[Sidenote: I 1155_a_] Next would seem properly to follow a dissertation
On Friendship: because, in the first place, it is either itself a virtue
Or connected with virtue; and next it is a thing most necessary for
Life, since no one would choose to live without friends though he should
Have all the other good things in the world: and, in fact, men who are
Rich or possessed of authority and influence are thought to have special
Need of friends: for where is the use of such prosperity if there be
Taken away the doing of kindnesses of which friends are the most usual
And most commendable objects? Or how can it be kept or preserved without
Friends? because the greater it is so much the more slippery and
Hazardous: in poverty moreover and all other adversities men think
Friends to be their only refuge
Furthermore, Friendship helps the young to keep from error: the old, in
Respect of attention and such deficiencies in action as their weakness
Makes them liable to; and those who are in their prime, in respect of
Noble deeds ("They _two_ together going," Homer says, you may remember)
Because they are thus more able to devise plans and carry them out
Again, it seems to be implanted in us by Nature: as, for instance, in
The parent towards the offspring and the offspring towards the parent
(not merely in the human species, but likewise in birds and most
Animals), and in those of the same tribe towards one another, and
Specially in men of the same nation; for which reason we commend those
Men who love their fellows: and one may see in the course of travel how
Close of kin and how friendly man is to man
Furthermore, Friendship seems to be the bond of Social Communities, and
Legislators seem to be more anxious to secure it than Justice even. I
Mean, Unanimity is somewhat like to Friendship, and this they certainly
Aim at and specially drive out faction as being inimical
Again, where people are in Friendship Justice is not required; but, on
The other hand, though they are just they need Friendship in addition
And that principle which is most truly just is thought to partake of the
Nature of Friendship
Lastly, not only is it a thing necessary but honourable likewise: since
We praise those who are fond of friends, and the having numerous friends
Is thought a matter of credit to a man; some go so far as to hold, that
"good man" and "friend" are terms synonymous
Yet the disputed points respecting it are not few: some men lay down
That it is a kind of resemblance, and that men who are like one another
Are friends: whence come the common sayings, "Like will to like," "Birds
Of a feather," and so on. Others, on the contrary, say, that all such
Come under the maxim, "Two of a trade never agree."
[Sidenote: 1155b] Again, some men push their inquiries on these points
Higher and reason physically: as Euripides, who says
"The earth by drought consumed doth love the rain
And the great heaven, overcharged with rain
Doth love to fall in showers upon the earth."
Heraclitus, again, maintains, that "contrariety is expedient, and that
The best agreement arises from things differing, and that all things
Come into being in the way of the principle of antagonism."
Empedocles, among others, in direct opposition to these, affirms, that
"like aims at like."
These physical questions we will take leave to omit, inasmuch as they
Are foreign to the present inquiry; and we will examine such as are
Proper to man and concern moral characters and feelings: as, for
Instance, "Does Friendship arise among all without distinction, or is it
Impossible for bad men to be friends?" and, "Is there but one species of
Friendship, or several?" for they who ground the opinion that there is
But one on the fact that Friendship admits of degrees hold that upon
Insufficient proof; because things which are different in species admit
Likewise of degrees (on this point we have spoken before)
II
Our view will soon be cleared on these points when we have ascertained
What is properly the object-matter of Friendship: for it is thought that
Not everything indiscriminately, but some peculiar matter alone, is the
Object of this affection; that is to say, what is good, or pleasurable
Or useful. Now it would seem that that is useful through which accrues
Any good or pleasure, and so the objects of Friendship, as absolute
Ends, are the good and the pleasurable
A question here arises; whether it is good absolutely or that which is
Good to the individuals, for which men feel Friendship (these two being
Sometimes distinct): and similarly in respect of the pleasurable. It
Seems then that each individual feels it towards that which is good to
Himself, and that abstractedly it is the real good which is the object
Of Friendship, and to each individual that which is good to each. It
Comes then to this; that each individual feels Friendship not for what
_is_ but for that which _conveys to his mind the impression of being_
Good to himself. But this will make no real difference, because that
Which is truly the object of Friendship will also convey this impression
To the mind
There are then three causes from which men feel Friendship: but the term
Is not applied to the case of fondness for things inanimate because
There is no requital of the affection nor desire for the good of those
Objects: it certainly savours of the ridiculous to say that a man fond
Of wine wishes well to it: the only sense in which it is true being that
He wishes it to be kept safe and sound for his own use and benefit. But
To the friend they say one should wish all good for his sake. And when
Men do thus wish good to another (he not *[Sidenote: 1156a]
Reciprocating the feeling), people call them Kindly; because Friendship
They describe as being "Kindliness between persons who reciprocate it."
But must they not add that the feeling must be mutually known? for many
Men are kindly disposed towards those whom they have never seen but whom
They conceive to be amiable or useful: and this notion amounts to the
Same thing as a real feeling between them
Well, these are plainly Kindly-disposed towards one another: but how can
One call them friends while their mutual feelings are unknown to one
Another? to complete the idea of Friendship, then, it is requisite that
They have kindly feelings towards one another, and wish one another good
From one of the aforementioned causes, and that these kindly feelings
Should be mutually known
III
As the motives to Friendship differ in kind so do the respective
Feelings and Friendships. The species then of Friendship are three, in
Number equal to the objects of it, since in the line of each there may
Be "mutual affection mutually known."
