TUTTLE: Good morning, everyone. This is Chris Tuttle. I'm the director of the Washington program in the Independent Task Force Program at the Council on Foreign Relations.
I'm gonna start out this morning with sort of a descriptive question. This is still breaking news -- and turn to Elliott for sort of his take on what exact -- what exactly we know at this point, what's happening, and maybe some of the things that you're hearing from your sources in the region.
Elliot.
ABRAMS: This time, the Israelis are just talking about getting at the tunnels, which might permit Hamas to get into Israel and conduct acts of terrorism, pushing perhaps -- pushing the parameter back so that there's a kind of buffer zone alone the Israel/Gaza border and going after the -- the warehouses or arsenals of rockets and rocket launchers.
The goal is to stop the rockets. Now, that did happen last time with Pillar of Defense in 2012, at the end of 2012.
In 2012, there were 2,557 rockets from Gaza into Israel. In 2013, there were 74. So something like a 95 percent decrease. So I think that's what the Israelis are -- are doing. And they're talking about it in a -- in a, let's say, a matter of fact manner, rather than any kind of bombastic manner.
TUTTLE: And, Robert, what's your take?
DANIN: Well, I agree entirely with what Elliot just said. I think what is striking, so far, is the -- is the limited nature of the Israeli objectives so far. And also the relative restraint that Israel has exercised in this operation to date.
Even with the decision yesterday to move to ground operations, it's clear that these operations are limited in their scope. This is not the all-in option that many are either talking about or fearing.
This is a limited incursion to go after rockets, as Elliot mentioned, and the goal, you know, in addition to going after rockets and trying to re-institute calm is to still leave some steps on the escalatory ladder to be able to affect Hamas to bring about a cease-fire or a cease of rocket firing, but at the same time, at the minimum cost to Israel.
I'm skeptical that this thing is about to end, but, you know, I think we have to look at -- if I may just -- what we have are two parallel tracks going on. We have what's happening on the ground, rocket fire into Israel, heavy bombardment of Gaza by Israel. And then you also have a diplomatic track, which is efforts to bring about an end to this, that are mainly being brokered so far by Egypt.
But you have also other players, such as Turkey and Qatar, that are involved, and then, over the horizon, the United States.
And, right now, what is so striking about that effort is how at odds the various parties are. Turkey and Qatar on the one side, Egypt on the other, very much at variance with one another. They don't talk to one another. And they are siding with different parties to this conflict so far.
Egypt is siding with Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Turkey and Qatar are siding with Hamas. And there has not be a -- this has not come together yet in any meaningful way.
And so, in a sense, what's -- you know, I think, if you want to see where this is heading, the question is which track is gonna gain more traction. Is the military track, that is, Israel's efforts to bring about a cessation of violence out of Gaza, rockets out of Gaza going to achieve results first, or will the diplomatic effort, which is, to date, ineffective, but has at least put forward an Egyptian cease-fire proposal that has been rejected by Hamas and was accepted by Israel. Is that effort going to gain traction?
OPERATOR: Our next question comes from Lisa Beyer with Bloomberg News.
QUESTION: Thank you.
I wonder if -- if one or both of you could explain this issue about the need to pay the Hamas workers in the Gaza Strip who have gone without pay and what this has to do -- what -- Israel's role in this, what Qatar's role is in this, what -- the P.A.'s role in this and what potentially the U.S. role in mediating this might be.
And is it wise to include this in some sort of cease-fire and negotiated settlement?
DANIN: You know -- well, I think, you know, Lisa -- you know, I think the -- it's an important issue but it also points to something larger.
You know, to a certain extent, this latest round of – of fighting erupted as a result of tensions within Palestinian politics.
Hamas and Fatah reached a (inaudible) agreement in -- in late April, in which Hamas made some major concessions including giving up its ministries in Gaza.
DANIN: Now, it did it out of a very strong sense of – of weakness, politically.
Now, one of the things they expected to come out of it was that the Palestinian Authority would start to pay salaries for Hamas employees in -- in Gaza now that the Palestinian Authority was rea**erting itself in Gaza. But that was not forthcoming, and then there were discussions among different parties, including Qatar, about providing that funding. But the Palestinian authority was not very excited about this, and neither was Israel, and that did not happen.
And to a certain extent, Hamas' decision making I think in this conflict has to be seen as a product of it having reached a point where it said, "Look, we have made these concessions for the national unity agreement, and we have not gotten -- we have not felt the respite as a result of it," and so we're still struggling, we're still suffering. The money's not forthcoming, and so we have nothing further to gain by continuing along the rules of the road." Or, to put it another way, "We have no interest in returning to the status quo ante." And that explains why it's difficult to bring about a cease-fire right now, because in essence, what the Egyptians are saying is, "we want to go back to the way the situation was before the fighting erupted." And Hamas is saying, "No, that wasn't so good for us, and so we want different terms now."
And that is kinda the macro story that's taking place. And the -- the payment of the salaries is one, you know, of the two, you know, one of the major elements of -- of -- of how Hamas is seeking to break out of the constriction that they -- they found themselves in up until now.
QUESTION: So, if I may, to follow up?
TUTTLE: Go ahead, Lisa.
QUESTION: If I may, two follow-ups. Does Israel have the ability, the capacity to veto Qatar paying for the civil servants, Hamas civil servants in Gaza? And then my second question is, you know, how do you -- how is this circle going to be squared?
(UNKNOWN): Well, let me -- Israel doesn't really have the ability to veto it. Here's where Qatar comes in. I mean, presumably, their contribution to arranging a cease-fire could be that they would say, "OK, we'll pay the salaries for a couple of years." This is a big amount because there are 43,000 -- usual figure -- 43,000 people on the Hamas payroll.
The problem is that we, the United States, have blocked that. Because that's money going to a terrorist group. Of the -- let's say 43,000, roughly 13,000 are police or security officials, and I think it's reasonable to guess that a substantial number of them are actually Hamas terrorists. They are members of the Izz ad-Din al- Qa**am Brigades, which is the actual military force of Hamas. So, we would be -- being asked to approve and facilitate the support of those people.
Hamas is, after all, a designated foreign terrorist organization. Now, there are ways around it. You know, for example, maybe Hamas would agree to have the other 30,000 civil servants paid as part of this agreement and not the security people, and it could use tax revenues or some other source of funding to pay them.
But our -- the problem in arranging this from the American point of view is, our law really requires us to act to prevent money going to terrorist groups, and Hamas is a terrorist group.