Every art, and every science reduced to a teachable form, and in like
Manner every action and moral choice, aims, it is thought, at some good:
For which reason a common and by no means a bad description of the Chief
Good is, "that which all things aim at."
Now there plainly is a difference in the Ends proposed: for in some
Cases they are acts of working, and in others certain works or tangible
Results beyond and beside the acts of working: and where there are
Certain Ends beyond and beside the actions, the works are in their
Nature better than the acts of working. Again, since actions and arts
And sciences are many, the Ends likewise come to be many: of the healing
Art, for instance, health; of the ship-building art, a vessel; of
The military art, victory; and of domestic management, wealth; are
Respectively the Ends
And whatever of such actions, arts, or sciences range under some one
Faculty (as under that of horsemanship the art of making bridles, and
All that are connected with the manufacture of horse-furniture in
General; this itself again, and every action connected with war, under
The military art; and in the same way others under others), in all such
The Ends of the master-arts are more choice-worthy than those ranging
Under them, because it is with a view to the former that the latter are
Pursued
(And in this comparison it makes no difference whether the acts of
Working are themselves the Ends of the actions, or something further
Beside them, as is the case in the arts and sciences we have been just
Speaking of.)
[Sidenote: II] Since then of all things which may be done there is some
One End which we desire for its own sake, and with a view to which we
Desire everything else; and since we do not choose in all instances with
A further End in view (for then men would go on without limit, and so
The desire would be unsatisfied and fruitless), this plainly must be the
Chief Good, _i.e._ the best thing of all
Surely then, even with reference to actual life and conduct, the
Knowledge of it must have great weight; and like archers, with a mark in
View, we shall be more likely to hit upon what is right: and if so, we
Ought to try to describe, in outline at least, what it is and of which
Of the sciences and faculties it is the End
[Sidenote: 1094b] Now one would naturally suppose it to be the End
Of that which is most commanding and most inclusive: and to this
Description, [Greek: _politikae_] plainly answers: for this it is that
Determines which of the sciences should be in the communities, and which
Kind individuals are to learn, and what degree of proficiency is to be
Required. Again; we see also ranging under this the most highly esteemed
Faculties, such as the art military, and that of domestic management
And Rhetoric. Well then, since this uses all the other practical
Sciences, and moreover lays down rules as to what men are to do, and
From what to abstain, the End of this must include the Ends of the rest
And so must be _The Good_ of Man. And grant that this is the same to
The individual and to the community, yet surely that of the latter is
Plainly greater and more perfect to discover and preserve: for to do
This even for a single individual were a matter for contentment; but to
Do it for a whole nation, and for communities generally, were more noble
And godlike
[Sidenote: III] Such then are the objects proposed by our treatise
Which is of the nature of [Greek: _politikae_]: and I conceive I shall
Have spoken on them satisfactorily, if they be made as distinctly clear
As the nature of the subject-matter will admit: for exactness must not
Be looked for in all discussions alike, any more than in all works
Of handicraft. Now the notions of nobleness and justice, with the
Examination of which _politikea_ is concerned, admit of variation
And error to such a degree, that they are supposed by some to exist
Conventionally only, and not in the nature of things: but then, again
The things which are allowed to be goods admit of a similar error
Because harm cornes to many from them: for before now some have perished
Through wealth, and others through valour
We must be content then, in speaking of such things and from such data
To set forth the truth roughly and in outline; in other words, since
We are speaking of general matter and from general data, to draw also
Conclusions merely general. And in the same spirit should each person
Receive what we say: for the man of education will seek exactness so far
In each subject as the nature of the thing admits, it being plainly much
The same absurdity to put up with a mathematician who tries to persuade
Instead of proving, and to demand strict demonstrative reasoning of a
Rhetorician
[Sidenote: 1095a] Now each man judges well what he knows, and of these
Things he is a good judge: on each particular matter then he is a good
Judge who has been instructed in _it_, and in a general way the man of
General mental cultivation
Hence the young man is not a fit student of Moral Philosophy, for he has
No experience in the actions of life, while all that is said presupposes
And is concerned with these: and in the next place, since he is apt to
Follow the impulses of his pa**ions, he will hear as though he heard
Not, and to no profit, the end in view being practice and not mere
Knowledge
And I draw no distinction between young in years, and youthful in temper
And disposition: the defect to which I allude being no direct result of
The time, but of living at the beck and call of pa**ion, and following
Each object as it rises. For to them that are such the knowledge comes
To be unprofitable, as to those of imperfect self-control: but, to
Those who form their desires and act in accordance with reason, to have
Knowledge on these points must be very profitable
Let thus much suffice by way of preface on these three points, the
Student, the spirit in which our observations should be received, and
The object which we propose
[Sidenote: IV] And now, resuming the statement with which we commenced
Since all knowledge and moral choice grasps at good of some kind or
Another, what good is that which we say [Greek: _politikai_] aims at?
