Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics lyrics

Nicomachean Ethics By Aristotle Written 350 B.C.E Translated by W. D. Ross BOOK I 1 Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit,is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightlybeen declared to be that at which all things aim…[1] 2 If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desirefor its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this),[2]and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (forat that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire wouldbe empty and vain),[3] clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Willnot the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall wenot, like archers who have a mark to aim at,[4] be more likely to hit uponwhat is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object.[5] 3 Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness asthe subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alikein all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts…We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects [as fine and just actions and other goods] and withsuch premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speakingabout things which are only for the most part true and with premisses ofthe same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit,therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the markof an educated man to look for precision in each cla** of things just sofar as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolishto accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from arhetorician scientific proofs.[6] Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he isa good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a goodjudge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round educationis a good judge in general.[7] Hence a young man is not a proper hearer oflectures on political science;[8] for he is inexperienced in the actions thatoccur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these;and, further, since he tends to follow his pa**ions, his study will bevain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action.And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful incharacter; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuingeach successive object, as pa**ion directs. For to such persons, as tothe incontinent,[9] knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire andact in accordance with a rational principle knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit. These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected,and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as ourpreface. 4 Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that allknowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say politicalscience aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action.Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of menand people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identifyliving well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happinessis they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise…[10] Presumably, then, we must begin with things known to us. Hence any onewho is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just,and generally, about the subjects of political science must have been broughtup in good habits. For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficientlyplain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and theman who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting points. And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the wordsof Hesiod: Far best is he who knows all things himself; Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right; But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart Another's wisdom, is a useless wight.[11] 7 Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what itcan be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is differentin medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then isthe good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. Inmedicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house,in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit theend; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else theydo. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be thegood achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will bethe goods achievable by action.[12] So the argument has by a different course reached the same point;but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidentlymore than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, andin general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not allends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore,if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and ifthere are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking.Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than thatwhich is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that whichis never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the thingsthat are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing,and therefore we call final without qualification that which is alwaysdesirable in itself and never for the sake of somethingelse. Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; forthis we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else,but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves(for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them),but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by meansof them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one choosesfor the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other thanitself.[13] From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seemsto follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient…[T]heself-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirableand lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and furtherwe think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as onegood thing among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be mademore desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that whichis added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is alwaysmore desirable. [14] Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient,and is the end of action.[15] Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seemsa platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This mightperhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. Forjust as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general,for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well'is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, ifhe has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functionsor activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function,may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these?What then can this be? [16] Life seems to be common even to plants, but we areseeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life ofnutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but italso seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. Thereremains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle;of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient toone, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought. And,as 'life of the rational element' also has two meanings, we must statethat life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to bethe more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an activityof soul which follows or implies a rational principle,[17] and if we say 'so-and-so-and'a good so-and-so' have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre,and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminencein respect of goodness being added to the name of the function (for thefunction of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-playeris to do so well):[18] if this is the case, and we state the function of manto be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or actions ofthe soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good manto be the good and noble performance of these, and if any action is wellperformed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence:if this is the case, human good turns out to be activity of soul in accordancewith virtue, and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance withthe best and most complete. But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does notmake a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, doesnot make a man blessed and happy.[19] BOOK II 1 Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectualvirtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (forwhich reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comesabout as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that isformed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit)…. [20] [T]he virtues we get byfirst exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well.For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doingthem, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre players by playing thelyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperateacts, brave by doing brave acts…[21] [B]y doing the acts that we do in our transactionswith other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that wedo in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence,we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelingsof anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgentand irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances.Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. Thisis why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is becausethe states of character correspond to the differences between these. Itmakes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind orof another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or ratherall the difference. 2 Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledgelike the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtueis, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would havebeen of no use), we must examine the nature of actions, namely how we oughtto do them; for these determine also the nature of the states of characterthat are produced, as we have said… First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature ofsuch things to be destroyed by defect and excess[22], as we see in the caseof strength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible wemust use the evidence of sensible things); both excessive and defectiveexercise destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is aboveor below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionateboth produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in thecase of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the man who fliesfrom and fears everything and does not stand his ground against anythingbecomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meetevery danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in everypleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man whoshuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible; temperanceand courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved bythe mean… 3 We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or painthat ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures anddelights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed atit is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things thatare terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, whilethe man who is pained is a coward.[23] For moral excellence is concerned withpleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things,and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones.[24] Hence we oughtto have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Platosays, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought;for this is the right education… Again, as we said but lately, every state of soul has a naturerelative to and concerned with the kind of things by which it tends tobe made worse or better; but it is by reason of pleasures and pains thatmen become bad, by pursuing and avoiding these- either the pleasures andpains they ought not or when they ought not or as they ought not, or bygoing wrong in one of the other similar ways that may be distinguished…We a**ume, then, that this kindof excellence tends to do what is best with regard to pleasures and pains,and vice does the contrary… That virtue, then, is concerned with pleasures and pains, and thatby the acts from which it arises it is both increased and, if they aredone differently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose arethose in which it actualizes itself- let this be taken a**aid. 4 The question might be asked, what we mean by saying that we mustbecome just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts;for if men do just and temperate acts, they are already just and temperate,exactly as, if they do what is in accordance with the laws of grammar andof music, they are grammarians and musicians… Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar;for the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so thatit is enough that they should have a certain character, but if the actsthat are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain characterit does not follow that they are done justly or temperately.[25] The agentalso must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first placehe must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts,[26] and choose themfor their own sakes,[27] and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm andunchangeable character…[28] Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are suchas the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who doesthese that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as justand temperate men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing justacts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperateman; without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becominggood. But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory andthink they are being philosophers and will become good in this way, behavingsomewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but donone of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be madewell in body by such a course of treatment, the former will not be madewell in soul by such a course of philosophy.[29] 6 We must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character,but also say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then, that everyvirtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of whichit is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well;[30] e.g.the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work good; for itis by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the excellenceof the horse makes a horse both good in itself and good at running andat carrying its rider and at awaiting the attack of the enemy. Therefore, if this is true in every case, the virtue of man also will be the stateof character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own workwell. How this is to happen we have stated already, but it will be madeplain also by the following consideration of the specific nature of virtue.In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more,less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itselfor relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess anddefect. By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistantfrom each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all men; [31] by theintermediate relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too little-and this is not one, nor the same for all. For instance, if ten is manyand two is few, six is the intermediate, taken in terms of the object;for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount; this is intermediateaccording to arithmetical proportion. But the intermediate relatively tous is not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much for a particular personto eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will ordersix pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person who is totake it, or too little- too little for Milo, too much for the beginner in athletic exercises. The same is true of running and wrestling. Thusa master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediateand chooses this- the intermediate not in the object but relatively tous.[32] If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well- by lookingto the intermediate and judging its works by this standard…[A]nd if, further, virtue is more exact andbetter than any art…, then virtue must have the qualityof aiming at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for it is this thatis concerned with pa**ions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect,and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetiteand anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both toomuch and too little, and in both cases not well;[33] but to feel them at theright times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people,with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediateand best, and this is characteristic of virtue.[34] Similarly with regard toactions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtueis concerned with pa**ions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure,and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success;and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue.Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims atwhat is intermediate. Again, it is possible to fail in many ways…while to succeed is possible only in one way (forwhich reason also one is easy and the other difficult- to miss the markeasy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defectare characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue;[35] For men are good in but one way, but bad inmany. Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lyingin a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rationalprinciple, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom woulddetermine it.[36] Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends onexcess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean becausethe vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both pa**ionsand actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate.Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essencevirtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right anextreme. Provided by The Internet Cla**ics Archive. Available online at http://cla**ics.mit.edu//Aristotle/nicomachaen.html