SECTION VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative
Principles of Reason
If by the term theology I understand the cognition of a primal being
That cognition is based either upon reason alone (theologia rationalis)
Or upon revelation (theologia revelata). The former cogitates its
Object either by means of pure transcendental conceptions, as an ens
Originarium, realissimum, ens entium, and is termed transcendental
Theology; or, by means of a conception derived from the nature of our
Own mind, as a supreme intelligence, and must then be entitled natural
Theology. The person who believes in a transcendental theology alone
Is termed a deist; he who acknowledges the possibility of a natural
Theology also, a theist. The former admits that we can cognize by pure
Reason alone the existence of a Supreme Being, but at the same time
Maintains that our conception of this being is purely transcendental
And that all we can say of it is that it possesses all reality, without
Being able to define it more closely. The second a**erts that reason
Is capable of presenting us, from the an*logy with nature, with a more
Definite conception of this being, and that its operations, as the cause
Of all things, are the results of intelligence and free will. The former
Regards the Supreme Being as the cause of the world--whether by the
Necessity of his nature, or as a free agent, is left undetermined; the
Latter considers this being as the author of the world
Transcendental theology aims either at inferring the existence of a
Supreme Being from a general experience, without any closer reference
To the world to which this experience belongs, and in this case it is
Called cosmotheology; or it endeavours to cognize the existence of such
A being, through mere conceptions, without the aid of experience, and is
Then termed ontotheology
Natural theology infers the attributes and the existence of an author of
The world, from the constitution of, the order and unity observable
In, the world, in which two modes of causality must be admitted to
Exist--those of nature and freedom. Thus it rises from this world to a
Supreme intelligence, either as the principle of all natural, or of
All moral order and perfection. In the former case it is termed
Physico-theology, in the latter, ethical or moral-theology
As we are won't to understand by the term God not merely an eternal
Nature, the operations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme
Being, who is the free and intelligent author of all things, and as it
Is this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity, we might
In strict rigour, deny to the deist any belief in God at all, and
Regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal being or
Thing--the supreme cause of all other things. But, as no one ought to be
Blamed, merely because he does not feel himself justified in maintaining
A certain opinion, as if he altogether denied its truth and a**erted
The opposite, it is more correct--as it is less harsh--to say, the deist
Believes in a God, the theist in a living God (summa intelligentia). We
Shall now proceed to investigate the sources of all these attempts of
Reason to establish the existence of a Supreme Being
It may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical knowledge or
Cognition as knowledge of that which is, and practical knowledge as
Knowledge of that which ought to be. In this view, the theoretical
Employment of reason is that by which I cognize a priori (as necessary)
That something is, while the practical is that by which I cognize a
Priori what ought to happen. Now, if it is an indubitably certain
Though at the same time an entirely conditioned truth, that something
Is, or ought to happen, either a certain determinate condition of this
Truth is absolutely necessary, or such a condition may be arbitrarily
Presupposed. In the former case the condition is postulated (per
Thesin), in the latter supposed (per hypothesin). There are certain
Practical laws--those of morality--which are absolutely necessary. Now
If these laws necessarily presuppose the existence of some being, as the
Condition of the possibility of their obligatory power, this being must
Be postulated, because the conditioned, from which we reason to this
Determinate condition, is itself cognized a priori as absolutely
Necessary. We shall at some future time show that the moral laws
Not merely presuppose the existence of a Supreme Being, but also, as
Themselves absolutely necessary in a different relation, demand
Or postulate it--although only from a practical point of view. The
Discussion of this argument we postpone for the present
When the question relates merely to that which is, not to that which
Ought to be, the conditioned which is presented in experience is
Always cogitated as contingent. For this reason its condition cannot be
Regarded as absolutely necessary, but merely as relatively necessary
Or rather as needful; the condition is in itself and a priori a mere
Arbitrary presupposition in aid of the cognition, by reason, of the
Conditioned. If, then, we are to possess a theoretical cognition of
The absolute necessity of a thing, we cannot attain to this cognition
Otherwise than a priori by means of conceptions; while it is impossible
In this way to cognize the existence of a cause which bears any relation
To an existence given in experience
Theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object
Or certain conceptions of an object which is not given and cannot be
Discovered by means of experience. It is opposed to the cognition of
Nature, which concerns only those objects or predicates which can be
Presented in a possible experience
The principle that everything which happens (the empirically contingent)
Must have a cause, is a principle of the cognition of nature, but not of
Speculative cognition. For, if we change it into an abstract principle
And deprive it of its reference to experience and the empirical, we
Shall find that it cannot with justice be regarded any longer as a
Synthetical proposition, and that it is impossible to discover any
Mode of transition from that which exists to something entirely
Different--termed cause. Nay, more, the conception of a cause likewise
That of the contingent--loses, in this speculative mode of employing
It, all significance, for its objective reality and meaning are
Comprehensible from experience alone
When from the existence of the universe and the things in it the
Existence of a cause of the universe is inferred, reason is proceeding
Not in the natural, but in the speculative method. For the principle of
The former enounces, not that things themselves or substances, but only
That which happens or their states--as empirically contingent, have
A cause: the a**ertion that the existence of substance itself is
Contingent is not justified by experience, it is the a**ertion of a
Reason employing its principles in a speculative manner. If, again, I
Infer from the form of the universe, from the way in which all things
Are connected and act and react upon each other, the existence of
A cause entirely distinct from the universe--this would again be a
Judgement of purely speculative reason; because the object in this
Case--the cause--can never be an object of possible experience. In both
These cases the principle of causality, which is valid only in the field
Of experience--useless and even meaningless beyond this region, would be
Diverted from its proper destination
Now I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a theology
By the aid of speculation alone are fruitless, that the principles of
Reason as applied to nature do not conduct us to any theological truths
And, consequently, that a rational theology can have no existence
Unless it is founded upon the laws of morality. For all synthetical
Principles of the understanding are valid only as immanent in
Experience; while the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates their
Being employed transcendentally, and of this the understanding is quite
Incapable. If the empirical law of causality is to conduct us to
A Supreme Being, this being must belong to the chain of empirical
Objects--in which case it would be, like all phenomena, itself
Conditioned. If the possibility of pa**ing the limits of experience be
Admitted, by means of the dynamical law of the relation of an effect to
Its cause, what kind of conception shall we obtain by this procedure?