Or, in other words, what is the highest of all the goods which are the
Objects of action?
So far as name goes, there is a pretty general agreement: for HAPPINESS
Both the multitude and the refined few call it, and "living well" and
"doing well" they conceive to be the same with "being happy;" but about
The Nature of this Happiness, men dispute, and the multitude do not in
Their account of it agree with the wise. For some say it is some one of
Those things which are palpable and apparent, as pleasure or wealth or
Honour; in fact, some one thing, some another; nay, oftentimes the same
Man gives a different account of it; for when ill, he calls it health;
When poor, wealth: and conscious of their own ignorance, men admire
Those who talk grandly and above their comprehension. Some again held it
To be something by itself, other than and beside these many good things
Which is in fact to all these the cause of their being good
Now to sift all the opinions would be perhaps rather a fruitless task;
So it shall suffice to sift those which are most generally current, or
Are thought to have some reason in them
[Sidenote: 1095b] And here we must not forget the difference between
Reasoning from principles, and reasoning to principles: for with good
Cause did Plato too doubt about this, and inquire whether the right road
Is from principles or to principles, just as in the racecourse from the
Judges to the further end, or _vice versâ_
Of course, we must begin with what is known; but then this is of two
Kinds, what we _do_ know, and what we _may_ know: perhaps then as
Individuals we must begin with what we _do_ know. Hence the necessity
That he should have been well trained in habits, who is to study, with
Any tolerable chance of profit, the principles of nobleness and justice
And moral philosophy generally. For a principle is a matter of fact
And if the fact is sufficiently clear to a man there will be no need in
Addition of the reason for the fact. And he that has been thus trained
Either has principles already, or can receive them easily: as for him
Who neither has nor can receive them, let him hear his sentence from
Hesiod:
He is best of all who of himself conceiveth all things;
Good again is he too who can adopt a good suggestion;
But whoso neither of himself conceiveth nor hearing from
Another
Layeth it to heart;--he is a useless man
[Sidenote: V] But to return from this digression
Now of the Chief Good (_i.e._ of Happiness) men seem to form their
Notions from the different modes of life, as we might naturally expect:
The many and most low conceive it to be pleasure, and hence they are
Content with the life of sensual enjoyment. For there are three lines of
Life which stand out prominently to view: that just mentioned, and the
Life in society, and, thirdly, the life of contemplation
Now the many are plainly quite slavish, choosing a life like that of
Brute animals: yet they obtain some consideration, because many of the
Great share the tastes of Sardanapalus. The refined and active again
Conceive it to be honour: for this may be said to be the end of the life
In society: yet it is plainly too superficial for the object of our
Search, because it is thought to rest with those who pay rather than
With him who receives it, whereas the Chief Good we feel instinctively
Must be something which is our own, and not easily to be taken from us
And besides, men seem to pursue honour, that they may *[Sidenote: 1096a]
Believe themselves to be good: for instance, they seek to be honoured
By the wise, and by those among whom they are known, and for virtue:
Clearly then, in the opinion at least of these men, virtue is higher
Than honour. In truth, one would be much more inclined to think this
To be the end of the life in society; yet this itself is plainly not
Sufficiently final: for it is conceived possible, that a man possessed
Of virtue might sleep or be inactive all through his life, or, as a
Third case, suffer the greatest evils and misfortunes: and the man who
Should live thus no one would call happy, except for mere disputation's
Sake
And for these let thus much suffice, for they have been treated of at
Sufficient length in my Encyclia
A third line of life is that of contemplation, concerning which we shall
Make our examination in the sequel
As for the life of money-making, it is one of constraint, and wealth
Manifestly is not the good we are seeking, because it is for use, that
Is, for the sake of something further: and hence one would rather
Conceive the forementioned ends to be the right ones, for men rest
Content with them for their own sakes. Yet, clearly, they are not the
Objects of our search either, though many words have been wasted on
Them. So much then for these
[Sidenote: VI] Again, the notion of one Universal Good (the same, that
Is, in all things), it is better perhaps we should examine, and discuss
The meaning of it, though such an inquiry is unpleasant, because they
Are friends of ours who have introduced these [Greek: _eidae_]. Still
Perhaps it may appear better, nay to be our duty where the safety of the
Truth is concerned, to upset if need be even our own theories, specially
As we are lovers of wisdom: for since both are dear to us, we are bound
To prefer the truth. Now they who invented this doctrine of [Greek:
_eidae_], did not apply it to those things in which they spoke of
Priority and posteriority, and so they never made any [Greek: _idea_] of
Numbers; but good is predicated in the categories of Substance, Quality
And Relation; now that which exists of itself, _i.e._ Substance, is
Prior in the nature of things to that which is relative, because this
Latter is an off-shoot, as it were, and result of that which is; on
Their own principle then there cannot be a common [Greek: _idea_] in the
Case of these
In the next place, since good is predicated in as many ways as there are
