CHAPTER III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason
By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system
Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it will
Be an aggregate, and not a system. Thus architectonic is the doctrine of
The scientific in cognition, and therefore necessarily forms part of our
Methodology
Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected and
Rhapsodistic state, but requires that the sum of our cognitions should
Constitute a system. It is thus alone that they can advance the ends
Of reason. By a system I mean the unity of various cognitions under one
Idea. This idea is the conception--given by reason--of the form of a
Whole, in so far as the conception determines a priori not only the
Limits of its content, but the place which each of its parts is to
Occupy. The scientific idea contains, therefore, the end and the form of
The whole which is in accordance with that end. The unity of the end, to
Which all the parts of the system relate, and through which all have a
Relation to each other, communicates unity to the whole system, so that
The absence of any part can be immediately detected from our knowledge
Of the rest; and it determines a priori the limits of the system, thus
Excluding all contingent or arbitrary additions. The whole is thus an
Organism (articulatio), and not an aggregate (coacervatio); it may grow
From within (per intussusceptionem), but it cannot increase by external
Additions (per appositionem). It is, thus, like an animal body, the
Growth of which does not add any limb, but, without changing their
Proportions, makes each in its sphere stronger and more active
We require, for the execution of the idea of a system, a schema, that
Is, a content and an arrangement of parts determined a priori by the
Principle which the aim of the system prescribes. A schema which is not
Projected in accordance with an idea, that is, from the standpoint of
The highest aim of reason, but merely empirically, in accordance
With accidental aims and purposes (the number of which cannot be
Predetermined), can give us nothing more than technical unity. But the
Schema which is originated from an idea (in which case reason presents
Us with aims a priori, and does not look for them to experience), forms
The basis of architectonical unity. A science, in the proper acceptation
Of that term, cannot be formed technically, that is, from observation
Of the similarity existing between different objects, and the purely
Contingent use we make of our knowledge in concreto with reference to
All kinds of arbitrary external aims; its constitution must be framed on
Architectonical principles, that is, its parts must be shown to possess
An essential affinity, and be capable of being deduced from one supreme
And internal aim or end, which forms the condition of the possibility
Of the scientific whole. The schema of a science must give a priori the
Plan of it (monogramma), and the division of the whole into parts, in
Conformity with the idea of the science; and it must also distinguish
This whole from all others, according to certain understood principles
No one will attempt to construct a science, unless he have some idea to
Rest on as a proper basis. But, in the elaboration of the science, he
Finds that the schema, nay, even the definition which he at first gave
Of the science, rarely corresponds with his idea; for this idea lies
Like a germ, in our reason, its parts undeveloped and hid even from
Microscopical observation. For this reason, we ought to explain and
Define sciences, not according to the description which the originator
Gives of them, but according to the idea which we find based in reason
Itself, and which is suggested by the natural unity of the parts of
The science already accumulated. For it will of ten be found that the
Originator of a science and even his latest successors remain attached
To an erroneous idea, which they cannot render clear to themselves, and
That they thus fail in determining the true content, the articulation or
Systematic unity, and the limits of their science
It is unfortunate that, only after having occupied ourselves for a long
Time in the collection of materials, under the guidance of an idea which
Lies undeveloped in the mind, but not according to any definite plan of
Arrangement--nay, only after we have spent much time and labour in the
Technical disposition of our materials, does it become possible to view
The idea of a science in a clear light, and to project, according to
Architectonical principles, a plan of the whole, in accordance with the
Aims of reason. Systems seem, like certain worms, to be formed by a kind
Of generatio aequivoca--by the mere confluence of conceptions, and to
Gain completeness only with the progress of time. But the schema or
Germ of all lies in reason; and thus is not only every system organized
According to its own idea, but all are united into one grand system
Of human knowledge, of which they form members. For this reason, it is
Possible to frame an architectonic of all human cognition, the formation
Of which, at the present time, considering the immense materials
Collected or to be found in the ruins of old systems, would not indeed
Be very difficult. Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan
Of the architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason; and we begin
