I Now since Virtue is concerned with the regulation of feelings and
Actions, and praise and blame arise upon such as are voluntary, while
For the involuntary allowance is made, and sometimes compa**ion is
Excited, it is perhaps a necessary task for those who are investigating
The nature of Virtue to draw out the distinction between what is
Voluntary and what involuntary; and it is certainly useful for
Legislators, with respect to the a**igning of honours and punishments
III
Involuntary actions then are thought to be of two kinds, being
Done either on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance. An action is
Properly speaking, compulsory, when the origination is external to the
Agent, being such that in it the agent (perhaps we may more properly
Say the patient) contributes nothing; as if a wind were to convey you
Anywhere, or men having power over your person
But when actions are done, either from fear of greater evils, or from
Some honourable motive, as, for instance, if you were ordered to commit
Some base act by a despot who had your parents or children in his power
And they were to be saved upon your compliance or die upon your refusal
In such cases there is room for a question whether the actions are
Voluntary or involuntary
A similar question arises with respect to cases of throwing goods
Overboard in a storm: abstractedly no man throws away his property
Willingly, but with a view to his own and his shipmates' safety any one
Would who had any sense
The truth is, such actions are of a mixed kind, but are most like
Voluntary actions; for they are choiceworthy at the time when they are
Being done, and the end or object of the action must be taken with
Reference to the actual occasion. Further, we must denominate an action
Voluntary or involuntary at the time of doing it: now in the given case
The man acts voluntarily, because the originating of the motion of his
Limbs in such actions rests with himself; and where the origination is
In himself it rests with himself to do or not to do
Such actions then are voluntary, though in the abstract perhaps
Involuntary because no one would choose any of such things in and by
Itself
But for such actions men sometimes are even praised, as when they endure
Any disgrace or pain to secure great and honourable equivalents; if
_vice versâ_, then they are blamed, because it shows a base mind to
Endure things very disgraceful for no honourable object, or for a
Trifling one
For some again no praise is given, but allowance is made; as where a
Man does what he should not by reason of such things as overstrain the
Powers of human nature, or pa** the limits of human endurance
Some acts perhaps there are for which compulsion cannot be pleaded, but
A man should rather suffer the worst and die; how absurd, for instance
Are the pleas of compulsion with which Alcmaeon in Euripides' play
Excuses his matricide!
But it is difficult sometimes to decide what kind of thing should be
Chosen instead of what, or what endured in preference to what, and much
Moreso to abide by one's decisions: for in general the alternatives are
Painful, and the actions required are base, and so praise or blame is
Awarded according as persons have been compelled or no
1110b What kind of actions then are to be called compulsory? may we say
Simply and abstractedly whenever the cause is external and the agent
Contributes nothing; and that where the acts are in themselves such
As one would not wish but choiceworthy at the present time and in
Preference to such and such things, and where the origination rests with
The agent, the actions are in themselves involuntary but at the given
Time and in preference to such and such things voluntary; and they are
More like voluntary than involuntary, because the actions consist of
Little details, and these are voluntary
But what kind of things one ought to choose instead of what, it is not
Easy to settle, for there are many differences in particular instances
But suppose a person should say, things pleasant and honourable exert
A compulsive force (for that they are external and do compel); at that
Rate every action is on compulsion, because these are universal motives
Of action
Again, they who act on compulsion and against their will do so with
Pain; but they who act by reason of what is pleasant or honourable act
With pleasure
It is truly absurd for a man to attribute his actions to external things
Instead of to his own capacity for being easily caught by them; or
Again, to ascribe the honourable to himself, and the base ones to
Pleasure
So then that seems to be compulsory "whose origination is from without
The party compelled contributing nothing." Now every action of which
Ignorance is the cause is not-voluntary, but that only is involuntary
Which is attended with pain and remorse; for clearly the man who has
Done anything by reason of ignorance, but is not annoyed at his own
Action, cannot be said to have done it _with_ his will because he did
Not know he was doing it, nor again _against_ his will because he is not
Sorry for it
So then of the cla** "acting by reason of ignorance," he who feels
Regret afterwards is thought to be an involuntary agent, and him that
Has no such feeling, since he certainly is different from the other, we
Will call a not-voluntary agent; for as there is a real difference it is
Better to have a proper name
Again, there seems to be a difference between acting _because of_
Ignorance and acting _with_ ignorance: for instance, we do not usually
Assign ignorance as the cause of the actions of the drunken or angry
Man, but either the drunkenness or the anger, yet they act not knowingly
But with ignorance
Again, every bad man is ignorant what he ought to do and what to leave
Undone, and by reason of such error men become unjust and wholly evil
[Sidenote: 1111a] Again, we do not usually apply the term involuntary
When a man is ignorant of his own true interest; because ignorance which
Affects moral choice constitutes depravity but not involuntariness: nor
Does any ignorance of principle (because for this men are blamed)
But ignorance in particular details, wherein consists the action and
Wherewith it is concerned, for in these there is both compa**ion and
Allowance, because he who acts in ignorance of any of them acts in a
Proper sense involuntarily
It may be as well, therefore, to define these particular details; what
They are, and how many; viz. who acts, what he is doing, with respect to
What or in what, sometimes with what, as with what instrument, and with
What result (as that of preservation, for instance), and how, as whether
Softly or violently
All these particulars, in one and the same case, no man in his senses
Could be ignorant of; plainly not of the agent, being himself. But
What he is doing a man may be ignorant, as men in speaking say a
Thing escaped them unawares; or as Aeschylus did with respect to the
Mysteries, that he was not aware that it was unlawful to speak of them;
Or as in the case of that catapult accident the other day the man said
He discharged it merely to display its operation. Or a person might
Suppose a son to be an enemy, as Merope did; or that the spear really
Pointed was rounded off; or that the stone was a pumice; or in striking
With a view to save might k**; or might strike when merely wishing to
Show another, as people do in sham-fighting
Now since ignorance is possible in respect to all these details in
Which the action consists, he that acted in ignorance of any of them is
Thought to have acted involuntarily, and he most so who was in ignorance
As regards the most important, which are thought to be those in which
The action consists, and the result
Further, not only must the ignorance be of this kind, to constitute an
Action involuntary, but it must be also understood that the action is
Followed by pain and regret
Now since all involuntary action is either upon compulsion or by reason
Of ignorance, Voluntary Action would seem to be "that whose origination
Is in the agent, he being aware of the particular details in which the
Action consists."