Certainly not the conception of a Supreme Being, because experience
Never presents us with the greatest of all possible effects, and it is
Only an effect of this character that could witness to the existence
Of a corresponding cause. If, for the purpose of fully satisfying the
Requirements of Reason, we recognize her right to a**ert the existence
Of a perfect and absolutely necessary being, this can be admitted
Only from favour, and cannot be regarded as the result or irresistible
Demonstration. The physico-theological proof may add weight to
Others--if other proofs there are--by connecting speculation with
Experience; but in itself it rather prepares the mind for theological
Cognition, and gives it a right and natural direction, than establishes
A sure foundation for theology
It is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions admit only
Of transcendental answers--those presented a priori by pure conceptions
Without the least empirical admixture. But the question in the present
Case is evidently synthetical--it aims at the extension of our cognition
Beyond the bounds of experience--it requires an a**urance respecting the
Existence of a being corresponding with the idea in our minds, to which
No experience can ever be adequate. Now it has been abundantly proved
That all a priori synthetical cognition is possible only as the
Expression of the formal conditions of a possible experience; and that
The validity of all principles depends upon their immanence in the field
Of experience, that is, their relation to objects of empirical cognition
Or phenomena. Thus all transcendental procedure in reference to
Speculative theology is without result
If any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs of our
an*lytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these old and
Time honoured arguments, he at least cannot decline answering the
Question--how he can pa** the limits of all possible experience by the
Help of mere ideas. If he talks of new arguments, or of improvements
Upon old arguments, I request him to spare me. There is certainly no
Great choice in this sphere of discussion, as all speculative arguments
Must at last look for support to the ontological, and I have, therefore
Very little to fear from the argumentative fecundity of the dogmatical
Defenders of a non-sensuous reason. Without looking upon myself as a
Remarkably combative person, I shall not decline the challenge to detect
The fallacy and destroy the pretensions of every attempt of speculative
Theology. And yet the hope of better fortune never deserts those who
Are accustomed to the dogmatical mode of procedure. I shall, therefore
Restrict myself to the simple and equitable demand that such reasoners
Will demonstrate, from the nature of the human mind as well as from that
Of the other sources of knowledge, how we are to proceed to extend
Our cognition completely a priori, and to carry it to that point where
Experience abandons us, and no means exist of guaranteeing the objective
Reality of our conceptions. In whatever way the understanding may have
Attained to a conception, the existence of the object of the conception
Cannot be discovered in it by an*lysis, because the cognition of the
Existence of the object depends upon the object's being posited and
Given in itself apart from the conception. But it is utterly impossible
To go beyond our conception, without the aid of experience--which
Presents to the mind nothing but phenomena, or to attain by the help
Of mere conceptions to a conviction of the existence of new kinds of
Objects or supernatural beings
But although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to
Demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being, it is of the highest
Utility in correcting our conception of this being--on the supposition
That we can attain to the cognition of it by some other means--in making
It consistent with itself and with all other conceptions of intelligible
Objects, clearing it from all that is incompatible with the conception
Of an ens summun, and eliminating from it all limitations or admixtures
Of empirical elements
Transcendental theology is still therefore, notwithstanding its
Objective insufficiency, of importance in a negative respect; it is
Useful as a test of the procedure of reason when engaged with pure
Ideas, no other than a transcendental standard being in this case
Admissible. For if, from a practical point of view, the hypothesis of
A Supreme and All-sufficient Being is to maintain its validity without
Opposition, it must be of the highest importance to define this
Conception in a correct and rigorous manner--as the transcendental
Conception of a necessary being, to eliminate all phenomenal elements
(anthropomorphism in its most extended signification), and at the
Same time to overflow all contradictory a**ertions--be they atheistic
Deistic, or anthropomorphic. This is of course very easy; as the same
Arguments which demonstrated the inability of human reason to affirm
The existence of a Supreme Being must be alike sufficient to prove the
Invalidity of its denial. For it is impossible to gain from the pure
Speculation of reason demonstration that there exists no Supreme Being
As the ground of all that exists, or that this being possesses none
Of those properties which we regard as an*logical with the dynamical
Qualities of a thinking being, or that, as the anthropomorphists would
Have us believe, it is subject to all the limitations which sensibility
Imposes upon those intelligences which exist in the world of experience
A Supreme Being is, therefore, for the speculative reason, a mere ideal
Though a faultless one--a conception which perfects and crowns the
System of human cognition, but the objective reality of which can
Neither be proved nor disproved by pure reason. If this defect is ever
Supplied by a moral theology, the problematic transcendental theology
Which has preceded, will have been at least serviceable as demonstrating
The mental necessity existing for the conception, by the complete
Determination of it which it has furnished, and the ceaseless testing of
The conclusions of a reason often deceived by sense, and not always in
Harmony with its own ideas. The attributes of necessity, infinitude
Unity, existence apart from the world (and not as a world soul)
Eternity (free from conditions of time), omnipresence (free from
Conditions of space), omnipotence, and others, are pure transcendental
