CHAPTER II. The Canon of Pure Reason
It is a humiliating consideration for human reason that it is
Incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation, but, on the Contrary, stands in need of discipline to check its deviations from the Straight path and to expose the illusions which it originates. But On the other hand, this consideration ought to elevate and to give it
Confidence, for this discipline is exercised by itself alone, and it is
Subject to the censure of no other power. The bounds, moreover, which it
Is forced to set to its speculative exercise, form likewise a check upon
The fallacious pretensions of opponents; and thus what remains of its
Possessions, after these exaggerated claims have been disallowed, is
Secure from attack or usurpation. The greatest, and perhaps the only
Use of all philosophy of pure reason is, accordingly, of a purely
Negative character. It is not an organon for the extension, but a
Discipline for the determination, of the limits of its exercise; and
Without laying claim to the discovery of new truth, it has the modest
Merit of guarding against error
At the same time, there must be some source of positive cognitions which
Belong to the domain of pure reason and which become the causes of error
Only from our mistaking their true character, while they form the goal
Towards which reason continually strives. How else can we account for
The inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a firm footing in
Some region beyond the limits of the world of experience? It hopes to
Attain to the possession of a knowledge in which it has the deepest
Interest. It enters upon the path of pure speculation; but in vain. We
Have some reason, however, to expect that, in the only other way that
Lies open to it--the path of practical reason--it may meet with better
Success
I understand by a canon a list of the a priori principles of the proper
Employment of certain faculties of cognition. Thus general logic, in
Its an*lytical department, is a formal canon for the faculties of
Understanding and reason. In the same way, Transcendental an*lytic was
Seen to be a canon of the pure understanding; for it alone is competent
To enounce true a priori synthetical cognitions. But, when no proper
Employment of a faculty of cognition is possible, no canon can exist
But the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason is, as has been
Shown, completely impossible. There cannot, therefore, exist any canon
For the speculative exercise of this faculty--for its speculative
Exercise is entirely dialectical; and, consequently, transcendental
Logic, in this respect, is merely a discipline, and not a canon
If, then, there is any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure
Reason--in which case there must be a canon for this faculty--this canon
Will relate, not to the speculative, but to the practical use of reason
This canon we now proceed to investigate
SECTION I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason
There exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture beyond
The field of experience, to attempt to reach the utmost bounds of all
Cognition by the help of ideas alone, and not to rest satisfied until
It has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions into a
Self-subsistent systematic whole. Is the motive for this endeavour to be
Found in its speculative, or in its practical interests alone?
Setting aside, at present, the results of the labours of pure reason in
Its speculative exercise, I shall merely inquire regarding the problems
The solution of which forms its ultimate aim, whether reached or
Not, and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and
Intermediate. These highest aims must, from the nature of reason
Possess complete unity; otherwise the highest interest of humanity could
Not be successfully promoted
The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things: the
Freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of
God. The speculative interest which reason has in those questions is
Very small; and, for its sake alone, we should not undertake the labour
Of transcendental investigation--a labour full of toil and ceaseless
Struggle. We should be loth to undertake this labour, because the
Discoveries we might make would not be of the smallest use in the sphere
Of concrete or physical investigation. We may find out that the will is
Free, but this knowledge only relates to the intelligible cause of our
Volition. As regards the phenomena or expressions of this will, that is
Our actions, we are bound, in obedience to an inviolable maxim, without
Which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, to explain
These in the same way as we explain all the other phenomena of nature
That is to say, according to its unchangeable laws. We may have
Discovered the spirituality and immortality of the soul, but we cannot
Employ this knowledge to explain the phenomena of this life, nor the
Peculiar nature of the future, because our conception of an incorporeal
Nature is purely negative and does not add anything to our knowledge
And the only inferences to be drawn from it are purely fictitious. If
Again, we prove the existence of a supreme intelligence, we should be
Able from it to make the conformity to aims existing in the arrangement
Of the world comprehensible; but we should not be justified in deducing
From it any particular arrangement or disposition, or inferring any
Where it is not perceived. For it is a necessary rule of the speculative
Use of reason that we must not overlook natural causes, or refuse to
Listen to the teaching of experience, for the sake of deducing what we
Know and perceive from something that transcends all our knowledge
In one word, these three propositions are, for the speculative reason
Always transcendent, and cannot be employed as immanent principles in
Relation to the objects of experience; they are, consequently, of no use
To us in this sphere, being but the valueless results of the severe but
Unprofitable efforts of reason
If, then, the actual cognition of these three cardinal propositions is
Perfectly useless, while Reason uses her utmost endeavours to induce us
To admit them, it is plain that their real value and importance relate
