Immanuel Kant - The Critique of Pure Reason; Part 12 lyrics

APPENDIX Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection From the Confusion of the Transcendental with the Empirical use of the Understanding Reflection (reflexio) is not occupied about objects themselves, for the Purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that state of The mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions Under which we obtain conceptions. It is the consciousness of the Relation of given representations to the different sources or faculties Of cognition, by which alone their relation to each other can be Rightly determined. The first question which occurs in considering our Representations is to what faculty of cognition do they belong? To the Understanding or to the senses? Many judgements are admitted to be true From mere habit or inclination; but, because reflection neither precedes Nor follows, it is held to be a judgement that has its origin in the Understanding. All judgements do not require examination, that is Investigation into the grounds of their truth. For, when they are Immediately certain (for example: "Between two points there can be only One straight line"), no better or less mediate test of their truth can Be found than that which they themselves contain and express. But All judgement, nay, all comparisons require reflection, that is, a Distinction of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions Belong. The act whereby I compare my representations with the faculty of Cognition which originates them, and whereby I distinguish whether they Are compared with each other as belonging to the pure understanding Or to sensuous intuition, I term transcendental reflection. Now, the Relations in which conceptions can stand to each other are those of Identity and difference, agreement and opposition, of the internal and External, finally, of the determinable and the determining (matter And form). The proper determination of these relations rests on the Question, to what faculty of cognition they subjectively belong, whether To sensibility or understanding? For, on the manner in which we solve This question depends the manner in which we must cogitate these Relations Before constructing any objective judgement, we compare the conceptions That are to be placed in the judgement, and observe whether there exists Identity (of many representations in one conception), if a general Judgement is to be constructed, or difference, if a particular; whether There is agreement when affirmative; and opposition when negative Judgements are to be constructed, and so on. For this reason we ought To call these conceptions, conceptions of comparison (conceptus Comparationis). But as, when the question is not as to the logical form But as to the content of conceptions, that is to say, whether the things Themselves are identical or different, in agreement or opposition And so on, the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty Of cognition, to wit, a relation either to sensibility or to the Understanding, and as on this relation depends their relation to Each other, transcendental reflection, that is, the relation of given Representations to one or the other faculty of cognition, can alone Determine this latter relation. Thus we shall not be able to discover Whether the things are identical or different, in agreement or Opposition, etc., from the mere conception of the things by means Of comparison (comparatio), but only by distinguishing the mode Of cognition to which they belong, in other words, by means of Transcendental reflection. We may, therefore, with justice say, that Logical reflection is mere comparison, for in it no account is taken of The faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong, and They are consequently, as far as regards their origin, to be treated As h*mogeneous; while transcendental reflection (which applies to the Objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of objective Comparison of representations with each other, and is therefore very Different from the former, because the faculties of cognition to which They belong are not even the same. Transcendental reflection is a duty Which no one can neglect who wishes to establish an a priori judgement Upon things. We shall now proceed to fulfil this duty, and thereby throw Not a little light on the question as to the determination of the proper Business of the understanding 1. Identity and Difference. When an object is presented to us several Times, but always with the same internal determinations (qualitas et Quantitas), it, if an object of pure understanding, is always the same Not several things, but only one thing (numerica identitas); but if a Phenomenon, we do not concern ourselves with comparing the conception of The thing with the conception of some other, but, although they may be In this respect perfectly the same, the difference of place at the same Time is a sufficient ground for a**erting the numerical difference of These objects (of sense). Thus, in the case of two drops of water, we May make complete abstraction of all internal difference (quality and Quantity), and, the fact that they are intuited at the same time in Different places, is sufficient to justify us in holding them to Be numerically different. Leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in Themselves, consequently as intelligibilia, that is, objects of pure Understanding (although, on account of the confused nature of their Representations, he gave them the name of phenomena), and in this Case his principle of the indiscernible (principium identatis Indiscernibilium) is not to be impugned. But, as phenomena are objects Of sensibility, and, as the understanding, in respect of them, must be Employed empirically and not purely or transcendentally, plurality And numerical difference are given by space itself as the condition of External phenomena. For one part of space, although it may be perfectly Similar and equal to another part, is still without it, and for this Reason alone is different from the latter, which is added to it in order To make up a greater space. It follows that this must hold good of All things that are in the different parts of space at the same time However similar and equal one may be to another 2. Agreement and Opposition. When reality is represented by the pure Understanding (realitas noumenon), opposition between realities