Of The Rules Which Determine Property
Though the establishment of the rule, concerning the stability of possession, be not only useful, but even absolutely necessary to human society, it can never serve to any purpose, while it remains in such general terms. Some method must be shewn, by which we may distinguish what particular goods are to be a**igned to each particular person, while the rest of mankind are excluded from their possession and enjoyment. Our next business, then, must be to discover the reasons which modify this general rule, and fit it to the common use and practice of the world.
It is obvious, that those reasons are not derived from any utility or advantage, which either the particular person or the public may reap from his enjoyment of any particular goods, beyond what would result from the possession of them by any other person. Twere better, no doubt, that every one were possessed of what is most suitable to him, and proper for his use: But besides, that this relation of fitness may be common to several at once, it is liable to so many controversies, and men are so partial and pa**ionate in judging of these controversies, that such a loose and uncertain rule would be absolutely incompatible with the peace of human society. The convention concerning the stability of possession is entered into, in order to cut off all occasions of discord and contention; and this end would never be attained, were we allowed to apply this rule differently in every particular case, according to every particular utility, which might be discovered in such an application. Justice, in her decisions, never regards the fitness or unfitness of objects to particular persons, but conducts herself by more extensive views. Whether a man be generous, or a miser, he is equally well received by her, and obtains with the same facility a decision in his favours, even for what is entirely useless to him.
It follows therefore, that the general rule, that possession must be stable, is not applied by particular judgments, but by other general rules, which must extend to the whole society, and be inflexible either by spite or favour. To illustrate this, I propose the following instance. I first consider men in their savage and solitary condition; and suppose, that being sensible of the misery of that state, and foreseeing the advantages that would result from society, they seek each other's company, and make an offer of mutual protection and a**istance. I also suppose, that they are endowed with such sagacity as immediately to perceive, that the chief impediment to this project of society and partnership lies in the avidity and selfishness of their natural temper; to remedy which, they enter into a convention for the stability of possession, and for mutual restraint and forbearance. I am sensible, that this method of proceeding is not altogether natural; but besides that I here only suppose those reflections to be formed at once, which in fact arise insensibly and by degrees; besides this, I say, it is very possible, that several persons, being by different accidents separated from the societies, to which they formerly belonged, may be obliged to form a new society among themselves; in which case they are entirely in the situation above-mentioned.
It is evident, then, that their first difficulty, in this situation, after the general convention for the establishment of society, and for the constancy of possession, is, how to separate their possessions, and a**ign to each his particular portion, which he must for the future inalterably enjoy. This difficulty will not detain them long; but it must immediately occur to them, as the most natural expedient, that every one continue to enjoy what he is at present master of, and that property or constant possession be conjoined to the immediate possession. Such is the effect of custom, that it not only reconciles us to any thing we have long enjoyed, but even gives us an affection for it, and makes us prefer it to other objects, which may be more valuable, but are less known to us. What has long lain under our eye, and has often been employed to our advantage, that we are always the most unwilling to part with; but can easily live without possessions, which we never have enjoyed, and are not accustomed to. It is evident, therefore, that men would easily acquiesce in this expedient, that every one continue to enjoy what he is at present possessed of; and this is the reason, why they would so naturally agree in preferring it.
[FN 15. No questions in philosophy are more
difficult, than when a number of causes present themselves
for the same phaenomenon, to determine which is the
principal and predominant. There seldom is any very precise
argument to fix our choice, and men must be contented to be
guided by a kind of taste or fancy, arising from an*logy,
and a comparison of familiar instances. Thus, in the present
case, there are, no doubt, motives of public interest for
most of the rules, which determine property; but still I
suspect, that these rules are principally fixed by the
imagination, or the more frivolous properties of our thought
and conception. I shall continue to explain these causes,
leaving it to the reader's choice, whether he will prefer
those derived from publick utility, or those derived from
the imagination. We shall begin with the right of the
vpresent possessor.