From the point where the main root of human knowledge divides into two
One of which is reason. By reason I understand here the whole higher
Faculty of cognition, the rational being placed in contradistinction to
The empirical
If I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition, objectively
Considered, all cognition is, from a subjective point of view, either
Historical or rational. Historical cognition is cognitio ex datis
Rational, cognitio ex principiis. Whatever may be the original source of
A cognition, it is, in relation to the person who possesses it, merely
Historical, if he knows only what has been given him from another
Quarter, whether that knowledge was communicated by direct experience
Or by instruction. Thus the Person who has learned a system of
Philosophy--say the Wolfian--although he has a perfect knowledge of all
The principles, definitions, and arguments in that philosophy, as well
As of the divisions that have been made of the system, possesses really
No more than an historical knowledge of the Wolfian system; he knows
Only what has been told him, his judgements are only those which he has
Received from his teachers. Dispute the validity of a definition, and
He is completely at a loss to find another. He has formed his mind
On another's; but the imitative faculty is not the productive. His
Knowledge has not been drawn from reason; and although, objectively
Considered, it is rational knowledge, subjectively, it is merely
Historical. He has learned this or that philosophy and is merely a
Plaster cast of a living man. Rational cognitions which are objective
That is, which have their source in reason, can be so termed from
A subjective point of view, only when they have been drawn by the
Individual himself from the sources of reason, that is, from principles;
And it is in this way alone that criticism, or even the rejection of
What has been already learned, can spring up in the mind
All rational cognition is, again, based either on conceptions, or on
The construction of conceptions. The former is termed philosophical, the
Latter mathematical. I have already shown the essential difference of
These two methods of cognition in the first chapter. A cognition may be
Objectively philosophical and subjectively historical--as is the case
With the majority of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the
Limits of their system, and who remain in a state of pupilage all their
Lives. But it is remarkable that mathematical knowledge, when committed
To memory, is valid, from the subjective point of view, as rational
Knowledge also, and that the same distinction cannot be drawn here as in
The case of philosophical cognition. The reason is that the only way
Of arriving at this knowledge is through the essential principles of
Reason, and thus it is always certain and indisputable; because reason
Is employed in concreto--but at the same time a priori--that is, in pure
And, therefore, infallible intuition; and thus all causes of illusion
And error are excluded. Of all the a priori sciences of reason
Therefore, mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy--unless it be
In an historical manner--cannot be learned; we can at most learn to
Philosophize
Philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition. We must use
This term in an objective sense, if we understand by it the archetype of
All attempts at philosophizing, and the standard by which all subjective
Philosophies are to be judged. In this sense, philosophy is merely the
Idea of a possible science, which does not exist in concreto, but
To which we endeavour in various ways to approximate, until we have
Discovered the right path to pursue--a path overgrown by the errors
And illusions of sense--and the image we have hitherto tried in vain to
Shape has become a perfect copy of the great prototype. Until that time
We cannot learn philosophy--it does not exist; if it does, where is
It, who possesses it, and how shall we know it? We can only learn
To philosophize; in other words, we can only exercise our powers of
Reasoning in accordance with general principles, retaining at the same
Time, the right of investigating the sources of these principles, of
Testing, and even of rejecting them
Until then, our conception of philosophy is only a scholastic
Conception--a conception, that is, of a system of cognition which we are
Trying to elaborate into a science; all that we at present know being
The systematic unity of this cognition, and consequently the logical
Completeness of the cognition for the desired end. But there is also a
Cosmical conception (conceptus cosmicus) of philosophy, which has always
Formed the true basis of this term, especially when philosophy was
Personified and presented to us in the ideal of a philosopher. In this
View philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to
The ultimate and essential aims of human reason (teleologia rationis
Humanae), and the philosopher is not merely an artist--who occupies
Himself with conceptions--but a lawgiver, legislating for human reason
In this sense of the word, it would be in the highest degree arrogant to
Assume the title of philosopher, and to pretend that we had reached the
Perfection of the prototype which lies in the idea alone
