TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. SECOND DIVISION
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION
I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance
We termed dialectic in general a logic of appearance. This does not
Signify a doctrine of probability; for probability is truth, only
Cognized upon insufficient grounds, and though the information it gives
Us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. Hence it must not be
Separated from the an*lytical part of logic. Still less must phenomenon
And appearance be held to be identical. For truth or illusory appearance
Does not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the
Judgement upon the object, in so far as it is thought. It is, therefore
Quite correct to say that the senses do not err, not because they always
Judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all. Hence truth and
Error, consequently also, illusory appearance as the cause of error, are
Only to be found in a judgement, that is, in the relation of an object
To our understanding. In a cognition which completely harmonizes with
The laws of the understanding, no error can exist. In a representation
Of the senses--as not containing any judgement--there is also no error
But no power of nature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence
Neither the understanding per se (without the influence of another
Cause), nor the senses per se, would fall into error; the former could
Not, because, if it acts only according to its own laws, the effect (the
Judgement) must necessarily accord with these laws. But in accordance
With the laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all
Truth. In the senses there is no judgement--neither a true nor a false
One. But, as we have no source of cognition besides these two, it
Follows that error is caused solely by the unobserved influence of
The sensibility upon the understanding. And thus it happens that the
Subjective grounds of a judgement and are confounded with the objective
And cause them to deviate from their proper determination,* just as a
Body in motion would always of itself proceed in a straight line, but
If another impetus gives to it a different direction, it will then
Start off into a curvilinear line of motion. To distinguish the peculiar
Action of the understanding from the power which mingles with it, it is
Necessary to consider an erroneous judgement as the diagonal between two
Forces, that determine the judgement in two different directions, which
As it were, form an angle, and to resolve this composite operation into
The simple ones of the understanding and the sensibility. In pure
A priori judgements this must be done by means of transcendental
Reflection, whereby, as has been already shown, each representation
Has its place appointed in the corresponding faculty of cognition, and
Consequently the influence of the one faculty upon the other is made
Apparent
It is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory
Appearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the
Empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding
And in which the judgement is misled by the influence of imagination
Our purpose is to speak of transcendental illusory appearance, which
Influences principles--that are not even applied to experience, for in
This case we should possess a sure test of their correctness--but which
Leads us, in disregard of all the warnings of criticism, completely
Beyond the empirical employment of the categories and deludes us with
The chimera of an extension of the sphere of the pure understanding
We shall term those principles the application of which is confined
Entirely within the limits of possible experience, immanent; those
On the other hand, which transgress these limits, we shall call
Transcendent principles. But by these latter I do not understand
Principles of the transcendental use or misuse of the categories, which
Is in reality a mere fault of the judgement when not under due restraint
From criticism, and therefore not paying sufficient attention to the
Limits of the sphere in which the pure understanding is allowed to
Exercise its functions; but real principles which exhort us to break
Down all those barriers, and to lay claim to a perfectly new field of
Cognition, which recognizes no line of demarcation. Thus transcendental
And transcendent are not identical terms. The principles of the
Pure understanding, which we have already propounded, ought to be
Of empirical and not of transcendental use, that is, they are not
Applicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience. A principle
Which removes these limits, nay, which authorizes us to overstep them
Is called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in exposing the
Illusion in these pretended principles, those which are limited in their
Employment to the sphere of experience may be called, in opposition to
The others, immanent principles of the pure understanding
Logical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form of
Reason (the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely from
A want of due attention to logical rules. So soon as the attention
Is awakened to the case before us, this illusion totally disappears
Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease to exist, even
After it has been exposed, and its nothingness clearly perceived by
Means of transcendental criticism. Take, for example, the illusion in
The proposition: "The world must have a beginning in time." The cause of
This is as follows. In our reason, subjectively considered as a faculty
Of human cognition, there exist fundamental rules and maxims of its
Exercise, which have completely the appearance of objective principles
Now from this cause it happens that the subjective necessity of a
Certain connection of our conceptions, is regarded as an objective
Necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This illusion it
Is impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea
Appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the shore, because we
See the former by means of higher rays than the latter, or, which is a
Still stronger case, as even the astronomer cannot prevent himself from
Seeing the moon larger at its rising than some time afterwards, although
He is not deceived by this illusion
Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing
The illusory appearance in transcendental judgements, and guarding us
Against it; but to make it, as in the case of logical illusion, entirely
Disappear and cease to be illusion is utterly beyond its power. For we
Have here to do with a natural and unavoidable illusion, which rests
Upon subjective principles and imposes these upon us as objective, while
Logical dialectic, in the detection of sophisms, has to do merely with
An error in the logical consequence of the propositions, or with an
Artificially constructed illusion, in imitation of the natural error
There is, therefore, a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure
Reason--not that in which the bungler, from want of the requisite
Knowledge, involves himself, nor that which the sophist devises for the
Purpose of misleading, but that which is an inseparable adjunct of human
Reason, and which, even after its illusions have been exposed, does not
Cease to deceive, and continually to lead reason into momentary errors
Which it becomes necessary continually to remove
II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appearance
A. OF REASON IN GENERAL
All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding
And ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in
The human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it
To the highest unity of thought. At this stage of our inquiry it is my
Duty to give an explanation of this, the highest faculty of cognition
And I confess I find myself here in some difficulty. Of reason, as of
The understanding, there is a merely formal, that is, logical use, in
Which it makes abstraction of all content of cognition; but there is
Also a real use, inasmuch as it contains in itself the source of certain
Conceptions and principles, which it does not borrow either from the
Senses or the understanding. The former faculty has been long defined by
Logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to
Immediate conclusions (consequentiae immediatae); but the nature of the
Latter, which itself generates conceptions, is not to be understood
From this definition. Now as a division of reason into a logical and
A transcendental faculty presents itself here, it becomes necessary to
Seek for a higher conception of this source of cognition which shall
Comprehend both conceptions. In this we may expect, according to the
an*logy of the conceptions of the understanding, that the logical
Conception will give us the key to the transcendental, and that the
Table of the functions of the former will present us with the clue to
The conceptions of reason
In the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the
Understanding to be the faculty of rules; reason may be distinguished
From understanding as the faculty of principles
The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a
Cognition that may be employed as a principle, although it is not in
Itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction
Every general proposition, even if derived from experience by the
Process of induction, may serve as the major in a syllogism; but it is
Not for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example, there
Can be only one straight line between two points) are general a priori
Cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles, relatively
To the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot for
This reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line from
Principles--I cognize it only in pure intuition
Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in which I cognize
The particular in the general by means of conceptions. Thus every
Syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a principle
For the major always gives a conception, through which everything that
Is subsumed under the condition thereof is cognized according to a
Principle. Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a
Syllogism, and the understanding presents us with such general a
Priori propositions, they may be termed principles, in respect of their
Possible use
But if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in
Relation to their origin, we shall find them to be anything rather
Than cognitions from conceptions. For they would not even be possible
A priori, if we could not rely on the a**istance of pure intuition (in
Mathematics), or on that of the conditions of a possible experience
That everything that happens has a cause, cannot be concluded from the
General conception of that which happens; on the contrary the principle
Of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from that which
Happens a determinate empirical conception
Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot supply
And they alone are entitled to be called principles. At the same time
All general propositions may be termed comparative principles
It has been a long-cherished wish--that (who knows how late), may one
Day, be happily accomplished--that the principles of the endless variety
Of civil laws should be investigated and exposed; for in this way alone
Can we find the secret of simplifying legislation. But in this case
Laws are nothing more than limitations of our freedom upon conditions
Under which it subsists in perfect harmony with itself; they
Consequently have for their object that which is completely our own
Work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of these
Conceptions. But how objects as things in themselves--how the nature of
Things is subordinated to principles and is to be determined, according
To conceptions, is a question which it seems well nigh impossible to
Answer. Be this, however, as it may--for on this point our investigation
