CHAPTER III. The Ideal of Pure Reason
SECTION I. Of the Ideal in General
We have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects to the mind
Except under sensuous conditions; because the conditions of objective
Reality do not exist in these conceptions, which contain, in fact
Nothing but the mere form of thought. They may, however, when applied to
Phenomena, be presented in concreto; for it is phenomena that present to
Them the materials for the formation of empirical conceptions, which
Are nothing more than concrete forms of the conceptions of the
Understanding. But ideas are still further removed from objective
Reality than categories; for no phenomenon can ever present them to the
Human mind in concreto. They contain a certain perfection, attainable
By no possible empirical cognition; and they give to reason a systematic
Unity, to which the unity of experience attempts to approximate, but can
Never completely attain
But still further removed than the idea from objective reality is the
Ideal, by which term I understand the idea, not in concreto, but in
Individuo--as an individual thing, determinable or determined by the
Idea alone. The idea of humanity in its complete perfection supposes not
Only the advancement of all the powers and faculties, which constitute
Our conception of human nature, to a complete attainment of their
Final aims, but also everything which is requisite for the complete
Determination of the idea; for of all contradictory predicates, only
One can conform with the idea of the perfect man. What I have termed
An ideal was in Plato's philosophy an idea of the divine mind--an
Individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of
Every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal
Existences
Without rising to these speculative heights, we are bound to confess
That human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which possess
Not, like those of Plato, creative, but certainly practical power--as
Regulative principles, and form the basis of the perfectibility of
Certain actions. Moral conceptions are not perfectly pure conceptions of
Reason, because an empirical element--of pleasure or pain--lies at the
Foundation of them. In relation, however, to the principle, whereby
Reason sets bounds to a freedom which is in itself without law, and
Consequently when we attend merely to their form, they may be considered
As pure conceptions of reason. Virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity
Are ideas. But the wise man of the Stoics is an ideal, that is to say, a
Human being existing only in thought and in complete conformity with the
Idea of wisdom. As the idea provides a rule, so the ideal serves as an
Archetype for the perfect and complete determination of the copy. Thus
The conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as a standard of
Action, with which we may compare and judge ourselves, which may help
Us to reform ourselves, although the perfection it demands can never be
Attained by us. Although we cannot concede objective reality to these
Ideals, they are not to be considered as chimeras; on the contrary
They provide reason with a standard, which enables it to estimate, by
Comparison, the degree of incompleteness in the objects presented to
It. But to aim at realizing the ideal in an example in the world of
Experience--to describe, for instance, the character of the perfectly
Wise man in a romance--is impracticable. Nay more, there is something
Absurd in the attempt; and the result must be little edifying, as
The natural limitations, which are continually breaking in upon the
Perfection and completeness of the idea, destroy the illusion in the
Story and throw an air of suspicion even on what is good in the idea
Which hence appears fictitious and unreal
Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason, which is always based
Upon determinate conceptions, and serves as a rule and a model for
Limitation or of criticism. Very different is the nature of the ideals
Of the imagination. Of these it is impossible to present an intelligible
Conception; they are a kind of monogram, drawn according to no
Determinate rule, and forming rather a vague picture--the production of
Many diverse experiences--than a determinate image. Such are the ideals
Which painters and physiognomists profess to have in their minds, and
Which can serve neither as a model for production nor as a standard for
Appreciation. They may be termed, though improperly, sensuous ideals, as
They are declared to be models of certain possible empirical intuitions
They cannot, however, furnish rules or standards for explanation or
Examination
In its ideals, reason aims at complete and perfect determination
According to a priori rules; and hence it cogitates an object, which
Must be completely determinable in conformity with principles, although
All empirical conditions are absent, and the conception of the object is
On this account transcendent
SECTION II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale)
Every conception is, in relation to that which is not contained in
It, undetermined and subject to the principle of determinability. This
Principle is that, of every two contradictorily opposed predicates, only
One can belong to a conception. It is a purely logical principle, itself
Based upon the principle of contradiction; inasmuch as it makes complete
Abstraction of the content and attends merely to the logical form of the
Cognition
But again, everything, as regards its possibility, is also subject to
The principle of complete determination, according to which one of all
The possible contradictory predicates of things must belong to it
This principle is not based merely upon that of contradiction; for
In addition to the relation between two contradictory predicates
It regards everything as standing in a relation to the sum of
Possibilities, as the sum total of all predicates of things, and, while