Modes of existence [for it is predicated in the category of Substance
As God, Intellect--and in that of Quality, as The Virtues--and in that
Of Quantity, as The Mean--and in that of Relation, as The Useful--and in
That of Time, as Opportunity--and in that of Place, as Abode; and
Other such like things], it manifestly cannot be something common and
Universal and one in all: else it would not have been predicated in all
The categories, but in one only
[Sidenote: 1096b] Thirdly, since those things which range under one
[Greek: _idea_] are also under the cognisance of one science, there
Would have been, on their theory, only one science taking cognisance of
All goods collectively: but in fact there are many even for those which
Range under one category: for instance, of Opportunity or Seasonableness
(which I have before mentioned as being in the category of Time), the
Science is, in war, generalship; in disease, medical science; and of the
Mean (which I quoted before as being in the category of Quantity), in
Food, the medical science; and in labour or exercise, the gymnastic
Science. A person might fairly doubt also what in the world they mean by
Very-this that or the other, since, as they would themselves allow, the
Account of the humanity is one and the same in the very-Man, and in any
Individual Man: for so far as the individual and the very-Man are both
Man, they will not differ at all: and if so, then very-good and any
Particular good will not differ, in so far as both are good. Nor will it
Do to say, that the eternity of the very-good makes it to be more good;
For what has lasted white ever so long, is no whiter than what lasts but
For a day
No. The Pythagoreans do seem to give a more credible account of the
Matter, who place "One" among the goods in their double list of goods
And bads: which philosophers, in fact, Speusippus seems to have
Followed
But of these matters let us speak at some other time. Now there is
Plainly a loophole to object to what has been advanced, on the plea that
The theory I have attacked is not by its advocates applied to all good:
But those goods only are spoken of as being under one [Greek: idea]
Which are pursued, and with which men rest content simply for their own
Sakes: whereas those things which have a tendency to produce or preserve
Them in any way, or to hinder their contraries, are called good because
Of these other goods, and after another fashion. It is manifest then
That the goods may be so called in two senses, the one cla** for their
Own sakes, the other because of these
Very well then, let us separate the independent goods from the
Instrumental, and see whether they are spoken of as under one [Greek:
Idea]. But the question next arises, what kind of goods are we to call
Independent? All such as are pursued even when separated from other
Goods, as, for instance, being wise, seeing, and certain pleasures and
Honours (for these, though we do pursue them with some further end in
View, one would still place among the independent goods)? or does it
Come in fact to this, that we can call nothing independent good except
The [Greek: idea], and so the concrete of it will be nought?
If, on the other hand, these are independent goods, then we shall
Require that the account of the goodness be the same clearly in all
Just as that of the whiteness is in snow and white lead. But how stands
The fact? Why of honour and wisdom and pleasure the accounts are
Distinct and different in so far as they are good. The Chief Good then
Is not something common, and after one [Greek: idea]
But then, how does the name come to be common (for it is not seemingly a
Case of fortuitous equivocation)? Are different individual things called
Good by virtue of being from one source, or all conducing to one end, or
Rather by way of an*logy, for that intellect is to the soul as sight to
The body, and so on? However, perhaps we ought to leave these questions
Now, for an accurate investigation of them is more properly the business
Of a different philosophy. And likewise respecting the [Greek: idea]:
For even if there is some one good predicated in common of all things
That are good, or separable and capable of existing independently
Manifestly it cannot be the object of human action or attainable by Man;
But we are in search now of something that is so
It may readily occur to any one, that it would be better to attain a
Knowledge of it with a view to such concrete goods as are attainable and
Practical, because, with this as a kind of model in our hands, we shall
The better know what things are good for us individually, and when we
Know them, we shall attain them
Some plausibility, it is true, this argument possesses, but it is
Contradicted by the facts of the Arts and Sciences; for all these
Though aiming at some good, and seeking that which is deficient, yet
Pretermit the knowledge of it: now it is not exactly probable that all
Artisans without exception should be ignorant of so great a help as this
Would be, and not even look after it; neither is it easy to see wherein
A weaver or a carpenter will be profited in respect of his craft by
Knowing the very-good, or how a man will be the more apt to effect cures
Or to command an army for having seen the [Greek: idea] itself. For
Manifestly it is not health after this general and abstract fashion
Which is the subject of the physician's investigation, but the health
Of Man, or rather perhaps of this or that man; for he has to heal
Individuals.--Thus much on these points
VII
And now let us revert to the Good of which we are in search: what can it
Be? for manifestly it is different in different actions and arts: for it
Is different in the healing art and in the art military, and similarly
In the rest. What then is the Chief Good in each? Is it not "that for
The sake of which the other things are done?" and this in the healing
