception Which expresses merely the possibility of the object, by my cogitating The object--in the expression, it is--as absolutely given or existing Thus the real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars Contain no more than a hundred possible dollars. For, as the latter Indicate the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition That the content of the former was greater than that of the latter, my Conception would not be an expression of the whole object, and would Consequently be an inadequate conception of it. But in reckoning my Wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than in a Hundred possible dollars--that is, in the mere conception of them For the real object--the dollars--is not an*lytically contained in my Conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my conception (which Is merely a determination of my mental state), although this objective Reality--this existence--apart from my conceptions, does not in the Least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars By whatever and by whatever number of predicates--even to the complete Determination of it--I may cogitate a thing, I do not in the least Augment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement: This thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more Than what was cogitated in my conception, would exist, and I could not Affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence. If I Cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one, the mode Of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the thing By the affirmation that the thing exists; on the contrary, the thing Exists--if it exist at all--with the same defect as that cogitated in Its conception; otherwise not that which was cogitated, but something Different, exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest reality Without defect or imperfection, the question still remains--whether this Being exists or not? For, although no element is wanting in the possible Real content of my conception, there is a defect in its relation to my Mental state, that is, I am ignorant whether the cognition of the object Indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori. And here the cause Of the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the question regarded an Object of sense merely, it would be impossible for me to confound the Conception with the existence of a thing. For the conception merely Enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general Conditions of experience; while the existence of the object permits me To cogitate it as contained in the sphere of actual experience. At the Same time, this connection with the world of experience does not in the Least augment the conception, although a possible perception has been Added to the experience of the mind. But if we cogitate existence by the Pure category alone, it is not to be wondered at, that we should find Ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it From mere possibility Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary To go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the Case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their connection according To empirical laws with some one of my perceptions; but there is no means Of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought, because it must Be cognized completely a priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be It immediately by perception, or by inferences connecting some object With a perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience--which Is in perfect unity with itself; and although an existence out of This sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a Hypothesis the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful idea; But for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of enlarging Our cognition with regard to the existence of things. It is not even Sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being which we Do not know to exist. The an*lytical criterion of possibility, which Consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot Be denied it. But the connection of real properties in a thing is a Synthesis of the possibility of which an a priori judgement cannot be Formed, because these realities are not presented to us specifically; And even if this were to happen, a judgement would still be impossible Because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must Be sought for in the world of experience, to which the object of an idea Cannot belong. And thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in His attempt to establish upon a priori grounds the possibility of this Sublime ideal being The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of A Supreme Being is therefore insufficient; and we may as well hope To increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the Merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash Account