Central Intelligence Agency - Memorandum for the Director, "MONGOOSE Operations and General Lansdale's Problems" lyrics

25 October 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR SUBJECT: MONGOOSE Operations and General Lansdale's Problems 1. You asked me to give you a paper by 5:00 p.m. today on the San Roman/Attorney General/Harvey/Lansdale/MONGOOSE problem in connection with submarines and the 50-Cuban project. I have talked only to Bill Harvey but in the light of my prior knowledge of Special Group/MONGOOSE/Lansdale voice level, etc., it is my clear opinion that this whole problem is centered around jurisdictional bureaucracy not unlike the tangle I had with Gilpatric and the Air Forces. 2. Lansdale feels badly cut out of the picture and appears to be seeking to reconstitute the MONGOOSE Special Group operations during this period of impending crisis. I need not tell you that Lansdale's organization and the MONGOOSE concept of clearing actions through Special Group is an impossible procedure under current circumstances. 3. The deliberative MONGOOSE system was not utilized for this particular project. Harvey rightly realized that intelligence collection was essential and that it should be geared to a turnover of the a**ets to the military in place in the event military operations took place. It was this requirement that generated the need for submarines and the need for the 50-odd Cubans. General Johnson of the JCS Staff was knowledgeable and General Lansdale was subsequently informed and a**isted in obtaining the submarines. The detailed planning is still going on but cannot be firm until the submarine commanders are available. The Cubans are not owned by San Roman but have been recruited and checked out by CIA and in a number of cases have been CIA agents for a long time. Unfortunately San Roman, like other exile group leaders, is looking out for the future of San Roman. 4. The targets planned for this operation as have been previously indicated to you, are to include the MRBM and IRBM sites. This is pure intelligence collection and the establishment of intelligence a**ets in place. It is being closely coordinated with the JCS Planning Staff and Lansdale knows about it. It obviously cannot be planned, controlled, and operated through the cumbersome procedures of MONGOOSE and therefore it is not in MONGOOSE channels. 5. I am convinced that if we are to have military operations in Cuba, and even now during this doubtful period of heavy military involvement in planning for such operations, the direct CIA-JCS coordinated liaison and control must be affected -- the time has long since pa**ed for MONGOOSE-type, Special Group-type consideration. [SIGNATURE] MSC