is Incogitable--such a relation, that is, that when these realities are Connected in one subject, they annihilate the effects of each other and May be represented in the formula 3 -3 = 0. On the other hand, the Real in a phenomenon (realitas phaenomenon) may very well be in mutual Opposition, and, when united in the same subject, the one may completely Or in part annihilate the effect or consequence of the other; as in the Case of two moving forces in the same straight line drawing or Impelling a point in opposite directions, or in the case of a pleasure Counterbalancing a certain amount of pain 3. The Internal and External. In an object of the pure understanding Only that is internal which has no relation (as regards its existence) To anything different from itself. On the other hand, the internal Determinations of a substantia phaenomenon in space are nothing But relations, and it is itself nothing more than a complex of mere Relations. Substance in space we are cognizant of only through forces Operative in it, either drawing others towards itself (attraction) Or preventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion and Impenetrability). We know no other properties that make up the Conception of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter On the other hand, as an object of the pure understanding, every Substance must have internal determination and forces. But what other Internal attributes of such an object can I think than those which my Internal sense presents to me? That, to wit, which in either itself Thought, or something an*logous to it. Hence Leibnitz, who looked upon Things as noumena, after denying them everything like external relation And therefore also composition or combination, declared that all Substances, even the component parts of matter, were simple substances With powers of representation, in one word, monads 4. Matter and Form. These two conceptions lie at the foundation of all Other reflection, so inseparably are they connected with every mode of Exercising the understanding. The former denotes the determinable in General, the second its determination, both in a transcendental sense Abstraction being made of every difference in that which is given, and Of the mode in which it is determined. Logicians formerly termed the Universal, matter, the specific difference of this or that part of The universal, form. In a judgement one may call the given conceptions Logical matter (for the judgement), the relation of these to each other (by means of the copula), the form of the judgement. In an object, the Composite parts thereof (essentialia) are the matter; the mode in which They are connected in the object, the form. In respect to things In general, unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all Possibility, the limitation thereof (negation) as the form, by which One thing is distinguished from another according to transcendental Conceptions. The understanding demands that something be given (at least In the conception), in order to be able to determine it in a certain Manner. Hence, in a conception of the pure understanding, the matter Precedes the form, and for this reason Leibnitz first a**umed the Existence of things (monads) and of an internal power of representation In them, in order to found upon this their external relation and the Community their state (that is, of their representations). Hence, with Him, space and time were possible--the former through the relation of Substances, the latter through the connection of their determinations With each other, as causes and effects. And so would it really be If the pure understanding were capable of an immediate application To objects, and if space and time were determinations of things in Themselves. But being merely sensuous intuitions, in which we determine All objects solely as phenomena, the form of intuition (as a subjective Property of sensibility) must antecede all matter (sensations) Consequently space and time must antecede all phenomena and all data Of experience, and rather make experience itself possible. But the Intellectual philosopher could not endure that the form should precede The things themselves and determine their possibility; an objection Perfectly correct, if we a**ume that we intuite things as they are Although with confused representation. But as sensuous intuition is a Peculiar subjective condition, which is a priori at the foundation of All perception, and the form of which is primitive, the form must be Given per se, and so far from matter (or the things themselves which Appear) lying at the foundation of experience (as we must conclude If we judge by mere conceptions), the very possibility of itself Presupposes, on the contrary, a given formal intuition (space and time) REMARK ON THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION Let me be allowed to term the position which we a**ign to a Conception either in the sensibility or in the pure understanding, the Transcendental place. In this manner, the appointment of the position Which must be taken by each conception according to the difference In its use, and the directions for determining this place to all Conceptions according to rules, would be a transcendental topic, a Doctrine which would thoroughly shield us from the surreptitious devices Of the pure understanding and the delusions which thence arise, as it Would always distinguish to what faculty of cognition each conception Properly belonged. Every conception, every title, under which many Cognitions rank together, may be called a logical place. Upon this is Based the logical topic of Aristotle, of which teachers and rhetoricians Could avail themselves, in order, under certain titles of thought, to Observe what would best suit the matter they had to treat, and thus Enable themselves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of Profundity Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing more than the Above-mentioned four titles of all comparison and distinction, which Differ from categories in this respect, that they do not represent the Object according to that which constitutes its conception (quantity Reality), but set forth merely the comparison of representations, which Precedes our conceptions of things. But this comparison requires a Previous reflection, that is, a determination of the place to which the Representations of the things which are compared belong, whether