It is a quality, which I have already observed in human
nature, that when two objects appear in a close relation to
each other, the mind is apt to ascribe to them any
additional relation, in order to compleat the union; and
this inclination is so strong, as often to make us run into
errors (such as that of the conjunction of thought and
matter) if we find that they can serve to that purpose. Many
of our impressions are incapable of place or local position;
and yet those very impressions we suppose to have a local
conjunction with the impressions of sight and touch, merely
because they are conjoined by causation, and are already
united in the imagination. Since, therefore, we can feign a
new relation, and even an absurd one, in order to compleat
any union, it will easily be imagined, that if there be any
relations, which depend on the mind, it will readily conjoin
them to any preceding relation, and unite, by a new bond,
such objects as have already an union in the fancy. Thus for
instance, we never fail, in our arrangement of bodies, to
place those which are resembling in contiguity to each
other, or at least in correspondent points of view; because
we feel a satisfaction in joining the relation of contiguity
to that of resemblance, or the resemblance of situation to
that of qualities. And this is easily accounted for from the
known properties of human nature. When the mind is
determined to join certain objects, but undetermined in its
choice of the particular objects, It naturally turns its eye
to such as are related together. They are already united in
the mind: They present themselves at the same time to the
conception; and instead of requiring any new reason for
their conjunction, it would require a very powerful reason
to make us over-look this natural affinity. This we shall
have occasion to explain more fully afterwards, when we come
to treat of beauty. In the mean time, we may content
ourselves with observing, that the same love of order and
uniformity, which arranges the books in a library, and the
chairs in a parlour, contribute to the formation of society,
and to the well-being of mankind, by modifying the general
rule concerning the stability of possession. And as property
forms a relation betwixt a person and an object, it is
natural to found it on some preceding relation; and as
property Is nothing but a constant possession, secured by
the laws of society, it is natural to add it to the present
possession, which is a relation that resembles it. For this
also has its influence. If it be natural to conjoin all
sorts of relations, it is more so, to conjoin such relations
as are resembling, and are related together.]
But we may observe, that though the rule of the a**ignment of property to the present possessor be natural, and by that means useful, yet its utility extends not beyond the first formation of society; nor would any thing be more pernicious, than the constant observance of it; by which restitution would be excluded, and every injustice would be authorized and rewarded. We must, therefore, seek for some other circumstance, that may give rise to property after society is once established; and of this kind, I find four most considerable, viz. Occupation, Prescription, Accession, and Succession. We shall briefly examine each of these, beginning with Occupation.
The possession of all external goods is changeable and uncertain; which is one of the most considerable impediments to the establishment of society, and is the reason why, by universal agreement, express or tacite, men restrain themselves by what we now call the rules of justice and equity. The misery of the condition, which precedes this restraint, is the cause why we submit to that remedy as quickly as possible; and this affords us an easy reason, why we annex the idea of property to the first possession, or to occupation. Men are unwilling to leave property in suspense, even for the shortest time, or open the least door to violence and disorder. To which we may add, that the first possession always engages the attention most; and did we neglect it, there would be no colour of reason for a**igning property to any succeeding possession.
[FN 16. Some philosophers account for the right of
occupation, by saying, that every one has a property in his
own labour; and when he joins that labour to any thing, it
gives him the property of the whole: But, 1. There are
several kinds of occupation, where we cannot be said to join
our labour to the object we acquire: As when we possess a
meadow by grazing our cattle upon it. 2. This accounts for
the matter by means of accession; which is taking a needless
circuit. 3. We cannot be said to join our labour to any
thing but in a figurative sense. Properly speaking, we only
make an alteration on it by our labour. This forms a
relation betwixt us and the object; and thence arises the
property, according to the preceding principles.]
There remains nothing, but to determine exactly, what is meant by possession; and this is not so easy as may at first sight be imagined. We are said to be in possession of any thing, not only when we immediately touch it, but also when we are so situated with respect to it, as to have it in our power to use it; and may move, alter, or destroy it, according to our present pleasure or advantage. This relation, then, is a species of cause and effect; and as property is nothing but a stable possession, derived from the rules of justice, or the conventions of men, it is to be considered as the same species of relation. But here we may observe, that as the power of using any object becomes more or less certain, according as the interruptions we may meet with are more or less probable; and as this probability may increase by insensible degrees; it is in many cases impossible to determine when possession begins or ends; nor is there any certain standard, by which we can decide such controversies. A wild boar, that falls into our snares, is deemed to be in our possession, if it be impossible for him to escape. But what do we mean by impossible? How do we separate this impossibility from an improbability? And how distinguish that exactly from a probability? Mark the precise limits of the one and the other, and shew the standard, by which we may decide all disputes that may arise, and, as we find by experience, frequently do arise upon this subject.