To our practical, and not to our speculative interest
I term all that is possible through free will, practical. But if the
Conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical, reason can
Have only a regulative, and not a constitutive, influence upon it, and
Is serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its empirical
Laws. In the moral philosophy of prudence, for example, the sole
Business of reason is to bring about a union of all the ends, which
Are aimed at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end--that of
Happiness--and to show the agreement which should exist among the
Means of attaining that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason cannot
Present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action, for our
Guidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and is incompetent to
Give us laws which are pure and determined completely a priori. On the
Other hand, pure practical laws, the ends of which have been given by
Reason entirely a priori, and which are not empirically conditioned, but
Are, on the contrary, absolutely imperative in their nature, would be
Products of pure reason. Such are the moral laws; and these alone belong
To the sphere of the practical exercise of reason, and admit of a canon
All the powers of reason, in the sphere of what may be termed pure
Philosophy, are, in fact, directed to the three above-mentioned problems
Alone. These again have a still higher end--the answer to the question
What we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is a God and a future
World. Now, as this problem relates to our in reference to the highest
Aim of humanity, it is evident that the ultimate intention of nature, in
The constitution of our reason, has been directed to the moral alone
We must take care, however, in turning our attention to an object which
Is foreign* to the sphere of transcendental philosophy, not to injure
The unity of our system by digressions, nor, on the other hand, to fail
In clearness, by saying too little on the new subject of discussion
I hope to avoid both extremes, by keeping as close as possible to the
Transcendental, and excluding all psychological, that is, empirical
Elements
I have to remark, in the first place, that at present I treat of the
Conception of freedom in the practical sense only, and set aside the
Corresponding transcendental conception, which cannot be employed as a
Ground of explanation in the phenomenal world, but is itself a problem
For pure reason. A will is purely animal (arbitrium brutum) when it is
Determined by sensuous impulses or instincts only, that is, when it is
Determined in a pathological manner. A will, which can be determined
Independently of sensuous impulses, consequently by motives presented by
Reason alone, is called a free will (arbitrium liberum); and everything
Which is connected with this free will, either as principle or
Consequence, is termed practical. The existence of practical freedom can
Be proved from experience alone. For the human will is not determined
By that alone which immediately affects the senses; on the contrary, we
Have the power, by calling up the notion of what is useful or hurtful in
A more distant relation, of overcoming the immediate impressions on
Our sensuous faculty of desire. But these considerations of what is
Desirable in relation to our whole state, that is, is in the end good
And useful, are based entirely upon reason. This faculty, accordingly
Enounces laws, which are imperative or objective laws of freedom and
Which tell us what ought to take place, thus distinguishing themselves
From the laws of nature, which relate to that which does take place. The
Laws of freedom or of free will are hence termed practical laws
Whether reason is not itself, in the actual delivery of these laws
Determined in its turn by other influences, and whether the action
Which, in relation to sensuous impulses, we call free, may not, in
Relation to higher and more remote operative causes, really form a part
Of nature--these are questions which do not here concern us. They are
Purely speculative questions; and all we have to do, in the practical
Sphere, is to inquire into the rule of conduct which reason has to
Present. Experience demonstrates to us the existence of practical
Freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature, that is, it shows
The causal power of reason in the determination of the will. The idea
Of transcendental freedom, on the contrary, requires that reason--in
Relation to its causal power of commencing a series of phenomena--should
Be independent of all sensuous determining causes; and thus it seems to
Be in opposition to the law of nature and to all possible experience
It therefore remains a problem for the human mind. But this problem does
Not concern reason in its practical use; and we have, therefore, in a
Canon of pure reason, to do with only two questions, which relate to
The practical interest of pure reason: Is there a God? and, Is there
A future life? The question of transcendental freedom is purely
Speculative, and we may therefore set it entirely aside when we come
To treat of practical reason. Besides, we have already discussed this
Subject in the antinomy of pure reason
SECTION II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining
Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason
Reason conducted us, in its speculative use, through the field of
Experience and, as it can never find complete satisfaction in that
Sphere, from thence to speculative ideas--which, however, in the end
Brought us back again to experience, and thus fulfilled the purpose of
Reason, in a manner which, though useful, was not at all in accordance
With our expectations. It now remains for us to consider whether pure
Reason can be employed in a practical sphere, and whether it will here
Conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason
As we have just stated them. We shall thus ascertain whether, from
The point of view of its practical interest, reason may not be able to
Supply us with that which, on the speculative side, it wholly denies us
The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is
Centred in the three following questions:
1. WHAT CAN I KNOW?
2. WHAT OUGHT I TO DO?
3. WHAT MAY I HOPE?
The first question is purely speculative. We have, as I flatter myself
Exhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible, and have at last
Found the reply with which reason must content itself, and with which it
Ought to be content, so long as it pays no regard to the practical. But
From the two great ends to the attainment of which all these efforts of
Pure reason were in fact directed, we remain just as far removed as if
We had consulted our ease and declined the task at the outset. So far
Then, as knowledge is concerned, thus much, at least, is established
That, in regard to those two problems, it lies beyond our reach
The second question is purely practical. As such it may indeed fall
Within the province of pure reason, but still it is not transcendental
But moral, and consequently cannot in itself form the subject of our
Criticism
The third question: If I act as I ought to do, what may I then hope?--is
At once practical and theoretical. The practical forms a clue to
The answer of the theoretical, and--in its highest form--speculative
Question. For all hoping has happiness for its object and stands in
Precisely the same relation to the practical and the law of morality as
Knowing to the theoretical cognition of things and the law of nature
The former arrives finally at the conclusion that something is (which
Determines the ultimate end), because something ought to take place; the
Latter, that something is (which operates as the highest cause), because
Something does take place
Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires; extensive, in regard
To their multiplicity; intensive, in regard to their degree; and
Protensive, in regard to their duration. The practical law based on the
Motive of happiness I term a pragmatical law (or prudential rule); but
That law, a**uming such to exist, which has no other motive than the
Worthiness of being happy, I term a moral or ethical law. The first
Tells us what we have to do, if we wish to become possessed of
Happiness; the second dictates how we ought to act, in order to deserve
Happiness. The first is based upon empirical principles; for it is only
By experience that I can learn either what inclinations exist which
Desire satisfaction, or what are the natural means of satisfying them
The second takes no account of our desires or the means of satisfying
Them, and regards only the freedom of a rational being, and the
Necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonize with
The distribution of happiness according to principles. This second law
May therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure reason, and may be cognized a
Priori
I a**ume that there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely a
Priori (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness), the
Conduct of a rational being, or in other words, to use which it makes of
Its freedom, and that these laws are absolutely imperative (not merely
Hypothetically, on the supposition of other empirical ends), and
Therefore in all respects necessary. I am warranted in a**uming this
Not only by the arguments of the most enlightened moralists, but by
The moral judgement of every man who will make the attempt to form a
Distinct conception of such a law
Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative, but in
Its practical, or, more strictly, its moral use, principles of the
Possibility of experience, of such actions, namely, as, in accordance
With ethical precepts, might be met with in the history of man. For
Since reason commands that such actions should take place, it must
Be possible for them to take place; and hence a particular kind of
Systematic unity--the moral--must be possible. We have found, it is
True, that the systematic unity of nature could not be established
According to speculative principles of reason, because, while reason
Possesses a causal power in relation to freedom, it has none in relation
To the whole sphere of nature; and, while moral principles of reason can
Produce free actions, they cannot produce natural laws. It is, then, in
Its practical, but especially in its moral use, that the principles of
Pure reason possess objective reality
I call the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance
With all the ethical laws--which, by virtue of the freedom of reasonable
Beings, it can be, and according to the necessary laws of morality it
Ought to be. But this world must be conceived only as an intelligible
World, inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all conditions (ends)
And even of all impediments to morality (the weakness or pravity of
Human nature). So far, then, it is a mere idea--though still a practical
Idea--which may have, and ought to have, an influence on the world of
Sense, so as to bring it as far as possible into conformity with itself
The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective reality, not as
Referring to an object of intelligible intuition--for of such an
Object we can form no conception whatever--but to the world of
Sense--conceived, however, as an object of pure reason in its practical
Use--and to a corpus mysticum of rational beings in it, in so far as the
Liberum arbitrium of the individual is placed, under and by virtue of
Moral laws, in complete systematic unity both with itself and with the
Freedom of all others
That is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason
Which relate to its practical interest: Do that which will render thee
Worthy of happiness. The second question is this: If I conduct myself
So as not to be unworthy of happiness, may I hope thereby to obtain
Happiness? In order to arrive at the solution of this question, we must
Inquire whether the principles of pure reason, which prescribe a priori
The law, necessarily also connect this hope with it
I say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary according
To reason in its practical use, so it is equally necessary according
To reason in its theoretical use to a**ume that every one has ground to
