Central Intelligence Agency - CIA Assa**ination Proposals (Operation PBFORTUNE, Guatemala) lyrics

Following a visit to Washington by Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza in April 1952, in which Somoza boasted that if provided arms he and Guatemalan exile Carlos Castillo Armas could overthrow Arbenz, President Harry Truman asked DCI Smith to investigate the possibility. Smith sent an agent, codenamed SEEKFORD, to contact Guatemalan dissidents about armed action against the Arbenz regime. After seeing his report, [ ] Chief of the [ ] Division of the Directorate of Plans (DP), proposed to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles that the Agency supply Castillo Armas with arms and $225,000 and that Nicaragua and Honduras furnish the Guatemalans with air support. Gaining Department of State support, Smith, on 9 September 1952, officially approved [ ]'s request to initiate operation PBFORTUNE to aid Guatemalan exiles in overthrowing Arbenz. Planning for PBFORTUNE lasted barely a month, however, when Smith terminated if after he learned in October that it had been blown. Throughout planning for PBFORTUNE there were proposals for a**a**ination. Even months before the official approval of PBFORTUNE, Directorate of Plans (DP) officers compiled a “hit list.” Working from an old 1949 Guatemalan Army list of Communists and information supplied by the Directorate of Intelligence, in January 1952 DP officers compiled a list of “top flight Communists whom the new government would desire to eliminate immediately in event of successful anti-Communist coup.” Headquarters asked [ ] to verify the list and recommend any additions or deletions. Headquarters also requested [ ] to verify a list of an additional 16 Communists and/or sympathizers whom the new government would desire to incarcerate immediately if the coup succeeded. [ ] in Guatemala City added three names to the list in his reply. Nine months later, SEEKFORD, the CIA agent in touch with Castillo Armas, forwarded to Headquarters a disposal list compiled by Castillo Armas. That list called for the execution through executive action 58 Guatemalans (Category I) and the imprisonment or exile of 74 additional Guatemalans (Category II). SEEKFORD also reported at the same time, 18 September 1952, that General Rafael Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic, had agreed to aid Castillo Armas in return for the “k**ing of four Santo Dominicans at present residing in Guatemala a few days prior to D-Day.” According to SEEKFORD, Castillo Armas readily agreed, but cautioned that it could not be done prior to D-Day because of security reasons. Castillo Armas further added that his own plans included similar action and that special squads were already being trained. There is no record that Headquarters took any action regarding Castillo Armas' list. After the PBFORTUNE operation was officially terminated, the Agency continued to pick up reports of a**a**ination planning on the part of the Guatemalan opposition. In late November 1952, for example, an opposition Guatemalan leader, in a conversation with SEEKFORD, confirmed that Castillo Armas had special “K” groups whose mission was to k** all leading political and military leaders, and that the hit list with the location of the homes and offices of all targets had already been drawn up. On 12 December SEEKFORD reported further that Castillo Armas planned to make maximum use of the “K” groups. Another source subsequently reported that Nicaraguan, Honduran, and Salvadoran soldiers in civilian clothes would infiltrate Guatemala and a**a**inate unnamed Communist leaders. In addition to monitoring events in Guatemala, the Agency continued to try to influence developments and to float ideas for disposing of key figures in the [ ] government. [ ] in 1953 proposed not only to focus on sabotage, defection, penetration, and propaganda efforts with regard to Guatemala, but to eliminate [ ] [ ]. According to [ ]'s draft memorandum, after creating a story that [ ] was preparing to oust the Communists, he could be eliminated. His a**a**ination would be “laid to the Commies” and used to bring about a ma** defection of the Guatemalan army. A Western Hemisphere Division memo of 28 August 1953 also suggested possible a**a**inating key Guatemalan military officers if they refused to be converted to the rebel cause. In September 1953 [ ] also sent [ ] an updated plan of action which included a reference to “neutralizing” key Guatemalan military leaders. IN the psychological warfare area, Guatemala City Station sent [ ] all leading Communists in Guatemala, “d**h notice” cards for 30 straight days beginning 15 April 1953. The Station repeated the operation beginning 15 June 1953 but reported no reaction from the targeted leaders.