Is yet to be made--it is at least manifest from what we have said that
Cognition from principles is something very different from cognition by
Means of the understanding, which may indeed precede other cognitions
In the form of a principle, but in itself--in so far as it is
Synthetical--is neither based upon mere thought, nor contains a general
Proposition drawn from conceptions alone
The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of
Phenomena by virtue of rules; the reason is a faculty for the production
Of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles. Reason
Therefore, never applies directly to experience, or to any sensuous
Object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the
Manifold cognition of which it gives a unity a priori by means of
Conceptions--a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is
Of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the
Understanding
The above is the general conception of the faculty of reason, in so
Far as it has been possible to make it comprehensible in the absence of
Examples. These will be given in the sequel
B. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON
A distinction is commonly made between that which is immediately
Cognized and that which is inferred or concluded. That in a figure
Which is bounded by three straight lines there are three angles, is an
Immediate cognition; but that these angles are together equal to two
Right angles, is an inference or conclusion. Now, as we are constantly
Employing this mode of thought and have thus become quite accustomed to
It, we no longer remark the above distinction, and, as in the case of
The so-called deceptions of sense, consider as immediately perceived
What has really been inferred. In every reasoning or syllogism, there
Is a fundamental proposition, afterwards a second drawn from it, and
Finally the conclusion, which connects the truth in the first with the
Truth in the second--and that infallibly. If the judgement concluded
Is so contained in the first proposition that it can be deduced from
It without the meditation of a third notion, the conclusion is called
Immediate (consequentia immediata); I prefer the term conclusion of
The understanding. But if, in addition to the fundamental cognition, a
Second judgement is necessary for the production of the conclusion, it
Is called a conclusion of the reason. In the proposition: All men are
Mortal, are contained the propositions: Some men are mortal, Nothing
That is not mortal is a man, and these are therefore immediate
Conclusions from the first. On the other hand, the proposition: all the
Learned are mortal, is not contained in the main proposition (for the
Conception of a learned man does not occur in it), and it can be deduced
From the main proposition only by means of a mediating judgement
In every syllogism I first cogitate a rule (the major) by means of
The understanding. In the next place I subsume a cognition under the
Condition of the rule (and this is the minor) by means of the judgement
And finally I determine my cognition by means of the predicate of the
Rule (this is the conclusio), consequently, I determine it a priori
By means of the reason. The relations, therefore, which the major
Proposition, as the rule, represents between a cognition and its
Condition, constitute the different kinds of syllogisms. These are just
Threefold--an*logously with all judgements, in so far as they differ
In the mode of expressing the relation of a cognition in the
Understanding--namely, categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive
When as often happens, the conclusion is a judgement which may follow
From other given judgements, through which a perfectly different object
Is cogitated, I endeavour to discover in the understanding whether the
Assertion in this conclusion does not stand under certain conditions
According to a general rule. If I find such a condition, and if the
Object mentioned in the conclusion can be subsumed under the given
Condition, then this conclusion follows from a rule which is also valid
For other objects of cognition. From this we see that reason endeavours
To subject the great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to
The smallest possible number of principles (general conditions), and
Thus to produce in it the highest unity
C. OF THE PURE USE OF REASON
Can we isolate reason, and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar source
Of conceptions and judgements which spring from it alone, and through
Which it can be applied to objects; or is it merely a subordinate
Faculty, whose duty it is to give a certain form to given cognitions--a
Form which is called logical, and through which the cognitions of the
Understanding are subordinated to each other, and lower rules to higher
(those, to wit, whose condition comprises in its sphere the condition
Of the others), in so far as this can be done by comparison? This is the
Question which we have at present to answer. Manifold variety of rules
And unity of principles is a requirement of reason, for the purpose of
Bringing the understanding into complete accordance with itself, just as
Understanding subjects the manifold content of intuition to conceptions
And thereby introduces connection into it. But this principle prescribes
No law to objects, and does not contain any ground of the possibility of
Cognizing or of determining them as such, but is merely a subjective
Law for the proper arrangement of the content of the understanding
The purpose of this law is, by a comparison of the conceptions of the
Understanding, to reduce them to the smallest possible number, although
At the same time, it does not justify us in demanding from objects
Themselves such a uniformity as might contribute to the convenience and
The enlargement of the sphere of the understanding, or in expecting that
It will itself thus receive from them objective validity. In one word
The question is: "does reason in itself, that is, does pure reason
Contain a priori synthetical principles and rules, and what are those
Principles?"
The formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives
Us sufficient information in regard to the ground on which the
Transcendental principle of reason in its pure synthetical cognition
Will rest
1. Reason, as observed in the syllogistic process, is not applicable to
Intuitions, for the purpose of subjecting them to rules--for this is the
Province of the understanding with its categories--but to conceptions
And judgements. If pure reason does apply to objects and the intuition
Of them, it does so not immediately, but mediately--through the
Understanding and its judgements, which have a direct relation to
The senses and their intuition, for the purpose of determining their
Objects. The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible
Experience, but is essentially different from this unity, which is that
Of the understanding. That everything which happens has a cause, is not
A principle cognized and prescribed by reason. This principle makes the
Unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason, which
Without a reference to possible experience, could never have produced by
Means of mere conceptions any such synthetical unity
2. Reason, in its logical use, endeavours to discover the general
Condition of its judgement (the conclusion), and a syllogism is itself
Nothing but a judgement by means of the subsumption of its condition
Under a general rule (the major). Now as this rule may itself be
Subjected to the same process of reason, and thus the condition of the
Condition be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) as long as the process
Can be continued, it is very manifest that the peculiar principle of
Reason in its logical use is to find for the conditioned cognition of
The understanding the unconditioned whereby the unity of the former is
Completed
But this logical maxim cannot be a principle of pure reason, unless we
Admit that, if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions
Subordinated to one another--a series which is consequently itself
Unconditioned--is also given, that is, contained in the object and its
Connection
But this principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical; for
an*lytically, the conditioned certainly relates to some condition, but
Not to the unconditioned. From this principle also there must originate
Different synthetical propositions, of which the pure understanding is
Perfectly ignorant, for it has to do only with objects of a possible
Experience, the cognition and synthesis of which is always conditioned
The unconditioned, if it does really exist, must be especially
Considered in regard to the determinations which distinguish it from
Whatever is conditioned, and will thus afford us material for many a
Priori synthetical propositions
The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason
Will, however, be transcendent in relation to phenomena, that is to
Say, it will be impossible to make any adequate empirical use of this
Principle. It is therefore completely different from all principles of
The understanding, the use made of which is entirely immanent, their
Object and purpose being merely the possibility of experience. Now our
Duty in the transcendental dialectic is as follows. To discover whether
The principle that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of
Phenomena, or of thought in general) extends to the unconditioned is
Objectively true, or not; what consequences result therefrom affecting
The empirical use of the understanding, or rather whether there exists
Any such objectively valid proposition of reason, and whether it is not
On the contrary, a merely logical precept which directs us to ascend
Perpetually to still higher conditions, to approach completeness in the
Series of them, and thus to introduce into our cognition the highest
Possible unity of reason. We must ascertain, I say, whether this
Requirement of reason has not been regarded, by a misunderstanding, as
A transcendental principle of pure reason, which postulates a thorough
Completeness in the series of conditions in objects themselves. We
Must show, moreover, the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into
Syllogisms, the major proposition of which pure reason has supplied--a
Proposition which has perhaps more of the character of a petitio than
Of a postulatum--and that proceed from experience upwards to its
Conditions. The solution of these problems is our task in transcendental
Dialectic, which we are about to expose even at its source, that lies
Deep in human reason. We shall divide it into two parts, the first of
Which will treat of the transcendent conceptions of pure reason, the
Second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms