TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC
INTRODUCTION. Idea of a Transcendental Logic
I. Of Logic in General
Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of which
Is the faculty or power of receiving representations (receptivity for
Impressions); the second is the power of cognizing by means of these
Representations (spontaneity in the production of conceptions). Through
The first an object is given to us; through the second, it is, in
Relation to the representation (which is a mere determination of the
Mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions constitute, therefore, the
Elements of all our knowledge, so that neither conceptions without
An intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without
Conceptions, can afford us a cognition. Both are either pure or
Empirical. They are empirical, when sensation (which presupposes the
Actual presence of the object) is contained in them; and pure, when no
Sensation is mixed with the representation. Sensations we may call
The matter of sensuous cognition. Pure intuition consequently contains
Merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure conception
Only the form of the thought of an object. Only pure intuitions and pure
Conceptions are possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriori
We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for
Impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected; and, on the other
Hand, we call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations
Or the spontaneity of cognition, understanding. Our nature is so
Constituted that intuition with us never can be other than sensuous
That is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects
On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous
Intuition is the understanding. Neither of these faculties has a
Preference over the other. Without the sensuous faculty no object
Would be given to us, and without the understanding no object would
Be thought. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without
Conceptions, blind. Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its
Conceptions sensuous (that is, to join to them the object in intuition)
As to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under
Conceptions). Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper
Function. Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot
Think. In no other way than from the united operation of both, can
Knowledge arise. But no one ought, on this account, to overlook the
Difference of the elements contributed by each; we have rather great
Reason carefully to separate and distinguish them. We therefore
Distinguish the science of the laws of sensibility, that is, aesthetic
From the science of the laws of the understanding, that is, logic
Now, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold--namely, as logic
Of the general, or of the particular use of the understanding. The first
Contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought, without which no use
Whatsoever of the understanding is possible, and gives laws therefore to
The understanding, without regard to the difference of objects on which
It may be employed. The logic of the particular use of the understanding
Contains the laws of correct thinking upon a particular cla** of
Objects. The former may be called elemental logic--the latter, the
Organon of this or that particular science. The latter is for the
Most part employed in the schools, as a propaedeutic to the sciences
Although, indeed, according to the course of human reason, it is the
Last thing we arrive at, when the science has been already matured, and
Needs only the finishing touches towards its correction and completion;
For our knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be
Tolerably extensive and complete before we can indicate the laws by
Which a science of these objects can be established
General logic is again either pure or applied. In the former, we
Abstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is
Exercised; for example, the influence of the senses, the play of the
Fantasy or imagination, the laws of the memory, the force of habit, of
Inclination, etc., consequently also, the sources of prejudice--in a
Word, we abstract all causes from which particular cognitions
Arise, because these causes regard the understanding under certain
Circumstances of its application, and, to the knowledge of them
Experience is required. Pure general logic has to do, therefore, merely
With pure a priori principles, and is a canon of understanding and
Reason, but only in respect of the formal part of their use, be the
Content what it may, empirical or transcendental. General logic is
Called applied, when it is directed to the laws of the use of the
Understanding, under the subjective empirical conditions which
Psychology teaches us. It has therefore empirical principles, although
At the same time, it is in so far general, that it applies to the
Exercise of the understanding, without regard to the difference of
Objects. On this account, moreover, it is neither a canon of the
Understanding in general, nor an organon of a particular science, but
Merely a cathartic of the human understanding
In general logic, therefore, that part which constitutes pure logic must
Be carefully distinguished from that which constitutes applied (though
Still general) logic. The former alone is properly science, although
Short and dry, as the methodical exposition of an elemental doctrine of
The understanding ought to be. In this, therefore, logicians must always
Bear in mind two rules:
1. As general logic, it makes abstraction of all content of the
Cognition of the understanding, and of the difference of objects, and
Has to do with nothing but the mere form of thought
2. As pure logic, it has no empirical principles, and consequently
Draws nothing (contrary to the common persuasion) from psychology, which
Therefore has no influence on the canon of the understanding. It is a
Demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain completely a
Priori
What I called applied logic (contrary to the common acceptation of this
Term, according to which it should contain certain exercises for the
Scholar, for which pure logic gives the rules), is a representation
Of the understanding, and of the rules of its necessary employment
In concreto, that is to say, under the accidental conditions of the
Subject, which may either hinder or promote this employment, and which
Are all given only empirically. Thus applied logic treats of attention
Its impediments and consequences, of the origin of error, of the state
Of doubt, hesitation, conviction, etc., and to it is related pure
General logic in the same way that pure morality, which contains only
The necessary moral laws of a free will, is related to practical ethics
Which considers these laws under all the impediments of feelings
Inclinations, and pa**ions to which men are more or less subjected, and
Which never can furnish us with a true and demonstrated science, because
It, as well as applied logic, requires empirical and psychological
Principles
II. Of Transcendental Logic.
General logic, as we have seen, makes abstraction of all content of
cognition, that is, of all relation of cognition to its object, and
regards only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to each
other, that is, the form of thought in general. But as we have both pure
and empirical intuitions (as transcendental aesthetic proves), in like
manner a distinction might be drawn between pure and empirical thought
(of objects). In this case, there would exist a kind of logic, in which
we should not make abstraction of all content of cognition; for or logic
which should comprise merely the laws of pure thought (of an object),
would of course exclude all those cognitions which were of empirical
content. This kind of logic would also examine the origin of our
cognitions of objects, so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to the
objects themselves; while, on the contrary, general logic has nothing
to do with the origin of our cognitions, but contemplates our
representations, be they given primitively a priori in ourselves, or be
they only of empirical origin, solely according to the laws which the
understanding observes in employing them in the process of thought, in
relation to each other. Consequently, general logic treats of the form
of the understanding only, which can be applied to representations, from
whatever source they may have arisen.
And here I shall make a remark, which the reader must bear well in mind
in the course of the following considerations, to wit, that not every
cognition a priori, but only those through which we cognize that and how
certain representations (intuitions or conceptions) are applied or are
possible only a priori; that is to say, the a priori possibility of
cognition and the a priori use of it are transcendental. Therefore
neither is space, nor any a priori geometrical determination of space,
a transcendental Representation, but only the knowledge that such a
representation is not of empirical origin, and the possibility of its
relating to objects of experience, although itself a priori, can be
called transcendental. So also, the application of space to objects
in general would be transcendental; but if it be limited to objects of
sense it is empirical. Thus, the distinction of the transcendental
and empirical belongs only to the critique of cognitions, and does not
concern the relation of these to their object.
Accordingly, in the expectation that there may perhaps be conceptions
which relate a priori to objects, not as pure or sensuous intuitions,
but merely as acts of pure thought (which are therefore conceptions,
but neither of empirical nor aesthetical origin)--in this expectation,
I say, we form to ourselves, by anticipation, the idea of a science
of pure understanding and rational cognition, by means of which we may
cogitate objects entirely a priori. A science of this kind, which should
determine the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such
cognitions, must be called transcendental logic, because it has not,
like general logic, to do with the laws of understanding and reason
in relation to empirical as well as pure rational cognitions without
distinction, but concerns itself with these only in an a priori relation
to objects.
III. Of the Division of General Logic into an*lytic and Dialectic.
The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a
corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or
confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art,
is this: "What is truth?" The definition of the word truth, to wit,
"the accordance of the cognition with its object," is presupposed in
the question; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what is the
universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition.
To know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a strong
evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For if a question be in itself
absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer, it is attended with the
danger--not to mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes
it--of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers, and
we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients
said) "milking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve."
If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its object,
this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all others; for a
cognition is false if it does not accord with the object to which it
relates, although it contains something which may be affirmed of other
objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would be that which is
valid for all cognitions, without distinction of their objects. But
it is evident that since, in the case of such a criterion, we make
abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that is, of all relation
to its object), and truth relates precisely to this content, it must
be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of
cognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient, and at the same time
universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found. As we have already
termed the content of a cognition its matter, we shall say: "Of the
truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter, no universal test
can be demanded, because such a demand is self-contradictory."