For, it may be, men are not justified by calling those actions
Involuntary, which are done by reason of Anger or Lust
Because, in the first place, if this be so no other animal but man, and
Not even children, can be said to act voluntarily. Next, is it meant
That we never act voluntarily when we act from Lust or Anger, or that we
Act voluntarily in doing what is right and involuntarily in doing what
Is discreditable? The latter supposition is absurd, since the cause
Is one and the same. Then as to the former, it is a strange thing to
Maintain actions to be involuntary which we are bound to grasp at: now
There are occasions on which anger is a duty, and there are things which
We are bound to lust after, health, for instance, and learning
Again, whereas actions strictly involuntary are thought to be attended
With pain, those which are done to gratify lust are thought to be
Pleasant
Again: how does the involuntariness make any difference between wrong
Actions done from deliberate calculation, and those done by reason of
Anger? for both ought to be avoided, and the irrational feelings are
Thought to be just as natural to man as reason, and so of course must be
Such actions of the individual as are done from Anger and Lust. It is
Absurd then to cla** these actions among the involuntary
II
Having thus drawn out the distinction between voluntary and involuntary
Action our next step is to examine into the nature of Moral Choice
Because this seems most intimately connected with Virtue and to be a
More decisive test of moral character than a man's acts are
Now Moral Choice is plainly voluntary, but the two are not co-extensive
Voluntary being the more comprehensive term; for first, children and all
Other animals share in voluntary action but not in Moral Choice; and
Next, sudden actions we call voluntary but do not ascribe them to Moral
Choice
Nor do they appear to be right who say it is lust or anger, or wish, or
Opinion of a certain kind; because, in the first place, Moral Choice is
Not shared by the irrational animals while Lust and Anger are. Next; the
Man who fails of self-control acts from Lust but not from Moral Choice;
The man of self-control, on the contrary, from Moral Choice, not from
Lust. Again: whereas Lust is frequently opposed to Moral Choice, Lust is
Not to Lust
Lastly: the object-matter of Lust is the pleasant and the painful, but
Of Moral Choice neither the one nor the other. Still less can it be
Anger, because actions done from Anger are thought generally to be least
Of all consequent on Moral Choice
Nor is it Wish either, though appearing closely connected with it;
Because, in the first place, Moral Choice has not for its objects
Impossibilities, and if a man were to say he chose them he would be
Thought to be a fool; but Wish may have impossible things for its
Objects, immortality for instance
Wish again may be exercised on things in the accomplishment of which
One's self could have nothing to do, as the success of any particular
Actor or athlete; but no man chooses things of this nature, only such as
He believes he may himself be instrumental in procuring
Further: Wish has for its object the End rather, but Moral Choice the
Means to the End; for instance, we wish to be healthy but we choose
The means which will make us so; or happiness again we wish for, and
Commonly say so, but to say we choose is not an appropriate term
Because, in short, the province of Moral Choice seems to be those things
Which are in our own power
Neither can it be Opinion; for Opinion is thought to be unlimited in its
Range of objects, and to be exercised as well upon things eternal and
Impossible as on those which are in our own power: again, Opinion is
Logically divided into true and false, not into good and bad as Moral
Choice is
However, nobody perhaps maintains its identity with Opinion simply; but
It is not the same with opinion of any kind, because by choosing good
And bad things we are constituted of a certain character, but by having
Opinions on them we are not
Again, we choose to take or avoid, and so on, but we opine what a thing
Is, or for what it is serviceable, or how; but we do not opine to take
Or avoid
Further, Moral Choice is commended rather for having a right object than
For being judicious, but Opinion for being formed in accordance with
Truth
Again, we choose such things as we pretty well know to be good, but we
Form opinions respecting such as we do not know at all
And it is not thought that choosing and opining best always go together
But that some opine the better course and yet by reason of viciousness
Choose not the things which they should
It may be urged, that Opinion always precedes or accompanies Moral
Choice; be it so, this makes no difference, for this is not the point in
Question, but whether Moral Choice is the same as Opinion of a certain
Kind
Since then it is none of the aforementioned things, what is it, or how
Is it characterised? Voluntary it plainly is, but not all voluntary
Action is an object of Moral Choice. May we not say then, it is "that
Voluntary which has pa**ed through a stage of previous deliberation?"
Because Moral Choice is attended with reasoning and intellectual
Process. The etymology of its Greek name seems to give a hint of it
Being when an*lysed "chosen in preference to somewhat else."
III
Well then; do men deliberate about everything, and is anything soever
The object of Deliberation, or are there some matters with respect to
Which there is none? (It may be as well perhaps to say, that by "object
Of Deliberation" is meant such matter as a sensible man would deliberate
Upon, not what any fool or madman might.)
