BOOK II.-- OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE REASON
It may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is
Something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a
Necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in
Fact, a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given
By reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being
Presented and intuited in a Possible experience. But we should express
Our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if
We said that we can have no knowledge of an object, which perfectly
Corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical
Conception thereof
Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure
Conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas
By a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms
Which contain no empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude
From something that we do know, to something of which we do not even
Possess a conception, to which we, nevertheless, by an unavoidable
Illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards
Their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although
Indeed, as regards their origin, they are very well entitled to the
Latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of
Reason, but are necessitated by its very nature. They are sophisms, not
Of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the Wisest cannot free
Himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error
But he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually
Mocks and misleads him
Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corresponding to
The number of the ideas which their conclusions present. In the argument
Or syllogism of the first cla**, I conclude, from the transcendental
Conception of the subject contains no manifold, the absolute unity
Of the subject itself, of which I cannot in this manner attain to a
Conception. This dialectical argument I shall call the transcendental
Paralogism. The second cla** of sophistical arguments is occupied with
The transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the series of
Conditions for a given phenomenon, and I conclude, from the fact that
I have always a self-contradictory conception of the unconditioned
Synthetical unity of the series upon one side, the truth of the opposite
Unity, of which I have nevertheless no conception. The condition of
Reason in these dialectical arguments, I shall term the antinomy of pure
Reason. Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument
I conclude, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in
General, in so far as they can be given, the absolute synthetical unity
Of all conditions of the possibility of things in general; that is, from
Things which I do not know in their mere transcendental conception, I
Conclude a being of all beings which I know still less by means of a
Transcendental conception, and of whose unconditioned necessity I can
Form no conception whatever. This dialectical argument I shall call the
Ideal of pure reason
CHAPTER I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason
The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect
Of its form, be the content what it may. But a transcendental paralogism
Has a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form
Is correct and unexceptionable. In this manner the paralogism has
Its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an
Unavoidable, though not insoluble, mental illusion
We now come to a conception which was not inserted in the general list
Of transcendental conceptions, and yet must be reckoned with them
But at the same time without in the least altering, or indicating a
Deficiency in that table. This is the conception, or, if the term is
Preferred, the judgement, "I think." But it is readily perceived that
This thought is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general
And consequently of transcendental conceptions also, and that it is
Therefore regarded as a transcendental conception, although it can
Have no peculiar claim to be so ranked, inasmuch as its only use is to
Indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness. At the same
Time, pure as this conception is from empirical content (impressions
Of the senses), it enables us to distinguish two different kinds of
Objects. "I," as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am
Called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called
Body. Thus the expression, "I," as a thinking being, designates the
Object-matter of psychology, which may be called "the rational doctrine
Of the soul," inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of
The soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me
In concreto), may be concluded from this conception "I," in so far as it
Appears in all thought
Now, the rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of
This kind. For if the smallest empirical element of thought, if any
Particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced among
The grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a rational
But an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before us a
Pretended science, raised upon the single proposition, "I think," whose
Foundation or want of foundation we may very properly, and agreeably
With the nature of a transcendental philosophy, here examine. It
Ought not to be objected that in this proposition, which expresses the
Perception of one's self, an internal experience is a**erted, and that
Consequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is founded upon it
Is not pure, but partly founded upon an empirical principle. For this
Internal perception is nothing more than the mere apperception, "I
Think," which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible
In which we say, "I think substance, cause, etc." For internal
Experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general, and
Its relation to other perceptions, unless some particular distinction
Or determination thereof is empirically given, cannot be regarded as
Empirical cognition, but as cognition of the empirical, and belongs
To the investigation of the possibility of every experience, which
Is certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience (for
Example, only pleasure or pain), that should be included in the general
Representation of self-consciousness, would immediately change the
Rational into an empirical psychology
"I think" is therefore the only text of rational psychology, from which