Presupposing this sum as an a priori condition, presents to the mind
Everything as receiving the possibility of its individual existence from
The relation it bears to, and the share it possesses in, the aforesaid
Sum of possibilities.* The principle of complete determination relates
The content and not to the logical form. It is the principle of the
Synthesis of all the predicates which are required to constitute the
Complete conception of a thing, and not a mere principle an*lytical
Representation, which enounces that one of two contradictory predicates
Must belong to a conception. It contains, moreover, a transcendental
Presupposition--that, namely, of the material for all possibility, which
Must contain a priori the data for this or that particular possibility
The proposition, everything which exists is completely determined, means
Not only that one of every pair of given contradictory attributes, but
That one of all possible attributes, is always predicable of the thing;
In it the predicates are not merely compared logically with each other
But the thing itself is transcendentally compared with the sum-total of
All possible predicates. The proposition is equivalent to saying: "To
Attain to a complete knowledge of a thing, it is necessary to possess a
Knowledge of everything that is possible, and to determine it thereby in
A positive or negative manner." The conception of complete determination
Is consequently a conception which cannot be presented in its totality
In concreto, and is therefore based upon an idea, which has its seat in
The reason--the faculty which prescribes to the understanding the laws
Of its harmonious and perfect exercise
Now, although this idea of the sum-total of all possibility, in so far
As it forms the condition of the complete determination of everything
Is itself undetermined in relation to the predicates which may
Constitute this sum-total, and we cogitate in it merely the sum-total of
All possible predicates--we nevertheless find, upon closer examination
That this idea, as a primitive conception of the mind, excludes a
Large number of predicates--those deduced and those irreconcilable with
Others, and that it is evolved as a conception completely determined a
Priori. Thus it becomes the conception of an individual object, which
Is completely determined by and through the mere idea, and must
Consequently be termed an ideal of pure reason
When we consider all possible predicates, not merely logically, but
Transcendentally, that is to say, with reference to the content which
May be cogitated as existing in them a priori, we shall find that
Some indicate a being, others merely a non-being. The logical negation
Expressed in the word not does not properly belong to a conception, but
Only to the relation of one conception to another in a judgement, and is
Consequently quite insufficient to present to the mind the content of a
Conception. The expression not mortal does not indicate that a non-being
Is cogitated in the object; it does not concern the content at all. A
Transcendental negation, on the contrary, indicates non-being in itself
And is opposed to transcendental affirmation, the conception of which
Of itself expresses a being. Hence this affirmation indicates a reality
Because in and through it objects are considered to be something--to be
Things; while the opposite negation, on the other band, indicates a
Mere want, or privation, or absence, and, where such negations alone
Are attached to a representation, the non-existence of anything
Corresponding to the representation
Now a negation cannot be cogitated as determined, without cogitating at
The same time the opposite affirmation. The man born blind has not the
Least notion of darkness, because he has none of light; the vagabond
Knows nothing of poverty, because he has never known what it is to be in
Comfort;* the ignorant man has no conception of his ignorance, because
He has no conception of knowledge. All conceptions of negatives are
Accordingly derived or deduced conceptions; and realities contain the
Data, and, so to speak, the material or transcendental content of the
Possibility and complete determination of all things
If, therefore, a transcendental substratum lies at the foundation of the
Complete determination of things--a substratum which is to form the fund
From which all possible predicates of things are to be supplied, this
Substratum cannot be anything else than the idea of a sum-total of
Reality (omnitudo realitatis). In this view, negations are nothing but
Limitations--a term which could not, with propriety, be applied to
Them, if the unlimited (the all) did not form the true basis of our
Conception
This conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a thing
In itself, regarded as completely determined; and the conception of an
Ens realissimum is the conception of an individual being, inasmuch as
It is determined by that predicate of all possible contradictory
Predicates, which indicates and belongs to being. It is, therefore, a
Transcendental ideal which forms the basis of the complete determination
Of everything that exists, and is the highest material condition of
Its possibility--a condition on which must rest the cogitation of all
Objects with respect to their content. Nay, more, this ideal is the only
Proper ideal of which the human mind is capable; because in this case
Alone a general conception of a thing is completely determined by and
Through itself, and cognized as the representation of an individuum
The logical determination of a conception is based upon a disjunctive
Syllogism, the major of which contains the logical division of the
Extent of a general conception, the minor limits this extent to a
Certain part, while the conclusion determines the conception by this
Part. The general conception of a reality cannot be divided a priori
Because, without the aid of experience, we cannot know any determinate
Kinds of reality, standing under the former as the genus. The
Transcendental principle of the complete determination of all things is
Therefore merely the representation of the sum-total of all reality; it
Is not a conception which is the genus of all predicates under
Itself, but one which comprehends them all within itself. The complete
Determination of a thing is consequently based upon the limitation of
This total of reality, so much being predicated of the thing, while all
That remains over is excluded--a procedure which is in exact agreement
With that of the disjunctive syllogism and the determination of the
Objects in the conclusion by one of the members of the division
It follows that reason, in laying the transcendental ideal at the
Foundation of its determination of all possible things, takes a course
In exact an*logy with that which it pursues in disjunctive syllogisms--a
Proposition which formed the basis of the systematic division of all
Transcendental ideas, according to which they are produced in complete
Parallelism with the three modes of syllogistic reasoning employed by
The human mind
It is self-evident that reason, in cogitating the necessary complete
Determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being
Corresponding to its ideal, but merely the idea of the ideal--for
The purpose of deducing from the unconditional totality of complete
Determination, The ideal is therefore the prototype of all things
Which, as defective copies (ectypa), receive from it the material of
Their possibility, and approximate to it more or less, though it is
Impossible that they can ever attain to its perfection
The possibility of things must therefore be regarded as derived--except
That of the thing which contains in itself all reality, which must be
Considered to be primitive and original. For all negations--and they
Are the only predicates by means of which all other things can be
Distinguished from the ens realissimum--are mere limitations of a
Greater and a higher--nay, the highest reality; and they consequently
Presuppose this reality, and are, as regards their content, derived from
It. The manifold nature of things is only an infinitely various mode of
Limiting the conception of the highest reality, which is their common
Substratum; just as all figures are possible only as different modes of
Limiting infinite space. The object of the ideal of reason--an object
Existing only in reason itself--is also termed the primal being (ens
Originarium); as having no existence superior to him, the supreme being
(ens summum); and as being the condition of all other beings, which rank
Under it, the being of all beings (ens entium). But none of these terms
Indicate the objective relation of an actually existing object to
Other things, but merely that of an idea to conceptions; and all our
Investigations into this subject still leave us in perfect uncertainty
With regard to the existence of this being
A primal being cannot be said to consist of many other beings with an
Existence which is derivative, for the latter presuppose the former, and
Therefore cannot be constitutive parts of it. It follows that the ideal
Of the primal being must be cogitated as simple
The deduction of the possibility of all other things from this primal
Being cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as a limitation, or as a
Kind of division of its reality; for this would be regarding the primal
Being as a mere aggregate--which has been shown to be impossible
Although it was so represented in our first rough sketch. The highest
Reality must be regarded rather as the ground than as the sum-total
Of the possibility of all things, and the manifold nature of things be
Based, not upon the limitation of the primal being itself, but upon the
Complete series of effects which flow from it. And thus all our powers
Of sense, as well as all phenomenal reality, phenomenal reality, may be
With propriety regarded as belonging to this series of effects
While they could not have formed parts of the idea, considered as an
Aggregate. Pursuing this track, and hypostatizing this idea, we shall
Find ourselves authorized to determine our notion of the Supreme Being
By means of the mere conception of a highest reality, as one, simple
All-sufficient, eternal, and so on--in one word, to determine it in its
Unconditioned completeness by the aid of every possible predicate
The conception of such a being is the conception of God in its
Transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the
Object-matter of a transcendental theology
But, by such an employment of the transcendental idea, we should be over
Stepping the limits of its validity and purpose. For reason placed
It, as the conception of all reality, at the basis of the complete
Determination of things, without requiring that this conception be
Regarded as the conception of an objective existence. Such an existence
Would be purely fictitious, and the hypostatizing of the content of
The idea into an ideal, as an individual being, is a step perfectly
Unauthorized. Nay, more, we are not even called upon to a**ume the
Possibility of such an hypothesis, as none of the deductions drawn
From such an ideal would affect the complete determination of things in
General--for the sake of which alone is the idea necessary
It is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic
Of reason; we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this
Dialectic, that we may have it in our power to give a rational
Explanation of this illusion, as a phenomenon of the human mind. For
The ideal, of which we are at present speaking, is based, not upon an
Arbitrary, but upon a natural, idea. The question hence arises: How
Happens it that reason regards the possibility of all things as deduced
From a single possibility, that, to wit, of the highest reality, and
Presupposes this as existing in an individual and primal being?
The answer is ready; it is at once presented by the procedure of
Transcendental an*lytic. The possibility of sensuous objects is a
Relation of these objects to thought, in which something (the empirical
Form) may be cogitated a priori; while that which constitutes the
Matter--the reality of the phenomenon (that element which corresponds to
Sensation)--must be given from without, as otherwise it could not even
Be cogitated by, nor could its possibility be presentable to the mind
Now, a sensuous object is completely determined, when it has been
Compared with all phenomenal predicates, and represented by means of
These either positively or negatively. But, as that which constitutes
The thing itself--the real in a phenomenon, must be given, and that, in
Which the real of all phenomena is given, is experience, one, sole, and
All-embracing--the material of the possibility of all sensuous objects
Must be presupposed as given in a whole, and it is upon the limitation
Of this whole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their
Distinction from each other and their complete determination, are based
Now, no other objects are presented to us besides sensuous objects, and
These can be given only in connection with a possible experience; it
Follows that a thing is not an object to us, unless it presupposes
The whole or sum-total of empirical reality as the condition of
Its possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads us to consider this
Principle, which is valid only of sensuous objects, as valid with regard
To things in general. And thus we are induced to hold the empirical
Principle of our conceptions of the possibility of things, as phenomena
By leaving out this limitative condition, to be a transcendental
Principle of the possibility of things in general
We proceed afterwards to hypostatize this idea of the sum-total of all
Reality, by changing the distributive unity of the empirical exercise
Of the understanding into the collective unity of an empirical whole--a
Dialectical illusion, and by cogitating this whole or sum of experience
As an individual thing, containing in itself all empirical reality
This individual thing or being is then, by means of the above-mentioned
Transcendental subreption, substituted for our notion of a thing which
Stands at the head of the possibility of all things, the real conditions
Of whose complete determination it presents
SECTION III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in
Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being
Notwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels, to form some
Presupposition that shall serve the understanding as a proper basis
For the complete determination of its conceptions, the idealistic and
Factitious nature of such a presupposition is too evident to allow
Reason for a moment to persuade itself into a belief of the objective
Existence of a mere creation of its own thought. But there are other
Considerations which compel reason to seek out some resting place in the
Regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned, which is not given
As an actual existence from the mere conception of it, although it
Alone can give completeness to the series of conditions. And this is
The natural course of every human reason, even of the most uneducated
Although the path at first entered it does not always continue to
Follow. It does not begin from conceptions, but from common experience
And requires a basis in actual existence. But this basis is insecure
Unless it rests upon the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary. And
This foundation is itself unworthy of trust, if it leave under and above
It empty space, if it do not fill all, and leave no room for a why or a
Wherefore, if it be not, in one word, infinite in its reality
If we admit the existence of some one thing, whatever it may be, we must
Also admit that there is something which exists necessarily. For what is
Contingent exists only under the condition of some other thing, which
Is its cause; and from this we must go on to conclude the existence of a
Cause which is not contingent, and which consequently exists necessarily
And unconditionally. Such is the argument by which reason justifies its
Advances towards a primal being
Now reason looks round for the conception of a being that may be
Admitted, without inconsistency, to be worthy of the attribute of
Absolute necessity, not for the purpose of inferring a priori, from
The conception of such a being, its objective existence (for if reason
Allowed itself to take this course, it would not require a basis in
Given and actual existence, but merely the support of pure conceptions)
But for the purpose of discovering, among all our conceptions of
Possible things, that conception which possesses no element inconsistent
With the idea of absolute necessity. For that there must be some
Absolutely necessary existence, it regards as a truth already
Established. Now, if it can remove every existence incapable of
Supporting the attribute of absolute necessity, excepting one--this
Must be the absolutely necessary being, whether its necessity is
Comprehensible by us, that is, deducible from the conception of it
Alone, or not
Now that, the conception of which contains a therefore to every
Wherefore, which is not defective in any respect whatever, which is
All-sufficient as a condition, seems to be the being of which we can
Justly predicate absolute necessity--for this reason, that, possessing
The conditions of all that is possible, it does not and cannot itself
Require any condition. And thus it satisfies, in one respect at least
The requirements of the conception of absolute necessity. In this
View, it is superior to all other conceptions, which, as deficient and
Incomplete, do not possess the characteristic of independence of all
Higher conditions. It is true that we cannot infer from this that what
Does not contain in itself the supreme and complete condition--the
Condition of all other things--must possess only a conditioned
Existence; but as little can we a**ert the contrary, for this supposed
Being does not possess the only characteristic which can enable reason
To cognize by means of an a priori conception the unconditioned and
Necessary nature of its existence
The conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees with
The conception of an unconditioned and necessary being. The former
Conception does not satisfy all the requirements of the latter; but
We have no choice, we are obliged to adhere to it, for we find that we
Cannot do without the existence of a necessary being; and even although
We admit it, we find it out of our power to discover in the whole sphere
Of possibility any being that can advance well-grounded claims to such a
Distinction
The following is, therefore, the natural course of human reason. It
Begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being. In
This being it recognizes the characteristics of unconditioned existence
It then seeks the conception of that which is independent of all
Conditions, and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient
Condition of all other things--in other words, in that which contains
All reality. But the unlimited all is an absolute unity, and is
Conceived by the mind as a being one and supreme; and thus reason
Concludes that the Supreme Being, as the primal basis of all things
Possesses an existence which is absolutely necessary
This conception must be regarded as in some degree satisfactory, if we
Admit the existence of a necessary being, and consider that there exists
A necessity for a definite and final answer to these questions. In such
A case, we cannot make a better choice, or rather we have no choice at
All, but feel ourselves obliged to declare in favour of the absolute
Unity of complete reality, as the highest source of the possibility
Of things. But if there exists no motive for coming to a definite
Conclusion, and we may leave the question unanswered till we have fully
Weighed both sides--in other words, when we are merely called upon to
Decide how much we happen to know about the question, and how much we
Merely flatter ourselves that we know--the above conclusion does not
Appear to be so great advantage, but, on the contrary, seems defective
In the grounds upon which it is supported
For, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that, namely, the
Inference from a given existence (my own, for example) to the existence
Of an unconditioned and necessary being is valid and una**ailable;
That, in the second place, we must consider a being which contains all
Reality, and consequently all the conditions of other things, to
Be absolutely unconditioned; and admitting too, that we have thus
Discovered the conception of a thing to which may be attributed, without
Inconsistency, absolute necessity--it does not follow from all this that
The conception of a limited being, in which the supreme reality does not
Reside, is therefore incompatible with the idea of absolute necessity
For, although I do not discover the element of the unconditioned in the
Conception of such a being--an element which is manifestly existent in
The sum-total of all conditions--I am not entitled to conclude that its
Existence is therefore conditioned; just as I am not entitled to affirm
In a hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain condition does not
Exist (in the present, completeness, as far as pure conceptions are
Concerned), the conditioned does not exist either. On the contrary
We are free to consider all limited beings as likewise unconditionally
Necessary, although we are unable to infer this from the general
Conception which we have of them. Thus conducted, this argument is
Incapable of giving us the least notion of the properties of a necessary
Being, and must be in every respect without result
This argument continues, however, to possess a weight and an authority
Which, in spite of its objective insufficiency, it has never been
Divested of. For, granting that certain responsibilities lie upon us
Which, as based on the ideas of reason, deserve to be respected and
Submitted to, although they are incapable of a real or practical
Application to our nature, or, in other words, would be responsibilities
Without motives, except upon the supposition of a Supreme Being to give
Effect and influence to the practical laws: in such a case we should be
Bound to obey our conceptions, which, although objectively insufficient
Do, according to the standard of reason, preponderate over and are
Superior to any claims that may be advanced from any other quarter
The equilibrium of doubt would in this case be destroyed by a practical
Addition; indeed, Reason would be compelled to condemn herself, if she
Refused to comply with the demands of the judgement, no superior to
Which we know--however defective her understanding of the grounds of
These demands might be
This argument, although in fact transcendental, inasmuch as it rests
Upon the intrinsic insufficiency of the contingent, is so simple and
Natural, that the commonest understanding can appreciate its value
We see things around us change, arise, and pa** away; they, or their
Condition, must therefore have a cause. The same demand must again be
Made of the cause itself--as a datum of experience. Now it is natural
That we should place the highest causality just where we place supreme
Causality, in that being, which contains the conditions of all possible
Effects, and the conception of which is so simple as that of an
All-embracing reality. This highest cause, then, we regard as absolutely
Necessary, because we find it absolutely necessary to rise to it, and
Do not discover any reason for proceeding beyond it. Thus, among all
Nations, through the darkest polytheism glimmer some faint sparks of
Monotheism, to which these idolaters have been led, not from reflection
And profound thought, but by the study and natural progress of the
Common understanding
There are only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity, on the
Grounds of speculative reason
All the paths conducting to this end begin either from determinate
Experience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense, and
Rise, according to the laws of causality, from it to the highest
Cause existing apart from the world--or from a purely indeterminate
Experience, that is, some empirical existence--or abstraction is made of
All experience, and the existence of a supreme cause is concluded from a
Priori conceptions alone. The first is the physico-theological argument
The second the cosmological, the third the ontological. More there are
Not, and more there cannot be
I shall show it is as unsuccessful on the one path--the empirical--as on
The other--the transcendental, and that it stretches its wings in vain
To soar beyond the world of sense by the mere might of speculative
Thought. As regards the order in which we must discuss those arguments
It will be exactly the reverse of that in which reason, in the progress
Of its development, attains to them--the order in which they are
Placed above. For it will be made manifest to the reader that, although
Experience presents the occasion and the starting-point, it is the
Transcendental idea of reason which guides it in its pilgrimage and
Is the goal of all its struggles. I shall therefore begin with an
Examination of the transcendental argument, and afterwards inquire what
Additional strength has accrued to this mode of proof from the addition
Of the empirical element
SECTION IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the
Existence of God
It is evident from what has been said that the conception of an
Absolutely necessary being is a mere idea, the objective reality of
Which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a
Need of reason. On the contrary, this idea serves merely to indicate a
Certain unattainable perfection, and rather limits the operations
Than, by the presentation of new objects, extends the sphere of the
Understanding. But a strange anomaly meets us at the very threshold;
For the inference from a given existence in general to an absolutely
Necessary existence seems to be correct and unavoidable, while the
Conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any
Conception of such a being
Philosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary being
And have nevertheless declined to take the trouble of conceiving
Whether--and how--a being of this nature is even cogitable, not to
Mention that its existence is actually demonstrable. A verbal definition
Of the conception is certainly easy enough: it is something the
Non-existence of which is impossible. But does this definition throw
Any light upon the conditions which render it impossible to cogitate the
Non-existence of a thing--conditions which we wish to ascertain, that we
May discover whether we think anything in the conception of such a
Being or not? For the mere fact that I throw away, by means of the word
Unconditioned, all the conditions which the understanding habitually
Requires in order to regard anything as necessary, is very far from
Making clear whether by means of the conception of the unconditionally
Necessary I think of something, or really of nothing at all
Nay, more, this chance-conception, now become so current, many have
Endeavoured to explain by examples which seemed to render any inquiries
Regarding its intelligibility quite needless. Every geometrical
Proposition--a triangle has three angles--it was said, is absolutely
Necessary; and thus people talked of an object which lay out of the
Sphere of our understanding as if it were perfectly plain what the
Conception of such a being meant
All the examples adduced have been drawn, without exception, from
Judgements, and not from things. But the unconditioned necessity of
A judgement does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. On the
Contrary, the absolute necessity of a judgement is only a conditioned
Necessity of a thing, or of the predicate in a judgement. The
Proposition above-mentioned does not enounce that three angles
Necessarily exist, but, upon condition that a triangle exists, three
Angles must necessarily exist--in it. And thus this logical necessity
Has been the source of the greatest delusions. Having formed an a
Priori conception of a thing, the content of which was made to embrace
Existence, we believed ourselves safe in concluding that, because
Existence belongs necessarily to the object of the conception (that is
Under the condition of my positing this thing as given), the existence
Of the thing is also posited necessarily, and that it is therefore
Absolutely necessary--merely because its existence has been cogitated in
The conception
If, in an identical judgement, I annihilate the predicate in thought
And retain the subject, a contradiction is the result; and hence I say
The former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if I suppress both
Subject and predicate in thought, no contradiction arises; for there is
Nothing at all, and therefore no means of forming a contradiction. To
Suppose the existence of a triangle and not that of its three angles
Is self-contradictory; but to suppose the non-existence of both triangle
And angles is perfectly admissible. And so is it with the conception of
An absolutely necessary being. Annihilate its existence in thought, and
You annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates; how then can
There be any room for contradiction? Externally, there is nothing
To give rise to a contradiction, for a thing cannot be necessary
Externally; nor internally, for, by the annihilation or suppression of
The thing itself, its internal properties are also annihilated. God is
Omnipotent--that is a necessary judgement. His omnipotence cannot be
Denied, if the existence of a Deity is posited--the existence, that is
Of an infinite being, the two conceptions being identical. But when you
Say, God does not exist, neither omnipotence nor any other predicate
Is affirmed; they must all disappear with the subject, and in this
Judgement there cannot exist the least self-contradiction
You have thus seen that when the predicate of a judgement is annihilated
In thought along with the subject, no internal contradiction can arise
Be the predicate what it may. There is no possibility of evading the
Conclusion--you find yourselves compelled to declare: There are certain
Subjects which cannot be annihilated in thought. But this is
Nothing more than saying: There exist subjects which are absolutely
Necessary--the very hypothesis which you are called upon to establish
For I find myself unable to form the slightest conception of a thing
Which when annihilated in thought with all its predicates, leaves
Behind a contradiction; and contradiction is the only criterion of
Impossibility in the sphere of pure a priori conceptions
Against these general considerations, the justice of which no one can
Dispute, one argument is adduced, which is regarded as furnishing a
Satisfactory demonstration from the fact. It is affirmed that there is
One and only one conception, in which the non-being or annihilation of
The object is self-contradictory, and this is the conception of an ens
Realissimum. It possesses, you say, all reality, and you feel yourselves
Justified in admitting the possibility of such a being. (This I am
Willing to grant for the present, although the existence of a conception
Which is not self-contradictory is far from being sufficient to prove
The possibility of an object.) Now the notion of all reality embraces
In it that of existence; the notion of existence lies, therefore, in
The conception of this possible thing. If this thing is annihilated
In thought, the internal possibility of the thing is also annihilated
Which is self-contradictory
I answer: It is absurd to introduce--under whatever term disguised--into
The conception of a thing, which is to be cogitated solely in reference
To its possibility, the conception of its existence. If this is
Admitted, you will have apparently gained the day, but in reality have
Enounced nothing but a mere tautology. I ask, is the proposition
This or that thing (which I am admitting to be possible) exists, an
an*lytical or a synthetical proposition? If the former, there is no
Addition made to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its
Existence; but then the conception in your minds is identical with
The thing itself, or you have supposed the existence of a thing to
Be possible, and then inferred its existence from its internal
Possibility--which is but a miserable tautology. The word reality in the
Conception of the thing, and the word existence in the conception of the
Predicate, will not help you out of the difficulty. For, supposing you
Were to term all positing of a thing reality, you have thereby posited
The thing with all its predicates in the conception of the subject
And a**umed its actual existence, and this you merely repeat in the
Predicate. But if you confess, as every reasonable person must, that
Every existential proposition is synthetical, how can it be
Maintained that the predicate of existence cannot be denied without
Contradiction?--a property which is the characteristic of an*lytical
Propositions, alone
I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this
Sophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the
Conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the
Illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate (a
Predicate which aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost all
The endeavours of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate may
Be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself;
For logic pays no regard to the content of a judgement. But the
Determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and enlarges
The conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the conception
Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of
Something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is
Merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it
Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition, God
Is omnipotent, contains two conceptions, which have a certain object or