Well: about eternal things no one deliberates; as, for instance, the
Universe, or the incommensurability of the diameter and side of a
Square
Nor again about things which are in motion but which always happen in
The same way either necessarily, or naturally, or from some other cause
As the solstices or the sunrise
Nor about those which are variable, as drought and rains; nor fortuitous
Matters, as finding of treasure
Nor in fact even about all human affairs; no Lacedæmonian, for instance
Deliberates as to the best course for the Scythian government to adopt;
Because in such cases we have no power over the result
But we do deliberate respecting such practical matters as are in our own
Power (which are what are left after all our exclusions)
I have adopted this division because causes seem to be divisible into
Nature, necessity, chance, and moreover intellect, and all human powers
And as man in general deliberates about what man in general can effect
So individuals do about such practical things as can be effected through
Their own instrumentality
[Sidenote: 1112b] Again, we do not deliberate respecting such arts or
Sciences as are exact and independent: as, for instance, about written
Characters, because we have no doubt how they should be formed; but we
Do deliberate on all buch things as are usually done through our own
Instrumentality, but not invariably in the same way; as, for instance
About matters connected with the healing art, or with money-making; and
Again, more about piloting ships than gymnastic exercises, because the
Former has been less exactly determined, and so forth; and more about
Arts than sciences, because we more frequently doubt respecting the
Former
So then Deliberation takes place in such matters as are under general
Laws, but still uncertain how in any given case they will issue
_i.e._ in which there is some indefiniteness; and for great matters we
Associate coadjutors in counsel, distrusting our ability to settle them
Alone
Further, we deliberate not about Ends, but Means to Ends. No physician
For instance, deliberates whether he will cure, nor orator whether
He will persuade, nor statesman whether he will produce a good
Constitution, nor in fact any man in any other function about his
Particular End; but having set before them a certain End they look how
And through what means it may be accomplished: if there is a choice of
Means, they examine further which are easiest and most creditable; or
If there is but one means of accomplishing the object, then how it may
Be through this, this again through what, till they come to the first
Cause; and this will be the last found; for a man engaged in a process
Of deliberation seems to seek and an*lyse, as a man, to solve a
Problem, an*lyses the figure given him. And plainly not every search is
Deliberation, those in mathematics to wit, but every Deliberation is
A search, and the last step in the an*lysis is the first in the
Constructive process. And if in the course of their search men come upon
An impossibility, they give it up; if money, for instance, be necessary
But cannot be got: but if the thing appears possible they then attempt
To do it
And by possible I mean what may be done through our own instrumentality
(of course what may be done through our friends is through our own
Instrumentality in a certain sense, because the origination in such
Cases rests with us). And the object of search is sometimes the
Necessary instruments, sometimes the method of using them; and similarly
In the rest sometimes through what, and sometimes how or through what
So it seems, as has been said, that Man is the originator of his
Actions; and Deliberation has for its object whatever may be done
Through one's own instrumentality, and the actions are with a view to
Other things; and so it is, not the End, but the Means to Ends on which
Deliberation is employed
[Sidenote: III3a]
Nor, again, is it employed on matters of detail, as whether the
Substance before me is bread, or has been properly cooked; for these
Come under the province of sense, and if a man is to be always
Deliberating, he may go on _ad infinitum_
Further, exactly the same matter is the object both of Deliberation
And Moral Choice; but that which is the object of Moral Choice is
Thenceforward separated off and definite, because by object of Moral
Choice is denoted that which after Deliberation has been preferred to
Something else: for each man leaves off searching how he shall do a
Thing when he has brought the origination up to himself, _i.e_. to the
Governing principle in himself, because it is this which makes the
Choice. A good illustration of this is furnished by the old regal
Constitutions which Homer drew from, in which the Kings would announce
To the commonalty what they had determined before
Now since that which is the object of Moral Choice is something in our
Own power, which is the object of deliberation and the grasping of the
Will, Moral Choice must be "a grasping after something in our own power
Consequent upon Deliberation:" because after having deliberated we
Decide, and then grasp by our Will in accordance with the result of our
Deliberation
Let this be accepted as a sketch of the nature and object of Moral
Choice, that object being "Means to Ends."
[Sidenote: IV] That Wish has for its object-matter the End, has been
Already stated; but there are two opinions respecting it; some thinking
That its object is real good, others whatever impresses the mind with a
Notion of good
Now those who maintain that the object of Wish is real good are beset by
This difficulty, that what is wished for by him who chooses wrongly is
Not really an object of Wish (because, on their theory, if it is an
Object of wish, it must be good, but it is, in the case supposed, evil)
Those who maintain, on the contrary, that that which impresses the mind
With a notion of good is properly the object of Wish, have to meet this
Difficulty, that there is nothing naturally an object of Wish but to
Each individual whatever seems good to him; now different people have
Different notions, and it may chance contrary ones
But, if these opinions do not satisfy us, may we not say that
Abstractedly and as a matter of objective truth, the really good is the
Object of Wish, but to each individual whatever impresses his mind with
The notion of good. And so to the good man that is an object of Wish
Which is really and truly so, but to the bad man anything may be; just
As physically those things are wholesome to the healthy which are really
So, but other things to the sick. And so too of bitter and sweet, and
Hot and heavy, and so on. For the good man judges in every instance
Correctly, and in every instance the notion conveyed to his mind is the
True one
For there are fair and pleasant things peculiar to, and so varying with
Each state; and perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of the
Good man is his seeing the truth in every instance, he being, in fact
The rule and measure of these matters
The multitude of men seem to be deceived by reason of pleasure, because
Though it is not really a good it impresses their minds with the notion
Of goodness, so they choose what is pleasant as good and avoid pain as
An evil
Now since the End is the object of Wish, and the means to the End of
Deliberation and Moral Choice, the actions regarding these matters
Must be in the way of Moral Choice, _i.e._ voluntary: but the acts of
Working out the virtues are such actions, and therefore Virtue is in our
Power
And so too is Vice: because wherever it is in our power to do it is also
In our power to forbear doing, and _vice versâ_: therefore if the doing
(being in a given case creditable) is in our power, so too is the
Forbearing (which is in the same case discreditable), and _vice versâ_
But if it is in our power to do and to forbear doing what is creditable
Or the contrary, and these respectively constitute the being good or
Bad, then the being good or vicious characters is in our power
As for the well-known saying, "No man voluntarily is wicked or
Involuntarily happy," it is partly true, partly false; for no man is
Happy against his will, of course, but wickedness is voluntary. Or must
We dispute the statements lately made, and not say that Man is the
Originator or generator of his actions as much as of his children?