To wit, they are cogitated by the pure understanding, or given by Sensibility Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of inquiring To what faculty their objects belong, whether as noumena, to the Understanding, or as phenomena, to sensibility. If, however, we wish to Employ these conceptions in respect of objects, previous transcendental Reflection is necessary. Without this reflection I should make a very Unsafe use of these conceptions, and construct pretended synthetical Propositions which critical reason cannot acknowledge and which Are based solely upon a transcendental amphiboly, that is, upon a Substitution of an object of pure understanding for a phenomenon For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and consequently Deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection, the Celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual system of the world Or rather, believed himself competent to cognize the internal nature of Things, by comparing all objects merely with the understanding and the Abstract formal conceptions of thought. Our table of the conceptions of Reflection gives us the unexpected advantage of being able to exhibit The distinctive peculiarities of his system in all its parts, and at the Same time of exposing the fundamental principle of this peculiar mode of Thought, which rested upon naught but a misconception. He compared all Things with each other merely by means of conceptions, and naturally Found no other differences than those by which the understanding Distinguishes its pure conceptions one from another. The conditions Of sensuous intuition, which contain in themselves their own means of Distinction, he did not look upon as primitive, because sensibility Was to him but a confused mode of representation and not any particular Source of representations. A phenomenon was for him the representation Of the thing in itself, although distinguished from cognition by the Understanding only in respect of the logical form--the former with its Usual want of an*lysis containing, according to him, a certain mixture Of collateral representations in its conception of a thing, which it is The duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish. In one word Leibnitz intellectualized phenomena, just as Locke, in his system Of noogony (if I may be allowed to make use of such expressions) Sensualized the conceptions of the understanding, that is to say Declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract conceptions Of reflection. Instead of seeking in the understanding and sensibility Two different sources of representations, which, however, can present us With objective judgements of things only in conjunction, each of These great men recognized but one of these faculties, which, in their Opinion, applied immediately to things in themselves, the other having No duty but that of confusing or arranging the representations of the Former Accordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leibnitz as things in General merely in the understanding 1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or difference--as Judged by the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely the Conceptions of objects, and not their position in intuition, in Which alone objects can be given, and left quite out of sight the Transcendental locale of these conceptions--whether, that is, their Object ought to be cla**ed among phenomena, or among things in Themselves, it was to be expected that he should extend the application Of the principle of indiscernibles, which is valid solely of conceptions Of things in general, to objects of sense (mundus phaenomenon), and that He should believe that he had thereby contributed in no small degree to Extend our knowledge of nature. In truth, if I cognize in all its inner Determinations a drop of water as a thing in itself, I cannot look upon One drop as different from another, if the conception of the one is Completely identical with that of the other. But if it is a phenomenon In space, it has a place not merely in the understanding (among Conceptions), but also in sensuous external intuition (in space), and in This case, the physical locale is a matter of indifference in regard to The internal determinations of things, and one place, B, may contain A thing which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place, A Just as well as if the two things were in every respect different from Each other. Difference of place without any other conditions, makes the Plurality and distinction of objects as phenomena, not only possible in Itself, but even necessary. Consequently, the above so-called law is not A law of nature. It is merely an an*lytical rule for the comparison of Things by means of mere conceptions 2nd. The principle: "Realities (as simple affirmations) never logically Contradict each other," is a proposition perfectly true respecting the Relation of conceptions, but, whether as regards nature, or things in Themselves (of which we have not the slightest conception), is without Any the least meaning. For real opposition, in which A -B is = 0 Exists everywhere, an opposition, that is, in which one reality united With another in the same subject annihilates the effects of the other--a Fact which is constantly brought before our eyes by the different Antagonistic actions and operations in nature, which, nevertheless, as Depending on real forces, must be called realitates phaenomena. General Mechanics can even present us with the empirical condition of this Opposition in an a priori rule, as it directs its attention to the Opposition in the direction of forces--a condition of which the Transcendental conception of reality can tell us nothing. Although M Leibnitz did not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of A new principle, he yet employed it for the establishment of New propositions, and his followers introduced it into their Leibnitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to this principle For example, all evils are but consequences of the limited nature of Created beings, that is, negations, because these are the only opposite Of reality. (In the mere conception of a thing in general this is really The case, but not in things as phenomena.) In like manner, the upholders Of this system deem it not only possible, but natural also, to connect And unite all reality in one being, because they acknowledge no