Now they who have Friendship for one another desire one another's good
According to the motive of their Friendship; accordingly they whose
Motive is utility have no Friendship for one another really, but only in
So far as some good arises to them from one another
And they whose motive is pleasure are in like case: I mean, they have
Friendship for men of easy pleasantry, not because they are of a given
Character but because they are pleasant to themselves. So then they
Whose motive to Friendship is utility love their friends for what is
Good to themselves; they whose motive is pleasure do so for what is
Pleasurable to themselves; that is to say, not in so far as the friend
Beloved _is_ but in so far as he is useful or pleasurable. These
Friendships then are a matter of result: since the object is not beloved
In that he is the man he is but in that he furnishes advantage or
Pleasure as the case may be. Such Friendships are of course very liable
To dissolution if the parties do not continue alike: I mean, that the
Others cease to have any Friendship for them when they are no longer
Pleasurable or useful. Now it is the nature of utility not to be
Permanent but constantly varying: so, of course, when the motive which
Made them friends is vanished, the Friendship likewise dissolves; since
It existed only relatively to those circumstances
Friendship of this kind is thought to exist principally among the old
(because men at that time of life pursue not what is pleasurable but
What is profitable); and in such, of men in their prime and of the
Young, as are given to the pursuit of profit. They that are such have no
Intimate intercourse with one another; for sometimes they are not
Even pleasurable to one another; nor, in fact, do they desire such
Intercourse unless their friends are profitable to them, because they
Are pleasurable only in so far as they have hopes of advantage. With
These Friendships is commonly ranked that of hospitality
But the Friendship of the young is thought to be based on the motive
Of pleasure: because they live at the beck and call of pa**ion and
Generally pursue what is pleasurable to themselves and the object of the
Present moment: and as their age changes so likewise do their pleasures
This is the reason why they form and dissolve Friendships rapidly: since
The Friendship changes with the pleasurable object and such pleasure
Changes quickly
[Sidenote: 1156b] The young are also much given up to Love; this pa**ion
Being, in great measure, a matter of impulse and based on pleasure: for
Which cause they conceive Friendships and quickly drop them, changing
Often in the same day: but these wish for society and intimate
Intercourse with their friends, since they thus attain the object of
Their Friendship
That then is perfect Friendship which subsists between those who are
Good and whose similarity consists in their goodness: for these men wish
One another's good in similar ways; in so far as they are good (and good
They are in themselves); and those are specially friends who wish good
To their friends for their sakes, because they feel thus towards them on
Their own account and not as a mere matter of result; so the Friendship
Between these men continues to subsist so long as they are good; and
Goodness, we know, has in it a principle of permanence
Moreover, each party is good abstractedly and also relatively to his
Friend, for all good men are not only abstractedly good but also useful
To one another. Such friends are also mutually pleasurable because
All good men are so abstractedly, and also relatively to one another
Inasmuch as to each individual those actions are pleasurable which
Correspond to his nature, and all such as are like them. Now when men
Are good these will be always the same, or at least similar
Friendship then under these circumstances is permanent, as we should
Reasonably expect, since it combines in itself all the requisite
Qualifications of friends. I mean, that Friendship of whatever kind is
Based upon good or pleasure (either abstractedly or relatively to the
Person entertaining the sentiment of Friendship), and results from a
Similarity of some sort; and to this kind belong all the aforementioned
Requisites in the parties themselves, because in this the parties are
Similar, and so on: moreover, in it there is the abstractedly good and
The abstractedly pleasant, and as these are specially the object-matter
Of Friendship so the feeling and the state of Friendship is found most
Intense and most excellent in men thus qualified
Rare it is probable Friendships of this kind will be, because men
Of this kind are rare. Besides, all requisite qualifications being
Presupposed, there is further required time and intimacy: for, as the
Proverb says, men cannot know one another "till they have eaten the
Requisite quantity of salt together;" nor can they in fact admit one
Another to intimacy, much less be friends, till each has appeared to
The other and been proved to be a fit object of Friendship. They who
Speedily commence an interchange of friendly actions may be said to wish
To be friends, but they are not so unless they are also proper objects
Of Friendship and mutually known to be such: that is to say, a desire
For Friendship may arise quickly but not Friendship itself
IV
Well, this Friendship is perfect both in respect of the time and in all
Other points; and exactly the same and similar results accrue to each
Party from the other; which ought to be the case between friends
[Sidenote: II57a] The friendship based upon the pleasurable is, so to
Say, a copy of this, since the good are sources of pleasure to one
Another: and that based on utility likewise, the good being also
Useful to one another. Between men thus connected Friendships are
Most permanent when the same result accrues to both from one another
Pleasure, for instance; and not merely so but from the same source, as
In the case of two men of easy pleasantry; and not as it is in that of a
Lover and the object of his affection, these not deriving their pleasure
From the same causes, but the former from seeing the latter and the
Latter from receiving the attentions of the former: and when the bloom
Of youth fades the Friendship sometimes ceases also, because then the
Lover derives no pleasure from seeing and the object of his affection
Ceases to receive the attentions which were paid before: in many cases
However, people so connected continue friends, if being of similar
Tempers they have come from custom to like one another's disposition
Where people do not interchange pleasure but profit in matters of Love
The Friendship is both less intense in degree and also less permanent:
In fact, they who are friends because of advantage commonly part when