But if this is matter of plain manifest fact, and we cannot refer our
Actions to any other originations beside those in our own power, those
Things must be in our own power, and so voluntary, the originations of
Which are in ourselves
Moreover, testimony seems to be borne to these positions both privately
By individuals, and by law-givers too, in that they chastise and punish
Those who do wrong (unless they do so on compulsion, or by reason of
Ignorance which is not self-caused), while they honour those who act
Rightly, under the notion of being likely to encourage the latter and
Restrain the former. But such things as are not in our own power, _i.e._
Not voluntary, no one thinks of encouraging us to do, knowing it to be
Of no avail for one to have been persuaded not to be hot (for instance)
Or feel pain, or be hungry, and so forth, because we shall have those
Sensations all the same
And what makes the case stronger is this: that they chastise for the
Very fact of ignorance, when it is thought to be self-caused; to the
Drunken, for instance, penalties are double, because the origination in
Such case lies in a man's own self: for he might have helped getting
Drunk, and this is the cause of his ignorance
[Sidenote: III4_a_] Again, those also who are ignorant of legal
Regulations which they are bound to know, and which are not hard to
Know, they chastise; and similarly in all other cases where neglect is
Thought to be the cause of the ignorance, under the notion that it was
In their power to prevent their ignorance, because they might have paid
Attention
But perhaps a man is of such a character that he cannot attend to such
Things: still men are themselves the causes of having become such
Characters by living carelessly, and also of being unjust or destitute
Of self-control, the former by doing evil actions, the latter by
Spending their time in drinking and such-like; because the particular
Acts of working form corresponding characters, as is shown by those who
Are practising for any contest or particular course of action, for such
Men persevere in the acts of working
As for the plea, that a man did not know that habits are produced
From separate acts of working, we reply, such ignorance is a mark of
Excessive stupidity
Furthermore, it is wholly irrelevant to say that the man who acts
Unjustly or dissolutely does not _wish_ to attain the habits of these
Vices: for if a man wittingly does those things whereby he must become
Unjust he is to all intents and purposes unjust voluntarily; but he
Cannot with a wish cease to be unjust and become just. For, to take the
an*logous case, the sick man cannot with a wish be well again, yet in
A supposable case he is voluntarily ill because he has produced his
Sickness by living intemperately and disregarding his physicians. There
Was a time then when he might have helped being ill, but now he has let
Himself go he cannot any longer; just as he who has let a stone out of
His hand cannot recall it, and yet it rested with him to aim and throw
It, because the origination was in his power. Just so the unjust man
And he who has lost all self-control, might originally have helped being
What they are, and so they are voluntarily what they are; but now that
They are become so they no longer have the power of being otherwise
And not only are mental diseases voluntary, but the bodily are so in
Some men, whom we accordingly blame: for such as are naturally deformed
No one blames, only such as are so by reason of want of exercise, and
Neglect: and so too of weakness and maiming: no one would think of
Upbraiding, but would rather compa**ionate, a man who is blind by
Nature, or from disease, or from an accident; but every one would blame
Him who was so from excess of wine, or any other kind of intemperance
It seems, then, that in respect of bodily diseases, those which depend
On ourselves are censured, those which do not are not censured; and if
So, then in the case of the mental disorders, those which are censured
Must depend upon ourselves
[Sidenote: III4_b_] But suppose a man to say, "that (by our own
Admission) all men aim at that which conveys to their minds an
Impression of good, and that men have no control over this impression
But that the End impresses each with a notion correspondent to his own
Individual character; that to be sure if each man is in a way the cause
Of his own moral state, so he will be also of the kind of impression he
Receives: whereas, if this is not so, no one is the cause to himself of
Doing evil actions, but he does them by reason of ignorance of the true
End, supposing that through their means he will secure the chief good
Further, that this aiming at the End is no matter of one's own choice
But one must be born with a power of mental vision, so to speak, whereby
To judge fairly and choose that which is really good; and he is blessed
By nature who has this naturally well: because it is the most important
Thing and the fairest, and what a man cannot get or learn from another
But will have such as nature has given it; and for this to be so given
Well and fairly would be excellence of nature in the highest and truest
Sense."
If all this be true, how will Virtue be a whit more voluntary than Vice?
Alike to the good man and the bad, the End gives its impression and is
Fixed by nature or howsoever you like to say, and they act so and so
Referring everything else to this End
Whether then we suppose that the End impresses each man's mind with
Certain notions not merely by nature, but that there is somewhat also
Dependent on himself; or that the End is given by nature, and yet Virtue
Is voluntary because the good man does all the rest voluntarily, Vice
Must be equally so; because his own agency equally attaches to the bad
Man in the actions, even if not in the selection of the End
If then, as is commonly said, the Virtues are voluntary (because we at
Least co-operate in producing our moral states, and we a**ume the End
To be of a certain kind according as we are ourselves of certain
Characters), the Vices must be voluntary also, because the cases are
Exactly similar
Well now, we have stated generally respecting the Moral Virtues, the
Genus (in outline), that they are mean states, and that they are habits
And how they are formed, and that they are of themselves calculated to
Act upon the circumstances out of which they were formed, and that they
Are in our own power and voluntary, and are to be done so as right
Reason may direct
[Sidenote: III5_a_] But the particular actions and the habits are not
Voluntary in the same sense; for of the actions we are masters from
Beginning to end (supposing of course a knowledge of the particular
Details), but only of the origination of the habits, the addition by
Small particular accessions not being cognisiable (as is the case with
Sicknesses): still they are voluntary because it rested with us to use
Our circumstances this way or that
Here we will resume the particular discussion of the Moral Virtues
And say what they are, what is their object-matter, and how they stand
Respectively related to it: of course their number will be thereby
Shown. First, then, of Courage. Now that it is a mean state, in respect
Of fear and boldness, has been already said: further, the objects of our
Fears are obviously things fearful or, in a general way of statement
Evils; which accounts for the common definition of fear, viz
"expectation of evil."