[FN 17. If we seek a solution of these difficulties in
reason and public interest, we never shall find
? and If we look for it in the imagination, it
is evident, that the qualities, which operate upon that
faculty, run so insensibly and gradually into each other,
that it is impossible to give them any precise bounds or
termination. The difficulties on this head must encrease,
when we consider, that our judgment alters very sensibly,
according to the subject, and that the same power and
proximity will be deemed possession in one case, which is
not esteemed such in another. A person, who has hunted a
hare to the last degree of weariness, would look upon it as
an injustice for another to rush in before him, and seize
his prey. But the same person advancing to pluck an apple,
that hangs within his reach, has no reason to complain, if
another, more alert, pa**es him, and takes possession. What
is the reason of this difference, but that immobility, not
being natural to the hare, but the effect of industry, forms
in that case a strong relation with the hunter, which is
wanting in the other?
Here then it appears, that a certain and infallible power of
enjoyment, without touch or some other sensible relation,
often produces not property: And I farther observe, that a
sensible relation, without any present power, is sometimes
sufficient to give a title to any object. The sight of a
thing is seldom a considerable relation, and is only
regarded as such, when the object is hidden, or very
? in which case we find, that the view alone conveys
a property; according to that maxim, that even a whole
continent belongs to the nation, which first discovered it.
It is however remarkable that both in the case of discovery
and that of possession, the first discoverer and possessor
must join to the relation an intention of rendering himself
proprietor, otherwise the relation will not have Its effect;
and that because the connexion in our fancy betwixt the
property and the relation is not so great, but that it
requires to be helped by such an intention.
From all these circumstances, it is easy to see how
perplexed many questions may become concerning the
acquisition of property by occupation; and the least effort
of thought may present us with instances, which are not
susceptible of any reasonable decision. If we prefer
examples, which are real, to such as are feigned, we may
consider the following one, which is to be met with In
almost every writer, that has treated of the laws of nature.
Two Grecian colonies, leaving their native country, in
search of new feats, were informed that a city near them was
deserted by its inhabitants. To know the truth of this
report, they dispatched at once two messengers, one from
each colony; who finding on their approach, that their
information was true, begun a race together with an
intention to take possession of the city, each of them for
his countrymen. One of these messengers, finding that he was
not an equal match for the other, launched his spear at the
gates of the city, and was so fortunate as to fix it there
before the arrival of his companion. This produced a dispute
betwixt the two colonies, which of them was the proprietor
of the empty city and this dispute still subsists among
philosophers. For my part I find the dispute impossible to
be decided, and that because the whole question hangs upon
the fancy, which in this case is not possessed of any
precise or determinate standard, upon which it can give
sentence. To make this evident, let us consider, that if
these two persons had been simply members of the colonies,
and not messengers or deputies, their actions would not have
been of any consequence; since in that case their relation
to the colonies would have been but feeble and imperfect.
Add to this, that nothing determined them to run to the
gates rather than the walls, or any other part of the city,
but that the gates, being the most obvious and remarkable
part, satisfy the fancy best in taking them for the whole;
as we find by the poets, who frequently draw their images
and metaphors from them. Besides we may consider, that the
touch or contact of the one messenger is not properly
possession, no more than the piercing the gates with a
? but only forms a relation; and there is a relation,
in the other case, equally obvious, tho' not, perhaps, of
equal force. Which of these relations, then, conveys a right
and property, or whether any of them be sufficient for that
effect, I leave to the decision of such as are wiser than
myself.]
But such disputes may not only arise concerning the real existence of property and possession, but also concerning their extent; and these disputes are often susceptible of no decision, or can be decided by no other faculty than the imagination. A person who lands on the shore of a small island, that is desart and uncultivated, is deemed its possessor from the very first moment, and acquires the property of the whole; because the object is there bounded and circumscribed in the fancy, and at the same time is proportioned to the new possessor. The same person landing on a desart island, as large as Great Britain, extends his property no farther than his immediate possession; though a numerous colony are esteemed the proprietors of the whole from the instant of their debarkment.
But it often happens, that the title of first possession becomes obscure through time; and that it is impossible to determine many controversies, which may arise concerning it. In that case long possession or prescription naturally takes place, and gives a person a sufficient property in any thing he enjoys. The nature of human society admits not of any great accuracy; nor can we always remount to the first origin of things, in order to determine their present condition. Any considerable space of time sets objects at such a distance, that they seem, in a manner, to lose their reality, and have as little influence on the mind, as if they never had been in being. A man's title, that is clear and certain at present, will seem obscure and doubtful fifty years hence, even though the facts, on which it is founded, should be proved with the greatest evidence and certainty. The same facts have not the same influence after so long an interval of time. And this may be received as a convincing argument for our preceding doctrine with regard to property and justice. Possession during a long tract of time conveys a title to any object. But as it is certain, that, however every thing be produced in time, there is nothing real that is produced by time; it follows, that property being produced by time, is not any thing real in the objects, but is the off-spring of the sentiments, on which alone time is found to have any influence.