The advantage ceases; for, in reality, they never were friends of one
Another but of the advantage
So then it appears that from motives of pleasure or profit bad men may
Be friends to one another, or good men to bad men or men of neutral
Character to one of any character whatever: but disinterestedly, for the
Sake of one another, plainly the good alone can be friends; because
Bad men have no pleasure even in themselves unless in so far as some
Advantage arises
And further, the Friendship of the good is alone superior to calumny;
It not being easy for men to believe a third person respecting one
Whom they have long tried and proved: there is between good men mutual
Confidence, and the feeling that one's friend would never have done one
Wrong, and all other such things as are expected in Friendship really
Worthy the name; but in the other kinds there is nothing to prevent all
Such suspicions
I call them Friendships, because since men commonly give the name of
Friends to those who are connected from motives of profit (which is
Justified by political language, for alliances between states are
Thought to be contracted with a view to advantage), and to those who are
Attached to one another by the motive of pleasure (as children are), we
May perhaps also be allowed to call such persons friends, and say there
Are several species of Friendship; primarily and specially that of
The good, in that they are good, and the rest only in the way of
Resemblance: I mean, people connected otherwise are friends in that way
In which there arises to them somewhat good and some mutual resemblance
(because, we must remember the pleasurable is good to those who are fond
Of it)
These secondary Friendships, however, do not combine very well; that is
To say, the same persons do not become friends by reason of advantage
And by reason of the pleasurable, for these matters of result are not
Often combined. And Friendship having been divided into these kinds, bad
[Sidenote: _1157b_] men will be friends by reason of pleasure or profit
This being their point of resemblance; while the good are friends for
One another's sake, that is, in so far as they are good
These last may be termed abstractedly and simply friends, the former as
A matter of result and termed friends from their resemblance to these
Last
V
Further; just as in respect of the different virtues some men are termed
Good in respect of a certain inward state, others in respect of acts
Of working, so is it in respect of Friendship: I mean, they who live
Together take pleasure in, and impart good to, one another: but they who
Are asleep or are locally separated do not perform acts, but only are in
Such a state as to act in a friendly way if they acted at all: distance
Has in itself no direct effect upon Friendship, but only prevents the
Acting it out: yet, if the absence be protracted, it is thought to cause
A forgetfulness even of the Friendship: and hence it has been said
"many and many a Friendship doth want of intercourse destroy."
Accordingly, neither the old nor the morose appear to be calculated for
Friendship, because the pleasurableness in them is small, and no one can
Spend his days in company with that which is positively painful or even
Not pleasurable; since to avoid the painful and aim at the pleasurable
Is one of the most obvious tendencies of human nature. They who get on
With one another very fairly, but are not in habits of intimacy, are
Rather like people having kindly feelings towards one another than
Friends; nothing being so characteristic of friends as the living with
One another, because the necessitous desire a**istance, and the happy
Companionship, they being the last persons in the world for solitary
Existence: but people cannot spend their time together unless they are
Mutually pleasurable and take pleasure in the same objects, a quality
Which is thought to appertain to the Friendship of companionship
The connection then subsisting between the good is Friendship _par
Excellence_, as has already been frequently said: since that which is
Abstractedly good or pleasant is thought to be an object of Friendship
And choiceworthy, and to each individual whatever is such to him;
And the good man to the good man for both these reasons. (Now the
Entertaining the sentiment is like a feeling, but Friendship itself
Like a state: because the former may have for its object even things
Inanimate, but requital of Friendship is attended with moral choice
Which proceeds from a moral state: and again, men wish good to the
Objects of their Friendship for their sakes, not in the way of a mere
Feeling but of moral state.)
And the good, in loving their friend, love their own good (inasmuch as
The good man, when brought into that relation, becomes a good to him
With whom he is so connected), so that either party loves his own
Good, and repays his friend equally both in wishing well and in the
Pleasurable: for equality is said to be a tie of Friendship. Well, these
Points belong most to the Friendship between good men
But between morose or elderly men Friendship is less apt to arise
Because they are somewhat awkward-tempered, and take less pleasure in
Intercourse and society; these being thought to be specially friendly
And productive of Friendship: and so young men become friends quickly
Old men not so (because people do not become friends with any, unless
They take pleasure in them); and in like manner neither do the morose
Yet men of these cla**es entertain kindly feelings towards one another:
They wish good to one another and render mutual a**istance in respect of
Their needs, but they are not quite friends, because they neither
Spend their time together nor take pleasure in one another, which
Circumstances are thought specially to belong to Friendship
To be a friend to many people, in the way of the perfect Friendship, is
Not possible; just as you cannot be in love with many at once: it is
So to speak, a state of excess which naturally has but one object; and
Besides, it is not an easy thing for one man to be very much pleased
With many people at the same time, nor perhaps to find many really good
Again, a man needs experience, and to be in habits of close intimacy
Which is very difficult
But it _is_ possible to please many on the score of advantage and
Pleasure: because there are many men of the kind, and the services may
Be rendered in a very short time
Of the two imperfect kinds that which most resembles the perfect is the
Friendship based upon pleasure, in which the same results accrue from
Both and they take pleasure in one another or in the same objects; such
As are the Friendships of the young, because a generous spirit is most
Found in these. The Friendship because of advantage is the connecting