Of course we fear evils of all kinds: disgrace, for instance, poverty
Disease, desolateness, d**h; but not all these seem to be the
Object-matter of the Brave man, because there are things which to fear
Is right and noble, and not to fear is base; disgrace, for example
Since he who fears this is a good man and has a sense of honour, and he
Who does not fear it is shameless (though there are those who call him
Brave by an*logy, because he somewhat resembles the Brave man who agrees
With him in being free from fear); but poverty, perhaps, or disease, and
In fact whatever does not proceed from viciousness, nor is attributable
To his own fault, a man ought not to fear: still, being fearless in
Respect of these would not constitute a man Brave in the proper sense of
The term
Yet we do apply the term in right of the similarity of the cases; for
There are men who, though timid in the dangers of war, are liberal men
And are stout enough to face loss of wealth
And, again, a man is not a coward for fearing insult to his wife or
Children, or envy, or any such thing; nor is he a Brave man for being
Bold when going to be scourged
What kind of fearful things then do constitute the object-matter of the
Brave man? first of all, must they not be the greatest, since no man is
More apt to withstand what is dreadful. Now the object of the greatest
Dread is d**h, because it is the end of all things, and the dead man is
Thought to be capable neither of good nor evil. Still it would seem
That the Brave man has not for his object-matter even d**h in every
Circumstance; on the sea, for example, or in sickness: in what
Circumstances then? must it not be in the most honourable? now such is
d**h in war, because it is d**h in the greatest and most honourable
Danger; and this is confirmed by the honours awarded in communities, and
By monarchs
He then may be most properly denominated Brave who is fearless in
Respect of honourable d**h and such sudden emergencies as threaten
d**h; now such specially are those which arise in the course of war
[Sidenote: 1115b] It is not meant but that the Brave man will be
Fearless also on the sea (and in sickness), but not in the same way as
Sea-faring men; for these are light-hearted and hopeful by reason of
Their experience, while landsmen though Brave are apt to give themselves
Up for lost and shudder at the notion of such a d**h: to which it
Should be added that Courage is exerted in circumstances which admit
Of doing something to help one's self, or in which d**h would be
Honourable; now neither of these requisites attach to destruction by
Drowning or sickness
VII
Again, fearful is a term of relation, the same thing not being so to
All, and there is according to common parlance somewhat so fearful as to
Be beyond human endurance: this of course would be fearful to every
Man of sense, but those objects which are level to the capacity of
Man differ in magnitude and admit of degrees, so too the objects of
Confidence or boldness
Now the Brave man cannot be frighted from his propriety (but of course
Only so far as he is man); fear such things indeed he will, but he will
Stand up against them as he ought and as right reason may direct, with a
View to what is honourable, because this is the end of the virtue
Now it is possible to fear these things too much, or too little, or
Again to fear what is not really fearful as if it were such. So the
Errors come to be either that a man fears when he ought not to fear at
All, or that he fears in an improper way, or at a wrong time, and so
Forth; and so too in respect of things inspiring confidence. He is
Brave then who withstands, and fears, and is bold, in respect of right
Objects, from a right motive, in right manner, and at right times:
Since the Brave man suffers or acts as he ought and as right reason may
Direct
Now the end of every separate act of working is that which accords
With the habit, and so to the Brave man Courage; which is honourable;
Therefore such is also the End, since the character of each is
Determined by the End
So honour is the motive from which the Brave man withstands things
Fearful and performs the acts which accord with Courage
Of the characters on the side of Excess, he who exceeds in utter absence
Of fear has no appropriate name (I observed before that many states have
None), but he would be a madman or inaccessible to pain if he feared
Nothing, neither earthquake, nor the billows, as they tell of the Celts
He again who exceeds in confidence in respect of things fearful is rash
He is thought moreover to be a braggart, and to advance unfounded claims
To the character of Brave: the relation which the Brave man really bears
To objects of fear this man wishes to appear to bear, and so imitates
Him in whatever points he can; for this reason most of them exhibit a
Curious mixture of rashness and cowardice; because, affecting rashness
In these circumstances, they do not withstand what is truly fearful
[Sidenote: III6_a_] The man moreover who exceeds in feeling fear is a
Coward, since there attach to him the circumstances of fearing wrong
Objects, in wrong ways, and so forth. He is deficient also in feeling
Confidence, but he is most clearly seen as exceeding in the case of
Pains; he is a fainthearted kind of man, for he fears all things: the
Brave man is just the contrary, for boldness is the property of the
Light-hearted and hopeful
So the coward, the rash, and the Brave man have exactly the same
Object-matter, but stand differently related to it: the two
First-mentioned respectively exceed and are deficient, the last is in a
Mean state and as he ought to be. The rash again are precipitate, and
Being eager before danger, when actually in it fall away, while the
Brave are quick and sharp in action, but before are quiet and composed
Well then, as has been said, Courage is a mean state in respect of
Objects inspiring boldness or fear, in the circumstances which have been
Stated, and the Brave man chooses his line and withstands danger either
Because to do so is honourable, or because not to do so is base. But
Dying to escape from poverty, or the pangs of love, or anything that is
Simply painful, is the act not of a Brave man but of a coward; because
It is mere softness to fly from what is toilsome, and the suicide braves
The terrors of d**h not because it is honourable but to get out of the
Reach of evil
VIII
Courage proper is somewhat of the kind I have described, but there are
Dispositions, differing in five ways, which also bear in common parlance
The name of Courage
We will take first that which bears most resemblance to the true, the
Courage of Citizenship, so named because the motives which are thought
To actuate the members of a community in braving danger are the
Penalties and disgrace held out by the laws to cowardice, and the
Dignities conferred on the Brave; which is thought to be the reason
Why those are the bravest people among whom cowards are visited with
Disgrace and the Brave held in honour
Such is the kind of Courage Homer exhibits in his characters; Diomed and
Hector for example. The latter says
"Polydamas will be the first to fix
Disgrace upon me."