[FN 18. Present possession is plainly a relation
betwixt a person and an object; but is not sufficient to
counter-ballance the relation of first possession, unless
the former be long and uninterrupted: In which case the
relation is encreased on the side of the present possession,
by the extent of time, and dlminished on that of first
possession, by the distance, This change in the relation
produces a consequent change in the property.]
We acquire the property of objects by accession, when they
are connected in an intimate manner with objects that are
already our property, and at the same time are inferior to
them. Thus the fruits of our garden, the offspring of our
cattle, and the work of our slaves, are all of them esteemed
our property, even before possession. Where objects are
connected together in the imagination, they are apt to be
put on the same footing, and are commonly supposed to be
endowed with the same qualities. We readily pa** from one to
the other, and make no difference in our judgments
concerning them; especially if the latter be inferior to the
former.
[FN 19. This source of property can never be
explained but from the imaginations; and one may affirm,
that the causes are here unmixed. We shall proceed to
explain them more particularly, and illustrate them by
examples from common life and experience.
It has been observed above, that the mind has a natural
propensity to join relations, especially resembling ones,
and finds a hind of fitness and uniformity in such an union.
From this propensity are derived these laws of nature, that
upon the first formation of society, property always follows
the present possession; and afterwards, that it arises from
first or from long possession. Now we may easily observe,
that relation is not confined merely to one degree; but that
from an object, that is related to us, we acquire a relation
to every other object, which is related to it, and so on,
till the thought loses the chain by too long a progress,
However the relation may weaken by each remove, it is not
immediately destroyed; but frequently connects two objects
by means of an intermediate one, which is related to both.
And this principle is of such force as to give rise to the
right of accession, and causes us to acquire the property
not only of such objects as we are immediately possessed of;
but also of such as are closely connected with them.
Suppose a German, a Frenchman, and a Spaniard to come into a
room, where there are placed upon the table three bottles of
wine, Rhenish, Burgundy and Port; and suppose they shoued
fall a quarrelling about the division of them; a person, who
was chosen for umpire would naturally, to shew his
impartiality, give every one the product of his own country:
And this from a principle, which, in some measure, is the
source of those laws of nature, that ascribe property to
occupation, prescription and accession.
In all these Cases, and particularly that of accession,
there is first a natural union betwixt the Idea of the
person and that of the object, and afterwards a new and
moral union produced by that right or property, which we
ascribe to the person. But here there occurs a difficulty,
which merits our attention, and may afford us an opportunity
of putting to tryal that singular method of reasoning, which
has been employed on the present subject. I have already
observed that the imagination pa**es with greater facility
from little to great, than from great to littie, and that
the transition of ideas is always easier and smoother in the
former case than in the latter. Now as the right of
accession arises from the easy transition of ideas, by which
related objects are connected together, it shoued naturally
be imagined, that the right of accession must encrease in
strength, in proportion as the transition of ideas is
performed with greater facility. It may, therefore, be
thought, that when we have acquired the property of any
small object, we shall readily consider any great object
related to it as an accession, and as belonging to the
proprietor of the small one; since the transition is in that
case very easy from the small object to the great one, and
shoued connect them together in the closest manner. But In
fact the case is always found to be otherwise, The empire of
Great Britain seems to draw along with it the dominion of
the Orkneys, the Hebrides, the isle of Man, and the Isle of
Wight; but the authority over those lesser islands does not
naturally imply any title to Great Britain. In short, a
small object naturally follows a great one as its accession;
but a great one Is never supposed to belong to the
proprietor of a small one related to it, merely on account
of that property and relation. Yet in this latter case the
transition of ideas is smoother from the proprietor to the
small object, which is his property, and from the small
object to the great one, than in the former case from the
proprietor to the great object, and from the great one to
the small. It may therefore be thought, that these
phaenomena are objections to the foregoing hypothesis, that
the ascribing of property to accession is nothing but an
affect of the relations of ideas, and of the smooth
transition of the imagination.
It will be easy to solve this objection, if we consider the
agility and unsteadiness of the imagination, with the
different views, in which it is continually placing its
objects. When we attribute to a person a property in two
objects, we do not always pa** from the person to one
object, and from that to the other related to it. The
objects being here to be considered as the property of the
person, we are apt to join them together, and place them in
the same light. Suppose, therefore, a great and a small
object to be related together; if a person be strongly
related to the great object, he will likewise be strongly
related to both the objects, considered together, because he
Is related to the most considerable part. On the contrary,
if he be only related to the small object, he will not be
strongly related to both, considered together, since his
relation lies only with the most trivial part, which is not
apt to strike us in any great degree, when we consider the
whole. And this Is the reason, why small objects become
accessions to great ones, and not great to small.
It is the general opinion of philosophers and civilians,
that the sea is incapable of becoming the property of any
nation; and that because it is impossible to take possession
of it, or form any such distinct relation with it, as may be
the foundation of property. Where this reason ceases,
property immediately takes place. Thus the most strenuous
advocates for the liberty of the seas universally allow,
that friths and hays naturally belong as an accession to the
proprietors of the surrounding continent. These have
properly no more bond or union with the land, than the
pacific ocean would have; but having an union in the fancy,
and being at the same time inferior, they are of course
regarded as an accession.
The property of rivers, by the laws of most nations, and by
the natural turn of our thought, Is attributed to the
proprietors of their banks, excepting such vast rivers as
the Rhine or the Danube, which seem too large to the
imagination to follow as an accession the property of the
neighbouring fields. Yet even these rivers are considered as
the property of that nation, thro' whose dominions they run;
the idea of a nation being of a suitable bulk to correspond
with them, and bear them such a relation in the fancy.
The accessions, which are made to lands bordering upon
rivers, follow the land, say the civilians, provided it be
made by what they call alluvion, that is, Insensibly and
Imperceptibly; which are circumstances that mightily a**ist
the imagination in the conjunction. Where there Is any
considerable portion torn at once from one bank, and joined
to another, it becomes not his property, whose land it falls
on, till it unite with the land, and till the trees or
plants have spread their roots into both. Before that, the
imagination does not sufficiently join them.
There are other cases, which somewhat resemble this of
accession, but which, at the bottom, are considerably
different, and merit our attention. Of this kind Is the
conjunction of the properties of different persons, after
such a manner as not to admit of separation. The question
is, to whom the united ma** must belong.
Where this conjunction is of such a nature as to admit of
division, but not of separation, the decision is natural and
easy. The whole ma** must be supposed to be common betwixt
the proprietors of the several parts, and afterwards must be
divided according to the proportions of these parts. But
here I cannot forbear taking notice of a remarkable subtilty
of the Roman law, in distinguishing betwixt confusion and
commixtion. Confusion is an union of two bodies, such as
different liquors, where the parts become entirely
undistinguishable. Commixtion is the blending of two bodies,
such as two bushels of corn, where the parts remain separate
in an obvious and visible manner. As in the latter case the
imagination discovers not so entire an union as in the
former, but is able to trace and preserve a distinct idea of
the property of each; this is the reason, why the civil law,
tho' it established an entire community in the case of
confusion, and after that a proportional division, yet in
the case of commixtion, supposes each of the proprietors to
maintain a distinct right; however necessity may at last
force them to submit to the same division.
quod si frumentum titii frumento tuo mistum fuerit: siquidem
ex voluntate vestra, commune est: quia singula corpora, id
est, singula grana, quae cujusque pro pria fuerunt, ex
consensu vestro communicata sunt. quod si casu id mistum
fuerit, vel titius id miscuerit sine tua volunt ate, non
videtur id commune esse; quia singula corpora in sua
substantia durant. sed nec magis istis casibus commune sit
frumentum quam grex intelligitur esse corn munis, si pecora
titii tuis pecoribus mista fuerint. sed si ab alterutro
vestrum totum id frumentum retineatur, in rem quidem actio
pro modo frumenti cujusque corn petit. arbitrio autem
judicis, ut ipse aestimet quale cujusque frumentum fuerit.
inst. lib. il tit. i. sect 28.
(In the case that your grain was mixed with that of Titius,
if it was done voluntarily on the part of both of you, it is
common property, inasmuch as the individual items, i.e., the
single grains, which were the peculiar property of either of
you, were combined with your joint consent. If, however, the
mixture was accidental, or if Titius mixed it without your
consent, it does not appear that it is common property,
Inasmuch as the several components retain their original
identity. Rather, in circumstances of this sort the grain
does not become common property, any more than a herd of
cattle is regarded as common property, If Titius beasts
should have become mixed up with yours.