Link of shopkeepers
Then again, the very happy have no need of persons who are profitable
But of pleasant ones they have because they wish to have people to live
Intimately with; and what is painful they bear for a short time indeed
But continuously no one could support it, nay, not even the Chief Good
Itself, if it were painful to him individually: and so they look out for
Pleasant friends: perhaps they ought to require such to be good also;
And good moreover to themselves individually, because then they will
Have all the proper requisites of Friendship
Men in power are often seen to make use of several distinct friends:
For some are useful to them and others pleasurable, but the two are not
Often united: because they do not, in fact, seek such as shall combine
Pleasantness and goodness, nor such as shall be useful for honourable
Purposes: but with a view to attain what is pleasant they look out for
Men of easy-pleasantry; and again, for men who are clever at executing
Any business put into their hands: and these qualifications are not
Commonly found united in the same man
It has been already stated that the good man unites the qualities of
Pleasantness and usefulness: but then such a one will not be a friend to
A superior unless he be also his superior in goodness: for if this be
Not the case, he cannot, being surpa**ed in one point, make things
Equal by a proportionate degree of Friendship. And characters who unite
Superiority of station and goodness are not common. Now all the kinds
Of Friendship which have been already mentioned exist in a state of
Equality, inasmuch as either the same results accrue to both and they
Wish the same things to one another, or else they barter one thing
Against another; pleasure, for instance, against profit: it has been
Said already that Friendships of this latter kind are less intense in
Degree and less permanent
And it is their resemblance or dissimilarity to the same thing which
Makes them to be thought to be and not to be Friendships: they show like
Friendships in right of their likeness to that which is based on virtue
(the one kind having the pleasurable, the other the profitable, both
Of which belong also to the other); and again, they do not show like
Friendships by reason of their unlikeness to that true kind; which
Unlikeness consists herein, that while that is above calumny and so
Permanent these quickly change and differ in many other points
VII
But there is another form of Friendship, that, namely, in which the one
Party is superior to the other; as between father and son, elder and
Younger, husband and wife, ruler and ruled. These also differ one from
Another: I mean, the Friendship between parents and children is not the
Same as between ruler and the ruled, nor has the father the same towards
The son as the son towards the father, nor the husband towards the wife
As she towards him; because the work, and therefore the excellence, of
Each of these is different, and different therefore are the causes of
Their feeling Friendship; distinct and different therefore are their
Feelings and states of Friendship
And the same results do not accrue to each from the other, nor in fact
Ought they to be looked for: but, when children render to their parents
What they ought to the authors of their being, and parents to their sons
What they ought to their offspring, the Friendship between such parties
Will be permanent and equitable
Further; the feeling of Friendship should be in a due proportion in all
Friendships which are between superior and inferior; I mean, the better
Man, or the more profitable, and so forth, should be the object of a
Stronger feeling than he himself entertains, because when the feeling of
Friendship comes to be after a certain rate then equality in a certain
Sense is produced, which is thought to be a requisite in Friendship
(It must be remembered, however, that the equal is not in the same case
As regards Justice and Friendship: for in strict Justice the exactly
Proportioned equal ranks first, and the actual numerically equal ranks
Second, while in Friendship this is exactly reversed.)
[Sidenote: 1159a] And that equality is thus requisite is plainly shown
By the occurrence of a great difference of goodness or badness, or
Prosperity, or something else: for in this case, people are not any
Longer friends, nay they do not even feel that they ought to be. The
Clearest illustration is perhaps the case of the gods, because they are
Most superior in all good things. It is obvious too, in the case of
Kings, for they who are greatly their inferiors do not feel entitled to
Be friends to them; nor do people very insignificant to be friends to
Those of very high excellence or wisdom. Of course, in such cases it
Is out of the question to attempt to define up to what point they may
Continue friends: for you may remove many points of agreement and the
Friendship last nevertheless; but when one of the parties is very far
Separated (as a god from men), it cannot continue any longer
This has given room for a doubt, whether friends do really wish to their
Friends the very highest goods, as that they may be gods: because, in
Case the wish were accomplished, they would no longer have them for
Friends, nor in fact would they have the good things they had, because
Friends are good things. If then it has been rightly said that a friend
Wishes to his friend good things for that friend's sake, it must be
Understood that he is to remain such as he now is: that is to say, he
Will wish the greatest good to him of which as man he is capable: yet
Perhaps not all, because each man desires good for himself most of all
VIII
It is thought that desire for honour makes the ma** of men wish rather
To be the objects of the feeling of Friendship than to entertain it
Themselves (and for this reason they are fond of flatterers, a flatterer
Being a friend inferior or at least pretending to be such and rather to
Entertain towards another the feeling of Friendship than to be himself
The object of it), since the former is thought to be nearly the same as
Being honoured, which the ma** of men desire. And yet men seem to choose
Honour, not for its own sake, but incidentally: I mean, the common run
Of men delight to be honoured by those in power because of the hope it
Raises; that is they think they shall get from them anything they may
Happen to be in want of, so they delight in honour as an earnest of
Future benefit. They again who grasp at honour at the hands of the good
And those who are really acquainted with their merits desire to confirm
Their own opinion about themselves: so they take pleasure in the
Conviction that they are good, which is based on the sentence of those