Hope for happiness in the measure in which he has made himself worthy
Of it in his conduct, and that therefore the system of morality is
Inseparably (though only in the idea of pure reason) connected with that
Of happiness
Now in an intelligible, that is, in the moral world, in the conception
Of which we make abstraction of all the impediments to morality
(sensuous desires), such a system of happiness, connected with and
Proportioned to morality, may be conceived as necessary, because freedom
Of volition--partly incited, and partly restrained by moral laws--would
Be itself the cause of general happiness; and thus rational beings
Under the guidance of such principles, would be themselves the authors
Both of their own enduring welfare and that of others. But such a system
Of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the carrying out of which
Depends upon the condition that every one acts as he ought; in other
Words, that all actions of reasonable beings be such as they would be if
They sprung from a Supreme Will, comprehending in, or under, itself all
Particular wills. But since the moral law is binding on each individual
In the use of his freedom of volition, even if others should not act
In conformity with this law, neither the nature of things, nor the
Causality of actions and their relation to morality, determine how the
Consequences of these actions will be related to happiness; and the
Necessary connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing
Endeavour to become worthy of happiness, cannot be cognized by reason
If we take nature alone for our guide. This connection can be hoped for
Only on the a**umption that the cause of nature is a supreme reason
Which governs according to moral laws
I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect
Will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in
The world, so far as happiness stands in strict relation to morality
(as the worthiness of being happy), the ideal of the supreme Good. It is
Only, then, in the ideal of the supreme original good, that pure reason
Can find the ground of the practically necessary connection of
Both elements of the highest derivative good, and accordingly of an
Intelligible, that is, moral world. Now since we are necessitated by
Reason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such a world, while the
Senses present to us nothing but a world of phenomena, we must a**ume
The former as a consequence of our conduct in the world of sense (since
The world of sense gives us no hint of it), and therefore as future in
Relation to us. Thus God and a future life are two hypotheses which
According to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the
Obligation which this reason imposes upon us
Morality per se constitutes a system. But we can form no system of
Happiness, except in so far as it is dispensed in strict proportion to
Morality. But this is only possible in the intelligible world, under a
Wise author and ruler. Such a ruler, together with life in such a world
Which we must look upon as future, reason finds itself compelled to
Assume; or it must regard the moral laws as idle dreams, since the
Necessary consequence which this same reason connects with them must
Without this hypothesis, fall to the ground. Hence also the moral laws
Are universally regarded as commands, which they could not be did they
Not connect a priori adequate consequences with their dictates, and thus
Carry with them promises and threats. But this, again, they could not
Do, did they not reside in a necessary being, as the Supreme Good, which
Alone can render such a teleological unity possible
Leibnitz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the rational
Beings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand
To each other, under the government of the Supreme Good, the kingdom of
Grace, and distinguished it from the kingdom of Nature, in which these
Rational beings live, under moral laws, indeed, but expect no other
Consequences from their actions than such as follow according to the
Course of nature in the world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore, as
In the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness awaits us, except in
So far as we ourselves limit our participation in it by actions which
Render us unworthy of happiness, is a practically necessary idea of
Reason
Practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions
That is, subjective principles, are termed maxims. The judgements
Of moral according to in its purity and ultimate results are framed
According ideas; the observance of its laws, according to according to
Maxims
The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims; but this
Is impossible, unless with the moral law, which is a mere idea, reason
Connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct which is in
Conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or in another
Life, which is in exact conformity with our highest aims. Thus, without
A God and without a world, invisible to us now, but hoped for, the
Glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of
Admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action. For they do
Not satisfy all the aims which are natural to every rational being, and
Which are determined a priori by pure reason itself, and necessary
Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being the complete
Good. Reason does not approve of it (however much inclination may desire
It), except as united with desert. On the other hand, morality alone
And with it, mere desert, is likewise far from being the complete good
To make it complete, he who conducts himself in a manner not unworthy
Of happiness, must be able to hope for the possession of happiness. Even
Reason, unbiased by private ends, or interested considerations, cannot
Judge otherwise, if it puts itself in the place of a being whose
Business it is to dispense all happiness to others. For in the practical
Idea both points are essentially combined, though in such a way
That participation in happiness is rendered possible by the moral
Disposition, as its condition, and not conversely, the moral disposition
By the prospect of happiness. For a disposition which should require the
Prospect of happiness as its necessary condition would not be moral, and
Hence also would not be worthy of complete happiness--a happiness which
In the view of reason, recognizes no limitation but such as arises from
Our own immoral conduct
Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of rational
Beings (whereby they are made worthy of happiness), constitutes alone
The supreme good of a world into which we absolutely must transport
Ourselves according to the commands of pure but practical reason
This world is, it is true, only an intelligible world; for of such a
Systematic unity of ends as it requires, the world of sense gives us no
Hint. Its reality can be based on nothing else but the hypothesis of a
Supreme original good. In it independent reason, equipped with all
The sufficiency of a supreme cause, founds, maintains, and fulfils the
Universal order of things, with the most perfect teleological harmony
However much this order may be hidden from us in the world of sense
This moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with
Speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the conception of a sole
Perfect, and rational First Cause, whereof speculative theology does
Not give us any indication on objective grounds, far less any convincing
Evidence. For we find neither in transcendental nor in natural theology
However far reason may lead us in these, any ground to warrant us in
Assuming the existence of one only Being, which stands at the head of
All natural causes, and on which these are entirely dependent. On the
Other band, if we take our stand on moral unity as a necessary law of
The universe, and from this point of view consider what is necessary to
Give this law adequate efficiency and, for us, obligatory force, we
Must come to the conclusion that there is one only supreme will, which
Comprehends all these laws in itself. For how, under different wills
Should we find complete unity of ends? This will must be omnipotent
That all nature and its relation to morality in the world may be
Subject to it; omniscient, that it may have knowledge of the most secret
Feelings and their moral worth; omnipresent, that it may be at hand to
Supply every necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give
Rise; eternal, that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail;
And so on
But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences--which
As mere nature, is only a world of sense, but, as a system of freedom
Of volition, may be termed an intelligible, that is, moral world (regnum
Gratiae)--leads inevitably also to the teleological unity of all things
Which constitute this great whole, according to universal natural
Laws--just as the unity of the former is according to universal and
Necessary moral laws--and unites the practical with the speculative
Reason. The world must be represented as having originated from an idea
If it is to harmonize with that use of reason without which we cannot
Even consider ourselves as worthy of reason--namely, the moral use
Which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good. Hence the
Investigation of nature receives a teleological direction, and becomes
In its widest extension, physico-theology. But this, taking its rise
In moral order as a unity founded on the essence of freedom, and
Not accidentally instituted by external commands, establishes the
Teleological view of nature on grounds which must be inseparably
Connected with the internal possibility of things. This gives rise to
A transcendental theology, which takes the ideal of the highest
Ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity; and this
Principle connects all things according to universal and necessary
Natural laws, because all things have their origin in the absolute
Necessity of the one only Primal Being
What use can we make of our understanding, even in respect of
Experience, if we do not propose ends to ourselves? But the highest ends
Are those of morality, and it is only pure reason that can give us the
Knowledge of these. Though supplied with these, and putting ourselves
Under their guidance, we can make no teleological use of the knowledge
Of nature, as regards cognition, unless nature itself has established
Teleological unity. For without this unity we should not even possess
Reason, because we should have no school for reason, and no cultivation
Through objects which afford the materials for its conceptions. But
Teleological unity is a necessary unity, and founded on the essence of
The individual will itself. Hence this will, which is the condition of
The application of this unity in concreto, must be so likewise. In this
Way the transcendental enlargement of our rational cognition would be
Not the cause, but merely the effect of the practical teleology which
Pure reason imposes upon us
Hence, also, we find in the history of human reason that, before the
Moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined, and
Before men had attained to a perception of the systematic unity of
Ends according to these conceptions and from necessary principles, the
Knowledge of nature, and even a considerable amount of intellectual
Culture in many other sciences, could produce only rude and vague
Conceptions of the Deity, sometimes even admitting of an astonishing
Indifference with regard to this question altogether. But the more
Enlarged treatment of moral ideas, which was rendered necessary by
The extreme pure moral law of our religion, awakened the interest, and
Thereby quickened the perceptions of reason in relation to this object
In this way, and without the help either of an extended acquaintance
With nature, or of a reliable transcendental insight (for these have
Been wanting in all ages), a conception of the Divine Being was arrived
At, which we now bold to be the correct one, not because speculative
Reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it accords with the
Moral principles of reason. Thus it is to pure reason, but only in its
Practical use, that we must ascribe the merit of having connected with
Our highest interest a cognition, of which mere speculation was able
Only to form a conjecture, but the validity of which it was unable to
Establish--and of having thereby rendered it, not indeed a demonstrated
Dogma, but a hypothesis absolutely necessary to the essential ends of
Reason
But if practical reason has reached this elevation, and has attained to
The conception of a sole Primal Being as the supreme good, it must not
Therefore, imagine that it has transcended the empirical conditions of
Its application, and risen to the immediate cognition of new objects; it
Must not presume to start from the conception which it has gained, and
To deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For it was these very laws
The internal practical necessity of which led us to the hypothesis of an
Independent cause, or of a wise ruler of the universe, who should give
Them effect. Hence we are not entitled to regard them as accidental
And derived from the mere will of the ruler, especially as we have no
Conception of such a will, except as formed in accordance with these
Laws. So far, then, as practical reason has the right to conduct us
We shall not look upon actions as binding on us, because they are the
Commands of God, but we shall regard them as divine commands, because
We are internally bound by them. We shall study freedom under the
Teleological unity which accords with principles of reason; we shall
Look upon ourselves as acting in conformity with the divine will only in
So far as we hold sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the
Nature of actions themselves, and we shall believe that we can obey
That will only by promoting the weal of the universe in ourselves and in
Others. Moral theology is, therefore, only of immanent use. It teaches
Us to fulfil our destiny here in the world, by placing ourselves in
Harmony with the general system of ends, and warns us against the
Fanaticism, nay, the crime of depriving reason of its legislative
Authority in the moral conduct of life, for the purpose of directly
Connecting this authority with the idea of the Supreme Being. For this
Would be, not an immanent, but a transcendent use of moral theology
And, like the transcendent use of mere speculation, would inevitably
Pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason
SECTION III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief
The holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our understanding
Which may rest on objective grounds, but requires, also, subjective
Causes in the mind of the person judging. If a judgement is valid for
Every rational being, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and it
Is termed a conviction. If, on the other hand, it has its ground in the
Particular character of the subject, it is termed a persuasion
Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judgement, which lies
Solely in the subject, being regarded as objective. Hence a judgement
Of this kind has only private validity--is only valid for the individual
Who judges, and the holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot
Be communicated. But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and
Consequently the judgements of all understandings, if true, must be in
Agreement with each other (consentientia uni tertio consentiunt inter
Se). Conviction may, therefore, be distinguished, from an external point
Of view, from persuasion, by the possibility of communicating it and by
Showing its validity for the reason of every man; for in this case the
Presumption, at least, arises that the agreement of all judgements with
Each other, in spite of the different characters of individuals, rests
Upon the common ground of the agreement of each with the object, and
Thus the correctness of the judgement is established
Persuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distinguished from
Conviction, that is, so long as the subject views its judgement simply
As a phenomenon of its own mind. But if we inquire whether the grounds
Of our judgement, which are valid for us, produce the same effect on
The reason of others as on our own, we have then the means, though only
Subjective means, not, indeed, of producing conviction, but of detecting
The merely private validity of the judgement; in other words, of
Discovering that there is in it the element of mere persuasion
If we can, in addition to this, develop the subjective causes of the
Judgement, which we have taken for its objective grounds, and thus
Explain the deceptive judgement as a phenomenon in our mind, apart
Altogether from the objective character of the object, we can then
Expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by it, although, if
Its subjective cause lies in our nature, we cannot hope altogether to
Escape its influence
I can only maintain, that is, affirm as necessarily valid for every one
That which produces conviction. Persuasion I may keep for myself, if it
Is agreeable to me; but I cannot, and ought not, to attempt to impose it
As binding upon others
Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgement in relation
To conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively valid), has the
Three following degrees: opinion, belief, and knowledge. Opinion is a
Consciously insufficient judgement, subjectively as well as objectively
Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being
Objectively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively
Sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself);
Objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all). I need not dwell
Longer on the explanation of such simple conceptions
I must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing something, at
Least, by which my judgement, in itself merely problematical, is brought