Predicates; and thus the accurate conception of a Supreme Being, which
Every theology requires, is furnished by transcendental theology alone
APPENDIX
Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason
The result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only
Confirms the truth of what we have already proved in our Transcendental
an*lytic, namely, that all inferences which would lead us beyond the
Limits of experience are fallacious and groundless, but it at the same
Time teaches us this important lesson, that human reason has a natural
Inclination to overstep these limits, and that transcendental ideas
Are as much the natural property of the reason as categories are of the
Understanding. There exists this difference, however, that while the
Categories never mislead us, outward objects being always in perfect
Harmony therewith, ideas are the parents of irresistible illusions, the
Severest and most subtle criticism being required to save us from the
Fallacies which they induce
Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers will be found to be in
Harmony with the final purpose and proper employment of these powers
When once we have discovered their true direction and aim. We are
Entitled to suppose, therefore, that there exists a mode of employing
Transcendental ideas which is proper and immanent; although, when we
Mistake their meaning, and regard them as conceptions of actual things
Their mode of application is transcendent and delusive. For it is not
The idea itself, but only the employment of the idea in relation to
Possible experience, that is transcendent or immanent. An idea is
Employed transcendently, when it is applied to an object falsely
Believed to be adequate with and to correspond to it; imminently, when
It is applied solely to the employment of the understanding in the
Sphere of experience. Thus all errors of subreptio--of misapplication
Are to be ascribed to defects of judgement, and not to understanding or
Reason
Reason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates
Immediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the
Understanding that it can be employed in the field of experience. It
Does not form conceptions of objects, it merely arranges them and gives
To them that unity which they are capable of possessing when the sphere
Of their application has been extended as widely as possible. Reason
Avails itself of the conception of the understanding for the sole
Purpose of producing totality in the different series. This totality the
Understanding does not concern itself with; its only occupation is the
Connection of experiences, by which series of conditions in accordance
With conceptions are established. The object of reason is, therefore
The understanding and its proper destination. As the latter brings unity
Into the diversity of objects by means of its conceptions, so the former
Brings unity into the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas; as
It sets the final aim of a collective unity to the operations of the
Understanding, which without this occupies itself with a distributive
Unity alone
I accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas can never be employed
As constitutive ideas, that they cannot be conceptions of objects, and
That, when thus considered, they a**ume a fallacious and dialectical
Character. But, on the other hand, they are capable of an admirable and
Indispensably necessary application to objects--as regulative ideas
Directing the understanding to a certain aim, the guiding lines towards
Which all its laws follow, and in which they all meet in one point. This
Point--though a mere idea (focus imaginarius), that is, not a point from
Which the conceptions of the understanding do really proceed, for it
Lies beyond the sphere of possible experience--serves, notwithstanding
To give to these conceptions the greatest possible unity combined with
The greatest possible extension. Hence arises the natural illusion which
Induces us to believe that these lines proceed from an object which lies
Out of the sphere of empirical cognition, just as objects reflected in
A mirror appear to be behind it. But this illusion--which we may hinder
From imposing upon us--is necessary and unavoidable, if we desire to
See, not only those objects which lie before us, but those which are at
A great distance behind us; that is to say, when, in the present case
We direct the aims of the understanding, beyond every given experience
Towards an extension as great as can possibly be attained
If we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall find that
The peculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a system, that
Is to say, to give them connection according to a principle. This unity
Presupposes an idea--the idea of the form of a whole (of cognition)
Preceding the determinate cognition of the parts, and containing the
Conditions which determine a priori to every part its place and relation
To the other parts of the whole system. This idea, accordingly, demands
Complete unity in the cognition of the understanding--not the unity of
A contingent aggregate, but that of a system connected according to
Necessary laws. It cannot be affirmed with propriety that this idea is a
Conception of an object; it is merely a conception of the complete unity
Of the conceptions of objects, in so far as this unity is available to
The understanding as a rule. Such conceptions of reason are not derived
From nature; on the contrary, we employ them for the interrogation and
Investigation of nature, and regard our cognition as defective so long
As it is not adequate to them. We admit that such a thing as pure earth
Pure water, or pure air, is not to be discovered. And yet we require
These conceptions (which have their origin in the reason, so far as
Regards their absolute purity and completeness) for the purpose of
Determining the share which each of these natural causes has in every
Phenomenon. Thus the different kinds of matter are all referred to
Earths, as mere weight; to salts and inflammable bodies, as pure force;
And finally, to water and air, as the vehicula of the former, or the
Machines employed by them in their operations--for the purpose of
Explaining the chemical action and reaction of bodies in accordance with
The idea of a mechanism. For, although not actually so expressed, the
Influence of such ideas of reason is very observable in the procedure of
Natural philosophers
If reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the general
And if the general be certain in se and given, it is only necessary
That the judgement should subsume the particular under the general
The particular being thus necessarily determined. I shall term this
The demonstrative or apodeictic employment of reason. If, however
The general is admitted as problematical only, and is a mere idea
The particular case is certain, but the universality of the rule which
Applies to this particular case remains a problem. Several particular
Cases, the certainty of which is beyond doubt, are then taken and
Examined, for the purpose of discovering whether the rule is applicable
To them; and if it appears that all the particular cases which can be
Collected follow from the rule, its universality is inferred, and at the
Same time, all the causes which have not, or cannot be presented to our
Observation, are concluded to be of the same character with those which
We have observed. This I shall term the hypothetical employment of the
Reason
The hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed as
Problematical conceptions is properly not constitutive. That is to say
If we consider the subject strictly, the truth of the rule, which has
Been employed as an hypothesis, does not follow from the use that is
Made of it by reason. For how can we know all the possible cases
That may arise? some of which may, however, prove exceptions to
The universality of the rule. This employment of reason is merely
Regulative, and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into the
Aggregate of our particular cognitions, and thereby the approximating of
The rule to universality
The object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the
Systematic unity of cognitions; and this unity is the criterion of the
Truth of a rule. On the other hand, this systematic unity--as a mere
Idea--is in fact merely a unity projected, not to be regarded as given
But only in the light of a problem--a problem which serves, however, as
A principle for the various and particular exercise of the understanding
In experience, directs it with regard to those cases which are not
Presented to our observation, and introduces harmony and consistency
Into all its operations
All that we can be certain of from the above considerations is that
This systematic unity is a logical principle, whose aim is to a**ist the
Understanding, where it cannot of itself attain to rules, by means of
Ideas, to bring all these various rules under one principle, and thus
To ensure the most complete consistency and connection that can be
Attained. But the a**ertion that objects and the understanding by which
They are cognized are so constituted as to be determined to systematic
Unity, that this may be postulated a priori, without any reference
To the interest of reason, and that we are justified in declaring all
Possible cognitions--empirical and others--to possess systematic unity
And to be subject to general principles from which, notwithstanding
Their various character, they are all derivable such an a**ertion can
Be founded only upon a transcendental principle of reason, which would
Render this systematic unity not subjectively and logically--in its
Character of a method, but objectively necessary
We shall illustrate this by an example. The conceptions of the
Understanding make us acquainted, among many other kinds of unity
With that of the causality of a substance, which is termed power. The
Different phenomenal manifestations of the same substance appear at
First view to be so very dissimilar that we are inclined to a**ume
The existence of just as many different powers as there are different
Effects--as, in the case of the human mind, we have feeling
Consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, an*lysis, pleasure, desire
And so on. Now we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these
Differences to as small a number as possible, by comparing them and
Discovering the hidden identity which exists. We must inquire, for
Example, whether or not imagination (connected with consciousness)
Memory, wit, and an*lysis are not merely different forms of
Understanding and reason. The idea of a fundamental power, the existence
Of which no effort of logic can a**ure us of, is the problem to be
Solved, for the systematic representation of the existing variety of
Powers. The logical principle of reason requires us to produce as great
A unity as is possible in the system of our cognitions; and the more
The phenomena of this and the other power are found to be identical
The more probable does it become, that they are nothing but different
Manifestations of one and the same power, which may be called
Relatively speaking, a fundamental power. And so with other cases
These relatively fundamental powers must again be compared with
Each other, to discover, if possible, the one radical and absolutely
Fundamental power of which they are but the manifestations. But this
Unity is purely hypothetical. It is not maintained, that this unity does
Really exist, but that we must, in the interest of reason, that is
For the establishment of principles for the various rules presented by
Experience, try to discover and introduce it, so far as is practicable
Into the sphere of our cognitions
But the transcendental employment of the understanding would lead us to
Believe that this idea of a fundamental power is not problematical, but
That it possesses objective reality, and thus the systematic unity
Of the various powers or forces in a substance is demanded by the
Understanding and erected into an apodeictic or necessary principle
For, without having attempted to discover the unity of the various
Powers existing in nature, nay, even after all our attempts have failed
We notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist, and may be, sooner or
Later, discovered. And this reason does, not only, as in the case
Above adduced, with regard to the unity of substance, but where
Many substances, although all to a certain extent h*mogeneous, are
Discoverable, as in the case of matter in general. Here also does
Reason presuppose the existence of the systematic unity of various
Powers--inasmuch as particular laws of nature are subordinate to general
Laws; and parsimony in principles is not merely an economical principle
Of reason, but an essential law of nature
We cannot understand, in fact, how a logical principle of unity can of