The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logician--how far
Soever the first may have advanced in rational, and the two latter in
Philosophical knowledge--are merely artists, engaged in the arrangement
And formation of conceptions; they cannot be termed philosophers. Above
Them all, there is the ideal teacher, who employs them as instruments
For the advancement of the essential aims of human reason. Him alone
Can we call philosopher; but he nowhere exists. But the idea of his
Legislative power resides in the mind of every man, and it alone teaches
Us what kind of systematic unity philosophy demands in view of
The ultimate aims of reason. This idea is, therefore, a cosmical
Conception
In view of the complete systematic unity of reason, there can only be
One ultimate end of all the operations of the mind. To this all other
Aims are subordinate, and nothing more than means for its attainment
This ultimate end is the destination of man, and the philosophy which
Relates to it is termed moral philosophy. The superior position occupied
By moral philosophy, above all other spheres for the operations of
Reason, sufficiently indicates the reason why the ancients always
Included the idea--and in an especial manner--of moralist in that of
Philosopher. Even at the present day, we call a man who appears to have
The power of self-government, even although his knowledge may be very
Limited, by the name of philosopher
The legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two objects--nature
And freedom--and thus contains not only the laws of nature, but also
Those of ethics, at first in two separate systems, which, finally, merge
Into one grand philosophical system of cognition. The philosophy of
Nature relates to that which is, that of ethics to that which ought to
Be
But all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure reason, or
The cognition of reason on the basis of empirical principles. The former
Is termed pure, the latter empirical philosophy
The philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic, that is, an
Inquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure a priori cognition
And is termed critical philosophy; or it is, secondly, the system of
Pure reason--a science containing the systematic presentation of the
Whole body of philosophical knowledge, true as well as illusory, given
By pure reason--and is called metaphysic. This name may, however, be
Also given to the whole system of pure philosophy, critical philosophy
Included, and may designate the investigation into the sources or
Possibility of a priori cognition, as well as the presentation of the a
Priori cognitions which form a system of pure philosophy--excluding, at
The same time, all empirical and mathematical elements
Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that of the
Practical use of pure reason, and is, accordingly, either the metaphysic
Of nature, or the metaphysic of ethics. The former contains all the pure
Rational principles--based upon conceptions alone (and thus excluding
Mathematics)--of all theoretical cognition; the latter, the principles
Which determine and necessitate a priori all action. Now moral
Philosophy alone contains a code of laws--for the regulation of our
Actions--which are deduced from principles entirely a priori. Hence the
Metaphysic of ethics is the only pure moral philosophy, as it is not
Based upon anthropological or other empirical considerations. The
Metaphysic of speculative reason is what is commonly called metaphysic
In the more limited sense. But as pure moral philosophy properly forms a
Part of this system of cognition, we must allow it to retain the name
Of metaphysic, although it is not requisite that we should insist on so
Terming it in our present discussion
It is of the highest importance to separate those cognitions which
Differ from others both in kind and in origin, and to take great care
That they are not confounded with those with which they are generally
Found connected. What the chemist does in the an*lysis of substances
What the mathematician in pure mathematics, is, in a still higher
Degree, the duty of the philosopher, that the value of each different
Kind of cognition, and the part it takes in the operations of the mind
May be clearly defined. Human reason has never wanted a metaphysic
Of some kind, since it attained the power of thought, or rather of
Reflection; but it has never been able to keep this sphere of thought
And cognition pure from all admixture of foreign elements. The idea of a
Science of this kind is as old as speculation itself; and what mind does
Not speculate--either in the scholastic or in the popular fashion? At
The same time, it must be admitted that even thinkers by profession have
Been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the two elements
Of our cognition--the one completely a priori, the other a posteriori;
And hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition, and
With it the just idea of a science which has so long and so deeply
Engaged the attention of the human mind, has never been established
When it was said: "Metaphysic is the science of the first principles
Of human cognition," this definition did not signalize a peculiarity in
Kind, but only a difference in degree; these first principles were thus
Declared to be more general than others, but no criterion of distinction