Content; the word is, is no additional predicate--it merely indicates
The relation of the predicate to the subject. Now, if I take the subject
(God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say: God is
Or, There is a God, I add no new predicate to the conception of God
I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its
Predicates--I posit the object in relation to my conception. The content
Of both is the same; and there is no addition made to the conception
Which expresses merely the possibility of the object, by my cogitating
The object--in the expression, it is--as absolutely given or existing
Thus the real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars
Contain no more than a hundred possible dollars. For, as the latter
Indicate the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition
That the content of the former was greater than that of the latter, my
Conception would not be an expression of the whole object, and would
Consequently be an inadequate conception of it. But in reckoning my
Wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than in a
Hundred possible dollars--that is, in the mere conception of them
For the real object--the dollars--is not an*lytically contained in my
Conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my conception (which
Is merely a determination of my mental state), although this objective
Reality--this existence--apart from my conceptions, does not in the
Least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars
By whatever and by whatever number of predicates--even to the complete
Determination of it--I may cogitate a thing, I do not in the least
Augment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement:
This thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more
Than what was cogitated in my conception, would exist, and I could not
Affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence. If I
Cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one, the mode
Of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the thing
By the affirmation that the thing exists; on the contrary, the thing
Exists--if it exist at all--with the same defect as that cogitated in
Its conception; otherwise not that which was cogitated, but something
Different, exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest reality
Without defect or imperfection, the question still remains--whether this
Being exists or not? For, although no element is wanting in the possible
Real content of my conception, there is a defect in its relation to my
Mental state, that is, I am ignorant whether the cognition of the object
Indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori. And here the cause
Of the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the question regarded an
Object of sense merely, it would be impossible for me to confound the
Conception with the existence of a thing. For the conception merely
Enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general
Conditions of experience; while the existence of the object permits me
To cogitate it as contained in the sphere of actual experience. At the
Same time, this connection with the world of experience does not in the
Least augment the conception, although a possible perception has been
Added to the experience of the mind. But if we cogitate existence by the
Pure category alone, it is not to be wondered at, that we should find
Ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it
From mere possibility
Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary
To go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the
Case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their connection according
To empirical laws with some one of my perceptions; but there is no means
Of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought, because it must
Be cognized completely a priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be
It immediately by perception, or by inferences connecting some object
With a perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experience--which
Is in perfect unity with itself; and although an existence out of
This sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a
Hypothesis the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining
The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful idea;
But for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of enlarging
Our cognition with regard to the existence of things. It is not even
Sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being which we
Do not know to exist. The an*lytical criterion of possibility, which
Consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot
Be denied it. But the connection of real properties in a thing is a
Synthesis of the possibility of which an a priori judgement cannot be
Formed, because these realities are not presented to us specifically;
And even if this were to happen, a judgement would still be impossible
Because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must
Be sought for in the world of experience, to which the object of an idea
Cannot belong. And thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in
His attempt to establish upon a priori grounds the possibility of this
Sublime ideal being
The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of
A Supreme Being is therefore insufficient; and we may as well hope
To increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the
Merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash
Account