Who a**ert it. But in being the objects of Friendship men delight for
Its own sake, and so this may be judged to be higher than being honoured
And Friendship to be in itself choiceworthy. Friendship, moreover, is
Thought to consist in feeling, rather than being the object of, the
Sentiment of Friendship, which is proved by the delight mothers have in
The feeling: some there are who give their children to be adopted and
Brought up by others, and knowing them bear this feeling towards them
Never seeking to have it returned, if both are not possible; but seeming
To be content with seeing them well off and bearing this feeling
Themselves towards them, even though they, by reason of ignorance, never
Render to them any filial regard or love
Since then Friendship stands rather in the entertaining, than in being
The object of, the sentiment, and they are praised who are fond of their
Friends, it seems that entertaining--*[Sidenote: II59b]the sentiment is
The Excellence of friends; and so, in whomsoever this exists in due
Proportion these are stable friends and their Friendship is permanent
And in this way may they who are unequal best be friends, because they
May thus be made equal
Equality, then, and similarity are a tie to Friendship, and specially
The similarity of goodness, because good men, being stable in
Themselves, are also stable as regards others, and neither ask degrading
Services nor render them, but, so to say, rather prevent them: for it is
The part of the good neither to do wrong themselves nor to allow their
Friends in so doing
The bad, on the contrary, have no principle of stability: in fact, they
Do not even continue like themselves: only they come to be friends for
A short time from taking delight in one another's wickedness. Those
Connected by motives of profit, or pleasure, hold together somewhat
Longer: so long, that is to say, as they can give pleasure or profit
Mutually
The Friendship based on motives of profit is thought to be most of all
Formed out of contrary elements: the poor man, for instance, is thus a
Friend of the rich, and the ignorant of the man of information; that
Is to say, a man desiring that of which he is, as it happens, in want
Gives something else in exchange for it. To this same cla** we may refer
The lover and beloved, the beautiful and the ill-favoured. For this
Reason lovers sometimes show in a ridiculous light by claiming to be the
Objects of as intense a feeling as they themselves entertain: of course
If they are equally fit objects of Friendship they are perhaps entitled
To claim this, but if they have nothing of the kind it is ridiculous
Perhaps, moreover, the contrary does not aim at its contrary for its own
Sake but incidentally: the mean is really what is grasped at; it being
Good for the dry, for instance, not to become wet but to attain the
Mean, and so of the hot, etc. However, let us drop these questions
Because they are in fact somewhat foreign to our purpose
IX
It seems too, as was stated at the commencement, that Friendship and
Justice have the same object-matter, and subsist between the same
Persons: I mean that in every Communion there is thought to be some
Principle of Justice and also some Friendship: men address as friends
For instance, those who are their comrades by sea, or in war, and in
Like manner also those who are brought into Communion with them in other
Ways: and the Friendship, because also the Justice, is co-extensive with
The Communion, This justifies the common proverb, "the goods of friends
Are common," since Friendship rests upon Communion
[1160a] Now brothers and intimate companions have all in common, but
Other people have their property separate, and some have more in common
And others less, because the Friendships likewise differ in degree. So
Too do the various principles of Justice involved, not being the same
Between parents and children as between brothers, nor between companions
As between fellow-citizens merely, and so on of all the other
Conceivable Friendships. Different also are the principles of Injustice
As regards these different grades, and the acts become intensified by
Being done to friends; for instance, it is worse to rob your companion
Than one who is merely a fellow-citizen; to refuse help to a brother
Than to a stranger; and to strike your father than any one else. So then
The Justice naturally increases with the degree of Friendship, as being
Between the same parties and of equal extent
All cases of Communion are parts, so to say, of the great Social one
Since in them men a**ociate with a view to some advantage and to procure
Some of those things which are needful for life; and the great Social
Communion is thought originally to have been a**ociated and to
Continue for the sake of some advantage: this being the point at which
Legislators aim, affirming that to be just which is generally expedient
All the other cases of Communion aim at advantage in particular points;
The crew of a vessel at that which is to result from the voyage which is
Undertaken with a view to making money, or some such object; comrades in
War at that which is to result from the war, grasping either at wealth
Or victory, or it may be a political position; and those of the same
Tribe, or Demus, in like manner
Some of them are thought to be formed for pleasure's sake, those, for
Instance, of bacchan*ls or club-fellows, which are with a view to
Sacrifice or merely company. But all these seem to be ranged under
The great Social one, inasmuch as the aim of this is, not merely the
Expediency of the moment but, for life and at all times; with a view
To which the members of it institute sacrifices and their attendant
Assemblies, to render honour to the gods and procure for themselves
Respite from toil combined with pleasure. For it appears that
Sacrifices and religious a**emblies in old times were made as a kind of
First-fruits after the ingathering of the crops, because at such seasons
They had most leisure
So then it appears that all the instances of Communion are parts of the
Great Social one: and corresponding Friendships will follow upon such
Communions
X
Of Political Constitutions there are three kinds; and equal in number
Are the deflections from them, being, so to say, corruptions of them
The former are Kingship, Aristocracy, and that which recognises the
Principle of wealth, which it seems appropriate to call Timocracy (I
Give to it the name of a political constitution because people commonly
Do so). Of these the best is Monarchy, and Timocracy the worst
[Sidenote: II6ob] From Monarchy the deflection is Despotism; both being
Monarchies but widely differing from each other; for the Despot looks to
His own advantage, but the King to that of his subjects: for he is in