other Sort of opposition than that of contradiction (by which the conception Itself of a thing is annihilated), and find themselves unable to Conceive an opposition of reciprocal destruction, so to speak, in which One real cause destroys the effect of another, and the conditions of Whose representation we meet with only in sensibility 3rd. The Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than on This philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of The internal and external solely in relation to the understanding Substances, in general, must have something inward, which is therefore Free from external relations, consequently from that of composition Also. The simple--that which can be represented by a unit--is therefore The foundation of that which is internal in things in themselves. The Internal state of substances cannot therefore consist in place, shape Contact, or motion, determinations which are all external relations And we can ascribe to them no other than that whereby we internally Determine our faculty of sense itself, that is to say, the state of Representation. Thus, then, were constructed the monads, which were to Form the elements of the universe, the active force of which consists in Representation, the effects of this force being thus entirely confined To themselves For the same reason, his view of the possible community of substances Could not represent it but as a predetermined harmony, and by no means As a physical influence. For inasmuch as everything is occupied only Internally, that is, with its own representations, the state of the Representations of one substance could not stand in active and living Connection with that of another, but some third cause operating on all Without exception was necessary to make the different states correspond With one another. And this did not happen by means of a**istance applied In each particular case (systema a**istentiae), but through the unity of The idea of a cause occupied and connected with all substances, in which They necessarily receive, according to the Leibnitzian school, their Existence and permanence, consequently also reciprocal correspondence According to universal laws 4th. This philosopher's celebrated doctrine of space and time, in which He intellectualized these forms of sensibility, originated in the same Delusion of transcendental reflection. If I attempt to represent by the Mere understanding, the external relations of things, I can do so only By employing the conception of their reciprocal action, and if I wish To connect one state of the same thing with another state, I must avail Myself of the notion of the order of cause and effect. And thus Leibnitz Regarded space as a certain order in the community of substances, and Time as the dynamical sequence of their states. That which space and Time possess proper to themselves and independent of things, he ascribed To a necessary confusion in our conceptions of them, whereby that which Is a mere form of dynamical relations is held to be a self-existent Intuition, antecedent even to things themselves. Thus space and time Were the intelligible form of the connection of things (substances and Their states) in themselves. But things were intelligible substances (substantiae noumena). At the same time, he made these conceptions valid Of phenomena, because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode of Intuition, but sought all, even the empirical representation of objects In the understanding, and left to sense naught but the despicable task Of confusing and disarranging the representations of the former But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition concerning things In themselves by means of the pure understanding (which is impossible) It could not apply to phenomena, which do not represent things in Themselves. In such a case I should be obliged in transcendental Reflection to compare my conceptions only under the conditions of Sensibility, and so space and time would not be determinations of things In themselves, but of phenomena. What things may be in themselves, I Know not and need not know, because a thing is never presented to me Otherwise than as a phenomenon I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions Of reflection. Matter is substantia phaenomenon. That in it which is Internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies, and In all the functions and operations it performs, and which are indeed Never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot therefore Find anything that is absolutely, but only what is comparatively Internal, and which itself consists of external relations. The Absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be according to the pure Understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter is not an object for The pure understanding. But the transcendental object, which is the Foundation of the phenomenon which we call matter, is a mere nescio Quid, the nature of which we could not understand, even though someone Were found able to tell us. For we can understand nothing that does not Bring with it something in intuition corresponding to the expressions Employed. If, by the complaint of being unable to perceive the internal Nature of things, it is meant that we do not comprehend by the pure Understanding what the things which appear to us may be in themselves It is a silly and unreasonable complaint; for those who talk thus really Desire that we should be able to cognize, consequently to intuite Things without senses, and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty Of cognition perfectly different from the human faculty, not merely in Degree, but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof, so that thus We should not be men, but belong to a cla** of beings, the possibility Of whose existence, much less their nature and constitution, we have No means of cognizing. By observation and an*lysis of phenomena we Penetrate into the interior of nature, and no one can say what progress This knowledge may make in time. But those transcendental questions Which pa** beyond the limits of nature, we could never answer, even Although all nature were laid open to us, because we have not the power Of observing our own mind with any other intuition than that of our Internal sense. For herein lies the mystery of the origin and source Of our faculty of sensibility. Its application to an object, and the Transcendental ground of this unity of subjective and objective, lie too Deeply concealed for us, who cognize ourselves only through the Internal sense, consequently as phenomena, to be able to discover in our Existence anything but phenomena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at The same time earnestly desire to penetrate to The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by the Processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration of the Nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are compared With each other in the understanding alone, while it at the same time Confirms what we particularly insisted on, namely, that, although Phenomena are not included as things in themselves among the objects of The pure understanding, they are nevertheless the only things by which Our cognition can possess objective reality, that is to say, which give Us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions When we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing more than Compare conceptions in our understanding, to discover whether both have The same content, whether they are self-contradictory or not, whether Anything is contained in either conception, which of the two is given And which is merely a mode of thinking that given. But if I apply these Conceptions to an object in general (in the transcendental sense) Without first determining whether it is an object of sensuous or Intellectual intuition, certain limitations present themselves, which Forbid us to pa** beyond the conceptions and render all empirical use Of them impossible. And thus these limitations prove that the Representation of an object as a thing in general is not only Insufficient, but, without sensuous determination and independently of Empirical conditions, self-contradictory; that we must therefore make Abstraction of all objects, as in logic, or, admitting them, must think Them under conditions of sensuous intuition; that, consequently, the Intelligible requires an altogether peculiar intuition, which we do not Possess, and in the absence of which it is for us nothing; while, on the Other hand phenomena cannot be objects in themselves. For, when I merely Think things in general, the difference in their external relations Cannot constitute a difference in the things themselves; on the Contrary, the former presupposes the latter, and if the conception of One of two things is not internally different from that of the other I am merely thinking the same thing in different relations. Further By the addition of one affirmation (reality) to the other, the positive Therein is really augmented, and nothing is abstracted or withdrawn From it; hence the real in things cannot be in contradiction with or Opposition to itself--and so on The true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employment of the Understanding has, as we have shown, been so misconceived by Leibnitz One of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or modern times That he has been misled into the construction of a baseless system of Intellectual cognition, which professes to determine its objects without The intervention of the senses. For this reason, the exposition of the Cause of the amphiboly of these conceptions, as the origin of these False principles, is of great utility in determining with certainty the Proper limits of the understanding It is right to say whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of a Conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it (dictum de omni Et nullo); but it would be absurd so to alter this logical proposition As to say whatever is not contained in a general conception is likewise Not contained in the particular conceptions which rank under it; for The latter are particular conceptions, for the very reason that Their content is greater than that which is cogitated in the general Conception. And yet the whole intellectual system of Leibnitz is based Upon this false principle, and with it must necessarily fall to the Ground, together with all the ambiguous principles in reference to the Employment of the understanding which have thence originated Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles or Indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition that, if in the Conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found, it is Also not to be met with in things themselves; that, consequently All things are completely identical (numero eadem) which are not Distinguishable from each other (as to quality or quantity) in our Conceptions of them. But, as in the mere conception of anything Abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition That of which abstraction has been made is rashly held to be Non-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is Contained in its conception The conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think it, is In itself completely identical. But two cubic feet in space are Nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their being In different places (they are numero diversa); and these places are Conditions of intuition, wherein the object of this conception is Given, and which do not belong to the conception, but to the faculty of Sensibility. In like manner, there is in the conception of a thing no Contradiction when a negative is not connected with an affirmative; And merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in conjunction, produce any Negation. But in sensuous intuition, wherein reality (take for example Motion) is given, we find conditions (opposite directions)--of which Abstraction has been made in the conception of motion in general--which Render possible a contradiction or opposition (not indeed of a logical Kind)--and which from pure positives produce zero = 0. We are therefore Not justified in saying that all reality is in perfect agreement And harmony, because no contradiction is discoverable among its Conceptions.* According to mere conceptions, that which is internal Is the substratum of all relations or external determinations. When Therefore, I abstract all conditions of intuition, and confine myself Solely to the conception of a thing in general, I can make abstraction Of all external relations, and there must nevertheless remain a Conception of that which indicates no relation, but merely internal Determinations. Now it seems to follow that in everything (substance) There is something which is absolutely internal and which antecedes all External determinations, inasmuch as it renders them possible; and That therefore this substratum is something which does not contain any External relations and is consequently simple (for corporeal things are Never anything but relations, at least of their parts external to Each other); and, inasmuch as we know of no other absolutely internal Determinations than those of the internal sense, this substratum is not Only simple, but also, an*logously with our internal sense, determined Through representations, that is to say, all things are properly monads Or simple beings endowed with the power of representation. Now all this Would be perfectly correct, if the conception of a thing were the Only necessary condition of the presentation of objects of external Intuition. It is, on the contrary, manifest that a permanent phenomenon In space (impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and Nothing that is absolutely internal, and yet be the primary substratum Of all external perception. By mere conceptions I cannot think anything External, without, at the same time, thinking something internal, for The reason that conceptions of relations presuppose given things, and Without these are impossible. But, as an intuition there is something (that is, space, which, with all it contains, consists of purely formal Or, indeed, real relations) which is not found in the mere conception of A thing in general, and this presents to us the substratum which could Not be cognized through conceptions alone, I cannot say: because a thing Cannot be represented by mere conceptions without something absolutely Internal, there is also, in the things themselves which are contained Under these conceptions, and in their intuition nothing external to Which something absolutely internal does not serve as the foundation For, when we have made abstraction of all the conditions of intuition There certainly remains in the mere conception nothing but the internal In general, through which alone the external is possible. But this Necessity, which is grounded upon abstraction alone, does not obtain in The case of things themselves, in so far as they are given in intuition With such determinations as express mere relations, without having Anything internal as their foundation; for they are not things of a Thing of which we can neither for they are not things in themselves, but Only phenomena. What we cognize in matter is nothing but relations (what We call its internal determinations are but comparatively internal). But There are some self-subsistent and permanent, through which a determined Object is given. That I, when abstraction is made of these relations Have nothing more to think, does not destroy the conception of a thing As phenomenon, nor the conception of an object in abstracto, but it does Away with the possibility of an object that is determinable according to Mere conceptions, that is, of a noumenon. It is certainly startling to Hear that a thing consists solely of relations; but this thing is simply A phenomenon, and cannot be cogitated by means of the mere categories: It does itself consist in the mere relation of something in general to The senses. In the same way, we cannot cogitate relations of things in Abstracto, if we commence with conceptions alone, in any other manner Than that one is the cause of determinations in the other; for that is Itself the conception of the understanding or category of relation. But As in this case we make abstraction of all intuition, we lose altogether The mode in which the manifold determines to each of its parts its Place, that is, the form of sensibility (space); and yet this mode Antecedes all empirical causality If by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought By means of the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of Sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the Objective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of Our sensuous intuition, whereby objects are given; and, if we make Abstraction of the latter, the former can have no relation to an object And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition from our Own, still our functions of thought would have no use or signification In respect thereof. But if we understand by the term, objects of a Non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our categories are not Valid, and of which we can accordingly have no knowledge (neither Intuition nor conception), in this merely negative sense noumena must be Admitted. For this is no more than saying that our mode of intuition is Not applicable to all things, but only to objects of our senses That consequently its objective validity is limited, and that room is Therefore left for another kind of intuition, and thus also for things That may be objects of it. But in this sense the conception of a Noumenon is problematical, that is to say, it is the notion of that it That it is possible, nor that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not Know of any mode of intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort Of conceptions than the categories--a mode of intuition and a kind of Conception neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We Are on this account incompetent to extend the sphere of our objects Of thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to a**ume the Existence of objects of pure thought, that is, of noumena, inasmuch as These have no true positive signification. For it must be confessed Of the categories that they are not of themselves sufficient for the Cognition of things in themselves and, without the data of sensibility Are mere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding. Thought is Certainly not a product of the senses, and in so far is not limited by Them, but it does not therefore follow that it may be employed purely And without the intervention of sensibility, for it would then be Without reference to an object. And we cannot call a noumenon an object Of pure thought; for the representation thereof is but the problematical Conception of an object for a perfectly different intuition and A perfectly different understanding from ours, both of which are Consequently themselves problematical. The conception of a noumenon is Therefore not the conception of an object, but merely a problematical Conception inseparably connected with the limitation of our sensibility That is to say, this conception contains the answer to the question: "Are there objects quite unconnected with, and independent of, our Intuition?"