Art is health, and in the art military victory, and in that of
House-building a house, and in any other thing something else; in short
In every action and moral choice the End, because in all cases men do
Everything else with a view to this. So that if there is some one End of
All things which are and may be done, this must be the Good proposed by
Doing, or if more than one, then these
Thus our discussion after some traversing about has come to the same
Point which we reached before. And this we must try yet more to clear
Up
Now since the ends are plainly many, and of these we choose some with
A view to others (wealth, for instance, musical instruments, and, in
General, all instruments), it is clear that all are not final: but the
Chief Good is manifestly something final; and so, if there is some one
Only which is final, this must be the object of our search: but if
Several, then the most final of them will be it
Now that which is an object of pursuit in itself we call more final than
That which is so with a view to something else; that again which is
Never an object of choice with a view to something else than those which
Are so both in themselves and with a view to this ulterior object: and
So by the term "absolutely final," we denote that which is an object of
Choice always in itself, and never with a view to any other
And of this nature Happiness is mostly thought to be, for this we choose
Always for its own sake, and never with a view to anything further:
Whereas honour, pleasure, intellect, in fact every excellence we choose
For their own sakes, it is true (because we would choose each of these
Even if no result were to follow), but we choose them also with a view
To happiness, conceiving that through their instrumentality we shall be
Happy: but no man chooses happiness with a view to them, nor in fact
With a view to any other thing whatsoever
The same result is seen to follow also from the notion of
Self-sufficiency, a quality thought to belong to the final good. Now
By sufficient for Self, we mean not for a single individual living a
Solitary life, but for his parents also and children and wife, and
In general, friends and countrymen; for man is by nature adapted to a
Social existence. But of these, of course, some limit must be fixed: for
If one extends it to parents and descendants and friends' friends
There is no end to it. This point, however, must be left for future
Investigation: for the present we define that to be self-sufficient
"which taken alone makes life choice-worthy, and to be in want of
Nothing;" now of such kind we think Happiness to be: and further, to
Be most choice-worthy of all things; not being reckoned with any other
Thing, for if it were so reckoned, it is plain we must then allow it
With the addition of ever so small a good, to be more choice-worthy than
It was before: because what is put to it becomes an addition of so much
More good, and of goods the greater is ever the more choice-worthy
So then Happiness is manifestly something final and self-sufficient
Being the end of all things which are and may be done
But, it may be, to call Happiness the Chief Good is a mere truism, and
What is wanted is some clearer account of its real nature. Now this
Object may be easily attained, when we have discovered what is the work
Of man; for as in the case of flute-player, statuary, or artisan of any
Kind, or, more generally, all who have any work or course of action
Their Chief Good and Excellence is thought to reside in their work, so
It would seem to be with man, if there is any work belonging to him
Are we then to suppose, that while carpenter and cobbler have certain
Works and courses of action, Man as Man has none, but is left by Nature
Without a work? or would not one rather hold, that as eye, hand, and
Foot, and generally each of his members, has manifestly some special
Work; so too the whole Man, as distinct from all these, has some work of
His own?
What then can this be? not mere life, because that plainly is shared
With him even by vegetables, and we want what is peculiar to him. We
Must separate off then the life of mere nourishment and growth, and next
Will come the life of sensation: but this again manifestly is common to
Horses, oxen, and every animal. There remains then a kind of life of
The Rational Nature apt to act: and of this Nature there are two parts
Denominated Rational, the one as being obedient to Reason, the other as
Having and exerting it. Again, as this life is also spoken of in two
Ways, we must take that which is in the way of actual working, because
This is thought to be most properly entitled to the name. If then the
Work of Man is a working of the soul in accordance with reason, or at
Least not independently of reason, and we say that the work of any given
Subject, and of that subject good of its kind, are the same in kind (as
For instance, of a harp-player and a good harp-player, and so on in
Every case, adding to the work eminence in the way of excellence; I
Mean, the work of a harp-player is to play the harp, and of a good
Harp-player to play it well); if, I say, this is so, and we a**ume the
Work of Man to be life of a certain kind, that is to say a working of
The soul, and actions with reason, and of a good man to do these things
Well and nobly, and in fact everything is finished off well in the way
Of the excellence which peculiarly belongs to it: if all this is so
Then the Good of Man comes to be "a working of the Soul in the way of
Excellence," or, if Excellence admits of degrees, in the way of the best
And most perfect Excellence
And we must add, in a complete life; for as it is not one swallow or one
Fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a short time that
Makes a man blessed and happy
Let this then be taken for a rough sketch of the Chief Good: since it