Fact no King who is not thoroughly independent and superior to the rest
In all good things, and he that is this has no further wants: he will
Not then have to look to his own advantage but to that of his subjects
For he that is not in such a position is a mere King elected by lot for
The nonce
But Despotism is on a contrary footing to this Kingship, because the
Despot pursues his own good: and in the case of this its inferiority
Is most evident, and what is worse is contrary to what is best. The
Transition to Despotism is made from Kingship, Despotism being a corrupt
Form of Monarchy, that is to say, the bad King comes to be a Despot
From Aristocracy to Oligarchy the transition is made by the fault of the
Rulers in distributing the public property contrary to right proportion;
And giving either all that is good, or the greatest share, to
Themselves; and the offices to the same persons always, making wealth
Their idol; thus a few bear rule and they bad men in the place of the
Best
From Timocracy the transition is to Democracy, they being contiguous:
For it is the nature of Timocracy to be in the hands of a multitude
And all in the same grade of property are equal. Democracy is the least
Vicious of all, since herein the form of the constitution undergoes
Least change
Well, these are generally the changes to which the various Constitutions
Are liable, being the least in degree and the easiest to make
Likenesses, and, as it were, models of them, one may find even in
Domestic life: for instance, the Communion between a Father and his Sons
Presents the figure of Kingship, because the children are the Father's
Care: and hence Homer names Jupiter Father because Kingship is intended
To be a paternal rule. Among the Persians, however, the Father's rule is
Despotic, for they treat their Sons as slaves. (The relation of Master
To Slaves is of the nature of Despotism because the point regarded
Herein is the Master's interest): this now strikes me to be as it ought
But the Persian custom to be mistaken; because for different persons
There should be different rules. [Sidenote: 1161a] Between Husband and
Wife the relation takes the form of Aristocracy, because he rules by
Right and in such points only as the Husband should, and gives to
The Wife all that befits her to have. Where the Husband lords it in
Everything he changes the relation into an Oligarchy; because he does
It contrary to right and not as being the better of the two. In some
Instances the Wives take the reins of government, being heiresses: here
The rule is carried on not in right of goodness but by reason of wealth
And power, as it is in Oligarchies
Timocracy finds its type in the relation of Brothers: they being equal
Except as to such differences as age introduces: for which reason, if
They are very different in age, the Friendship comes to be no longer
A fraternal one: while Democracy is represented specially by families
Which have no head (all being there equal), or in which the proper head
Is weak and so every member does that which is right in his own eyes
XI
Attendant then on each form of Political Constitution there plainly is
Friendship exactly co-extensive with the principle of Justice; that
Between a King and his Subjects being in the relation of a superiority
Of benefit, inasmuch as he benefits his subjects; it being a**umed that
He is a good king and takes care of their welfare as a shepherd tends
His flock; whence Homer (to quote him again) calls Agamemnon, "shepherd
Of the people." And of this same kind is the Paternal Friendship, only
That it exceeds the former in the greatness of the benefits done;
Because the father is the author of being (which is esteemed the
Greatest benefit) and of maintenance and education (these things are
Also, by the way, ascribed to ancestors generally): and by the law of
Nature the father has the right of rule over his sons, ancestors over
Their descendants, and the king over his subjects
These friendships are also between superiors and inferiors, for which
Reason parents are not merely loved but also honoured. The principle of
Justice also between these parties is not exactly the same but according
To proportiton, because so also is the Friendship
Now between Husband and Wife there is the same Friendship as in
Aristocracy: for the relation is determined by relative excellence, and
The better person has the greater good and each has what befits: so too
Also is the principle of Justice between them
The Fraternal Friendship is like that of Companions, because brothers
Are equal and much of an age, and such persons have generally like
Feelings and like dispositions. Like to this also is the Friendship of a
Timocracy, because the citizens are intended to be equal and equitable:
Rule, therefore, pa**es from hand to hand, and is distributed on equal
Terms: so too is the Friendship accordingly
[Sidenote: 1161b] In the deflections from the constitutional forms, just
As the principle of Justice is but small so is the Friendship also: and
Least of all in the most perverted form: in Despotism there is little
Or no Friendship. For generally wherever the ruler and the ruled have
Nothing in common there is no Friendship because there is no Justice;
But the case is as between an artisan and his tool, or between soul and
Body, and master and slave; all these are benefited by those who use
Them, but towards things inanimate there is neither Friendship nor
Justice: nor even towards a horse or an ox, or a slave _quâ_ slave
Because there is nothing in common: a slave as such is an animate tool
A tool an inanimate slave. _Quâ_ slave, then, there is no Friendship
Towards him, only _quâ_ man: for it is thought that there is some
Principle of Justice between every man, and every other who can share in
Law and be a party to an agreement; and so somewhat of Friendship, in so
Far as he is man. So in Despotisms the Friendships and the principle of
Justice are inconsiderable in extent, but in Democracies they are most
Considerable because they who are equal have much in common
XII
Now of course all Friendship is based upon Communion, as has been
Already stated: but one would be inclined to separate off from the rest
The Friendship of Kindred, and that of Companions: whereas those of men
Of the same city, or tribe, or crew, and all such, are more peculiarly
It would seem, based upon Communion, inasmuch as they plainly exist in
Right of some agreement expressed or implied: among these one may rank
Also the Friendship of Hospitality
The Friendship of Kindred is likewise of many kinds, and appears in all
Its varieties to depend on the Parental: parents, I mean, love their
Children as being a part of themselves, children love their parents as