Right exist, unless we presuppose a transcendental principle, by which
Such a systematic unit--as a property of objects themselves--is regarded
As necessary a priori. For with what right can reason, in its logical
Exercise, require us to regard the variety of forces which nature
Displays, as in effect a disguised unity, and to deduce them from one
Fundamental force or power, when she is free to admit that it is just
As possible that all forces should be different in kind, and that a
Systematic unity is not conformable to the design of nature? In this
View of the case, reason would be proceeding in direct opposition to her
Own destination, by setting as an aim an idea which entirely conflicts
With the procedure and arrangement of nature. Neither can we a**ert that
Reason has previously inferred this unity from the contingent nature
Of phenomena. For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this
Unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it we should not possess
A faculty of reason, nor without reason a consistent and self-accordant
Mode of employing the understanding, nor, in the absence of this, any
Proper and sufficient criterion of empirical truth. In relation to this
Criterion, therefore, we must suppose the idea of the systematic unity
Of nature to possess objective validity and necessity
We find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different forms in
The principles of philosophers, although they have neither recognized
It nor confessed to themselves its presence. That the diversities of
Individual things do not exclude identity of species, that the various
Species must be considered as merely different determinations of a
Few genera, and these again as divisions of still higher races, and
So on--that, accordingly, a certain systematic unity of all possible
Empirical conceptions, in so far as they can be deduced from higher and
More general conceptions, must be sought for, is a scholastic maxim or
Logical principle, without which reason could not be employed by us. For
We can infer the particular from the general, only in so far as general
Properties of things constitute the foundation upon which the particular
Rest
That the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by philosophers
In the well-known scholastic maxim, which forbids us unnecessarily to
Augment the number of entities or principles (entia praeter necessitatem
Non esse multiplicanda). This maxim a**erts that nature herself a**ists
In the establishment of this unity of reason, and that the seemingly
Infinite diversity of phenomena should not deter us from the expectation
Of discovering beneath this diversity a unity of fundamental properties
Of which the aforesaid variety is but a more or less determined form
This unity, although a mere idea, thinkers have found it necessary
Rather to moderate the desire than to encourage it. It was considered
A great step when chemists were able to reduce all salts to two main
Genera--acids and alkalis; and they regard this difference as itself a
Mere variety, or different manifestation of one and the same fundamental
Material. The different kinds of earths (stones and even metals)
Chemists have endeavoured to reduce to three, and afterwards to two; but
Still, not content with this advance, they cannot but think that behind
These diversities there lurks but one genus--nay, that even salts and
Earths have a common principle. It might be conjectured that this is
Merely an economical plan of reason, for the purpose of sparing itself
Trouble, and an attempt of a purely hypothetical character, which
When successful, gives an appearance of probability to the principle of
Explanation employed by the reason. But a selfish purpose of this kind
Is easily to be distinguished from the idea, according to which every
One presupposes that this unity is in accordance with the laws of
Nature, and that reason does not in this case request, but requires
Although we are quite unable to determine the proper limits of this
Unity
If the diversity existing in phenomena--a diversity not of form (for
In this they may be similar) but of content--were so great that the
Subtlest human reason could never by comparison discover in them the
Least similarity (which is not impossible), in this case the logical law
Of genera would be without foundation, the conception of a genus, nay
All general conceptions would be impossible, and the faculty of the
Understanding, the exercise of which is restricted to the world
Of conceptions, could not exist. The logical principle of genera
Accordingly, if it is to be applied to nature (by which I mean objects
Presented to our senses), presupposes a transcendental principle. In
Accordance with this principle, h*mogeneity is necessarily presupposed
In the variety of phenomena (although we are unable to determine a
Priori the degree of this h*mogeneity), because without it no empirical
Conceptions, and consequently no experience, would be possible
The logical principle of genera, which demands identity in phenomena, is
Balanced by another principle--that of species, which requires variety
And diversity in things, notwithstanding their accordance in the same
Genus, and directs the understanding to attend to the one no less than
To the other. This principle (of the faculty of distinction) acts as a
Check upon the reason and reason exhibits in this respect a double and
Conflicting interest--on the one hand, the interest in the extent (the
Interest of generality) in relation to genera; on the other, that of the
Content (the interest of individuality) in relation to the variety of
Species. In the former case, the understanding cogitates more under its
Conceptions, in the latter it cogitates more in them. This distinction
Manifests itself likewise in the habits of thought peculiar to natural
Philosophers, some of whom--the remarkably speculative heads--may be
Said to be hostile to heterogeneity in phenomena, and have their
Eyes always fixed on the unity of genera, while others--with a strong
Empirical tendency--aim unceasingly at the an*lysis of phenomena
And almost destroy in us the hope of ever being able to estimate the
Character of these according to general principles
The latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical principle
The aim of which is the systematic completeness of all cognitions
This principle authorizes me, beginning at the genus, to descend to the
Various and diverse contained under it; and in this way extension, as