However, if all of the aforesaid corn is kept by either of
you, this gives rise to a suit to determine the ownership of
property, in respect of the amount of corn belonging to
each. It is in the discretion of the judge to determine
which is the corn belonging to either party.]
Where the properties of two persons are united after such a
manner as neither to admit of division nor separation, as
when one builds a house on another's ground, in that case,
the whole must belong to one of the proprietors: And here I
a**ert, that it naturally is conceived to belong to the
proprietor of the most considerable part. For however the
compound object may have a relation to two different
persons, and carry our view at once to both of them, yet as
the most considerable part principally engages our
attention, and by the strict union draws the inferior along
it; for this reason, the whole bears a relation to the
proprietor of that part, and is regarded as his property.
The only difficulty is, what we shall be pleased to call the
most considerable part, and most attractive to the
imagination.
This quality depends on several different circumstances,
which have little connexion with each other. One part of a
compound object may become more considerable than another,
either because it is more constant and durable; because it
is of greater value; because it is more obvious and
remarkable; because it is of greater extent; or because its
existence is more separate and independent. It will be easy
to conceive, that, as these circumstances may be conjoined
and opposed in all the different ways, and according to all
the different degrees, which can be imagined, there will
result many cases, where the reasons on both sides are so
equally balanced, that it is impossible for us to give any
satisfactory decision. Here then is the proper business of
municipal laws, to fix what the principles of human nature
have left undetermined.
The superficies yields to the soil, says the civil law: The
writing to the paper: The canvas to the picture. These
decisions do not well agree together, and are a proof of the
contrariety of those principles, from which they are
derived.
But of all the questions of this kind the most curious is
that, which for so many ages divided the disciples of
Proculus and Sabinus. Suppose a person shoued make a cup
from the metal of another, or a ship from his wood, and
suppose the proprietor of the metal or wood shoued demand
his goods, the question is, whether he acquires a title to
the cup or ship. Sabinus maintained the affirmative, and
a**erted that the substance or matter is the foundation of
all the qualities; that it is incorruptible and immortal,
and therefore superior to the form, which is casual and
dependent. On the other hand, Proculus observed, that the
form is the most obvious and remarkable part, and that from
it bodies are denominated of this or that particular
species. To which he might have added, that the matter or
substance is in most bodies so fluctuating and uncertain,
that it is utterly impossible to trace it in all its
changes. For my part, I know not from what principles such a
controversy can be certainly determined. I shall therefore
content my self with observing, that the decision of
Trebonian seems to me pretty ingenious; that the cup belongs
to the proprietor of the metal, because it can be brought
back to its first form: But that the ship belongs to the
author of its form for a contrary reason. But however
ingenious this reason may seem, it plainly depends upon the
fancy, which by the possibility of such a reduction, finds a
closer connexion and relation betwixt a cup and the
proprietor of its metal, than betwixt a ship and the
proprietor of its wood, where the substance is more fixed
and unalterable.]
The right of succession is a very natural one, from the presumed consent of the parent or near relation, and from the general interest of mankind, which requires, that men's possessions should pa** to those, who are dearest to them, in order to render them more industrious and frugal. Perhaps these causes are seconded by the influence of relation, or the a**ociation of ideas, by which
we are naturally directed to consider the son after the parent's decease, and ascribe to him a title to his father's possessions. Those goods must become the property of some body: But of whom is the question. Here it is evident the persons children naturally present themselves to the mind; and being already. connected to those possessions by means of their deceased parent, we are apt to connect them still farther by the relation of property. Of this there are many parallel instances.
[FN 20 In examining the different titles to authority
in government, we shall meet with many reasons to convince
us, that the right of succession depends, in a great measure
on the imagination. Mean while I shall rest contented with
observing one example, which belongs to the present subject.
Suppose that a person die without children, and that a
dispute arises among his relations concerning his
inheritance; it is evident, that if his riches be deriv'd
partly from his father, partly from his mother, the most
natural way of determining such a dispute, is, to divide his
possessions, and a**ign each part to the family, from whence
it is deriv'd. Now as the person is suppos'd to have been
once the full and entire proprietor of those goods; I ask,
what is it makes us find a certain equity and natural reason
in this partition, except it be the imagination? His
affection to these families does not depend upon his
possessions; for which reason his consent can never be
presum'd precisely for such a partition. And as to the
public interest, it seems not to be in the least concern'd
on the one side or the other.]