Being themselves somewhat derived from them. But parents know their
Offspring more than these know that they are from the parents, and the
Source is more closely bound to that which is produced than that which
Is produced is to that which formed it: of course, whatever is derived
From one's self is proper to that from which it is so derived (as, for
Instance, a tooth or a hair, or any other thing whatever to him that
Has it): but the source to it is in no degree proper, or in an inferior
Degree at least
Then again the greater length of time comes in: the parents love their
Offspring from the first moment of their being, but their offspring
Them only after a lapse of time when they have attained intelligence
Or instinct. These considerations serve also to show why mothers have
Greater strength of affection than fathers
Now parents love their children as themselves (since what is derived
From themselves becomes a kind of other Self by the fact of separation)
But children their parents as being sprung from them. And brothers love
One another from being sprung from the same; that is, their sameness
With the common stock creates a sameness with one another; whence come
The phrases, "same blood," "root," and so on. In fact they are the same
In a sense, even in the separate distinct individuals
Then again the being brought up together, and the nearness of age, are
A great help towards Friendship, for a man likes one of his own age and
Persons who are used to one another are companions, which accounts
For the resemblance between the Friendship of Brothers and that of
Companions
[Sidenote:1162a] And cousins and all other relatives derive their bond
Of union from these, that is to say, from their community of origin: and
The strength of this bond varies according to their respective distances
From the common ancestor
Further: the Friendship felt by children towards parents, and by men
Towards the gods, is as towards something good and above them; because
These have conferred the greatest possible benefits, in that they are
The causes of their being and being nourished, and of their having been
Educated after they were brought into being
And Friendship of this kind has also the pleasurable and the profitable
More than that between persons unconnected by blood, in proportion as
Their life is also more shared in common. Then again in the Fraternal
Friendship there is all that there is in that of Companions, and more in
The good, and generally in those who are alike; in proportion as they
Are more closely tied and from their very birth have a feeling of
Affection for one another to begin with, and as they are more like in
Disposition who spring from the same stock and have grown up together
And been educated alike: and besides this they have the greatest
Opportunities in respect of time for proving one another, and can
Therefore depend most securely upon the trial. The elements
Of Friendship between other consanguinities will be of course
Proportionably similar
Between Husband and Wife there is thought to be Friendship by a law of
Nature: man being by nature disposed to pair, more than to a**ociate in
Communities: in proportion as the family is prior in order of time and
More absolutely necessary than the Community. And procreation is more
Common to him with other animals; all the other animals have Communion
Thus far, but human creatures cohabit not merely for the sake of
Procreation but also with a view to life in general: because in this
Connection the works are immediately divided, and some belong to the
Man, others to the woman: thus they help one the other, putting what is
Peculiar to each into the common stock
And for these reasons this Friendship is thought to combine the
Profitable and the pleasurable: it will be also based upon virtue if
They are good people; because each has goodness and they may take
Delight in this quality in each other. Children too are thought to be a
Tie: accordingly the childless sooner separate, for the children are a
Good common to both and anything in common is a bond of union
The question how a man is to live with his wife, or (more generally) one
Friend with another, appears to be no other than this, how it is just
That they should: because plainly there is not the same principle
Of Justice between a friend and friend, as between strangers, or
Companions, or mere chance fellow-travellers
XIII
[Sidenote:1162b] There are then, as was stated at the commencement of
This book, three kinds of Friendship, and in each there may be friends
On a footing of equality and friends in the relation of superior and
Inferior; we find, I mean, that people who are alike in goodness, become
Friends, and better with worse, and so also pleasant people; again
Because of advantage people are friends, either balancing exactly their
Mutual profitableness or differing from one another herein. Well then
Those who are equal should in right of this equality be equalised also
By the degree of their Friendship and the other points, and those who
Are on a footing of inequality by rendering Friendship in proportion to
The superiority of the other party
Fault-finding and blame arises, either solely or most naturally, in
Friendship of which utility is the motive: for they who are friends by
Reason of goodness, are eager to do kindnesses to one another because
This is a natural result of goodness and Friendship; and when men are
Vying with each other for this End there can be no fault-finding nor
Contention: since no one is annoyed at one who entertains for him the
Sentiment of Friendship and does kindnesses to him, but if of a refined
Mind he requites him with kind actions. And suppose that one of the two
Exceeds the other, yet as he is attaining his object he will not find
Fault with his friend, for good is the object of each party
Neither can there well be quarrels between men who are friends for
Pleasure's sake: because supposing them to delight in living together
Then both attain their desire; or if not a man would be put in a
Ridiculous light who should find fault with another for not pleasing
Him, since it is in his power to forbear intercourse with him. But
The Friendship because of advantage is very liable to fault-finding;
Because, as the parties use one another with a view to advantage, the
Requirements are continually enlarging, and they think they have less
Than of right belongs to them, and find fault because though justly
Entitled they do not get as much as they want: while they who do the
Kindnesses, can never come up to the requirements of those to whom they
Are being done
It seems also, that as the Just is of two kinds, the unwritten and the
Legal, so Friendship because of advantage is of two kinds, what may
