Fidel Castro - CASTRO STATEMENT ON CUBAN-CPR RELATIONS lyrics

Havana--We now give the statement made by Maj. Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba and Prime Minister of the revolutionary government, in reply to statements made by the Government of the People's Republic of China on trade relations with China: In connection with my statements in the 2 January speech and subsequent statements from the Cuban Foreign Trade Ministry the Chinese Government has made two statements in an effort to justify its conduct in the matter of trade relations with Cuba. These statements by the Chinese Government, put in the mouth of a supposed official of that country's Foreign Trade Ministry, are extremely deceptive. Nobody will believe that in China a simple, unknown official in the Foreign Trade Ministry can make statements calling a liar the prime minister of a socialist state with which formal diplomatic relations are maintained and, by virtue of their political content and disrespectful form, involving the possibility of seriously affecting relations between two countries like Cuba and China. Two things must be stated before anything else: first, this manner of proceeding is very hypocritical, because such statements can only come from the highest echelons of the Chinese Government; second, as well as being dishonest, this method reveals a feeling of contempt for other peoples, for it is tantamount to saying that the statement of the prime minister of a small state, even though the matter being discussed seriously affects that state, deserve a reply only from some anonymous, lesser official of China's Foreign Trade Ministry. We will not make use of such hypocritical, contemptuous procedures because we are no accustomed to it; nor do we distinguish between big nations and small nations in matters pertaining to the defense of our country's dignity or to the respect we owe others, regardless of what consequences may ensue. This conduct of the Chinese Government goes beyond the limits of a discussion based strictly on figures and data related to trade. Now that this point has been reached, it is almost idle to argue about these figures and data. Nevertheless we must not leave unanswered the statements and conclusions in that field which the Chinese Government is trying to defend. On 2 January I did not wish to judge, define, or qualify the measures of an economic nature; adopted by the Chinese Government, even though I had more than enough basis for doing so. I confined myself to stating that there would be a sudden, unexpected reduction of imports from China. I set forth the reasons invoked for this by the Chinese Government, and the consequences that this had for our country in the immediate present. I said textually: "There is one product that will be a problem to us this year for reasons beyond our control, and that product is rice. I am going to explain the reasons why we will have less rice, basing my statements on this report from our Foreign Trade Ministry in connection with trade with the Chinese People's Republic. It says: "'For the year 1966 our policy on trade with China we oriented toward continuing the increase in the volume of trade, thereby continuing the trend of the last few years. Exports planned for 1966 came to 110 million and imports to 140 million. These sums, compared with preceding years, called for increases sugar deliveries by us and increases rice deliveries by the other party. "'In mid-November our delegation, headed by the director of our ministry, Comrade Ismael Bello, arrived in Peking to discuss the 1966 trade protocol to be signed in Havana. After several interviews with the Chinese officials the latter officially set forth the following: "'Sugar: The Chinese cannot accept the 800,000 tons of sugar offered for the following reasons: "'A--They had a big crop this year. "'B--In 1961 the USSR loaned them 500,000 tons of sugar, repayable in the same product. This year they have finished paying back that sugar to the USSR, using some of the sugar they bought from Cuba. "'C--The Chinese people currently do not require coupons for purchases of sugar since there is enough to meet the demand. "'The amount of rice supplied Cuba in 1965, 250,000 tons, was an exception, in response to the request addressed to the Chinese amba**ador by Prime Minister Fidel Castro. "'Even though they had a good crop, for 1966 they see no prospect for an amount greater than 135,000 metric tons, the 1964 figure, for the following reasons: "'B--(as received) The aid they have to give Vietnam. "'C--A deficit in the production of other grains that obliges them to import for the capitalist areas; as a result, they have to use certain quantities of rice to obtain foreign currency for this purpose. "'When our delegation brought up the question of using the remainder of the 10 million from the 1960 credit to partially finance the unfavorable trade balance that would occur in 1966 according to our export and import figures, the Chinese delegates replied: "'Use of the economic credit was not in their competence but must be brought up at government level, but as for the products and quantities they could furnish us, their offers were a maximum and hence final. They said that in this way the volume of trade would more or less attain the 1964 level, since it would be balanced trade. "'Commercial implications of this; says the foreign trade report. "'Although the Chinese speak of brining our trade to the 1964 level by not allowing an imbalance as in previous years, actually it is only our exports that are brought to the 1964 level, while the value of our imports will drop to a level below that of any year of trade form 1961 to 1965, since 1961 when our trade was established, as customary among socialist countries, by means of yearly trade protocols.'" The Chinese side has not been able either to refute or to