From empirical principles was given. Of these some are more general
And therefore higher, than others; and--as we cannot distinguish what is
Completely a priori from that which is known to be a posteriori--where
Shall we draw the line which is to separate the higher and so-called
First principles, from the lower and subordinate principles of
Cognition? What would be said if we were asked to be satisfied with a
Division of the epochs of the world into the earlier centuries and those
Following them? "Does the fifth, or the tenth century belong to the
Earlier centuries?" it would be asked. In the same way I ask: Does the
Conception of extension belong to metaphysics? You answer, "Yes." Well
That of body too? "Yes." And that of a fluid body? You stop, you are
Unprepared to admit this; for if you do, everything will belong
To metaphysics. From this it is evident that the mere degree of
Subordination--of the particular to the general--cannot determine the
Limits of a science; and that, in the present case, we must expect to
Find a difference in the conceptions of metaphysics both in kind and in
Origin. The fundamental idea of metaphysics was obscured on another
Side by the fact that this kind of a priori cognition showed a certain
Similarity in character with the science of mathematics. Both have the
Property in common of possessing an a priori origin; but, in the
One, our knowledge is based upon conceptions, in the other, on the
Construction of conceptions. Thus a decided dissimilarity between
Philosophical and mathematical cognition comes out--a dissimilarity
Which was always felt, but which could not be made distinct for want
Of an insight into the criteria of the difference. And thus it happened
That, as philosophers themselves failed in the proper development of the
Idea of their science, the elaboration of the science could not
Proceed with a definite aim, or under trustworthy guidance. Thus, too
Philosophers, ignorant of the path they ought to pursue and always
Disputing with each other regarding the discoveries which each a**erted
He had made, brought their science into disrepute with the rest of the
World, and finally, even among themselves
All pure a priori cognition forms, therefore, in view of the peculiar
Faculty which originates it, a peculiar and distinct unity; and
Metaphysic is the term applied to the philosophy which attempts to
Represent that cognition in this systematic unity. The speculative part
Of metaphysic, which has especially appropriated this appellation--that
Which we have called the metaphysic of nature--and which considers
Everything, as it is (not as it ought to be), by means of a priori
Conceptions, is divided in the following manner
Metaphysic, in the more limited acceptation of the term, consists of two
Parts--transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason
The former presents the system of all the conceptions and principles
Belonging to the understanding and the reason, and which relate to
Objects in general, but not to any particular given objects (Ontologia);
The latter has nature for its subject-matter, that is, the sum of given
Objects--whether given to the senses, or, if we will, to some other kind
Of intuition--and is accordingly physiology, although only rationalis
But the use of the faculty of reason in this rational mode of regarding
Nature is either physical or hyperphysical, or, more properly speaking
Immanent or transcendent. The former relates to nature, in so far as our
Knowledge regarding it may be applied in experience (in concreto); the
Latter to that connection of the objects of experience, which transcends
All experience. Transcendent physiology has, again, an internal and
An external connection with its object, both, however, transcending
Possible experience; the former is the physiology of nature as a whole
Or transcendental cognition of the world, the latter of the connection
Of the whole of nature with a being above nature, or transcendental
Cognition of God
Immanent physiology, on the contrary, considers nature as the sum of
All sensuous objects, consequently, as it is presented to us--but still
According to a priori conditions, for it is under these alone that
Nature can be presented to our minds at all. The objects of immanent
Physiology are of two kinds: 1. Those of the external senses, or
Corporeal nature; 2. The object of the internal sense, the soul, or, in
Accordance with our fundamental conceptions of it, thinking nature
The metaphysics of corporeal nature is called physics; but, as it must
Contain only the principles of an a priori cognition of nature, we must
Term it rational physics. The metaphysics of thinking nature is called
Psychology, and for the same reason is to be regarded as merely the
Rational cognition of the soul
Thus the whole system of metaphysics consists of four principal parts:
1. Ontology; 2. Rational Physiology; 3. Rational cosmology; and 4
Rational theology. The second part--that of the rational doctrine of
Nature--may be subdivided into two, physica rationalis* and psychologia
Rationalis
The fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of necessity
Dictates this division; it is, therefore, architectonical--in accordance
With the highest aims of reason, and not merely technical, or according
To certain accidentally-observed similarities existing between the