It must develop its whole system. It is manifest that this thought, when
Applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but transcendental
Predicates thereof; because the least empirical predicate would destroy
The purity of the science and its independence of all experience
But we shall have to follow here the guidance of the categories--only
As in the present case a thing, "I," as thinking being, is at first
Given, we shall--not indeed change the order of the categories as it
Stands in the table--but begin at the category of substance, by which at
The a thing in itself is represented and proceeds backwards through
The series. The topic of the rational doctrine of the soul, from which
Everything else it may contain must be deduced, is accordingly as
Follows:
1
The Soul is SUBSTANCE
2
As regards its quality
It is SIMPLE
3
As regards the different
Times in which it exists
It is numerically identical
That is UNITY, not Plurality
4
It is in relation to possible objects in space
From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology
By combination alone, without the aid of any other principle. This
Substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives
The conception of Immateriality; as simple substance, that of
Incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, gives the
Conception of Personality; all these three together, Spirituality
Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection
(commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the
Principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul (anima), and as the
Ground of Animality; and this, limited and determined by the conception
Of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality
Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental
Psychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason
Touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at
The foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself
Perfectly contentless representation "I" which cannot even be called
A conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all
Conceptions. By this "I," or "He," or "It," who or which thinks, nothing
More is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which
Is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and
Of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception. Hence
In a perpetual circle, inasmuch as we must always employ it, in order
To frame any judgement respecting it. And this inconvenience we find it
Impossible to rid ourselves of, because consciousness in itself is not
So much a representation distinguishing a particular object, as a form
Of representation in general, in so far as it may be termed cognition;
For in and by cognition alone do I think anything
It must, however, appear extraordinary at first sight that the condition
Under which I think, and which is consequently a property of my subject
Should be held to be likewise valid for every existence which thinks
And that we can presume to base upon a seemingly empirical proposition
A judgement which is apodeictic and universal, to wit, that everything
Which thinks is constituted as the voice of my consciousness declares it
To be, that is, as a self-conscious being. The cause of this belief is
To be found in the fact that we necessarily attribute to things a priori
All the properties which constitute conditions under which alone we
Can cogitate them. Now I cannot obtain the least representation of
A thinking being by means of external experience, but solely through
Self-consciousness. Such objects are consequently nothing more than the
Transference of this consciousness of mine to other things which can
Only thus be represented as thinking beings. The proposition, "I think,"
Is, in the present case, understood in a problematical sense, not in
So far as it contains a perception of an existence (like the Cartesian
"Cogito, ergo sum"),[Footnote: "I think, therefore I am."] but in regard
To its mere possibility--for the purpose of discovering what properties
May be inferred from so simple a proposition and predicated of the
Subject of it
If at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of thinking beings
There lay more than the mere Cogito--if we could likewise call in aid
Observations on the play of our thoughts, and the thence derived natural
Laws of the thinking self, there would arise an empirical psychology
Which would be a kind of physiology of the internal sense and might
Possibly be capable of explaining the phenomena of that sense. But it
Could never be available for discovering those properties which do not
Belong to possible experience (such as the quality of simplicity)
Nor could it make any apodeictic enunciation on the nature of thinking
Beings: it would therefore not be a rational psychology
Now, as the proposition "I think" (in the problematical sense) contains
The form of every judgement in general and is the constant accompaniment
Of all the categories, it is manifest that conclusions are drawn from
It only by a transcendental employment of the understanding. This use of
The understanding excludes all empirical elements; and we cannot, as
Has been shown above, have any favourable conception beforehand of
Its procedure. We shall therefore follow with a critical eye this
Proposition through all the predicaments of pure psychology; but we
Shall, for brevity's sake, allow this examination to proceed in an
Uninterrupted connection
Before entering on this task, however, the following general remark may
Help to quicken our attention to this mode of argument. It is not
Merely through my thinking that I cognize an object, but only through my
Determining a given intuition in relation to the unity of consciousness
In which all thinking consists. It follows that I cognize myself, not
Through my being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am
Conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in relation to the
Function of thought. All the modi of self-consciousness in thought
Are hence not conceptions of objects (conceptions of the
Understanding--categories); they are mere logical functions, which do
Not present to thought an object to be cognized, and cannot therefore
Present my Self as an object. Not the consciousness of the determining
But only that of the determinable self, that is, of my internal
Intuition (in so far as the manifold contained in it can be connected
Conformably with the general condition of the unity of apperception in
Thought), is the object
1. In all judgements I am the determining subject of that relation which
Constitutes a judgement. But that the I which thinks, must be considered
