NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
Adam Silver
Commissioner
May 28, 2015
Dear Jody, Chadwick, Neil and Kate:
Thanks for your letter and for devoting FiveThirtyEight's considerable resources (and those of your readers/listeners) to addressing the NBA Draft Lottery.
I was impressed with the detail and sophistication on display in many of the proposals — though I can't say I'll be riding a bear into the Lottery room any time soon. From the Tombstone Date to the Tweaked Wheel, I am grateful for the hard work of all 7,000 pa**ionate basketball fans who took the time to examine our Draft Lottery from every conceivable angle.
Of course, there can only be one winning proposal, and the work of the Futures Draft Planning Committee is a worthy champion. It is thorough, well researched and addresses many of the questions we are currently facing with the Draft Lottery; in fact, our internal Draft Lottery working team looked at models very similar to the one proposed by Samuel and Cody. While we continue to study this concept, we believe that "NBA Futures" runs into some of the same problems as other proposals we have considered — namely, by solving one potential problem, it creates a host of new ones.
To elaborate, we believe the proposed system would represent a change in two major areas:
First, it creates more variability; it is difficult to predict exactly where a team will finish in a particular year, so there is not a guaranteed reward for getting the first selection of a surrogate" team. However, we believe there would be a strong correlation between the selection order of surrogate teams and their actual performance (based on the high correlation of teams' year-over-year performance). This suggests that there would indeed still be an incentive to be among the worst-performing teams in any given year.
Second, “NBA Futures" delays the allocation of high draft picks to poor performing teams; for example, Team X finishes with the worst record in year 1 and gets the right to select its surrogate team first – Team . As described above, we would expect Team Y to perform poorly in year 2 more often than not, thus resulting in a high draft pick for Team X after year 2. Under our current system, Team X would get a high draft pick after year 1.
It is debatable whether the goals of increased variability and delayed allocation of high draft picks to poor-performing teams are the right ones. If we were in fact seeking to accomplish these two goals, there are several approaches that might be more straightforward. For example:
-- To add variability, level out the odds for the worst performing teams
-- To delay pick allocation, tie lottery odds to performance from one year prior
The proposed system could also create strange incentives around surrogate team selection: Will teams be inclined to select a surrogate in their division or conference for competitive purposes? Will teams try to sign their surrogates top free agent simply to make them worse? There could also be situations in which a team would have incentive to contribute to its non-surrogates improvement.
And even though it sounds like Samuel and Cody have thought of contingencies like no trade clauses between surrogate teams, the proposal would likely add a significant layer of complexity to the trading of draft picks.
Finally, its worth noting that the timing of surrogate selection would be very important. Wherever set, it could become subject to gamesmanship by teams sequencing transactions or disclosing (or not disclosing) information, like injuries, on either side of the deadline.
As you can see, while there appears to be a growing consensus that we need to reform the Draft Lottery, finding the right balance of competing interests, especially one that will gain the support of three-quarters of NBA teams (the vote required to make the change), is a work in-progress. Regardless of the outcome, all of us at the NBA thank you for your contributions to a lively debate. Please keep the ideas coming!
Sincerely,
(Adam Signature)