In the former case unity, is a**ured to the system. For if we merely
Examine the sphere of the conception which indicates a genus, we cannot
Discover how far it is possible to proceed in the division of that
Sphere; just as it is impossible, from the consideration of the space
Occupied by matter, to determine how far we can proceed in the division
Of it. Hence every genus must contain different species, and these again
Different subspecies; and as each of the latter must itself contain a
Sphere (must be of a certain extent, as a conceptus communis), reason
Demands that no species or sub-species is to be considered as the lowest
Possible. For a species or sub-species, being always a conception, which
Contains only what is common to a number of different things, does not
Completely determine any individual thing, or relate immediately to
It, and must consequently contain other conceptions, that is, other
Sub-species under it. This law of specification may be thus expressed:
Entium varietates non temere sunt minuendae
But it is easy to see that this logical law would likewise be without
Sense or application, were it not based upon a transcendental law of
Specification, which certainly does not require that the differences
Existing phenomena should be infinite in number, for the logical
Principle, which merely maintains the indeterminateness of the logical
Sphere of a conception, in relation to its possible division, does not
Authorize this statement; while it does impose upon the understanding
The duty of searching for subspecies to every species, and minor
Differences in every difference. For, were there no lower conceptions
Neither could there be any higher. Now the understanding cognizes only
By means of conceptions; consequently, how far soever it may proceed
In division, never by mere intuition, but always by lower and lower
Conceptions. The cognition of phenomena in their complete determination
(which is possible only by means of the understanding) requires an
Unceasingly continued specification of conceptions, and a progression
To ever smaller differences, of which abstraction bad been made in the
Conception of the species, and still more in that of the genus
This law of specification cannot be deduced from experience; it can
Never present us with a principle of so universal an application
Empirical specification very soon stops in its distinction of
Diversities, and requires the guidance of the transcendental law, as
A principle of the reason--a law which imposes on us the necessity of
Never ceasing in our search for differences, even although these may not
Present themselves to the senses. That absorbent earths are of different
Kinds could only be discovered by obeying the anticipatory law of
Reason, which imposes upon the understanding the task of discovering the
Differences existing between these earths, and supposes that nature is
Richer in substances than our senses would indicate. The faculty of the
Understanding belongs to us just as much under the presupposition of
Differences in the objects of nature, as under the condition that these
Objects are h*mogeneous, because we could not possess conceptions, nor
Make any use of our understanding, were not the phenomena included under
These conceptions in some respects dissimilar, as well as similar, in
Their character
Reason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for the operations
Of this faculty: 1. By the principle of the h*mogeneity of the diverse
In higher genera; 2. By the principle of the variety of the h*mogeneous
In lower species; and, to complete the systematic unity, it adds, 3
A law of the affinity of all conceptions which prescribes a continuous
Transition from one species to every other by the gradual increase of
Diversity. We may term these the principles of the h*mogeneity, the
Specification, and the continuity of forms. The latter results from the
Union of the two former, inasmuch as we regard the systematic connection
As complete in thought, in the ascent to higher genera, as well as in
The descent to lower species. For all diversities must be related
To each other, as they all spring from one highest genus, descending
Through the different gradations of a more and more extended
Determination
We may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical
Principles in the following manner. Every conception may be regarded as
A point, which, as the standpoint of a spectator, has a certain horizon
Which may be said to enclose a number of things that may be viewed
So to speak, from that centre. Within this horizon there must be an
Infinite number of other points, each of which has its own horizon
Smaller and more circumscribed; in other words, every species contains
Sub-species, according to the principle of specification, and the
Logical horizon consists of smaller horizons (subspecies), but not of
Points (individuals), which possess no extent. But different horizons
Or genera, which include under them so many conceptions, may have one
Common horizon, from which, as from a mid-point, they may be surveyed;
And we may proceed thus, till we arrive at the highest genus, or
Universal and true horizon, which is determined by the highest
Conception, and which contains under itself all differences and
Varieties, as genera, species, and subspecies
To this highest standpoint I am conducted by the law of h*mogeneity
As to all lower and more variously-determined conceptions by the law
Of specification. Now as in this way there exists no void in the whole
Extent of all possible conceptions, and as out of the sphere of these
The mind can discover nothing, there arises from the presupposition of
The universal horizon above mentioned, and its complete division, the
Principle: Non datur vacuum formarum. This principle a**erts that there
Are not different primitive and highest genera, which stand isolated, so
To speak, from each other, but all the various genera are mere divisions
And limitations of one highest and universal genus; and hence follows
Immediately the principle: Datur continuum formarum. This principle
Indicates that all differences of species limit each other, and do not
Admit of transition from one to another by a saltus, but only through
Smaller degrees of the difference between the one species and the other
In one word, there are no species or sub-species which (in the view of
Reason) are the nearest possible to each other; intermediate species or
Sub-species being always possible, the difference of which from each of