Into connection with the truth--which connection, although not perfect
Is still something more than an arbitrary fiction. Moreover, the law of
Such a connection must be certain. For if, in relation to this law
I have nothing more than opinion, my judgement is but a play of the
Imagination, without the least relation to truth. In the judgements of
Pure reason, opinion has no place. For, as they do not rest on empirical
Grounds and as the sphere of pure reason is that of necessary truth
And a priori cognition, the principle of connection in it
Requires universality and necessity, and consequently perfect
Certainty--otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all. Hence
It is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics; we must know, or
Abstain from forming a judgement altogether. The case is the same with
The maxims of morality. For we must not hazard an action on the mere
Opinion that it is allowed, but we must know it to be so. In the
Transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, the term opinion
Is too weak, while the word knowledge is too strong. From the merely
Speculative point of view, therefore, we cannot form a judgement at
All. For the subjective grounds of a judgement, such as produce belief
Cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries, inasmuch as they cannot
Stand without empirical support and are incapable of being communicated
To others in equal measure
But it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically
Insufficient judgement can be termed belief. Now the practical reference
Is either to sk** or to morality; to the former, when the end proposed
Is arbitrary and accidental, to the latter, when it is absolutely
Necessary
If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its
Attainment are hypothetically necessary. The necessity is subjectively
But still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am acquainted with no
Other conditions under which the end can be attained. On the other hand
It is sufficient, absolutely and for every one, if I know for certain
That no one can be acquainted with any other conditions under which the
Attainment of the proposed end would be possible. In the former case my
Supposition--my judgement with regard to certain conditions--is a merely
Accidental belief; in the latter it is a necessary belief. The physician
Must pursue some course in the case of a patient who is in danger, but
Is ignorant of the nature of the disease. He observes the symptoms, and
Concludes, according to the best of his judgement, that it is a case
Of phthisis. His belief is, even in his own judgement, only contingent:
Another man might, perhaps come nearer the truth. Such a belief
Contingent indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of
Means for the attainment of certain ends, I term Pragmatical belief
The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his
Persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm
Belief, is a bet. It frequently happens that a man delivers his opinions
With so much boldness and a**urance, that he appears to be under no
Apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. The offer of
A bet startles him, and makes him pause. Sometimes it turns out that
His persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten. For he does not
Hesitate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is proposed to stake
Ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being
Mistaken--a possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation. If
We imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole
Life on the truth of any proposition, our judgement drops its air of
Triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our
Belief. Thus pragmatical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to
The interests at stake
Now, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in
Reference to some object, and where, accordingly, our judgement is
Purely theoretical, we can still represent to ourselves, in thought
The possibility of a course of action, for which we suppose that we have
Sufficient grounds, if any means existed of ascertaining the truth of
The matter. Thus we find in purely theoretical judgements an an*logon of
Practical judgements, to which the word belief may properly be applied
And which we may term doctrinal belief. I should not hesitate to stake
My all on the truth of the proposition--if there were any possibility of
Bringing it to the test of experience--that, at least, some one of the
Planets, which we see, is inhabited. Hence I say that I have not merely
The opinion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would
Stake even many of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in
Other worlds
Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to
Doctrinal belief. For, although in respect to the theoretical cognition
Of the universe I do not require to form any theory which necessarily
Involves this idea, as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena
Which the universe presents, but, on the contrary, am rather bound so
To use my reason as if everything were mere nature, still teleological
Unity is so important a condition of the application of my reason to
Nature, that it is impossible for me to ignore it--especially since, in
Addition to these considerations, abundant examples of it are supplied
By experience. But the sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends
Under which this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature
Is the a**umption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things
According to the wisest ends. Consequently, the hypothesis of a wise
Author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the investigation
Of nature--is the condition under which alone I can fulfil an end which
Is contingent indeed, but by no means unimportant. Moreover, since
The result of my attempts so frequently confirms the utility of this
Assumption, and since nothing decisive can be adduced against it, it