Be called the Moral, and the Legal: and the most fruitful source of
Complaints is that parties contract obligations and discharge them not
In the same line of Friendship. The Legal is upon specified conditions
Either purely tradesmanlike from hand to hand or somewhat more
Gentlemanly as regards time but still by agreement a _quid pro quo_
In this Legal kind the obligation is clear and admits of no dispute, the
Friendly element is the delay in requiring its discharge: and for this
Reason in some countries no actions can be maintained at Law for the
Recovery of such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on the
Footing of credit must be content to abide the issue
That which may be termed the Moral kind is not upon specified
Conditions, but a man gives as to his friend and so on: but still he
Expects to receive an equivalent, or even more, as though he had not
Given but lent: he also will find fault, because he does not get the
Obligation discharged in the same way as it was contracted
[Sidenote:1163a] Now this results from the fact, that all men, or the
Generality at least, _wish_ what is honourable, but, when tested
_choose_ what is profitable; and the doing kindnesses disinterestedly
Is honourable while receiving benefits is profitable. In such cases one
Should, if able, make a return proportionate to the good received, and
Do so willingly, because one ought not to make a disinterested friend of
A man against his inclination: one should act, I say, as having made a
Mistake originally in receiving kindness from one from whom one ought
Not to have received it, he being not a friend nor doing the act
Disinterestedly; one should therefore discharge one's self of the
Obligation as having received a kindness on specified terms: and if able
A man would engage to repay the kindness, while if he were unable even
The doer of it would not expect it of him: so that if he is able he
Ought to repay it. But one ought at the first to ascertain from whom
One is receiving kindness, and on what understanding, that on that same
Understanding one may accept it or not
A question admitting of dispute is whether one is to measure a kindness
By the good done to the receiver of it, and make this the standard by
Which to requite, or by the kind intention of the doer?
For they who have received kindnesses frequently plead in depreciation
That they have received from their benefactors such things as were small
For them to give, or such as they themselves could have got from others:
While the doers of the kindnesses affirm that they gave the best they
Had, and what could not have been got from others, and under danger, or
In such-like straits
May we not say, that as utility is the motive of the Friendship the
Advantage conferred on the receiver must be the standard? because he it
Is who requests the kindness and the other serves him in his need on the
Understanding that he is to get an equivalent: the a**istance rendered
Is then exactly proportionate to the advantage which the receiver has
Obtained, and he should therefore repay as much as he gained by it, or
Even more, this being more creditable
In Friendships based on goodness, the question, of course, is never
Raised, but herein the motive of the doer seems to be the proper
Standard, since virtue and moral character depend principally on motive
XIV
Quarrels arise also in those Friendships in which the parties are
Unequal because each party thinks himself entitled to the greater share
And of course, when this happens, the Friendship is broken up
The man who is better than the other thinks that having the greater
Share pertains to him of right, for that more is always awarded to the
Good man: and similarly the man who is more profitable to another than
That other to him: "one who is useless," they say, "ought not to share
Equally, for it comes to a tax, and not a Friendship, unless the fruits
Of the Friendship are reaped in proportion to the works done:" their
Notion being, that as in a money partnership they who contribute more
Receive more so should it be in Friendship likewise
On the other hand, the needy man and the less virtuous advance the
Opposite claim: they urge that "it is the very business of a good friend
To help those who are in need, else what is the use of having a good or
Powerful friend if one is not to reap the advantage at all?"
[Sidenote: 1163b] Now each seems to advance a right claim and to be
Entitled to get more out of the connection than the other, only _not
More of the same thing_: but the superior man should receive more
Respect, the needy man more profit: respect being the reward of goodness
And beneficence, profit being the aid of need
This is plainly the principle acted upon in Political Communities:
He receives no honour who gives no good to the common stock: for the
Property of the Public is given to him who does good to the Public, and
Honour is the property of the Public; it is not possible both to make
Money out of the Public and receive honour likewise; because no one will
Put up with the less in every respect: so to him who suffers loss as
Regards money they award honour, but money to him who can be paid by
Gifts: since, as has been stated before, the observing due proportion
Equalises and preserves Friendship
Like rules then should be observed in the intercourse of friends who
Are unequal; and to him who advantages another in respect of money, or
Goodness, that other should repay honour, making requital according to
His power; because Friendship requires what is possible, not what is
Strictly due, this being not possible in all cases, as in the honours
Paid to the gods and to parents: no man could ever make the due return
In these cases, and so he is thought to be a good man who pays respect
According to his ability
For this reason it may be judged never to be allowable for a son to
Disown his father, whereas a father may his son: because he that owes
Is bound to pay; now a son can never, by anything he has done, fully
Requite the benefits first conferred on him by his father, and so is
Always a debtor. But they to whom anything is owed may cast off their
Debtors: therefore the father may his son. But at the same time it must
Perhaps be admitted, that it seems no father ever _would_ sever himself
Utterly from a son, except in a case of exceeding depravity: because
Independently of the natural Friendship, it is like human nature not to
Put away from one's self the a**istance which a son might render. But to
The son, if depraved, a**isting his father is a thing to be avoided, or
At least one which he will not be very anxious to do; most men
Being willing enough to receive kindness, but averse to doing it as
Unprofitable
Let thus much suffice on these points