conceal any of the essential points of all the questions presented. They have limited themselves exclusively to the discussion of a single--point whether it is true or not that the volume of exports that Cuba will receive from China in 1966 will be larger or smaller than in previous years. They have been unable to deny that the exports offered by Cuba, including the 800,000 tons of sugar, would amount to 110 million pesos and that Cuban needs were estimated at 140 million pesos. They have been unable to deny that the Chinese Government rejected the offer of 800,000 tons of sugar and the arguments used to justify that refusal, that is, that: 1--They had had a large harvest this year; 2--That USSR lent them 500,000 tons of sugar in 1961 to be repaid with the same product and this year they finished repaying the sugar to the USSR using part of the sugar they bought from Cuba for that purpose; and 3--The Chinese people currently do not require ration coupons to purchase sugar, since sufficient quantities of it exist to satisfy the demand. They have been unable to deny that they agreed to turn over to Cuba in 1966 only 135,000 metric tons of rice, that is, 115,000 tons less than the previous year and 145,000 tons less than our needs. They have not been able to justify the arguments used to the effect, namely, that in spite of having had a good harvest, they saw no possibility in 1966 for exporting larger quantities than in 1964, when the amount was 135,000 tons, for the following reasons: 1--The need to set up reserves in case of an attack by the Yankee imperialists; 2--The aid they have to give Vietnam; 3--A deficit in the production of other grains which forces them to import from the capitalist area; they must, therefore, export some quantities of rice to obtain exchange for that purpose. They have been unable to deny that when our delegation proposed to use the 10 millions in credit finance in part the resulting imbalance, the Chinese side replied that the matter should be proposed at government level but that as far as the products and quantities that could be turned over, the Chinese offer was the maximum to be expected and therefore definite. They have not been able to deny that the Cuban delegation was informed, moreover--a thing that has not happened in any previous year--that the trade deal would be balanced, and this in commercial terms means that no credit whatsoever can be expected. Essentially, they have not been able to deny that the Chinese side presented in a clear and precise manner the following four points: 1--Our export of sugar, which is fundamentally the product what which we pay for our imports, would be limited to only 600,000 tons; 2--The quantities of products offers to us were the maximum and definite; 3--The imbalance would terminate this year; 4--The rice, the traditional and considerable product of Cuban consumption, would be cut back to almost half the amount of the previous year. They have not been able to deny that these points were made to the Cuban side in an absolutely surprising manner toward the end of 1965 and that our government had received no indication at all that this was to be the new trade policy of the Chinese Government toward Cuba. Not being able to deny any of these essential points, I repeat, they have limited themselves exclusively to the discussion of a secondary point, that is, whether or not it is true that the volume of exports that Cuba will get from China in 1966 will be greater or smaller than in previous years, that is, since 1961. What they did in an attempt to refute this in the 9 January declaration was to speak of total trade volume and, without offering any other date, to state that the information of the Cuba Mincex read by me on 2 January, to the effect that the imports would be lower than any of those years, was false. Nevertheless, the Cuban Foreign Trade Ministry on 12 January supplied the following figures regarding the Cuban imports from China: 1961, 98.6 million; 1962, 89.8 million; 1963, 90.8 million; 1964, 109.3 million; 1965, 128.9 million; 1966, 85.0 million. It is new statement of 30 December, the Chinese Government, again avoiding the essential points and insisting on the point relating to the comparison with previous years, tried to criticize the method used by the Cuban Mincex, claiming that it used three categories of figures. In its turn, basing itself, it says, on the lists of the protocols, the Chinese Government declares that the Chinese exports to Cuba were: 1961, 108.00; 1962, 62.00; 1963, 77.61; 1964, 95.11; 1965, 127.00; 1966, (84.50). Very well, let us see how the Cuban Mincex arrived at its figures. For the years 1961, 1962, 1963, and 1964 it took the most accurate data that could exist, which consists of the physical goods that really entered and left the country, inasmuch as if often happens that the figures agreed upon in the protocols vary considerably during the course of their execution. With regard to 1965, during the month of December, which is when the Mincex made its report, it was from all points of view impossible to use the same method, based on the totality of the goods that entered and left, because among other things, the year had not ended and because a certain amount of time is needed to receive, confirm, and process the data. In this case, for the aforementioned year, the ministry was obliged to use the figures contained in the protocol, even though they, as has been noted could vary considerably from reality. Similarly, with regard to 1966, which is beginning, the ministry could only count the figures of the goods offered by China as being maximum and conclusive during the negotiations. Did not the Chinese Government also take these figures for 1966 as the basis for its comparison? Then the Chinese Government used different categories of data, too, one for the years 1961-1965--the protocol lists--and