Different parts of the whole science. For this reason, also, is the
Division immutable and of legislative authority. But the reader may
Observe in it a few points to which he ought to demur, and which may
Weaken his conviction of its truth and legitimacy
In the first place, how can I desire an a priori cognition or metaphysic
Of objects, in so far as they are given a posteriori? and how is
It possible to cognize the nature of things according to a priori
Principles, and to attain to a rational physiology? The answer is this
We take from experience nothing more than is requisite to present us
With an object (in general) of the external or of the internal sense;
In the former case, by the mere conception of matter (impenetrable and
Inanimate extension), in the latter, by the conception of a thinking
Being--given in the internal empirical representation, I think. As to
The rest, we must not employ in our metaphysic of these objects any
Empirical principles (which add to the content of our conceptions by
Means of experience), for the purpose of forming by their help any
Judgements respecting these objects
Secondly, what place shall we a**ign to empirical psychology, which has
Always been considered a part of metaphysics, and from which in our time
Such important philosophical results have been expected, after the hope
Of constructing an a priori system of knowledge had been abandoned? I
Answer: It must be placed by the side of empirical physics or physics
Proper; that is, must be regarded as forming a part of applied
Philosophy, the a priori principles of which are contained in pure
Philosophy, which is therefore connected, although it must not be
Confounded, with psychology. Empirical psychology must therefore be
Banished from the sphere of metaphysics, and is indeed excluded by
The very idea of that science. In conformity, however, with scholastic
Usage, we must permit it to occupy a place in metaphysics--but only
As an appendix to it. We adopt this course from motives of economy;
As psychology is not as yet full enough to occupy our attention as
An independent study, while it is, at the same time, of too great
Importance to be entirely excluded or placed where it has still less
Affinity than it has with the subject of metaphysics. It is a stranger
Who has been long a guest; and we make it welcome to stay, until it can
Take up a more suitable abode in a complete system of anthropology--the
Pendant to empirical physics
The above is the general idea of metaphysics, which, as more was
Expected from it than could be looked for with justice, and as these
Pleasant expectations were unfortunately never realized, fell into
General disrepute. Our Critique must have fully convinced the reader
That, although metaphysics cannot form the foundation of religion
It must always be one of its most important bulwarks, and that human
Reason, which naturally pursues a dialectical course, cannot do without
This science, which checks its tendencies towards dialectic and, by
Elevating reason to a scientific and clear self-knowledge, prevents the
Ravages which a lawless speculative reason would infallibly commit in
The sphere of morals as well as in that of religion. We may be sure
Therefore, whatever contempt may be thrown upon metaphysics by those who
Judge a science not by its own nature, but according to the accidental
Effects it may have produced, that it can never be completely abandoned
That we must always return to it as to a beloved one who has been for a
Time estranged, because the questions with which it is engaged relate
To the highest aims of humanity, and reason must always labour either
To attain to settled views in regard to these, or to destroy those which
Others have already established
Metaphysic, therefore--that of nature, as well as that of ethics, but in
An especial manner the criticism which forms the propaedeutic to all the
Operations of reason--forms properly that department of knowledge which
May be termed, in the truest sense of the word, philosophy. The path
Which it pursues is that of science, which, when it has once been
Discovered, is never lost, and never misleads. Mathematics, natural
Science, the common experience of men, have a high value as means, for
The most part, to accidental ends--but at last also, to those which are
Necessary and essential to the existence of humanity. But to guide them
To this high goal, they require the aid of rational cognition on the
Basis of pure conceptions, which, be it termed as it may, is properly
Nothing but metaphysics
For the same reason, metaphysics forms likewise the completion of the
Culture of human reason. In this respect, it is indispensable, setting
Aside altogether the influence which it exerts as a science. For its
Subject-matter is the elements and highest maxims of reason, which form
The basis of the possibility of some sciences and of the use of all
That, as a purely speculative science, it is more useful in preventing
Error than in the extension of knowledge, does not detract from its
Value; on the contrary, the supreme office of censor which it occupies
Assures to it the highest authority and importance. This office it
Administers for the purpose of securing order, harmony, and well-being
To science, and of directing its noble and fruitful labours to the
Highest possible aim--the happiness of all mankind