Diomed again
"For Hector surely will hereafter say
Speaking in Troy, Tydides by my hand"--
This I say most nearly resembles the Courage before spoken of, because
It arises from virtue, from a feeling of shame, and a desire of what is
Noble (that is, of honour), and avoidance of disgrace which is base. In
The same rank one would be inclined to place those also who act under
Compulsion from their commanders; yet are they really lower, because not
A sense of honour but fear is the motive from which they act, and what
They seek to avoid is not that which is base but that which is simply
Painful: commanders do in fact compel their men sometimes, as Hector
Says (to quote Homer again)
"But whomsoever I shall find cowering afar from the fight
The teeth of dogs he shall by no means escape."
[Sidenote: III6_h_] Those commanders who station staunch troops by
Doubtful ones, or who beat their men if they flinch, or who draw their
Troops up in line with the trenches, or other similar obstacles
In their rear, do in effect the same as Hector, for they all use
Compulsion
But a man is to be Brave, not on compulsion, but from a sense of honour
In the next place, Experience and Sk** in the various particulars is
Thought to be a species of Courage: whence Socrates also thought that
Courage was knowledge
This quality is exhibited of course by different men under different
Circumstances, but in warlike matters, with which we are now concerned
It is exhibited by the soldiers ("the regulars"): for there are, it
Would seem, many things in war of no real importance which these have
Been constantly used to see; so they have a show of Courage because
Other people are not aware of the real nature of these things. Then
Again by reason of their sk** they are better able than any others to
Inflict without suffering themselves, because they are able to use their
Arms and have such as are most serviceable both with a view to offence
And defence: so that their case is parallel to that of armed men
Fighting with unarmed or trained athletes with amateurs, since in
Contests of this kind those are the best fighters, not who are the
Bravest men, but who are the strongest and are in the best condition
In fact, the regular troops come to be cowards whenever the danger is
Greater than their means of meeting it; supposing, for example, that
They are inferior in numbers and resources: then they are the first to
Fly, but the mere militia stand and fall on the ground (which as you
Know really happened at the Hermæum), for in the eyes of these flight
Was disgraceful and d**h preferable to safety bought at such a price:
While "the regulars" originally went into the danger under a notion
Of their own superiority, but on discovering their error they took to
Flight, having greater fear of d**h than of disgrace; but this is not
The feeling of the Brave man
Thirdly, mere Animal Spirit is sometimes brought under the term Courage:
They are thought to be Brave who are carried on by mere Animal Spirit
As are wild beasts against those who have wounded them, because in fact
The really Brave have much Spirit, there being nothing like it for going
At danger of any kind; whence those frequent expressions in Homer
"infused strength into his spirit," "roused his strength and spirit," or
Again, "and keen strength in his nostrils," "his blood boiled:" for all
These seem to denote the arousing and impetuosity of the Animal Spirit
[Sidenote: III7_a_] Now they that are truly Brave act from a sense of
Honour, and this Animal Spirit co-operates with them; but wild beasts
From pain, that is because they have been wounded, or are frightened;
Since if they are quietly in their own haunts, forest or marsh, they do
Not attack men. Surely they are not Brave because they rush into danger
When goaded on by pain and mere Spirit, without any view of the danger:
Else would a**es be Brave when they are hungry, for though beaten they
Will not then leave their pasture: profligate men besides do many bold
Actions by reason of their lust. We may conclude then that they are not
Brave who are goaded on to meet danger by pain and mere Spirit; but
Still this temper which arises from Animal Spirit appears to be most
Natural, and would be Courage of the true kind if it could have added
To it moral choice and the proper motive. So men also are pained by a
Feeling of anger, and take pleasure in revenge; but they who fight from
These causes may be good fighters, but they are not truly Brave (in
That they do not act from a sense of honour, nor as reason directs, but
Merely from the present feeling), still they bear some resemblance to
That character
Nor, again, are the Sanguine and Hopeful therefore Brave: since their
Boldness in dangers arises from their frequent victories over numerous
Foes. The two characters are alike, however, in that both are confident;
But then the Brave are so from the afore-mentioned causes, whereas these
Are so from a settled conviction of their being superior and not likely
To suffer anything in return (they who are intoxicated do much the
Same, for they become hopeful when in that state); but when the event
Disappoints their expectations they run away: now it was said to be the
Character of a Brave man to withstand things which are fearful to man
Or produce that impression, because it is honourable so to do and the
Contrary is dishonourable
For this reason it is thought to be a greater proof of Courage to be
Fearless and undisturbed under the pressure of sudden fear than under
That which may be anticipated, because Courage then comes rather from a
Fixed habit, or less from preparation: since as to foreseen dangers a
Man might take his line even from calculation and reasoning, but in
Those which are sudden he will do so according to his fixed habit of
Mind
Fifthly and lastly, those who are acting under Ignorance have a show
Of Courage and are not very far from the Hopeful; but still they are
Inferior inasmuch as they have no opinion of themselves; which the
Others have, and therefore stay and contest a field for some little