another for the year 1966--the Chinese offers in the negotiations. There is only one substantial difference; between the data supplied by the Cuban and the Chinese foreign trade ministries. It is that the data used by Cuba during the years 1961-1964, which covered two-thirds of the six-year period being an*lyzed and which can really express the rhythm of the development of the exchange between the two countries is based precisely on the goods that have arrived in or have departed physically from the country, while the data of the Chinese Government, in absolute disregard of the reality, bases itself on the capricious view that the lists of goods protocolized on paper are more reliable than the goods that actually arrived in one or the other country. Such good occasionally surpa** the protocol amounts, as happened in 1962 when, 62 millions having been agreed upon, 89.8 millions were received, which is what really counts and what we have used in our figures. Other years, such as 1961, with 108 millions having been agreed upon, 98.6 millions in imports reached Cuba, which is what counts and what we have used. On the other hand, there could be no possibility that during 1966 the goods to be received would surpa** the figures agreed upon because the Chinese party declared categorically--which had not occurred in any previous year--that the amounts offered would be the maximum and conclusive. The use by China of the argument of categories is performed with evident bad faith to confuse inexpert persons, to conceal the weakness of its position, and to make it seem that the Cuban Mincex is playing with figures in an irresponsible manner. In my 2 January speech I also said; "Taking into account the fact that per capita consumption of rice was very high in the CPR and the consumption of sugar very low, and taking into account, by myself, that in China, unlike Cuba, sugar is priced to the population four or five times higher than rice, while in Cuba the price of rice was two or three times higher than that of sugar, I though it could be mutually convenient to both countries to have greater exchange of sugar for rice. Therefore, I made the proposal--which in my opinion was highly beneficial to that country and also to outs--that we were willing to deliver two tons of sugar for each ton of rice sent us by China. "I made this proposal considering a series of circumstances--as I said--among other, the principle of the international division of work, the fact that we are a country that has traditionally cultivated sugarcane and we are sugar producers; that we are a country which knows how to cultivate sugarcane and which can be capable of obtaining very high sugar yields per hectare of sugarcane, that is not our situation with rice, in relation to which we do not have the same experience nor the large quantities of water, nor large rivers, nor large areas with optimum conditions for the cultivation of rive, nor do we know the best techniques, nor do we have the best varieties of seed, as happens, on the other hand, with sugarcane." Further on, I said: "And it must be said that on that occasion the response was more than we expected. They accepted the proposal and even proposes that the exchange not be made in the manner we said, but that we continue to pay the same price for the rice." In this regard, what do they deny? They deny that it was true that the exchange offered was one for one, but was, rather, three for two. In this regard, the Cuban Mincex explained with complete clarity: "In October 1964 preliminary talks were initiated in Havana to be followed in Peking later by those dealing with the trade protocol for 1965. The Chinese party had already agreed to send us that year 150,000 tons of rice, which constituted a slight increase over the figure of 1964, 135,000 tons. Therefore, Cuba could receive in 1965, 150,000 tons of rice which, at a price fluctuating between 145 and 150 pesos per ton depending on the variety of rice, would be exchange for an equivalent of approximately 165,000 tons of sugar according to the stipulated price of 6.11 centavos per pound. "It was on that occasion that the Premier of the Cuban Revolutionary Government proposed increasing the trade of rice for sugar, exchanging annually--as the Chinese foreign trade office admits, according to the NCNA text--370,000 tons of sugar for 250,000 tons of rice, that is, instead of 150,000 tons, China would deliver 250,000 tons of rice, and, instead of 165,000 tons of sugar, Cuba could deliver 370,000 tons. Arithmetically speaking, Cuba would deliver approximately 205,000 tons more of sugar, and, if the arithmetic is not mistaken, this represents a ratio of almost exactly two for one. Therefore, the statement by the premier that the Cuban proposal involved an increase in the exchange of sugar for rice at the rate of two tons of sugar for each tone of rice is strictly correct" The Chinese Government replied to these irrefutable arguments and data by saying that "the Ministry of Foreign Trade made a great effort and produced some strange figures to prove that what Prime Minister Fidel Castro has said about the exchange of two tons of Cuban sugar for one ton of Chinese rice was strictly true." Evidently, a simple arithmetic problems is a great effort for the Chinese Government and the figures that do not suit them they consider strange figures. The error of the Chinese Government is that it an*lyzes figures without bearing in mind at all that it had been agreed that the first 150,000 tons of rice were to be sold for the equivalent price of approximately 165,000 tons of sugar, that is, at the rate of 1.1 for one-the rate established when I proposed to increase the sugar quota from 165,000 to 370,000 tons, that is, 205,000 tons more sugar in exchange for 100,000 additional tons of rice, at the rate of two for one. This, added to the amount already agreed upon at another price, would make a total of 250,000 tons of rice for Cuba. They simply limit themselves to comparing the total figures. However, whatever the criterion they used to an*lyze the figures, the fact remains that they would receive 205,000 tons more sugar by shipping us only 100,000 additional tons of rice. Can they deny that this arrangement would have been most advantageous to the Chinese people? However, the essential point of all this is that they have had to admit the following? 1--The Cuban Government proposed at the end of 1964 a special rate of exchange of sugar for rice; 2--The Cuban proposal was conceived in terms of exchanging larger quantities of sugar for rice, contrary to what had been agreed upon in other exchanges; 3--As a result of this proposal, they agreed to hand over 250,000 tons of rice; 4--As I said on 2 January, they had agreed to turn over the requested amount of rice but had refused to pay a higher price than the one agreed upon for the sugar. How did the Cuban Government interpret the Chinese reply? This is an important question. When China agreed to increase its rice exports to Cuba to 250,000 tons, we had to consider this an affirmative reply to our proposal, in which we clearly indicated our annual need of the product so important for national consumption. The Chinese refusal to accept a greater price in sugar in return seemed to us consistent with the spirit of collaboration that had always guided the Chinese Government in its relations with us and was never considered a refusal of the pledge to supply us with the minimum amount requested. The interpretation that the Chinese Government has now given this question-- a favor for one year and something absolutely not proposed by us--reveals an ambiguous conduct of procedure and constitutes a betrayal of Cuba's good faith. We never though that the Chinese Government--as though hiding a dagger--reserved the right, absolutely unilaterally and without any kind of warning or previous discussion, to interpret the scope of its pledge precisely at a time when out country was not in a position nor had the means of acquiring the rice in other markets. In connection with the rationing we have force to establish, as a result of the drastic and unexpected cut in the exports of rice to Cuba by the Chinese Government, the latter said the following in its last statement: " . . . Cuba began to ration rice in 1962 with a monthly quota of six pounds per capita. The total amount of rice exported by the country to Cuba in that same years was 120,000 tons. In the following two years--1963 and 1964--our country exported 135,000 tons of rice yearly to Cuba and the per capita quota of the product for the Cuban population remained unchanged. Our exports of rice to Cuba were almost doubled in 1965, but the per capita quote for the Cuban people was not increased. According to the figures discussed by both parties in the preliminary talks, the export of Chinese rice to Cuba in 1966 will be lower than in 1965. However, in spite of all, it will be higher than in 1962 and equal to the exports in 1963 and 1964. In view of these facts, how can on arbitrarily connect the reduction in the Chinese rice export quota to Cuba with the problem of trade between China and Cuba?" We cannot but consider this argument cynical. The Chinese Government cannot ignore that in the years 1962, 1963, and 1964 Cuba supplies itself from other markets also; that in many of these possible suppliers, we encountered growing difficulties of a political nature as a result of the Yankee blockade; that no Latin America country, save Mexico, trades with Cuba; and that those which had not broken off trade, such as Uruguay and others, did so after the OAS agreement decreed the Yankee imperialism in the consultative meeting held in Washington in July 1964, in which measures were taken against Cuba under the accusation of it having sent weapons to the Venezuelan revolutionaries, and, consequently, those countries were obliged to break off diplomatic, consular, and trade relations with our country. Moreover, to supply ourselves with rice form the few possible places, our purchasing power is limited by the prices of sugar on the so-called world market. The government of China cannot ignore the sugar prices in the years it mentions. According to average spot prices in London, they were: 1962, 2.89 centavos per pound, FOB; 1963, 8.50; 1964, 5.88, and 1965, 2.15 per pound; with the average prices during the last five months of 1965 having been the following: August, 1.87; September, 1.93; October, 2.08; November, 1.85; and December, 2.04. If, during the month of December of this same year in which the prices have been so poor, our Mincex receives the surprising news that the Chinese Government will send 115,000 fewer tons of rice than the previous year and 145,000 tons less than are needed, how can the Cuban Government avoid reducing the quote for the population in 1966? How can the Chinese Government attempt to ignore these realities and declare, without blushing, that "if the Cuban party had sincerely wished--for reasons of difficulties (few words indistinct) with foreign countries--our country to export more rice to Cuba in 1966, it could have brought up the matter in negotiations on the highest level, as it did in the past." Naturally, the (Cuban) Government had--as I will explain later--abundant reasons to do that. But before getting to that point, we want to ask what could the Chinese people think of the Cuban Government, knowing their sugar needs total 600,000 tons, (few words indistinct) we replied that we intended to reduce delivery to 300,000 because we had to sell the reserve to obtain foreign exchange with which to obtain various articles. However, despite the fact that Cuba has suffered the most severe drought of the last 60 years, that its production will not be the same, but rather lower than the previous year, that sugar on the world market has reached the lowest price in recent decades, and that Yankee imperialism has strengthened the blockade against us--despite all this, instead of reduction of 300,000 we proposed sending 800,000. With less sugar, we offered more; you, with more rive, offered less. For our part, in the middle of a drought, the blockage, and low prices, we offered to increase deliveries of our main trade article; you, while acknowledging that you had good crops, cut rice deliveries to us by almost 60 percent. The representatives of the Chinese Government, in addition, alleged a need to build up rice stocks to as to be prepared in case of Yankee aggression. Does not Cuba run an equal or greater risk of Yankee aggression than the Chinese People's Republic? And in case of aggression, how could a bit of food reach our shores, thousands of miles from any country of the socialist camp? By what means, across what frontier, could Cuba be supplied? According to the Chinese Government's concept of international obligations, it is obvious that a country like ours, weaker militarily, more vulnerable to aggression, has no right to think of stocks, has no right even to maintain a modest ration of food supplies that it had been obliged to establish because of the blockade imposed by the Yankee imperialists. We do not blame the Chinese Government alone for the cut in that quota. The responsibilities lies, first of all, with the Yankee imperialists who established the economic blockade against use, and then the Chinese Government for having in fact joined in that blockade, and every year this or that difference of opinion arises in them, but Prime Minister Fidel Castro had never before proceeded in this way. Then why he suddenly take this extraordinary step on the eve of the Havana solidarity conference of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America? This is food for thought. In its statement of 30 January 1966 the Chinese Government insists with even greater guile: "We have carefully studied the reply from the Cuban Foreign Trade Ministry and we consider that it has not answered the central question I put in my statements of 8 January, to wit, the question of why Prime Minister Fidel Castro, on the eve of the solidarity conference of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, unexpectedly, unilaterally, and in a manner not in keeping with the facts, made known the content of the preliminary negotiations on trade for 1966 between China and Cuba while those negotiations were in progress and circumstances were such that the Cuban Government could perfectly well approach the Chinese Government with any different ideas or request it might have." At the end of this statement it repeats, with the most venomous intent, the same insinuating, subtle, cynical idea: "If really, because of difficulties, in its relations with foreign countries, the Cuban side had wished sincerely for our country to export more rice to Cuba in 1966, it could perfectly well have set forth the matter in negotiations at a higher level, as it did in the past. But at a time when the preliminary negotiations between the delegations of our two countries' foreign trade ministries were still going on, the Cuban side unilaterally made public, and in a manner not in keeping with the facts, the content of the negotiations and it laid on China the blame for reducing the rice ration for the inhabitants of Cuba. This forces us to suspect that in acting in this way the Cuban side is pursuing some other objective." It insists on the same idea three times. It talks as if relations between our two countries at that moment were exactly the same as in previous years, as if our relations were continuing in the greatest harmony, as if serious matters that gravely disturbed those relations had never taken place prior to the negotiations of December 1965, and as if, as a result, the Cuban Government's position was illogical, odd, abnormal, suspicious, a problem created in the most artificial manner with hidden intent in mind. And who knows what hidden intent! It tries to sow doubts with the worst kind of venom in an insinuating, sly, subtle way. This argument has been used with the greatest ill-faith, because the Chinese Government has sought to make use of the fact that certain matters were not public knowledge in order to deceive and sow confusion. This is even more repulsive if one takes into account the fact that the Government of Cuba did not want to take the painful step of revealing these matters. In my 2 January speech I confined myself strictly to speaking of the difficulties that arose in regard to trade, without qualifying China's conduct, without going further into the problem, because it was extremely painful and disagreeable to have to divulge other more serious matters that had occurred previously and which explained quite clearly and true motives of China's conduct. At the same time the Chinese Government talks as if 2 January had something to do with the Tricontinental Conference, as if it were not the celebration of our national holiday, for the rebel army victory in 1959, the date when we meet with the people at ma** gatherings every year to discuss the country's fundamental problems. It seeks to completely ignore the nature of that date and the fact that fresh difficulties, which would begin to make themselves felt immediately, would have to be explained to the people. This had absolutely nothing to do with the Tricontinental Conference. We, however, can say that precisely on the eve of this solidarity conference of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America the Chinese Government committed a criminal act of economic aggression against our country, in a year of serious difficulties with the climate, extraordinary low prices on the world market for our chief export product, and a rigorous imperialist economic blockade that hampers or prevents trade with many countries. The Chinese Government could not have chosen a more timely or more suitable moment to deal our people a telling blow, and what is even more serious, just before the conference of solidarity among the peoples of the three continents. This does deserve serious thought. What we are going to say now we could have said on 2 January, and thereby have explained the motive behind the Chinese Government's conduct. However we did not do so. It is the Chinese Government, with its perfidy, hypocrisy, malevolent insinuations, and disdain for our small country, that forces us to do so. Three months before the start of the trade talks, 14 September 1965, at 10 o'clock in the morning, the President of the republic, Comrade Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, and I, in my position as Prime Minister, summoned the charge d'affaires of the Chinese People's republic to discuss questions which in our opinion were extremely serious. Even though the Chinese Government was perfectly aware--because the Government of Cuba had stated it, even publicly--of our stand on the distribution of propaganda material in our country on matters of a political nature, particularly matters that tend to deepen the differences among socialist peoples and states, the representative of Cuba of the Chinese Government had completely disregarded our injunctions, ignoring our government's exclusive prerogatives as head of a sovereign country. This stand of the Government of Cuba had been very clearly set forth on 13 March 1965 at the university terraces, at which time we also clearly stated our opinion on the split in the socialist camp and the imperialist aggression in Vietnam. On what occasion we stated unequivocally: "We small countries, which do not rest on the strength of armies of millions of men, which do not rest on the strength of atomic might, we small countries like Vietnam and Cuba have enough instinct to see cooly and understand that nobody more than we, in special situations--here 90 miles from the Yankee empire, and there being attacked by Yankee planes--are affected by these splits and this discord that weaken the strength of the socialist camp. "It is not a question here of an*lyzing in the field of theory, in the field of philosophy, the matters in dispute, but of keeping in mind the great truth that when confronted with an attacking enemy, and with an increasingly aggressive enemy, disunion has no reason for existence, disunion is senseless, disunion had no motive. In any epoch of history, in any period of mankind, since the first revolutionary appeared in the work from the time revolutions arose as social phenomena in which the ma**es acted instinctively, to the time revolutions became conscious, became tasks and phenomena fully understood by the people--something that occurs when Marxism appears--disunion, in the face of the enemy, was never proper strategy, it was never revolutionary strategy, it was never intelligent strategy. "In this revolutionary process of all of us from the start have been trained in the idea that everything which divided weakened, that everything which disunited was bad for our people and good for imperialism. And the ma**es of our people understood from the first the need for unity, and unity became an essential matter for the revolution, unity became a clamor of the ma**es, unity became a watch-word for all the people. And we ask whether the imperialists have disappeared, we ask whether the imperialists are not attacking North Vietnam, we ask whether men and women are not dying over there? "And whom are they going to show, whom are they going to convince, that disunion is advisable, that disunion is useful? Perchance the imperialist advance over there is not seen? Perchance they do not see the tactics the imperialists follow over there to crush the revolutionary movement in South Vietnam, by first making air raids on North Vietnam on the pretext of retaliation, then claiming the right to attack whenever it suits them, and continuing with the use of ma**es of planes against the fighters in South Vietnam? "The imperialists reserve for themselves the right to wage this kind of air warfare with the minimum of sacrifice, bombing with hundreds of planes and then taking the luxury of going to rescue the pilots of the downed planes by helicopter. (Really), the imperialists want a very comfortable kind of war. "Indubitably the imperialists want a kind of war which will cost them only industrial-losses! That is, 'so many planes lost.' Indubitably the people of South Vietnam and the people of North Vietnam are suffering all of this! And they are suffering it in their own flesh, because those denying there are men and women, both in the south and in the north, victims of Yankee machinegun fire, victims of Yankee bombings. "The imperialists have not the slightest hesitation of declaring that they propose to continue doing all this because even the attacks on North Vietnam have succeeded in overcoming the division with the socialist family and who can doubt that this division encourages the imperialists? Who can doubt that a united front against the imperialist enemy would have made them hesitate, would have made them think carefully before launching their adventurous attacks and their increasingly brazen intervention in the part of the world? Can anyone be convinced of this? With what argument? With what logic? "Who are those who benefit? The imperialists! Who are the victims? The Vietnamese! Who suffers? The prestige of socialism, the prestige of the international communist movement, the international revolutionary movement! And this must really pain us because for us the liberation movement is not a demogogic phrase, but a call to action which we have always felt. "We are a small country which does not aspired to become the center of the world; we are small people who do not aspire to become the revolutionary center of the world. And when we talk of these problems we speak with absolute sincerity. We speak with absolute unselfishness and we speak as people who did not win revolutionary power in any bourgeois elections, but in armed combat. We speak in the name of a people who for six years unshakably resisted, without vacillation, the snared and the threats of imperialism! "We speak in the name of the people who did not hesitate--for the sake of the strength of the revolutionary movement, for the sake of the socialist camp, for the sake of their own firm determination to defend the resolution against the imperialists--to risk the dangers of thermonuclear war, the nuclear attack against us, when in our country and in our territory--with full and absolute right, which we have not renounced and in an absolutely legitimate action, of which we shall never repent--we agreed to the installation of strategic thermonuclear missiles on our territory! Moreover, not only did we agree to having them brought in, we disagreed with their removal! I believe that this is a secret to no one. "We are a nation and a people--on whose behalf we speak--which do not receive Yankee credits nor food for peace and which do not have the slightest link with the imperialists; that is, in the field of revolutionary conviction and sincerity no one has taught us--no one has taught us--just as no one taught our liberators of 1895 and 1868 the road of independence and dignity. We are the people of the second Havana declaration, which we did not copy from any document, but which was the pure expression of the profoundly revolutionary and highly internationalist spirit of our people. "Since that has been the feeling and the thought of our revolution, demonstrated on every occasion on which it has been necessary and demonstrated without any kind of vacillation, without contradictions of any kind, that is why we have the right to ask--as many other peoples must ask themselves--who profits by this discord if not our enemies? Therefore, we have the complete and absolute right--which I do not think anyone will dare to question--to proscribe from our country and from the midst of our people such discord and such Byzantine battles. "And it is well for it to be known that here the propaganda is made by our party! That here, the orientation is drafted by our party! That here, that is a question that falls under our jurisdiction! and that if we do not want the apple of discord to come here because we do not feel like it, no one can smuggle to us the apple of discord! That our enemies, our enemies, our only enemies are the Yankee imperialists! Our only unsurmountable contradictions is with Yankee imperialism! The only adversary against which we are willing to break alliances is imperialism! "Our position is one: We are in favor of giving Vietnam all the aid that may be necessary! We are in favor of that aid being in weapons and in men! We are in favor of the socialist camp running the risks that may be necessary for Vietnam! "We are well aware that in the case of any serious international complications we will be one of the first targets of imperialism, but that doe not now nor has it ever concerned us. That is, in all frankness and with all sincerity, our reasoned, dispa**ionate position emanated from the right to think, emanated from the right to reason, and emanated from our very legitimate and inviolable right to adopt the measures and act in the way that we deem most just and most revolutionary without anyone thinking that they can give us lessons in being revolutionaries. "I hope that the mistake will not be made of understanding, of failing to realize the idiosyncrasy of our people; because heaps of mistakes of this kind have been committed by Yankee imperialism, one of whose characteristics is contempt for others, contempt for and underestimation of small peoples. This imperialism has committed great, huge mistakes in underestimating our revolutionary people; it would be deplorable if others should commit similar mistakes. Our sincere policy has been and is to unite, because we are not and never shall be satellites of anyone! "Great are the dangers which lie in wait for us, but these are not to be fought with irrelevant discord, academic verbosity. No! They are to be opposed with revolutionary firmness, revolutionary integrity, the will to fight. The imperialist enemy cannot be fought effectively in any part of the world with the revolutionaries attacking one another. There must be unity and cohesion in the revolutionary ranks. For those who did not believe that this is the correct tactic for the international communist movement, we tell them that for us here, on our little island, in our territory, in the front line trench, 90 miles from the imperialists, this is the correct tactic!" Despite this absolutely clear position, the unmistakable expression of the will of our people and of the policy we propose to follow, the Chinese Government has increased the shipment and ma** distribution of propaganda material to our country, both directly from China and through its diplomatic representatives. One 12 September the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces reported that a ma** distribution of this material was being systematically conducted by representatives of the Chinese Government among the officers of the revolutionary armed forces of Cuba. This propaganda was being sent to the general staffs of the armies, to the staffs of the various arms administrations, to the heads of political sections, and in many cases directly to officers of our armed forces at their homes addresses. On occasion Chinese representatives tried to make direct contact with Cuban officers and went so far sometime as to approach officers in an apparent effort to influence them personally, either seeking to proselytize or sometimes to obtain information. A type of ma**ive distribution of propaganda, similar to the one mentioned in this Minfar report, was carried out among many civil functionaries of the state, although to a less intense degree. This was a really senseless thing which no sovereign state, no government that respects itself, will ever tolerate; a flagrant violation of the norms of the most elemental respect that should exist between socialist and even nonsocialist countries. Our revolutionary state could not allow such an attempt to influence military and administrative cadres by acts that constitute a betrayal of the trust, friendship, and brotherhood with which our country receives the representatives of any socialist state. This was the reason that on 14 September we expressed our protest in the most energetic terms to the CPR charge d'affaires--the amba**ador was absent--and our demand that such activities cease. We very clearly told the representative of the Chinese Government that those methods and procedures were exactly the same as the ones used by the U.S. Emba**y in our country when it attempted to meddle in the internal affairs of Cuba and impose its will on the nation in one way or another; that our country had liberated itself from that imperialism 90 miles from our shores and it was not willing to permit another powerful state to come 20,000 kilometers to impose similar practices on us; that we considered the actions of the representatives of the Chinese Government to be in frank violation of the sovereignty of our country and harmful to the prerogatives that pertain exclusively to our government within our borders; and that no matter what the cost, our government was not willing to tolerate such things. After extensively expressing those points with an abundance of arguments and in energetic terms, we expressed our protest against the slander campaign against the Cuban revolution that was being carried our in some parts of the world by elements closely linked to the Chinese Government which, from our point of view, made more serious the Chinese representatives' lack of compliance with the requirements made regarding the ma**ive distribution of propaganda dealing with typically political matters. Despite the warning, made in the most precise and conclusive manner, the Chinese Government and its representatives, with the insolence of out omnipotent and complete scorn for our country, sent more than 800 bags containing bulletins with political propaganda material for distribution in Cuba. After the aforementioned interview, there arrived: in September--bulletin No. 37, 200 copies; bulletin No. 38, 190 copies; bulletin No. 39, 3,816 copies; in October-- bulletin No. 40, 7,448 copies; bulletin No. 41, 6,816 copies; bulletin No. 42, 4,827 copies; bulletin No. 43, 10,043 copies; in November--bulletin No. 44, 7,178 copies; bulletin No. 45, 2,671 copies; bulletin No. 46, 2,204 copies; bulletin No. 47, 2,668 copies, in December--bulletin No. 50, 1,522 copies; bulletin No. 51, 1,311 copies; bulletin No. 52, 1,559 copies; in January bulletin No. 1, 1,099 copies; bulletin No. 2, 1,1075 copies; bulletin No. 3, 1,200 copies. The total of these bulletins delivered to Cuba from abroad since the direct, personal warning from the President of the Republic and the Premier of the Revolutionary Government is 58,041. Also, since that date tens of thousands of other bulletins and material of a political nature, printed or accumulated by the Chinese representatives in Cuba, have been distributed. Such propaganda material has continued to be received uninterruptedly by the armed forces general staff, the general staffs of the army corps, of the divisions, of the arms administrations, and by the heads of political sections. This has happened despite the fact that CPR charge d'affaires informed us on 14 September that he would inform the government of his country and it would answer the objections raised. Not the slightest explanation from the Chinese Government has arrived. It has continued to conduct its activities and it gave is answer very obviously and very clearly when our trade delegation arrived in China to discuss trade for 1966. It gave its answer in the form of a brutal economic reprisal for purely political reasons. Naturally these activities will cease. Once this has been explained, we have the right to ask: how could the Chinese Government expect that the Cuban Government would humbly go higher up to beg, to implore, that they give us a credit, that they accept the 800,000 tons of sugar, that they restore the 115,00 tons of rice, that they allow us a trade imbalance as in previous years, when from the first moment we understood the obvious extortionist position taken by China in the trade negotiations? This expectation on the part of the Chinese Government can be explained only as a display of absolute contempt toward our country; of total ignorance of the character and sense of dignity of our people. It was not simply a matter of more or less tons of rice, or more or less square meters of cloth; which were also involved, but of a much more important and fundamental questions for the peoples: whether in the world of tomorrow and powerful nations can a**ume the right to blackmail, extort, pressure, attack, and strangle small peoples; whether in the world of tomorrow, which the revolutionaries are struggling to establish, there are to continue to prevail the worst methods of piracy, oppression, and filibusterism which have been established in the world since a cla** society has existed by regimes of slavery, feudal regimes, absolute monarchies, the bourgeois states, and, in the contemporary world, the imperialist states. Fidel Castro, premier of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba. -END-