The former is always smaller than the difference existing between these
The first law, therefore, directs us to avoid the notion that there
Exist different primal genera, and enounces the fact of perfect
h*mogeneity; the second imposes a check upon this tendency to unity and
Prescribes the distinction of sub-species, before proceeding to apply
Our general conceptions to individuals. The third unites both the
Former, by enouncing the fact of h*mogeneity as existing even in the
Most various diversity, by means of the gradual transition from one
Species to another. Thus it indicates a relationship between the
Different branches or species, in so far as they all spring from the
Same stem
But this logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum logicarum)
Presupposes a transcendental principle (lex continui in natura), without
Which the understanding might be led into error, by following the
Guidance of the former, and thus perhaps pursuing a path contrary to
That prescribed by nature. This law must, consequently, be based upon
Pure transcendental, and not upon empirical, considerations. For, in the
Latter case, it would come later than the system; whereas it is really
Itself the parent of all that is systematic in our cognition of nature
These principles are not mere hypotheses employed for the purpose
Of experimenting upon nature; although when any such connection is
Discovered, it forms a solid ground for regarding the hypothetical unity
As valid in the sphere of nature--and thus they are in this respect not
Without their use. But we go farther, and maintain that it is manifest
That these principles of parsimony in fundamental causes, variety in
Effects, and affinity in phenomena, are in accordance both with reason
And nature, and that they are not mere methods or plans devised for the
Purpose of a**isting us in our observation of the external world
But it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which
No adequate object can be discovered in experience. And this for two
Reasons. First, because the species in nature are really divided, and
Hence form quanta discreta; and, if the gradual progression through
Their affinity were continuous, the intermediate members lying between
Two given species must be infinite in number, which is impossible
Secondly, because we cannot make any determinate empirical use of this
Law, inasmuch as it does not present us with any criterion of affinity
Which could aid us in determining how far we ought to pursue the
Graduation of differences: it merely contains a general indication that
It is our duty to seek for and, if possible, to discover them
When we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order
Conformable to their employment in experience, they will stand thus:
Variety, Affinity, Unity, each of them, as ideas, being taken in the
Highest degree of their completeness. Reason presupposes the existence
Of cognitions of the understanding, which have a direct relation to
Experience, and aims at the ideal unity of these cognitions--a unity
Which far transcends all experience or empirical notions. The affinity
Of the diverse, notwithstanding the differences existing between its
Parts, has a relation to things, but a still closer one to the mere
Properties and powers of things. For example, imperfect experience
May represent the orbits of the planets as circular. But we discover
Variations from this course, and we proceed to suppose that the planets
Revolve in a path which, if not a circle, is of a character very similar
To it. That is to say, the movements of those planets which do not form
A circle will approximate more or less to the properties of a circle
And probably form an ellipse. The paths of comets exhibit still greater
Variations, for, so far as our observation extends, they do not return
Upon their own course in a circle or ellipse. But we proceed to the
Conjecture that comets describe a parabola, a figure which is closely
Allied to the ellipse. In fact, a parabola is merely an ellipse, with
Its longer axis produced to an indefinite extent. Thus these principles
Conduct us to a unity in the genera of the forms of these orbits, and
Proceeding farther, to a unity as regards the cause of the motions of
The heavenly bodies--that is, gravitation. But we go on extending our
Conquests over nature, and endeavour to explain all seeming deviations
From these rules, and even make additions to our system which no
Experience can ever substantiate--for example, the theory, in affinity
With that of ellipses, of hyperbolic paths of comets, pursuing which
These bodies leave our solar system and, pa**ing from sun to sun, unite
The most distant parts of the infinite universe, which is held together
By the same moving power
The most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles is that
They seem to be transcendental, and, although only containing ideas
For the guidance of the empirical exercise of reason, and although this
Empirical employment stands to these ideas in an asymptotic relation
Alone (to use a mathematical term), that is, continually
Approximate, without ever being able to attain to them, they possess
Notwithstanding, as a priori synthetical propositions, objective
Though undetermined validity, and are available as rules for possible
Experience. In the elaboration of our experience, they may also be
Employed with great advantage, as heuristic [Footnote: From the Greek
Eurhioko.] principles. A transcendental deduction of them cannot be
Made; such a deduction being always impossible in the case of ideas, as
Has been already shown
We distinguished, in the Transcendental an*lytic, the dynamical
Principles of the understanding, which are regulative principles of
Intuition, from the mathematical, which are constitutive principles of
Intuition. These dynamical laws are, however, constitutive in relation
To experience, inasmuch as they render the conceptions without which
Experience could not exist possible a priori. But the principles of pure
Reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical conceptions
Because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be discovered, and
They cannot therefore have an object in concreto. Now, if I grant that
They cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, as constitutive
Principles, how shall I secure for them employment and objective
Validity as regulative principles, and in what way can they be so
Employed?