Time; but they who have been deceived fly the moment they know things to
Be otherwise than they supposed, which the Argives experienced when they
Fell on the Lacedæmonians, taking them for the men of Sicyon. We have
Described then what kind of men the Brave are, and what they who are
Thought to be, but are not really, Brave
[Sidenote: IX]
It must be remarked, however, that though Courage has for its
Object-matter boldness and fear it has not both equally so, but objects
Of fear much more than the former; for he that under pressure of these
Is undisturbed and stands related to them as he ought is better entitled
To the name of Brave than he who is properly affected towards objects
Of confidence. So then men are termed Brave for withstanding painful
Things
It follows that Courage involves pain and is justly praised, since it
Is a harder matter to withstand things that are painful than to abstain
From such as are pleasant
[Sidenote: 1117_b_]
It must not be thought but that the End and object of Courage is
Pleasant, but it is obscured by the surrounding circumstances: which
Happens also in the gymnastic games; to the boxers the End is pleasant
With a view to which they act, I mean the crown and the honours; but the
Receiving the blows they do is painful and annoying to flesh and blood
And so is all the labour they have to undergo; and, as these drawbacks
Are many, the object in view being small appears to have no pleasantness
In it
If then we may say the same of Courage, of course d**h and wounds must
Be painful to the Brave man and against his will: still he endures these
Because it is honourable so to do or because it is dishonourable not to
Do so. And the more complete his virtue and his happiness so much the
More will he be pained at the notion of d**h: since to such a man as
He is it is best worth while to live, and he with full consciousness is
Deprived of the greatest goods by d**h, and this is a painful idea. But
He is not the less Brave for feeling it to be so, nay rather it may be
He is shown to be more so because he chooses the honour that may be
Reaped in war in preference to retaining safe possession of these other
Goods. The fact is that to act with pleasure does not belong to all the
Virtues, except so far as a man realises the End of his actions
But there is perhaps no reason why not such men should make the best
Soldiers, but those who are less truly Brave but have no other good to
Care for: these being ready to meet danger and bartering their lives
Against small gain
Let thus much be accepted as sufficient on the subject of Courage; the
True nature of which it is not difficult to gather, in outline at least
From what has been said
[Sidenote: X]
Next let us speak of Perfected Self-Mastery, which seems to claim the
Next place to Courage, since these two are the Excellences of the
Irrational part of the Soul
That it is a mean state, having for its object-matter Pleasures, we have
Already said (Pains being in fact its object-matter in a less degree
And dissimilar manner), the state of utter absence of self-control has
Plainly the same object-matter; the next thing then is to determine what
Kind of Pleasures
Let Pleasures then be understood to be divided into mental and bodily:
Instances of the former being love of honour or of learning: it being
Plain that each man takes pleasure in that of these two objects which he
Has a tendency to like, his body being no way affected but rather his
Intellect. Now men are not called perfectly self-mastering or wholly
Destitute of self-control in respect of pleasures of this cla**: nor in
Fact in respect of any which are not bodily; those for example who love
To tell long stories, and are prosy, and spend their days about
Mere chance matters, we call gossips but not wholly destitute of
Self-control, nor again those who are pained at the loss of money or
Friends
[Sidenote: 1118_a_]
It is bodily Pleasures then which are the object-matter of Perfected
Self-Mastery, but not even all these indifferently: I mean, that they
Who take pleasure in objects perceived by the Sight, as colours, and
Forms, and painting, are not denominated men of Perfected Self-Mastery
Or wholly destitute of self-control; and yet it would seem that one may
Take pleasure even in such objects, as one ought to do, or excessively
Or too little
So too of objects perceived by the sense of Hearing; no one applies the
Terms before quoted respectively to those who are excessively pleased
With musical tunes or acting, or to those who take such pleasure as they
Ought
Nor again to those persons whose pleasure arises from the sense
Of Smell, except incidentally: I mean, we do not say men have no
Self-control because they take pleasure in the scent of fruit, or
Flowers, or incense, but rather when they do so in the smells of
Unguents and sauces: since men destitute of self-control take pleasure
Herein, because hereby the objects of their lusts are recalled to their
Imagination (you may also see other men take pleasure in the smell of
Food when they are hungry): but to take pleasure in such is a mark of
The character before named since these are objects of desire to him
Now not even brutes receive pleasure in right of these senses, except
Incidentally. I mean, it is not the scent of hares' flesh but the eating
It which dogs take pleasure in, perception of which pleasure is caused
By the sense of Smell. Or again, it is not the lowing of the ox but
Eating him which the lion likes; but of the fact of his nearness the
Lion is made sensible by the lowing, and so he appears to take pleasure
In this. In like manner, he has no pleasure in merely seeing or finding
A stag or wild goat, but in the prospect of a meal
The habits of Perfect Self-Mastery and entire absence of self-control
Have then for their object-matter such pleasures as brutes also share
In, for which reason they are plainly servile and brutish: they are
Touch and Taste
But even Taste men seem to make little or no use of; for to the sense of
Taste belongs the distinguishing of flavours; what men do, in fact, who
Are testing the quality of wines or seasoning "made dishes."