As in thought always a subject, and as a thing which cannot be a
Predicate to thought, is an apodeictic and identical proposition. But
This proposition does not signify that I, as an object, am, for
Myself, a self-subsistent being or substance. This latter
Statement--an ambitious one--requires to be supported by data which are
Not to be discovered in thought; and are perhaps (in so far as I
Consider the thinking self merely as such) not to be discovered in the
Thinking self at all
2. That the I or Ego of apperception, and consequently in all thought
Is singular or simple, and cannot be resolved into a plurality of
Subjects, and therefore indicates a logically simple subject--this is
Self-evident from the very conception of an Ego, and is consequently an
an*lytical proposition. But this is not tantamount to declaring that
The thinking Ego is a simple substance--for this would be a synthetical
Proposition. The conception of substance always relates to intuitions
Which with me cannot be other than sensuous, and which consequently lie
Completely out of the sphere of the understanding and its thought:
But to this sphere belongs the affirmation that the Ego is simple
In thought. It would indeed be surprising, if the conception of
"substance," which in other cases requires so much labour to distinguish
From the other elements presented by intuition--so much trouble, too
To discover whether it can be simple (as in the case of the parts of
Matter)--should be presented immediately to me, as if by revelation, in
The poorest mental representation of all
3. The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the manifold
Representations of which I am conscious, is likewise a proposition lying
In the conceptions themselves, and is consequently an*lytical. But
This identity of the subject, of which I am conscious in all its
Representations, does not relate to or concern the intuition of the
Subject, by which it is given as an object. This proposition cannot
Therefore enounce the identity of the person, by which is understood the
Consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being
In all change and variation of circumstances. To prove this, we
Should require not a mere an*lysis of the proposition, but synthetical
Judgements based upon a given intuition
4. I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from
That of other things external to me--among which my body also is
Reckoned. This is also an an*lytical proposition, for other things are
Exactly those which I think as different or distinguished from myself
But whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things
External to me; and whether therefore I can exist merely as a thinking
Being (without being man)--cannot be known or inferred from this
Proposition
Thus we have gained nothing as regards the cognition of myself as
Object, by the an*lysis of the consciousness of my Self in thought. The
Logical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a metaphysical
Determination of the object
Our Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous, if there
Existed a possibility of proving a priori, that all thinking beings
Are in themselves simple substances, as such, therefore, possess
The inseparable attribute of personality, and are conscious of their
Existence apart from and unconnected with matter. For we should thus
Have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have penetrated into
The sphere of noumena; and in this case the right could not be denied
Us of extending our knowledge in this sphere, of establishing ourselves
And, under a favouring star, appropriating to ourselves possessions
In it. For the proposition: "Every thinking being, as such, is simple
Substance," is an a priori synthetical proposition; because in the first
Place it goes beyond the conception which is the subject of it, and adds
To the mere notion of a thinking being the mode of its existence, and in
The second place annexes a predicate (that of simplicity) to the latter
Conception--a predicate which it could not have discovered in the sphere
Of experience. It would follow that a priori synthetical propositions
Are possible and legitimate, not only, as we have maintained, in
Relation to objects of possible experience, and as principles of the
Possibility of this experience itself, but are applicable to things
In themselves--an inference which makes an end of the whole of this
Critique, and obliges us to fall back on the old mode of metaphysical
Procedure. But indeed the danger is not so great, if we look a little
Closer into the question
There lurks in the procedure of rational Psychology a paralogism, which
Is represented in the following syllogism:
That which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject, does not exist
Otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance
A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogitated
Otherwise than as subject
Therefore it exists also as such, that is, as substance
In the major we speak of a being that can be cogitated generally and in
Every relation, consequently as it may be given in intuition. But in the
Minor we speak of the same being only in so far as it regards itself as
Subject, relatively to thought and the unity of consciousness, but
Not in relation to intuition, by which it is presented as an object to
Thought. Thus the conclusion is here arrived at by a Sophisma figurae
Dictionis
That this famous argument is a mere paralogism, will be plain to any one
Who will consider the general remark which precedes our exposition of
The principles of the pure understanding, and the section on noumena
For it was there proved that the conception of a thing, which can
Exist per se--only as a subject and never as a predicate, possesses
No objective reality; that is to say, we can never know whether there
Exists any object to correspond to the conception; consequently, the
Conception is nothing more than a conception, and from it we derive
No proper knowledge. If this conception is to indicate by the term
Substance, an object that can be given, if it is to become a cognition
We must have at the foundation of the cognition a permanent intuition
As the indispensable condition of its objective reality. For through
Intuition alone can an object be given. But in internal intuition
There is nothing permanent, for the Ego is but the consciousness of my
Thought. If then, we appeal merely to thought, we cannot discover
The necessary condition of the application of the conception of
Substance--that is, of a subject existing per se--to the subject as