Follows that it would be saying far too little to term my judgement
In this case, a mere opinion, and that, even in this theoretical
Connection, I may a**ert that I firmly believe in God. Still, if we use
Words strictly, this must not be called a practical, but a doctrinal
Belief, which the theology of nature (physico-theology) must also
Produce in my mind. In the wisdom of a Supreme Being, and in the
Shortness of life, so inadequate to the development of the glorious
Powers of human nature, we may find equally sufficient grounds for a
Doctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul
The expression of belief is, in such cases, an expression of modesty
From the objective point of view, but, at the same time, of firm
Confidence, from the subjective. If I should venture to term this merely
Theoretical judgement even so much as a hypothesis which I am entitled
To a**ume; a more complete conception, with regard to another world and
To the cause of the world, might then be justly required of me than I
Am, in reality, able to give. For, if I a**ume anything, even as a mere
Hypothesis, I must, at least, know so much of the properties of such a
Being as will enable me, not to form the conception, but to imagine the
Existence of it. But the word belief refers only to the guidance which
An idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the conduct of
My reason, which forces me to hold it fast, though I may not be in a
Position to give a speculative account of it
But mere doctrinal belief is, to some extent, wanting in stability
We often quit our hold of it, in consequence of the difficulties which
Occur in speculation, though in the end we inevitably return to it
Again
It is quite otherwise with moral belief. For in this sphere action is
Absolutely necessary, that is, I must act in obedience to the moral law
In all points. The end is here incontrovertibly established, and there
Is only one condition possible, according to the best of my perception
Under which this end can harmonize with all other ends, and so have
Practical validity--namely, the existence of a God and of a future
World. I know also, to a certainty, that no one can be acquainted with
Any other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends under the
Moral law. But since the moral precept is, at the same time, my maxim
(as reason requires that it should be), I am irresistibly constrained to
Believe in the existence of God and in a future life; and I am sure
That nothing can make me waver in this belief, since I should thereby
Overthrow my moral maxims, the renunciation of which would render me
Hateful in my own eyes
Thus, while all the ambitious attempts of reason to penetrate beyond the
Limits of experience end in disappointment, there is still enough left
To satisfy us in a practical point of view. No one, it is true, will be
Able to boast that he knows that there is a God and a future life; for
If he knows this, he is just the man whom I have long wished to find
All knowledge, regarding an object of mere reason, can be communicated;
And I should thus be enabled to hope that my own knowledge would
Receive this wonderful extension, through the instrumentality of his
Instruction. No, my conviction is not logical, but moral certainty; and
Since it rests on subjective grounds (of the moral sentiment), I must
Not even say: It is morally certain that there is a God, etc., but: I
Am morally certain, that is, my belief in God and in another world is so
Interwoven with my moral nature that I am under as little apprehension
Of having the former torn from me as of losing the latter
The only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion is
That this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral sentiments
If we give up this a**umption, and take a man who is entirely
Indifferent with regard to moral laws, the question which reason
Proposes, becomes then merely a problem for speculation and may, indeed
Be supported by strong grounds from an*logy, but not by such as
Will compel the most obstinate scepticism to give way.* But in these
Questions no man is free from all interest. For though the want of good
Sentiments may place him beyond the influence of moral interests, still
Even in this case enough may be left to make him fear the existence of
God and a future life. For he cannot pretend to any certainty of the
Non-existence of God and of a future life, unless--since it could only
Be proved by mere reason, and therefore apodeictically--he is prepared
To establish the impossibility of both, which certainly no reasonable
Man would undertake to do. This would be a negative belief, which could
Not, indeed, produce morality and good sentiments, but still could
Produce an an*logon of these, by operating as a powerful restraint on
The outbreak of evil dispositions.
But, it will be said, is this all that pure reason can effect, in
opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience? Nothing more than
two articles of belief? Common sense could have done as much as this,
without taking the philosophers to counsel in the matter!
I shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the
laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human
reason--even granting that its merit should turn out in the end to be
only negative--for on this point something more will be said in the next
section. But, I ask, do you require that that knowledge which concerns
all men, should transcend the common understanding, and should only be
revealed to you by philosophers? The very circumstance which has called
forth your censure, is the best confirmation of the correctness of
our previous a**ertions, since it discloses, what could not have been
foreseen, that Nature is not chargeable with any partial distribution of
her gifts in those matters which concern all men without distinction
and that, in respect to the essential ends of human nature, we cannot
advance further with the help of the highest philosophy, than under the
guidance which nature has vouchsafed to the meanest understanding.