Is probably the right way to give first the outline, and fill it in
Afterwards. And it would seem that any man may improve and connect
What is good in the sketch, and that time is a good discoverer and
Co-operator in such matters: it is thus in fact that all improvements
In the various arts have been brought about, for any man may fill up a
Deficiency
You must remember also what has been already stated, and not seek
For exactness in all matters alike, but in each according to the
Subject-matter, and so far as properly belongs to the system. The
Carpenter and geometrician, for instance, inquire into the right line in
Different fashion: the former so far as he wants it for his work, the
Latter inquires into its nature and properties, because he is concerned
With the truth
So then should one do in other matters, that the incidental matters may
Not exceed the direct ones
And again, you must not demand the reason either in all things
Alike, because in some it is sufficient that the fact has been well
Demonstrated, which is the case with first principles; and the fact is
The first step, _i.e._ starting-point or principle
And of these first principles some are obtained by induction, some by
Perception, some by a course of habituation, others in other different
Ways. And we must try to trace up each in their own nature, and take
Pains to secure their being well defined, because they have
Great influence on what follows: it is thought, I mean, that the
Starting-point or principle is more than half the whole matter, and that
Many of the points of inquiry come simultaneously into view thereby
VIII
We must now inquire concerning Happiness, not only from our conclusion
And the data on which our reasoning proceeds, but likewise from what
Is commonly said about it: because with what is true all things which
Really are are in harmony, but with that which is false the true very
Soon jars
Now there is a common division of goods into three cla**es; one being
Called external, the other two those of the soul and body respectively
And those belonging to the soul we call most properly and specially
Good. Well, in our definition we a**ume that the actions and workings of
The soul constitute Happiness, and these of course belong to the soul
And so our account is a good one, at least according to this opinion
Which is of ancient date, and accepted by those who profess philosophy
Rightly too are certain actions and workings said to be the end, for
Thus it is brought into the number of the goods of the soul instead of
The external. Agreeing also with our definition is the common notion
That the happy man lives well and does well, for it has been stated by
Us to be pretty much a kind of living well and doing well
But further, the points required in Happiness are found in combination
In our account of it
For some think it is virtue, others practical wisdom, others a kind of
Scientific philosophy; others that it is these, or else some one of
Them, in combination with pleasure, or at least not independently of it;
While others again take in external prosperity
Of these opinions, some rest on the authority of numbers or antiquity
Others on that of few, and those men of note: and it is not likely that
Either of these cla**es should be wrong in all points, but be right at
Least in some one, or even in most
Now with those who a**ert it to be Virtue (Excellence), or some kind of
Virtue, our account agrees: for working in the way of Excellence surely
Belongs to Excellence
And there is perhaps no unimportant difference between conceiving of
The Chief Good as in possession or as in use, in other words, as a mere
State or as a working. For the state or habit may possibly exist in a
Subject without effecting any good, as, for instance, in him who is
Asleep, or in any other way inactive; but the working cannot so, for it
Will of necessity act, and act well. And as at the Olympic games it is
Not the finest and strongest men who are crowned, but they who enter the
Lists, for out of these the prize-men are selected; so too in life, of
The honourable and the good, it is they who act who rightly win the
Prizes
Their life too is in itself pleasant: for the feeling of pleasure is a
Mental sensation, and that is to each pleasant of which he is said to be
Fond: a horse, for instance, to him who is fond of horses, and a sight
To him who is fond of sights: and so in like manner just acts to him who
Is fond of justice, and more generally the things in accordance with
Virtue to him who is fond of virtue. Now in the case of the multitude of
Men the things which they individually esteem pleasant clash, because
They are not such by nature, whereas to the lovers of nobleness those
Things are pleasant which are such by nature: but the actions in
Accordance with virtue are of this kind, so that they are pleasant both
To the individuals and also in themselves
So then their life has no need of pleasure as a kind of additional
Appendage, but involves pleasure in itself. For, besides what I have
Just mentioned, a man is not a good man at all who feels no pleasure in
Noble actions, just as no one would call that man just who does not feel
Pleasure in acting justly, or liberal who does not in liberal actions
And similarly in the case of the other virtues which might be
Enumerated: and if this be so, then the actions in accordance with
Virtue must be in themselves pleasurable. Then again they are certainly
Good and noble, and each of these in the highest degree; if we are to
Take as right the judgment of the good man, for he judges as we have
Said
Thus then Happiness is most excellent, most noble, and most pleasant
And these attributes are not separated as in the well-known Delian
Inscription--
"Most noble is that which is most just, but best is health; And
Naturally most pleasant is the obtaining one's desires."
For all these co-exist in the best acts of working: and we say that
Happiness is these, or one, that is, the best of them
Still it is quite plain that it does require the addition of external
Goods, as we have said: because without appliances it is impossible, or
At all events not easy, to do noble actions: for friends, money, and
Political influence are in a manner instruments whereby many things
Are done: some things there are again a deficiency in which mars
Blessedness; good birth, for instance, or fine offspring, or even
Personal beauty: for he is not at all capable of Happiness who is very
Ugly, or is ill-born, or solitary and childless; and still less perhaps
Supposing him to have very bad children or friends, or to have lost good
Ones by d**h. As we have said already, the addition of prosperity of
This kind does seem necessary to complete the idea of Happiness; hence
Some rank good fortune, and others virtue, with Happiness
And hence too a question is raised, whether it is a thing that can be
Learned, or acquired by habituation or discipline of some other kind, or
Whether it comes in the way of divine dispensation, or even in the way
Of chance
Now to be sure, if anything else is a gift of the Gods to men, it is
Probable that Happiness is a gift of theirs too, and specially because
Of all human goods it is the highest. But this, it may be, is a question
Belonging more properly to an investigation different from ours: and it
Is quite clear, that on the supposition of its not being sent from the
Gods direct, but coming to us by reason of virtue and learning of a
Certain kind, or discipline, it is yet one of the most Godlike things;
Because the prize and End of virtue is manifestly somewhat most
Excellent, nay divine and blessed
It will also on this supposition be widely participated, for it may
Through learning and diligence of a certain kind exist in all who have
Not been maimed for virtue
And if it is better we should be happy thus than as a result of chance
This is in itself an argument that the case is so; because those things
Which are in the way of nature, and in like manner of art, and of every
Cause, and specially the best cause, are by nature in the best way
Possible: to leave them to chance what is greatest and most noble would
Be very much out of harmony with all these facts
The question may be determined also by a reference to our definition of
Happiness, that it is a working of the soul in the way of excellence or
Virtue of a certain kind: and of the other goods, some we must have to
Begin with, and those which are co-operative and useful are given by
Nature as instruments
These considerations will harmonise also with what we said at the
Commencement: for we a**umed the End of [Greek Text: poletikae] to be
Most excellent: now this bestows most care on making the members of the
Community of a certain character; good that is and apt to do what is
Honourable
With good reason then neither ox nor horse nor any other brute animal
Do we call happy, for none of them can partake in such working: and for
This same reason a child is not happy either, because by reason of his
Tender age he cannot yet perform such actions: if the term is applied
It is by way of anticipation
For to constitute Happiness, there must be, as we have said, complete
Virtue and a complete life: for many changes and chances of all kinds
Arise during a life, and he who is most prosperous may become involved
In great misfortunes in his old age, as in the heroic poems the tale is
Told of Priam: but the man who has experienced such fortune and died in
Wretchedness, no man calls happy
Are we then to call no man happy while he lives, and, as Solon would
Have us, look to the end? And again, if we are to maintain this
Position, is a man then happy when he is dead? or is not this a complete
Absurdity, specially in us who say Happiness is a working of a certain
Kind?
If on the other hand we do not a**ert that the dead man is happy, and
Solon does not mean this, but only that one would then be safe in
Pronouncing a man happy, as being thenceforward out of the reach of
Evils and misfortunes, this too admits of some dispute, since it is
Thought that the dead has somewhat both of good and evil (if, as we must
Allow, a man may have when alive but not aware of the circumstances)
As honour and dishonour, and good and bad fortune of children and
Descendants generally
Nor is this view again without its difficulties: for, after a man has
Lived in blessedness to old age and died accordingly, many changes may
Befall him in right of his descendants; some of them may be good and
Obtain positions in life accordant to their merits, others again quite
The contrary: it is plain too that the descendants may at different
Intervals or grades stand in all manner of relations to the ancestors
Absurd indeed would be the position that even the dead man is to change
About with them and become at one time happy and at another miserable
Absurd however it is on the other hand that the affairs of the
Descendants should in no degree and during no time affect the ancestors
But we must revert to the point first raised, since the present question
Will be easily determined from that
If then we are to look to the end and then pronounce the man blessed
Not as being so but as having been so at some previous time, surely it
Is absurd that when he _is_ happy the truth is not to be a**erted of
Him, because we are unwilling to pronounce the living happy by reason of
Their liability to changes, and because, whereas we have conceived of
Happiness as something stable and no way easily changeable, the fact is
That good and bad fortune are constantly circling about the same people:
For it is quite plain, that if we are to depend upon the fortunes of
Men, we shall often have to call the same man happy, and a little while
After miserable, thus representing our happy man
"Chameleon-like, and based on rottenness."
Is not this the solution? that to make our sentence dependent on the
Changes of fortune, is no way right: for not in them stands the well, or
The ill, but though human life needs these as accessories (which we have
Allowed already), the workings in the way of virtue are what determine
Happiness, and the contrary the contrary
And, by the way, the question which has been here discussed, testifies
Incidentally to the truth of our account of Happiness. For to nothing
Does a stability of human results attach so much as it does to the
Workings in the way of virtue, since these are held to be more abiding
Even than the sciences: and of these last again the most precious
Are the most abiding, because the blessed live in them most and most
Continuously, which seems to be the reason why they are not forgotten
So then this stability which is sought will be in the happy man, and
He will be such through life, since always, or most of all, he will be
Doing and contemplating the things which are in the way of virtue: and
The various chances of life he will bear most nobly, and at all times
And in all ways harmoniously, since he is the truly good man, or in the
Terms of our proverb "a faultless cube."
