Chief Justice John Roberts - United States v. Windsor (Dissent) lyrics

I agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of the courts below. On the merits of the constitutional dispute the Court decides to decide, I also agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that Congress acted constitutionally in pa**ing the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Interests in uniformity and stability amply justified Congress's decision to retain the definition of marriage that, at that point, had been adopted by every State in our Nation, and every nation in the world. Post, at 19–20 (dissenting opinion). The majority sees a more sinister motive, pointing out that the Federal Government has generally (though not uniformly) deferred to state definitions of marriage in the past. That is true, of course, but none of those prior state-by-state variations had involved differences over something—as the majority puts it—“thought of by most people as essential to the very definition of [marriage] and to its role and function throughout the history of civilization.” Ante, at 13. That the Federal Government treated this fundamental question differently than it treated variations over consanguinity or minimum age is hardly surprising— and hardly enough to support a conclusion that the “principal purpose,” ante, at 22, of the 342 Representatives and 85 Senators who voted for it, and the President who signed it, was a bare desire to harm. Nor do the snippets of legislative history and the ban*l title of the Act to which the majority points suffice to make such a showing. At least without some more convincing evidence that the Act's principal purpose was to codify malice, and that it furthered no legitimate government interests, I would not tar the political branches with the brush of bigotry. But while I disagree with the result to which the majority's an*lysis leads it in this case, I think it more important to point out that its an*lysis leads no further. The Court does not have before it, and the logic of its opinion does not decide, the distinct question whether the States, in the exercise of their “historic and essential authority to define the marital relation,” ante, at 18, may continue to utilize the traditional definition of marriage. The majority goes out of its way to make this explicit in the penultimate sentence of its opinion. It states that “[t]his opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages,” ante, at 26—referring to same-s** marriages that a State has already recognized as a result of the local “community's considered perspective on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality.” Ante, at 20. JUSTICE SCALIA believes this is a “‘bald, unreasoned disclaime[r].'” Post, at 22. In my view, though, the disclaimer is a logical and necessary consequence of the argument the majority has chosen to adopt. The dominant theme of the majority opinion is that the Federal Government's intrusion into an area “central to state domestic relations law applicable to its residents and citizens” is sufficiently “unusual” to set off alarm bells. Ante, at 17, 20. I think the majority goes off course, as I have said, but it is undeniable that its judgment is based on federalism. The majority extensively chronicles DOMA's departure from the normal allocation of responsibility between State and Federal Governments, emphasizing that DOMA “rejects the long-established precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State.” Ante, at 18. But there is no such departure when one State adopts or keeps a definition of marriage that differs from that of its neighbor, for it is entirely expected that state definitions would “vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next.” Ibid. Thus, while “[t]he State's power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance” to the majority's decision to strike down DOMA here, ibid., that power will come into play on the other side of the board in future cases about the constitutionality of state marriage definitions. So too will the concerns for state diversity and sovereignty that weigh against DOMA's constitutionality in this case. See ante, at 19. It is not just this central feature of the majority's an*lysis that is unique to DOMA, but many considerations on the periphery as well. For example, the majority focuses on the legislative history and title of this particular Act, ante, at 21; those statute-specific considerations will, of course, be irrelevant in future cases about different statutes. The majority emphasizes that DOMA was a “system-wide enactment with no identified connection to any particular area of federal law,” but a State's definition of marriage “is the foundation of the State's broader authority to regulate the subject of domestic relations with respect to the ‘[p]rotection of offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities.'” Ante, at 22, 17. And the federal decision undermined (in the majority's view) the “dignity [already] conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power,” ante, at 21, whereas a State's decision whether to expand the definition of marriage from its traditional contours involves no similar concern. We may in the future have to resolve challenges to state marriage definitions affecting same-s** couples. That issue, however, is not before us in this case, and we hold today that we lack jurisdiction to consider it in the particular context of Hollingsworth v. Perry, ante, p. ___. I write only to highlight the limits of the majority's holding and reasoning today, lest its opinion be taken to resolve not only a question that I believe is not properly before us—DOMA's constitutionality—but also a question that all agree, and the Court explicitly acknowledges, is not at issue. FOOTNOTES [1] Our precedents make clear that, in order to support our jurisdiction, BLAG must demonstrate that it had Article III standing in its own right, quite apart from its status as an intervenor. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) ("Although intervenors are considered parties entitled, among other things, to seek review by this Court, an intervenor's right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III" (citation omitted)); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) ("Standing to defend on appeal in the place of an original defendant, no less than standing to sue, demands that the litigant possess a direct stake in the outcome" (internal quotation marks omitted)); id., at 65, 117 S.Ct. 1055 ("An intervenor cannot step into the shoes of the original party unless the intervenor independently fulfills the requirements of Article III" (internal quotation marks omitted)). [2] H. Res. 5, 113th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a)(1)(B) (2013) ("[BLAG] continues to speak for, and articulates the institutional position of, the House in all litigation matters in which it appears, including in Windsor v. United States"). [3] Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), is not to the contrary. The Court's statements there concerned enforcement, not defense. [4] Curry-Sumner, A Patchwork of Partnerships: Comparative Overview of Registration Schemes in Europe, in Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships 71, 72 (K. Boele-Woelki & A. Fuchs eds., rev. 2d ed., 2012). [5] As sociologists have documented, it sometimes takes decades to document the effects of social changes — like the sharp rise in divorce rates following the advent of no-fault divorce — on children and society. See generally J. Wallerstein, J. Lewis, & S. Blakeslee, The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: The 25 Year Landmark Study (2000). [6] Among those holding that position, some deplore and some applaud this predicted development. Compare, e.g., Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish": Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 771, 799 (2001) ("Culturally, the legalization of same-s** marriage would send a message that would undermine the social boundaries relating to marriage and family relations. The confusion of social roles linked with marriage and parenting would be tremendous, and the message of `anything goes' in the way of s**ual behavior, procreation, and parenthood would wreak its greatest havoc among groups of vulnerable individuals who most need the encouragement of bright line laws and clear social mores concerning procreative responsibility") and Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. St. Thomas L.J. 33, 58 (2005) ("If the idea of marriage really does matter — if society really does need a social institution that manages opposite-s** attractions in the interests of children and society — then taking an already weakened social institution, subjecting it to radical new redefinitions, and hoping that there are no consequences is probably neither a wise nor a compa**ionate idea"), with Brownworth, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Is Marriage Right for Queers? in I Do/I Don't: Queers on Marriage 53, 58-59 (G. Wharton & I. Phillips eds. 2004) (Former President George W. "Bush is correct ... when he states that allowing same-s** couples to marry will weaken the institution of marriage. It most certainly will do so, and that will make marriage a far better concept than it previously has been") and Willis, Can Marriage Be Saved? A Forum, The Nation, p. 16 (2004) (celebrating the fact that "conferring the legitimacy of marriage on h*mos**ual relations will introduce an implicit revolt against the institution into its very heart"). [7] The degree to which this question is intractable to typical judicial processes of decision-making was highlighted by the trial in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 130 S.Ct. 705, 175 L.Ed.2d 657 (2010). In that case, the trial judge, after receiving testimony from some expert witnesses, purported to make "findings of fact" on such questions as why marriage came to be, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921, 958 (N.D.Cal.2010) (finding of fact no. 27) ("Marriage between a man and a woman was traditionally organized based on presumptions of division of labor along gender lines. Men were seen as suited for certain types of work and women for others. Women were seen as suited to raise children and men were seen as suited to provide for the family"), what marriage is, id., at 961 (finding of fact no. 34) ("Marriage is the state recognition and approval of a couple's choice to live with each other, to remain committed to one another and to form a household based on their own feelings about one another and to join in an economic partnership and support one another and any dependents"), and the effect legalizing same-s** marriage would have on opposite-s** marriage, id., at 972 (finding of fact no. 55) ("Permitting same-s** couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-s** couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-s** marriages"). At times, the trial reached the heights of parody, as when the trial judge questioned his ability to take into account the views of great thinkers of the past because they were unavailable to testify in person in his courtroom. See 13 Tr. in No. C 09-2292 VRW (ND Cal.), pp. 3038-3039. And, if this spectacle were not enough, some professors of constitutional law have argued that we are bound to accept the trial judge's findings — including those on major philosophical questions and predictions about the future — unless they are "clearly erroneous." See Brief for Constitutional Law and Civil Procedure Professors as Amici Curiae in Hollingsworth v. Perry, O.T. 2012, No. 12-144, pp. 2-3 ("[T]he district court's factual findings are compelling and should be given significant weight"); id., at 25 ("Under any standard of review, this Court should credit and adopt the trial court's findings because they result from rigorous and exacting application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and are supported by reliable research and by the unanimous consensus of mainstream social science experts"). Only an arrogant legal culture that has lost all appreciation of its own limitations could take such a suggestion seriously.