--a question to which only an indeterminate answer can be Given. That answer is: "Inasmuch as sensuous intuition does not apply To all things without distinction, there remains room for other and Different objects." The existence of these problematical objects Is therefore not absolutely denied, in the absence of a determinate Conception of them, but, as no category is valid in respect of them Neither must they be admitted as objects for our understanding Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same time Enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it forbids sensibility to Apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and restricts it To the sphere of phenomena, it cogitates an object in itself, only However, as a transcendental object, which is the cause of a phenomenon (consequently not itself a phenomenon), and which cannot be thought Either as a quantity or as reality, or as substance (because these Conceptions always require sensuous forms in which to determine an Object)--an object, therefore, of which we are quite unable to say Whether it can be met with in ourselves or out of us, whether it would Be annihilated together with sensibility, or, if this were taken away Would continue to exist. If we wish to call this object a noumenon Because the representation of it is non-sensuous, we are at liberty To do so. But as we can apply to it none of the conceptions of our Understanding, the representation is for us quite void, and is available Only for the indication of the limits of our sensuous intuition, thereby Leaving at the same time an empty space, which we are competent to Fill by the aid neither of possible experience, nor of the pure Understanding The critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit us To create for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which are Presented to us as phenomena, and to stray into intelligible worlds; Nay, it does not even allow us to endeavour to form so much as a Conception of them. The specious error which leads to this--and which is A perfectly excusable one--lies in the fact that the employment of the Understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and destination, is made Transcendental, and objects, that is, possible intuitions, are made to Regulate themselves according to conceptions, instead of the conceptions Arranging themselves according to the intuitions, on which alone their Own objective validity rests. Now the reason of this again is that Apperception, and with it thought, antecedes all possible determinate Arrangement of representations. Accordingly we think something in General and determine it on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other Distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object from this Particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains a mode of Determining the object by mere thought, which is really but a logical Form without content, which, however, seems to us to be a mode of The existence of the object in itself (noumenon), without regard to Intuition which is limited to our senses Before ending this transcendental an*lytic, we must make an addition Which, although in itself of no particular importance, seems to be Necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest conception With which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins, is the division Into possible and impossible. But as all division presupposes a divided Conception, a still higher one must exist, and this is the conception of An object in general--problematically understood and without its being Decided whether it is something or nothing. As the categories are the Only conceptions which apply to objects in general, the distinguishing Of an object, whether it is something or nothing, must proceed according To the order and direction of the categories 1. To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions of all, many And one, the conception which annihilates all, that is, the conception Of none, is opposed. And thus the object of a conception, to which no Intuition can be found to correspond, is = nothing. That is, it is a Conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena, which cannot Be considered possible in the sphere of reality, though they must not Therefore be held to be impossible--or like certain new fundamental Forces in matter, the existence of which is cogitable without Contradiction, though, as examples from experience are not forthcoming They must not be regarded as possible 2. Reality is something; negation is nothing, that is, a conception of The absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil privativum) 3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no Object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as phenomenon) As pure space and pure time. These are certainly something, as forms Of intuition, but are not themselves objects which are intuited (ens Imaginarium) 4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is nothing Because the conception is nothing--is impossible, as a figure composed Of two straight lines (nihil negativum) The table of this division of the conception of nothing (the Corresponding division of the conception of something does not require Special description) must therefore be arranged as follows: NOTHING AS 1 As Empty Conception Without object Ens rationis 2 Empty object of A conception Nihil privativum 3 Empty intuition Without object Ens imaginarium 4 Empty object Without conception Nihil negativum We see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil negativum Or pure nothing by the consideration that the former must not be Reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction--though Not self-contradictory, while the latter is completely opposed to All possibility, inasmuch as the conception annihilates itself. Both However, are empty conceptions. On the other hand, the nihil privativum And ens imaginarium are empty data for conceptions. If light be not Given to the senses, we cannot represent to ourselves darkness, and if Extended objects are not perceived, we cannot represent space. Neither The negation, nor the mere form of intuition can, without something Real, be an object