A thinking being. And thus the conception of the simple nature of
Substance, which is connected with the objective reality of this
Conception, is shown to be also invalid, and to be, in fact, nothing
More than the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in
Thought; whilst we remain perfectly ignorant whether the subject is
Composite or not
Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Substantiality or
Permanence of the Soul
This acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the common
Argument which attempts to prove that the soul--it being granted that it
Is a simple being--cannot perish by dissolution or decomposition; he
Saw it is not impossible for it to cease to be by extinction, or
Disappearance. He endeavoured to prove in his Phaedo, that the soul
Cannot be annihilated, by showing that a simple being cannot cease to
Exist. Inasmuch as, he said, a simple existence cannot diminish, nor
Gradually lose portions of its being, and thus be by degrees reduced
To nothing (for it possesses no parts, and therefore no multiplicity)
Between the moment in which it is, and the moment in which it is not
No time can be discovered--which is impossible. But this philosopher
Did not consider that, granting the soul to possess this simple nature
Which contains no parts external to each other and consequently no
Extensive quantity, we cannot refuse to it any less than to any other
Being, intensive quantity, that is, a degree of reality in regard to
All its faculties, nay, to all that constitutes its existence. But this
Degree of reality can become less and less through an infinite series
Of smaller degrees. It follows, therefore, that this supposed
Substance--this thing, the permanence of which is not a**ured in any
Other way, may, if not by decomposition, by gradual loss (remissio)
Of its powers (consequently by elanguescence, if I may employ this
Expression), be changed into nothing. For consciousness itself has
Always a degree, which may be lessened.* Consequently the faculty of
Being conscious may be diminished; and so with all other faculties. The
Permanence of the soul, therefore, as an object of the internal sense
Remains undemonstrated, nay, even indemonstrable. Its permanence in
Life is evident, per se, inasmuch as the thinking being (as man) is to
Itself, at the same time, an object of the external senses. But this
Does not authorize the rational psychologist to affirm, from mere
Conceptions, its permanence beyond life
If, now, we take the above propositions--as they must be accepted as
Valid for all thinking beings in the system of rational psychology--in
Synthetical connection, and proceed, from the category of relation
With the proposition: "All thinking beings are, as such, substances,"
Backwards through the series, till the circle is completed; we come
At last to their existence, of which, in this system of rational
Psychology, substances are held to be conscious, independently of
External things; nay, it is a**erted that, in relation to the permanence
Which is a necessary characteristic of substance, they can of
Themselves determine external things. It follows that idealism--at least
Problematical idealism, is perfectly unavoidable in this rationalistic
System. And, if the existence of outward things is not held to be
Requisite to the determination of the existence of a substance in time
The existence of these outward things at all, is a gratuitous a**umption
Which remains without the possibility of a proof
But if we proceed an*lytically--the "I think" as a proposition
Containing in itself an existence as given, consequently modality being
The principle--and dissect this proposition, in order to ascertain its
Content, and discover whether and how this Ego determines its existence
In time and space without the aid of anything external; the propositions
Of rationalistic psychology would not begin with the conception of a
Thinking being, but with a reality, and the properties of a thinking
Being in general would be deduced from the mode in which this reality is
Cogitated, after everything empirical had been abstracted; as is shown
In the following table:
1
I think
2
As Subject
3
As simple Subject
4
As identical Subject
In every state of my thought
Now, inasmuch as it is not determined in this second proposition
Whether I can exist and be cogitated only as subject, and not also as a
Predicate of another being, the conception of a subject is here taken in
A merely logical sense; and it remains undetermined, whether substance
Is to be cogitated under the conception or not. But in the third
Proposition, the absolute unity of apperception--the simple Ego in the
Representation to which all connection and separation, which constitute
Thought, relate, is of itself important; even although it presents
Us with no information about the constitution or subsistence of the
Subject. Apperception is something real, and the simplicity of its
Nature is given in the very fact of its possibility. Now in space there
Is nothing real that is at the same time simple; for points, which are
The only simple things in space, are merely limits, but not constituent
Parts of space. From this follows the impossibility of a definition
On the basis of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as a merely
Thinking subject. But, because my existence is considered in the first
Proposition as given, for it does not mean, "Every thinking being
Exists" (for this would be predicating of them absolute necessity)
But only, "I exist thinking"; the proposition is quite empirical, and
Contains the determinability of my existence merely in relation to my
Representations in time. But as I require for this purpose something
That is permanent, such as is not given in internal intuition; the
Mode of my existence, whether as substance or as accident, cannot
Be determined by means of this simple self-consciousness. Thus
If materialism is inadequate to explain the mode in which I exist
Spiritualism is likewise as insufficient; and the conclusion is that we
Are utterly unable to attain to any knowledge of the constitution of
The soul, in so far as relates to the possibility of its existence apart
From external objects
And, indeed, how should it be possible, merely by the aid of the unity
Of consciousness--which we cognize only for the reason that it is
Indispensable to the possibility of experience--to pa** the bounds of
Experience (our existence in this life); and to extend our cognition
To the nature of all thinking beings by means of the empirical--but
In relation to every sort of intuition, perfectly undetermined--proposition
"I think"?