On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere
form (excluding all content), it is equally manifest that logic, in
so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of the
understanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria of
truth. Whatever contradicts these rules is false, because thereby the
understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of thought;
that is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply solely to
the form of truth, that is, of thought in general, and in so far they
are perfectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although a cognition
may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not
self-contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may
not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely logical
criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of a cognition with the
universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, is nothing more
than the conditio sine qua non, or negative condition of all truth.
Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which depends not
on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it has no test to
discover.
General logic, then, resolves the whole formal business of understanding
and reason into its elements, and exhibits them as principles of all
logical judging of our cognitions. This part of logic may, therefore, be
called an*lytic, and is at least the negative test of truth, because all
cognitions must first of an be estimated and tried according to these
laws before we proceed to investigate them in respect of their content,
in order to discover whether they contain positive truth in regard to
their object. Because, however, the mere form of a cognition, accurately
as it may accord with logical laws, is insufficient to supply us with
material (objective) truth, no one, by means of logic alone, can venture
to predicate anything of or decide concerning objects, unless he has
obtained, independently of logic, well-grounded information about them,
in order afterwards to examine, according to logical laws, into the use
and connection, in a cohering whole, of that information, or, what is
still better, merely to test it by them. Notwithstanding, there lies so
seductive a charm in the possession of a specious art like this--an
art which gives to all our cognitions the form of the understanding,
although with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly
deficient--that general logic, which is merely a canon of judgement, has
been employed as an organon for the actual production, or rather for
the semblance of production, of objective a**ertions, and has thus
been grossly misapplied. Now general logic, in its a**umed character of
organon, is called dialectic.
Different as are the significations in which the ancients used this
term for a science or an art, we may safely infer, from their actual
employment of it, that with them it was nothing else than a logic of
illusion--a sophistical art for giving ignorance, nay, even intentional
sophistries, the colouring of truth, in which the thoroughness of
procedure which logic requires was imitated, and their topic employed
to cloak the empty pretensions. Now it may be taken as a safe and useful
warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, must always be
a logic of illusion, that is, be dialectical, for, as it teaches us
nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions, but merely
the formal conditions of their accordance with the understanding, which
do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any
attempt to employ it as an instrument (organon) in order to extend and
enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one
being able to maintain or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any
single a**ertion whatever.
Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy. For
these reasons we have chosen to denominate this part of logic dialectic,
in the sense of a critique of dialectical illusion, and we wish the term
to be so understood in this place.
IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental
an*lytic and Dialectic.
In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as in
transcendental aesthetic the sensibility) and select from our cognition
merely that part of thought which has its origin in the understanding
alone. The exercise of this pure cognition, however, depends upon this
as its condition, that objects to which it may be applied be given to
us in intuition, for without intuition the whole of our cognition
is without objects, and is therefore quite void. That part of
transcendental logic, then, which treats of the elements of pure
cognition of the understanding, and of the principles without which no
object at all can be thought, is transcendental an*lytic, and at the
same time a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict it, without
losing at the same time all content, that is, losing all reference to an
object, and therefore all truth. But because we are very easily seduced
into employing these pure cognitions and principles of the understanding
by themselves, and that even beyond the boundaries of experience, which
yet is the only source whence we can obtain matter (objects) on which
those pure conceptions may be employed--understanding runs the risk of
making, by means of empty sophisms, a material and objective use of
the mere formal principles of the pure understanding, and of pa**ing
judgements on objects without distinction--objects which are not given
to us, nay, perhaps cannot be given to us in any way. Now, as it ought
properly to be only a canon for judging of the empirical use of the
understanding, this kind of logic is misused when we seek to employ
it as an organon of the universal and unlimited exercise of the
understanding, and attempt with the pure understanding alone to judge
synthetically, affirm, and determine respecting objects in general. In
this case the exercise of the pure understanding becomes dialectical.
The second part of our transcendental logic must therefore be a critique
of dialectical illusion, and this critique we shall term transcendental
dialectic--not meaning it as an art of producing dogmatically
such illusion (an art which is unfortunately too current among
the practitioners of metaphysical juggling), but as a critique of
understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use. This
critique will expose the groundless nature of the pretensions of
these two faculties, and invalidate their claims to the discovery
and enlargement of our cognitions merely by means of transcendental
principles, and show that the proper employment of these faculties is to
test the judgements made by the pure understanding, and to guard it from
sophistical delusion.