The understanding is the object of reason, as sensibility is the object
Of the understanding. The production of systematic unity in all the
Empirical operations of the understanding is the proper occupation of
Reason; just as it is the business of the understanding to connect the
Various content of phenomena by means of conceptions, and subject them
To empirical laws. But the operations of the understanding are, without
The schemata of sensibility, undetermined; and, in the same manner
The unity of reason is perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions
Under which, and the extent to which, the understanding ought to carry
The systematic connection of its conceptions. But, although it is
Impossible to discover in intuition a schema for the complete systematic
Unity of all the conceptions of the understanding, there must be some
an*logon of this schema. This an*logon is the idea of the maximum of the
Division and the connection of our cognition in one principle. For we
May have a determinate notion of a maximum and an absolutely perfect
All the restrictive conditions which are connected with an indeterminate
And various content having been abstracted. Thus the idea of reason
Is an*logous with a sensuous schema, with this difference, that the
Application of the categories to the schema of reason does not present
A cognition of any object (as is the case with the application of the
Categories to sensuous schemata), but merely provides us with a rule or
Principle for the systematic unity of the exercise of the understanding
Now, as every principle which imposes upon the exercise of the
Understanding a priori compliance with the rule of systematic unity
Also relates, although only in an indirect manner, to an object of
Experience, the principles of pure reason will also possess objective
Reality and validity in relation to experience. But they will not aim at
Determining our knowledge in regard to any empirical object; they
Will merely indicate the procedure, following which the empirical and
Determinate exercise of the understanding may be in complete harmony and
Connection with itself--a result which is produced by its being brought
Into harmony with the principle of systematic unity, so far as that is
Possible, and deduced from it
I term all subjective principles, which are not derived from observation
Of the constitution of an object, but from the interest which Reason
Has in producing a certain completeness in her cognition of that object
Maxims of reason. Thus there are maxims of speculative reason, which are
Based solely upon its speculative interest, although they appear to be
Objective principles
When principles which are really regulative are regarded as
Constitutive, and employed as objective principles, contradictions must
Arise; but if they are considered as mere maxims, there is no room for
Contradictions of any kind, as they then merely indicate the different
Interests of reason, which occasion differences in the mode of thought
In effect, Reason has only one single interest, and the seeming
Contradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates a difference
In, and a reciprocal limitation of, the methods by which this interest
Is satisfied
This reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity--in accordance
With the principle of specification; another, the interest of unity--in
Accordance with the principle of aggregation. Each believes that
His judgement rests upon a thorough insight into the subject he is
Examining, and yet it has been influenced solely by a greater or less
Degree of adherence to some one of the two principles, neither of which
Are objective, but originate solely from the interest of reason, and on
This account to be termed maxims rather than principles. When I observe
Intelligent men disputing about the distinctive characteristics of men
Animals, or plants, and even of minerals, those on the one side a**uming
The existence of certain national characteristics, certain well-defined
And hereditary distinctions of family, race, and so on, while the other
Side maintain that nature has endowed all races of men with the same
Faculties and dispositions, and that all differences are but the result
Of external and accidental circumstances--I have only to consider for
A moment the real nature of the subject of discussion, to arrive at the
Conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of, and
That there is little probability of either party being able to speak
From a perfect insight into and understanding of the nature of the
Subject itself. Both have, in reality, been struggling for the twofold
Interest of reason; the one maintaining the one interest, the other the
Other. But this difference between the maxims of diversity and unity
May easily be reconciled and adjusted; although, so long as they
Are regarded as objective principles, they must occasion not only
Contradictions and polemic, but place hinderances in the way of the
Advancement of truth, until some means is discovered of reconciling
These conflicting interests, and bringing reason into union and harmony
With itself
The same is the case with the so-called law discovered by Leibnitz, and
Supported with remarkable ability by Bonnet--the law of the continuous
Gradation of created beings, which is nothing more than an inference
From the principle of affinity; for observation and study of the order
Of nature could never present it to the mind as an objective truth. The
Steps of this ladder, as they appear in experience, are too far apart
From each other, and the so-called petty differences between different
Kinds of animals are in nature commonly so wide separations that no
Confidence can be placed in such views (particularly when we reflect
On the great variety of things, and the ease with which we can discover
Resemblances), and no faith in the laws which are said to express
The aims and purposes of nature. On the other hand, the method of
Investigating the order of nature in the light of this principle
And the maxim which requires us to regard this order--it being still
Undetermined how far it extends--as really existing in nature, is beyond
Doubt a legitimate and excellent principle of reason--a principle which
Extends farther than any experience or observation of ours and which
Without giving us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of
Experience, guides us to the goal of systematic unity