And whereas the incidents of chance are many, and differ in greatness
And smallness, the small pieces of good or ill fortune evidently do not
Affect the balance of life, but the great and numerous, if happening for
Good, will make life more blessed (for it is their nature to contribute
To ornament, and the using of them comes to be noble and excellent), but
If for ill, they bruise as it were and maim the blessedness: for they
Bring in positive pain, and hinder many acts of working. But still, even
In these, nobleness shines through when a man bears contentedly many and
Great mischances not from insensibility to pain but because he is noble
And high-spirited
And if, as we have said, the acts of working are what determine the
Character of the life, no one of the blessed can ever become wretched
Because he will never do those things which are hateful and mean. For
The man who is truly good and sensible bears all fortunes, we presume
Becomingly, and always does what is noblest under the circumstances
Just as a good general employs to the best advantage the force he has
With him; or a good shoemaker makes the handsomest shoe he can out
Of the leather which has been given him; and all other good artisans
Likewise. And if this be so, wretched never can the happy man come to
Be: I do not mean to say he will be blessed should he fall into fortunes
Like those of Priam
Nor, in truth, is he shifting and easily changeable, for on the one
Hand from his happiness he will not be shaken easily nor by ordinary
Mischances, but, if at all, by those which are great and numerous; and
On the other, after such mischances he cannot regain his happiness in a
Little time; but, if at all, in a long and complete period, during which
He has made himself master of great and noble things
Why then should we not call happy the man who works in the way of
Perfect virtue, and is furnished with external goods sufficient for
Acting his part in the drama of life: and this during no ordinary period
But such as constitutes a complete life as we have been describing it
Or we must add, that not only is he to live so, but his d**h must be in
Keeping with such life, since the future is dark to us, and Happiness we
Assume to be in every way an end and complete. And, if this be so, we
Shall call them among the living blessed who have and will have the
Things specified, but blessed _as Men_
On these points then let it suffice to have denned thus much
XI
Now that the fortunes of their descendants, and friends generally
Contribute nothing towards forming the condition of the dead, is plainly
A very heartless notion, and contrary to the current opinions
But since things which befall are many, and differ in all kinds of ways
And some touch more nearly, others less, to go into minute particular
Distinctions would evidently be a long and endless task: and so it may
Suffice to speak generally and in outline
If then, as of the misfortunes which happen to one's self, some have a
Certain weight and turn the balance of life, while others are, so to
Speak, lighter; so it is likewise with those which befall all our
Friends alike; if further, whether they whom each suffering befalls
Be alive or dead makes much more difference than in a tragedy the
Presupposing or actual perpetration of the various crimes and horrors
We must take into our account this difference also, and still more
Perhaps the doubt concerning the dead whether they really partake of any
Good or evil; it seems to result from all these considerations, that if
Anything does pierce the veil and reach them, be the same good or bad
It must be something trivial and small, either in itself or to them; or
At least of such a magnitude or such a kind as neither to make happy
Them that are not so otherwise, nor to deprive of their blessedness them
That are
It is plain then that the good or ill fortunes of their friends do
Affect the dead somewhat: but in such kind and degree as neither to make
The happy unhappy nor produce any other such effect
XII
Having determined these points, let us examine with respect to
Happiness, whether it belongs to the cla** of things praiseworthy or
Things precious; for to that of faculties it evidently does not
Now it is plain that everything which is a subject of praise is praised
For being of a certain kind and bearing a certain relation to something
Else: for instance, the just, and the valiant, and generally the good
Man, and virtue itself, we praise because of the actions and the
Results: and the strong man, and the quick runner, and so forth, we
Praise for being of a certain nature and bearing a certain relation to
Something good and excellent (and this is illustrated by attempts to
Praise the gods; for they are presented in a ludicrous aspect by being
Referred to our standard, and this results from the fact, that all
Praise does, as we have said, imply reference to a standard). Now if
It is to such objects that praise belongs, it is evident that what is
Applicable to the best objects is not praise, but something higher and
Better: which is plain matter of fact, for not only do we call the gods
Blessed and happy, but of men also we pronounce those blessed who most
Nearly resemble the gods. And in like manner in respect of goods; no man
Thinks of praising Happiness as he does the principle of justice, but
Calls it blessed, as being somewhat more godlike and more excellent
Eudoxus too is thought to have advanced a sound argument in support of
The claim of pleasure to the highest prize: for the fact that, though it
Is one of the good things, it is not praised, he took for an indication
Of its superiority to those which are subjects of praise: a superiority
He attributed also to a god and the Chief Good, on the ground that they
Form the standard to which everything besides is referred. For praise
Applies to virtue, because it makes men apt to do what is noble; but
Encomia to definite works of body or mind
However, it is perhaps more suitable to a regular treatise on encomia to
Pursue this topic with exactness: it is enough for our purpose that from
What has been said it is evident that Happiness belongs to the cla** of
Things precious and final. And it seems to be so also because of its
Being a starting-point; which it is, in that with a view to it we all do
Everything else that is done; now the starting-point and cause of good
Things we a**ume to be something precious and divine
XIII
Moreover, since Happiness is a kind of working of the soul in the way
Of perfect Excellence, we must inquire concerning Excellence: for so
Probably shall we have a clearer view concerning Happiness; and again
He who is really a statesman is generally thought to have spent most
Pains on this, for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient
To the laws. (For examples of this cla** we have the lawgivers of the
Cretans and Lacedaemonians and whatever other such there have been.)