There does not then exist any rational psychology as a doctrine
Furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. It is nothing
More than a discipline, which sets impa**able limits to speculative
Reason in this region of thought, to prevent it, on the one hand, from
Throwing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism, and, on the
Other, from losing itself in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism
It teaches us to consider this refusal of our reason to give any
Satisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this
Our human life, as a hint to abandon fruitless speculation; and to
Direct, to a practical use, our knowledge of ourselves--which, although
Applicable only to objects of experience, receives its principles from a
Higher source, and regulates its procedure as if our destiny reached far
Beyond the boundaries of experience and life
From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in
A mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at the
Basis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition of the subject
As an object; and the category of substance is applied to the intuition
But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought, by which no
Object is given; to which therefore the category of substance--which
Always presupposes a given intuition--cannot be applied. Consequently
The subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the categories cannot
Therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates these, frame any
Conception of itself as an object of the categories; for, to
Cogitate these, it must lay at the foundation its own pure
Self-consciousness--the very thing that it wishes to explain and
Describe. In like manner, the subject, in which the representation of
Time has its basis, cannot determine, for this very reason, its own
Existence in time. Now, if the latter is impossible, the former, as an
Attempt to determine itself by means of the categories as a thinking
Being in general, is no less so
Thus, then, appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a cognition
Which is to extend its rule beyond the limits of experience--a cognition
Which is one of the highest interests of humanity; and thus is proved
The futility of the attempt of speculative philosophy in this region of
Thought. But, in this interest of thought, the severity of criticism has
Rendered to reason a not unimportant service, by the demonstration of
The impossibility of making any dogmatical affirmation concerning an
Object of experience beyond the boundaries of experience. She has thus
Fortified reason against all affirmations of the contrary. Now, this can
Be accomplished in only two ways. Either our proposition must be
Proved apodeictically; or, if this is unsuccessful, the sources of this
Inability must be sought for, and, if these are discovered to exist in
The natural and necessary limitation of our reason, our opponents must
Submit to the same law of renunciation and refrain from advancing claims
To dogmatic a**ertion
But the right, say rather the necessity to admit a future life, upon
Principles of the practical conjoined with the speculative use
Of reason, has lost nothing by this renunciation; for the merely
Speculative proof has never had any influence upon the common reason of
Men. It stands upon the point of a hair, so that even the schools have
Been able to preserve it from falling only by incessantly discussing
It and spinning it like a top; and even in their eyes it has never been
Able to present any safe foundation for the erection of a theory
The proofs which have been current among men, preserve their value
Undiminished; nay, rather gain in clearness and unsophisticated power
By the rejection of the dogmatical a**umptions of speculative reason
For reason is thus confined within her own peculiar province--the
Arrangement of ends or aims, which is at the same time the arrangement
Of nature; and, as a practical faculty, without limiting itself to the
Latter, it is justified in extending the former, and with it our own
Existence, beyond the boundaries of experience and life. If we turn our
Attention to the an*logy of the nature of living beings in this world
In the consideration of which reason is obliged to accept as a principle
That no organ, no faculty, no appetite is useless, and that nothing is
Superfluous, nothing disproportionate to its use, nothing unsuited to
Its end; but that, on the contrary, everything is perfectly conformed to
Its destination in life--we shall find that man, who alone is the final
End and aim of this order, is still the only animal that seems to be
Excepted from it. For his natural gifts--not merely as regards the
Talents and motives that may incite him to employ them, but especially
The moral law in him--stretch so far beyond all mere earthly utility and
Advantage, that he feels himself bound to prize the mere consciousness
Of probity, apart from all advantageous consequences--even the shadowy
Gift of posthumous fame--above everything; and he is conscious of an
Inward call to constitute himself, by his conduct in this world--without
Regard to mere sublunary interests--the citizen of a better. This
Mighty, irresistible proof--accompanied by an ever-increasing knowledge
Of the conformability to a purpose in everything we see around us
By the conviction of the boundless immensity of creation, by the
Consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the possible extension
Of our knowledge, and by a desire commensurate therewith--remains to
Humanity, even after the theoretical cognition of ourselves has failed
To establish the necessity of an existence after d**h