But men scarcely take pleasure at all in these things, at least those
Whom we call destitute of self-control do not, but only in the actual
Enjoyment which arises entirely from the sense of Touch, whether in
Eating or in drinking, or in grosser lusts. This accounts for the wish
Said to have been expressed once by a great glutton, "that his throat
Had been formed longer than a crane's neck," implying that his pleasure
Was derived from the Touch
[Sidenote: 1118b] The sense then with which is connected the habit of
Absence of self-control is the most common of all the senses, and this
Habit would seem to be justly a matter of reproach, since it attaches to
Us not in so far as we are men but in so far as we are animals. Indeed
It is brutish to take pleasure in such things and to like them best of
All; for the most respectable of the pleasures arising from the touch
Have been set aside; those, for instance, which occur in the course of
Gymnastic training from the rubbing and the warm bath: because the touch
Of the man destitute of self-control is not indifferently of _any_ part
Of the body but only of particular parts
XI
Now of lusts or desires some are thought to be universal, others
Peculiar and acquired; thus desire for food is natural since every one
Who really needs desires also food, whether solid or liquid, or both
(and, as Homer says, the man in the prime of youth needs and desires
Intercourse with the other s**); but when we come to this or that
Particular kind, then neither is the desire universal nor in all men is
It directed to the same objects. And therefore the conceiving of such
Desires plainly attaches to us as individuals. It must be admitted
However, that there is something natural in it: because different things
Are pleasant to different men and a preference of some particular
Objects to chance ones is universal. Well then, in the case of the
Desires which are strictly and properly natural few men go wrong and all
In one direction, that is, on the side of too much: I mean, to eat and
Drink of such food as happens to be on the table till one is overfilled
Is exceeding in quantity the natural limit, since the natural desire
Is simply a supply of a real deficiency. For this reason these men are
Called belly-mad, as filling it beyond what they ought, and it is the
Slavish who become of this character
But in respect of the peculiar pleasures many men go wrong and in many
Different ways; for whereas the term "fond of so and so" implies either
Taking pleasure in wrong objects, or taking pleasure excessively, or as
The ma** of men do, or in a wrong way, they who are destitute of all
Self-control exceed in all these ways; that is to say, they take
Pleasure in some things in which they ought not to do so (because they
Are properly objects of detestation), and in such as it is right to take
Pleasure in they do so more than they ought and as the ma** of men do
Well then, that excess with respect to pleasures is absence of
Self-control, and blameworthy, is plain. But viewing these habits on the
Side of pains, we find that a man is not said to have the virtue for
Withstanding them (as in the case of Courage), nor the vice for not
Withstanding them; but the man destitute of self-control is such
Because he is pained more than he ought to be at not obtaining things
Which are pleasant (and thus his pleasure produces pain to him), and the
Man of Perfected Self-Mastery is such in virtue of not being pained by
Their absence, that is, by having to abstain from what is pleasant
[Sidenote:III9a] Now the man destitute of self-control desires either
All pleasant things indiscriminately or those which are specially
Pleasant, and he is impelled by his desire to choose these things in
Preference to all others; and this involves pain, not only when he
Misses the attainment of his objects but, in the very desiring them
Since all desire is accompanied by pain. Surely it is a strange case
This, being pained by reason of pleasure
As for men who are defective on the side of pleasure, who take
Less pleasure in things than they ought, they are almost imaginary
Characters, because such absence of sensual perception is not natural to
Man: for even the other animals distinguish between different kinds of
Food, and like some kinds and dislike others. In fact, could a man be
Found who takes no pleasure in anything and to whom all things are
Alike, he would be far from being human at all: there is no name for
Such a character because it is simply imaginary
But the man of Perfected Self-Mastery is in the mean with respect to
These objects: that is to say, he neither takes pleasure in the things
Which delight the vicious man, and in fact rather dislikes them, nor at
All in improper objects; nor to any great degree in any object of the
Cla**; nor is he pained at their absence; nor does he desire them; or
If he does, only in moderation, and neither more than he ought, nor at
Improper times, and so forth; but such things as are conducive to health
And good condition of body, being also pleasant, these he will grasp at
In moderation and as he ought to do, and also such other pleasant things
As do not hinder these objects, and are not unseemly or disproportionate
To his means; because he that should grasp at such would be liking such
Pleasures more than is proper; but the man of Perfected Self-Mastery
Is not of this character, but regulates his desires by the dictates of
Right reason
XII
Now the vice of being destitute of all Self-Control seems to be more
Truly voluntary than Cowardice, because pleasure is the cause of the
Former and pain of the latter, and pleasure is an object of choice
Pain of avoidance. And again, pain deranges and spoils the natural
Disposition of its victim, whereas pleasure has no such effect and is
More voluntary and therefore more justly open to reproach
It is so also for the following reason; that it is easier to be inured
By habit to resist the objects of pleasure, there being many things of
This kind in life and the process of habituation being unaccompanied by
Danger; whereas the case is the reverse as regards the objects of fear
Again, Cowardice as a confirmed habit would seem to be voluntary in
A different way from the particular instances which form the habit;
Because it is painless, but these derange the man by reason of pain so
That he throws away his arms and otherwise behaves himself unseemly
For which reason they are even thought by some to exercise a power of
Compulsion
But to the man destitute of Self-Control the particular instances are on
The contrary quite voluntary, being done with desire and direct exertion
Of the will, but the general result is less voluntary: since no man
Desires to form the habit
[Sidenote: 1119b]
The name of this vice (which signifies etymologically unchastened-ness)
We apply also to the faults of children, there being a certain
Resemblance between the cases: to which the name is primarily applied
And to which secondarily or derivatively, is not relevant to the present
Subject, but it is evident that the later in point of time must get the
Name from the earlier. And the metaphor seems to be a very good one;
For whatever grasps after base things, and is liable to great increase
Ought to be chastened; and to this description desire and the child
Answer most truly, in that children also live under the direction of
Desire and the grasping after what is pleasant is most prominently seen
In these
Unless then the appetite be obedient and subjected to the governing
Principle it will become very great: for in the fool the grasping after
What is pleasant is insatiable and undiscriminating; and every acting
Out of the desire increases the kindred habit, and if the desires are
Great and violent in degree they even expel Reason entirely; therefore
They ought to be moderate and few, and in no respect to be opposed
To Reason. Now when the appetite is in such a state we denominate it
Obedient and chastened
In short, as the child ought to live with constant regard to the orders
Of its educator, so should the appetitive principle with regard to those
Of Reason
So then in the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, the appetitive principle
Must be accordant with Reason: for what is right is the mark at which
Both principles aim: that is to say, the man of perfected self-mastery
Desires what he ought in right manner and at right times, which is
Exactly what Reason directs. Let this be taken for our account of
Perfected Self-Mastery