But if this investigation belongs properly to [Greek: politikae], then
Clearly the inquiry will be in accordance with our original design
Well, we are to inquire concerning Excellence, _i.e._ Human Excellence
Of course, because it was the Chief Good of Man and the Happiness of Man
That we were inquiring of just now. By Human Excellence we mean not that
Of man's body but that of his soul; for we call Happiness a working of
The Soul
And if this is so, it is plain that some knowledge of the nature of the
Soul is necessary for the statesman, just as for the Oculist a knowledge
Of the whole body, and the more so in proportion as [Greek: politikae]
Is more precious and higher than the healing art: and in fact physicians
Of the higher cla** do busy themselves much with the knowledge of the
Body
So then the statesman is to consider the nature of the Soul: but he must
Do so with these objects in view, and so far only as may suffice for
The objects of his special inquiry: for to carry his speculations to a
Greater exactness is perhaps a task more laborious than falls within his
Province
In fact, the few statements made on the subject in my popular treatises
Are quite enough, and accordingly we will adopt them here: as, that
The Soul consists of two parts, the Irrational and the Rational (as to
Whether these are actually divided, as are the parts of the body, and
Everything that is capable of division; or are only metaphysically
Speaking two, being by nature inseparable, as are convex and concave
Circumferences, matters not in respect of our present purpose). And of
The Irrational, the one part seems common to other objects, and in fact
Vegetative; I mean the cause of nourishment and growth (for such a
Faculty of the Soul one would a**ume to exist in all things that receive
Nourishment, even in embryos, and this the same as in the perfect
Creatures; for this is more likely than that it should be a different
One)
Now the Excellence of this manifestly is not peculiar to the human
Species but common to others: for this part and this faculty is thought
To work most in time of sleep, and the good and bad man are least
Distinguishable while asleep; whence it is a common saying that during
One half of life there is no difference between the happy and the
Wretched; and this accords with our anticipations, for sleep is an
Inactivity of the soul, in so far as it is denominated good or bad
Except that in some wise some of its movements find their way through
The veil and so the good come to have better dreams than ordinary men
But enough of this: we must forego any further mention of the nutritive
Part, since it is not naturally capable of the Excellence which is
Peculiarly human
And there seems to be another Irrational Nature of the Soul, which yet
In a way partakes of Reason. For in the man who controls his appetites
And in him who resolves to do so and fails, we praise the Reason or
Rational part of the Soul, because it exhorts aright and to the best
Course: but clearly there is in them, beside the Reason, some other
Natural principle which fights with and strains against the Reason. (For
In plain terms, just as paralysed limbs of the body when their owners
Would move them to the right are borne aside in a contrary direction to
The left, so is it in the case of the Soul, for the impulses of men who
Cannot control their appetites are to contrary points: the difference is
That in the case of the body we do see what is borne aside but in the
Case of the soul we do not. But, it may be, not the less on that account
Are we to suppose that there is in the Soul also somewhat besides the
Reason, which is opposed to this and goes against it; as to _how_ it is
Different, that is irrelevant.)
But of Reason this too does evidently partake, as we have said: for
Instance, in the man of self-control it obeys Reason: and perhaps in
The man of perfected self-mastery, or the brave man, it is yet more
Obedient; in them it agrees entirely with the Reason
So then the Irrational is plainly twofold: the one part, the merely
Vegetative, has no share of Reason, but that of desire, or appetition
Generally, does partake of it in a sense, in so far as it is obedient to
It and capable of submitting to its rule. (So too in common phrase we
Say we have [Greek: _logos_] of our father or friends, and this in a
Different sense from that in which we say we have [Greek: logos] of
Mathematics.)
Now that the Irrational is in some way persuaded by the Reason
Admonition, and every act of rebuke and exhortation indicate. If then we
Are to say that this also has Reason, then the Rational, as well as the
Irrational, will be twofold, the one supremely and in itself, the other
Paying it a kind of filial regard
The Excellence of Man then is divided in accordance with this
Difference: we make two cla**es, calling the one Intellectual, and
The other Moral; pure science, intelligence, and practical
Wisdom--Intellectual: liberality, and perfected self-mastery--Moral: in
Speaking of a man's Moral character, we do not say he is a scientific
Or intelligent but a meek man, or one of perfected self-mastery: and we
Praise the man of science in right of his mental state; and of these
Such as are praiseworthy we call Excellences